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The study that follows is a revised and expanded version of a doctoral disser-
tation completed in 2016 at Clare College, Cambridge, devoted to the aims and 
argument of Berthold of Moosburg’s Expositio on the Elementatio theologica of 
Proclus (“Supersapientia. A Study of the Expositio super Elementationem theo-
logicam Procli of Berthold von Moosburg”). The final stages of this work were 
accomplished within the framework of the erc Grant NeoplAT CoG 771640. 
I beg the reader’s pardon that such an unrelenting grip on the text, perhaps 
more excusable for a dissertation, has been retained here. The understanding 
of Berthold’s thought in its complexity is still under construction. To contrib-
ute something to this ongoing inquiry, it seemed safest to proceed by keeping 
close attention on Berthold’s arguments as well as to his modifications of his 
sources, in order to begin to appreciate the uniqueness and coherence of his 
project.
Like the dissertation, this book’s division in two parts is intended to reflect 
the distinct methodological traits of Berthold of Moosburg’s commentary on 
Proclus. It seemed to me that a phrase from Dionysius the Areopagite often 
cited by Berthold, that theology must proceed “not according to ourselves” 
(non secundum nos), had at once an exegetical and a philosophical significance 
for his commentary on Proclus. These words encapsulate, to my mind, his atti-
tude toward the history of philosophy and his views about the place of his own 
project within it: the study of the beatifying wisdom of the Platonists would be 
undertaken in the form of a commentary that distilled an entire tradition – a 
work Berthold himself described as a “compilation”. Dionysius’ phrase was also 
used by Berthold to underscore the necessity for a Platonic understanding of 
universals when reasoning about the divine: God and the separate substances 
are to be understood not according to our abstractions but by attending to 
what is causally operative independently of our thinking.
The Introduction gathers the extant information about Berthold’s life, 
library, and intellectual contexts, attempting to produce a coherent account 
of his career where this is permissible, while also acknowledging the gaps in 
the record. Part 1 takes its inspiration from the two- sidedness of Berthold’s 
commentary project, as exegesis and as philosophy. It is structured as a guided 
tour through Berthold’s three prefaces to the commentary (Prologus, Expositio 
tituli, Praeambulum). This sequential reading pauses at various stages to allow 
us to tunnel into the decisive instances of Berthold’s synthesis and transfor-




originality of the Platonism he articulated in his attempt to revive the divin-
ising philosophy he glimpsed in the distant golden age of antiquity. Special 
attention is given in these chapters to the relationship between paganism and 
Christianity in Berthold’s thought. Along with the translation of the three pref-
aces at the back of the volume, it is hoped that this portion of the book will 
introduce the reader to the spirit animating the Expositio.
Part 2 ranges more freely through the commentary to provide a more sys-
tematic and doctrinal picture of Berthold’s Platonism. Its two chapters are 
structured around Berthold’s Hermetic motif of the macrocosm and micro-
cosm, which provides a natural framework for ordering the major themes of 
Berthold’s cosmology and anthropology. After setting out his understanding 
of the discord between Plato and Aristotle in terms of their philosophical 
approaches to first principles, it examines how an ecstatic and realist reason-
ing about universality has its objective correlate in every level of Berthold’s 
cosmology, from the spontaneously creative activity of the Good, through the 
essential order of separate substances, to the physical laws of the diffusion of 
light. The discussion of Berthold’s anthropology in the final chapter focuses 
on the relation of the individual to the ideal human nature (the imago Dei) 
that subsists at the lower limit of the essential order of causes. Here we under-
stand how, for Berthold, the awakening of “the one of the soul” (unum animae), 
which is the goal of Platonic philosophy and the Expositio, can bring the indi-
vidual into harmony with human nature and, through it, with the providential 
Good, and so be raised to an operative union with God.
This study can only see the light of day thanks to the guidance of several 
teachers, colleagues, and friends. To my supervisor at Clare College, Douglas 
Hedley, for his ready council and unconditional support, and to my doctoral 
examiners, Stephen Gersh and Loris Sturlese, for their precious insights 
and inspiration, I give my sincere thanks. For his loyalty and patience, I am 
profoundly grateful to Dragos Calma, without whom this work would have 
remained doubly undone. Along the way I have received crucial assistance from 
Alessandra Beccarisi, Hjördis Becker- Lindenthal, Álvaro Campillo Bo, the cet-
efil team in Lecce, Luke DeWeese, Jonathan Greig, Alexander Hampton, Paul 
Hellmeier op, Ezequiel Ludueña, John Marenbon, the NeoplAT team in Dublin, 
Fiorella Retucci, Joshua Robinson, Iulia Székely, Caterina Tarlazzi, Matthew 
Vanderkwaak, and Daniel Watson. What faults remain are entirely my own. 
To my teachers and friends at the schola Haligoniensis, and especially Wayne 
Hankey, I shall always be grateful. For the means of undertaking this project at 
all, it is a pleasure to acknowledge the financial support of the Social Sciences 
and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Cambridge Commonwealth, 
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European, and International Trust, and the European Research Council (erc 
Grant NeoplAT).
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Introduction
1 Life and Contexts
The fundamental documentation for establishing the trajectory of the life of 
Berthold of Moosburg (c. 1290 – c. 1361/ 1363) has changed little from what is 
gathered in Loris Sturlese’s introduction to his critical edition of Propositions 
184– 211 of the Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli, published in 
1974.1 These documents trace the outlines of the career of a successful teacher 
and pastor in the Dominican order, who was involved with some of the most 
active centres of learning and literature in 14th- century Europe. The biogra-
phy of Berthold of Moosburg that follows attempts to bring this portrait into a 
slightly higher resolution by making use of more recent scholarly discoveries 
that shed light on the contexts in which he lived and worked.
The first and most essential documentary addition to our knowledge of 
Berthold’s life came as a fragment, published by Thomas Kaeppeli in 1978, of 
the proceedings of a Dominican chapter meeting in Friesach, informing us 
that in 1315 Berthold was to be sent to Oxford for his studies.2 This gives us 
some clues about the date of Berthold’s birth. Typically, after a two- or three- 
year novitiate, with teenagers no younger than 15 allowed to enter, Dominican 
friars in the German- speaking provinces would have progressed through three 
years of study in the schools of logical arts (studia logicalium) and two to three 
years in the schools of natural philosophy (studia naturarum).3 Those selected 
for advanced studies in the schools of general theology (studia generalia) may 
 1 See L. Sturlese, “Introduzione” in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem the-
ologicam Procli. 184– 211. De animabus, ed. L. Sturlese (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 
1974), p. xv– xxii; and H. Boese, Wilhelm von Moerbeke als Übersetzer der Stoicheiosis the-
ologike des Proclus. Untersuchungen und Texte zur Überlieferung der Elementatio theolog-
ica (Birkenau: Bitsch, 1985), p. 69– 83. See also W. Eckert, “Berthold von Moosburg O.P. Ein 
Vertreter der Einheitsmetaphysik im Spätmittelalter”, in Philosophisches Jahrbuch 65(1957), 
p. 120– 133, at p. 122– 124.
 2 Th. Kaeppeli, “Ein Fragment der Akten des in Friesach 1315 gefeierten Kapitels der Provinz 
Teutonia”, in Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 48(1978), p. 71– 75, at p. 72: […] guerrarum 
strepitum, quibus quasi tota ian<vensis> provincia affligitur et gravatur. Hoc anno intermisi-
mus studia artium et philosophiae, volumus <tamen> et inponimus prioribus universis qui in 
suis conventibus habent aliquos juvenes ap<tos et> habiles ad profectum, quod ipsis aliquem 
fratrem preficiant qui eis aliquid de naturis <…>bus legere teneatur, quos etiam volumus a dis-
cursibus suportari. […] Mictimus <in Ang>liam fr. Berchtoldum de Mospurg.
 3 W. Senner, “Dominican Education”, in J. Hackett (ed.), A Companion to Meister Eckhart 










have been asked first to lecture on logic for two to three years. As Oxford housed 
one of the Dominican order’s schools of general theology, counting back from 
1315 we may infer that Berthold was likely born around or before 1290. Since he 
was sent to Oxford by a chapter meeting in Friesach, we can be quite certain 
that his birthplace was the town of Moosburg located on the Isar river before 
Landshut, northeast of Munich, and that he was educated within that region 
of the Dominican province of Teutonia. The character of his early education 
is unknown; the formative influences on his thinking can only be guessed. 
We shall see that Berthold was more familiar with the works of Dietrich of 
Freiberg, his elder confrere, than any other medieval author known to date. 
The last extant record of Dietrich’s activities indicates that he served as pro-
vincial vicar to Teutonia in 1310– 1311,4 and scholars surmise that Dietrich may 
have lived until 1318 or 1320.5 But whether Berthold had any personal contact 
with his most esteemed contemporary master remains a matter of speculation.
The impact of the intellectual life in Oxford in the mid- 1310s on Berthold’s 
formation is also a matter of conjecture. The most significant recent develop-
ment in our understanding of Berthold’s thought came as a result of Fiorella 
Retucci’s advance on the discovery made by Françoise Hudry, who indicated 
that Berthold made use of a rare commentary on the Hermetic Liber xxiv phi-
losophorum, which was also known to the English Franciscan, Thomas of York 
(c. 1220 – d. before 1269).6 Retucci then went on to demonstrate the enormous 
extent of the Dominican’s debt to Thomas’ magnum opus, the Sapientiale 
(written sometime before 1256), which has been called the first summa of met-
aphysics in the 13th century.7 Thomas was given a controversial exemption to 
bypass the standard requirement for an degree in arts before advancing to the-
ological studies, and this is no surprise, for the Sapientiale is an ample demon-
stration of his staggering command of ancient and medieval philosophical 
 4 L. Sturlese, Dokumente und Forschungen zu Leben und Werke Dietrichs von Freiberg (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 1984), p. 58– 63.
 5 L. Sturlese, “Alle origini della mistica speculativa tedesca. Antichi testi su Teodorico di 
Freiberg”, in Medioevo 3(1977), p. 21– 87, at p. 41– 43; K. Flasch, Dietrich von Freiberg. Philosophie, 
Theologie, Naturforschung um 1300 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2007), p. 31.
 6 Françoise Hudry first signalled the influence of Thomas on Berthold in Hermes Latinus, Liber 
viginti quattuor philosophorum, ed. F. Hudry (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997). On the 12th- century 
origins of the Liber, see Z. Kaluza, “Comme une branche d’amandier en fleurs. Dieu dans 
le Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum”, in P. Lucentini, I. Parri, V. Perrone Compagni (eds), 
Hermetism from Late Antiquity to Humanism. Atti del Convegno internazionale di studi, Napoli, 
20- 24 Novembre 2001 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003), p. 93– 123.
 7 E. Longpré, “Fr. Thomas d’York, O.F.M. La première somme métaphysique du XIIIe siècle”, in 










theology. It is natural to suppose that Berthold first encountered the Sapientiale 
in Oxford.8 Certainly, when he began writing the Expositio almost a decade or 
more later, Thomas of York remained ever near at hand.9 Berthold not only 
used the Sapientiale as his direct source for many of the classical and medie-
val authorities cited in the Expositio, but looked to it for inspiration when he 
announced the dignity and goal of philosophical wisdom itself. We will see in 
more detail how completely Berthold adopted Thomas’ maximal endorsement 
of the attainments of the non- Christian sages of antiquity in their knowledge 
of God and how he incorporated it into a model relating theology and philos-
ophy that came from his German Dominican predecessors (Albert the Great, 
Ulrich of Strassburg, and Dietrich of Freiberg).
Further research may reveal the extent to which the Sapientiale circulated 
in 14th- century England. One factor leading to Berthold’s encounter with the 
text may have been the association of Thomas’ name with the political ten-
sions that began in 1303 between the mendicants and secular clergy in Oxford 
as to whether, among other things, a dispensation from the University was 
required in every case for a student to proceed directly to the theology doctor-
ate after studying arts outside the University.10 This conflict significantly dest-
abilised the Dominican studium in Oxford. Between 1312 and 1320 the fallout 
between the friars and the University had so escalated that the regular stream 
of Dominican friars to the studium was often substantially interrupted.11 In 
1314, the English Dominicans appealed to King Edward ii, and again in 1317 to 
 8 Retucci, F., Goering, J., “The Sapientiale of Thomas of York, OFM. The Fortunes and 
Misfortunes of a Critical Edition”, in Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 52(2010), p. 133– 155, 
at p. 150.
 9 F. Retucci, “Magister Thomas Anglicus minor. Eine neue Quelle der Expositio super 
Elementationem theologicam Procli Bertholds von Moosburg – das ungedruckte 
Sapientiale des Franziskaners Thomas von York”, in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super 
Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 136- 159 (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), p. xxii- 
xxxix; ead., “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, in A. Beccarisi, 
R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds), Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der mit-
telalterlichen Forschung. Loris Sturlese zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet (Hamburg: Meiner, 
2008), p. 79– 111; ead., “Magister Thomas Anglicus Minor. Tommaso di York fonte dell’Ex-
positio di Bertoldo di Moosburg”, in F. Amerini, S. Fellina, A. Strazzoni (eds), Tra anti-
chità e modernità. Studi di storia della filosofia medievale e rinascimentale (E- THECA: On 
Line Open Access Edizioni, 2019), p. 1- 41; ead., “Between Cologne and Oxford. Berthold of 
Moosburg and Thomas of York’s Sapientiale”, forthcoming.
 10 See the synthesis in H.G. Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise. Contingency and Necessity 
in Dominican Theology at Oxford, 1300– 1350 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. 39– 43.
 11 A.B. Emden, A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500, 3 vols 










Pope John xxii, requesting the repeal of the Statute of 1253 which resolved “the 
affair of Thomas of York”, whose exceptional case had set the precedent for the 
contested arrangement.12 There would be no lasting resolution to the conflict 
until 1320, by which time Berthold was probably no longer in Oxford.
By the mid- 1310s, Oxford witnessed the emergence of thinkers whom schol-
ars have come to identify as “the classicising friars”.13 Among the precursors of 
this group was the Dominican Nicholas Trevet (1257/ 65 – c. 1334), one of the 
English province’s most distinguished scholars.14 In 1314 Nicholas was called 
back to Oxford to preside as master of theology of the Dominican convent. He 
appointment was likely meant to bring some degree of stability to the troubled 
situation. By this time, among other writings, Nicholas had composed a com-
mentary on Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy, using the glosses of William 
of Conches, and a commentary on Seneca’s tragedies. Between 1317 and 1320 
he produced a commentary on the Psalter. Another Dominican member of the 
“classicising” group was Thomas Waleys, who began lecturing on the Sentences 
in Oxford in 1314, which itself represented a relative return to normality for 
the Preachers.15 Waleys later would make use of Proclus’ Tria opuscula in his 
 12 See the literature cited in Retucci, Goering, “The Sapientiale of Thomas of York, OFM”.
 13 B. Smalley, English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1960); J.B. Allen, The Friar as Critic. Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages 
(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1971).
 14 F. Ehrle, “Nikolaus Trevet. Sein Leben, seine Quodlibet und Quaestiones Ordinariae”, in 
Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Festgabe Clemens Baeumker 
(Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1923), p. 1– 63; Emden, A Biographical Register of the University 
of Oxford to A.D. 1500, p. 1902– 1903; R.J. Dean, “Cultural Relations in the Middle Ages. 
Nicholas Trevet and Nicholas of Prato”, in Studies in Philology 45(1948), p. 541– 564; ead., 
“The Dedication of Nicholas Trevet’s Commentary on Boethius”, in Studies in Philology 
63(1966), p. 593– 603; Smalley, English Friars and Antiquity, p. 58– 65; J. Catto, “Theology 
and Theologians 1220– 1320”, in J. Catto (ed.), The Early Oxford Schools (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), p. 471– 517, at p. 513– 517; Minnis, A.J., Nauta, L., “More Platonico 
loquitur. What Nicholas Trevet really did to William of Conches”, in A.J. Minnis (ed.), 
Chaucer’s Boece and the Medieval Tradition of Boethius (Woodbridge: Brewer, 1993), p. 1– 
33; L. Nauta, “The Scholastic Context of the Boethius Commentary by Nicholas Trevet”, 
in M.J.F.M. Hoenen, L. Nauta (eds), Boethius in the Middle Ages. Latin and Vernacular 
Traditions of the Consolatio philosophiae (Leiden: Brill, 1997), p. 41– 67; J.G. Clark, 
“Trevet, Nicholas (b. 1257x65, d. in or after 1334)”, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 349– 351; Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise, 
p. 62– 64.
 15 S. Tugwell, “Waleys [Wallensis], Thomas”, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 800– 801. See B. Smalley, “Thomas Waleys O.P.”, 











own commentary on the Psalter, written in 1326– 1327 in Bologna.16 Berthold’s 
arrival to the studium generale in Oxford around or after 1315 would certainly 
have brought him into contact with these leading figures of the early classicis-
ing movement.
The next record of Berthold’s activity indicates that, after Oxford, he was 
occupied with teaching natural philosophy and was already making use of 
Dietrich of Freiberg’s works in this domain. A friar tasked with teaching nat-
ural philosophy three years after studying theology would be following the 
typical pattern. Without the expectation that they would obtain a degree, 
especially in Oxford during these unsettled years for the Dominicans, most 
friars spent only two years in advanced theological studies before they would 
begin serving as lector in one of the order’s conventual schools.17 Berthold’s 
teaching of natural philosophy is attested in two glosses now preserved in 
ms Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.iv.30, f. 56v- 57r, which appear alongside 
the text of Dietrich’s De iride et radialibus impressionibus, and have been pub-
lished by Loris Sturlese.18 They report a commentary given by Berthold in 1318 
on Aristotle’s Meteorology iii.5, 375b16– 377a28, in which the friar provided 
a geometrical analysis of Aristotle’s discussion of the pole of the rainbow. 
Sturlese has observed that the geometrical figures that accompany the glosses 
were probably not the work of Berthold. The explanation of the figures, which 
is ascribed to Berthold in the glosses, demonstrates a degree of geometrical 
proficiency to elucidate Aristotle’s argument (although Berthold relied on 
Dietrich’s calculations).19 The next chronological witness of Berthold’s activ-
ity comes in the form of glosses on the Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis by 
Macrobius, which can be dated to before 1323. These are studied more closely 
 16 Commenting on Psalm 2:12, Waleys cited q. 8 of De decem dubitationibus circa providen-
tiam three times, for examples of philosophers who restrained their anger; on Psalm 
9:25 he cited the same question on the way divine justice metes out punishment. See 
Averroes, La béatitude de l’âme, eds M. Geoffroy, C. Steel (Paris: Vrin, 2001), p. 85 and 87. 
According to Marc Geoffroy and Carlos Steel, these citations indicate that Waleys used a 
text deriving from another branch of the manuscript tradition than Berthold’s copy. See 
also Smalley, “Thomas Waleys O.P.”, p. 80– 81.
 17 M.M. Mulchahey, “First the Bow is Bent in Study …”. Dominican Education Before 1350 
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1998), p. 130 and 383– 4.
 18 L. Sturlese, “Note su Bertoldo di Moosburg O.P., scienziato e filosofo”, in Freiburger 
Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 32(1985), p. 249– 259, at p. 250: Descriptio figurae, 
in qua explicatur intentio Philosophi in III Meteororum, cum textus expositione inventa a 
fratre Bertoldo de Mosburch ordinis praedicatorum anno Christi 1318. This is followed by 
the gloss that gives the geometrical explanation of the figures. On the manuscript, see 
Sturlese, Dokumente und Forschungen, p. 69– 72.










in section 2, below, but can be noted here as further confirmation of Berthold’s 
engagements with natural philosophy at this period.
A document from April 1327 names Berthold as a lector at the Dominican 
convent in Regensburg, which was one of the larger schools in his native region 
of Bavaria.20 We cannot know for certain which subjects he taught there. In the 
1280s, before the Dominicans divided their province of Teutonia in 1303 into 
Teutonia and Saxony, Regensburg housed one of its nine schools of the logical 
arts. By the mid- 14th century, it served as a school of particular theology (studium 
particularis theologiae), which typically had the Sentences of Peter Lombard as 
its focus, and was subordinate to the more elite studium generale, in which the 
Sentences and Scriptural exegesis were taught.21 By that time, as David Sheffler 
has noted, the library holdings of the Dominican convent would have been ill- 
suited to support the teaching of natural philosophy.22 Thus it appears likely that 
Berthold taught theology in Regensburg, having previously served as a lector in a 
studium naturarum, which would again follow a typical pattern.
At least one of Berthold’s confreres in Regensburg shared his philosophical 
interests. In the same document that attests to Berthold’s lectorship, we have 
mention of another Dominican, Henry of Ekkewint, who served as prior of 
the convent between 1321 and 1326.23 The sample of Henry’s preaching pre-
served in his four (perhaps five) extant sermons shows him appealing to the 
authorities of Augustine, Dionysius, the Liber de causis, Gregory the Great, 
Origen, Avicebron, and Jerome.24 Henry employed the broadly Neoplatonic 
 20 See the references in Sturlese, “Introduzione”, p. xvi– xvii, n. 6- 7.
 21 Mulchahey, First the Bow is Bent in Study, p. 336– 340.
 22 D. Sheffler, Schools and Schooling in Late Medieval Germany. Regensburg, 1250– 1500 
(Leiden: Brill, 2008), p. 60– 67.
 23 L. Sturlese, Homo divinus. Philosophische Projekte in Deutschland zwischen Meister Eckhart 
und Heinrich Seuse (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007), p. 138. See also K. Ruh, “Heinrich von 
Ekkewint (Eckbuint, Egwint, Egwin)”, in K. Ruh et al. (eds), Die deutsche Literatur des 
Mittelalters. Verfasserlexikon, vol. 3 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1980), p. 718– 720; id., Geschichte 
der abendländischen Mystik, Band III. Die Mystik des deutschen Predigerordens und ihre 
Grundlegung durch die Hochscholastik (München: Beck, 1996), p. 408– 410.
 24 Four sermons are edited in F. Pfeiffer, “Predigten und Sprüche deutscher Mystiker”, in 
Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum 8(1851), p. 209– 258, at p. 223– 234. A fifth sermon attributed 
to der von Egwin, of uncertain authenticity, is found in ms Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, 
B.xi.10, f. 129v- 145r. A divergent version of the same sermon is attributed to Eckhart 
in A. Jundt, Histoire du panthéisme populaire au Moyen Âge et au seizième siècle 
(Strasbourg: Fischbach, 1875), p. 270– 274, but has not been incorporated into the criti-
cal edition of Eckhart’s works. For literature on this question, see Meyer, G., Burckhardt, 
M., Die mittelalterlichen Handschriften der Universitätsbibliothek Basel. Beschreibendes 
Verzeichnis. Abteilung B: Theologische Pergamenthandschriften. Bd. 2: Signaturen B VIII 













doctrines of procession and return and of the soul’s natural yearning for God, 
which finds satisfaction only by turning inward and looking beyond itself, 
away from transient goods and its own will.25 Since like can be known only 
by like, Henry insisted, so the soul can only know God by being conformed 
to God. At one point he cited several lines from the Fons vitae of Avicebron 
on the means by which the soul can “avoid death” and reach “the fount of 
life”, that is, by turning away from the instability of the sensible world and 
by rising, with its highest part, toward things that are changeless and beyond 
time.26 In Henry’s sermons one can also find reflections on the Trinity and 
the divine essence or groundless abyss (grundelôse abgründe) reminiscent of 
Meister Eckhart.27 Perhaps most striking, in anticipation of what we will see 
with Berthold of Moosburg, is Henry’s anthropology. For both Dominicans, 
the soul is in some sense all things, which corresponds to its location at the 
middle of the universe.28 According to Henry, the highest principle in the 
soul is a tiny spark (der funke oder der glanster der sêle), whose activity is 
experienced as a kind of ethical counsel that implies a metaphysics of human 
nature: the spark constantly advises a person that “you should let go of each 
man”, that is, one’s proper will and attachment, “so that you may be free of 
him, as if all of human nature was enclosed within you and your nature was 
the essence of all people, and as if you could see yourself in every man and 
every man in you”.29 This, Henry continued, amounts to seeing Christ in “his 
pure humanity”. We will see that Berthold’s synthesis of the Proclean notion 
of the one of the soul (unum animae) and the exemplarist doctrine of human 
nature transmitted in the Eriugenian Clavis physicae would amount to a very 
similar position.
The next recorded appearance of Berthold connects him to the Dominican 
convent of Heilig Kreuz in Cologne and sheds some light on his pastoral 
and the Vernacular Tradition. Pseudo- Eckhart and Eckhart Legends”, in J. Hackett (ed.), A 
Companion to Meister Eckhart, p. 509– 551, at p. 514.
 25 Henry of Ekkewint, Predigt 1, p. 223– 224.
 26 Henry of Ekkewint, Predigt 4, p. 232. This paraphrases the conclusion of the text: Avicebron, 
Fons vitae, ex Arabico in Latinum translatus ab Johanne Hispano et Dominico Gundissalino, 
ed. C. Baeumker, 2 vols (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1892), vol. 1, lib. v, c. 43, p. 338, l. 8- 27.
 27 Henry of Ekkewint, Predigt 2, p. 227.
 28 Henry of Ekkewint, Predigt 3, p. 230: dâ von sprichet der meister des buoches von der êrsten 
sache, das diu sêle geschaffen sî in dem orte zwischen zît und êwikeit.
 29 Henry of Ekkewint, Predigt 2, p. 227: das ist der funke oder der glanster der sêle, der uns alle 
zît râtet das dû einem ieglîchen menschen erlâssest des dû von ime wilt vrî sîn, als ob aller 
mensche nâtiure in dir begriffen sî unde dîn nâtiure aller liuten wesen si unde dû dich selber 












responsibilities. After 7 April 1335, when he was nominated as a co- executor 
of the will of Bela Hardevust, a beguine from a prominent family in the city, 
his name appears sporadically in the city’s records over the subsequent dec-
ades (1343, 1353 and 1361) in matters relating to her last will and testament.30 
There was at least one hiatus in Berthold’s residency in Cologne over these 
years, when a conflict between the Dominicans and the secular authorities led 
to the expulsion of the friars from the city from 1346 to 1351 owing to a dis-
pute regarding lands held by the order in perpetuity or “mortmain”. During 
this time, in 1348, Berthold is identified as vicar in Nuremberg, but the begin-
ning and duration of his post is unknown.31 It has been widely assumed by 
scholars that Berthold served as lector in Cologne for many years in these dec-
ades, and perhaps even directed the studium generale.32 This seems to infer 
too much from the evidence. The only document associating him with the 
domus Coloniensis is the first mention of his executorship of Hardevust’s will 
in 1335. His lectorship is attested in the colophon of the Vatican manuscript of 
the Expositio. Without further information, we can only conclude that, at some 
point between 1335 and 1361, and perhaps nearer to 1335, Berthold served as a 
lector at the Cologne studium.33
It is an altogether separate question whether his commentary on the 
Elementatio theologica was undertaken in Heilig Kreuz while Berthold served 
there in another capacity. We know very little about the nature of Berthold’s 
connection with the community after 1335 that is not the result of inference 
from the pedagogical norms of the order and the fact that, as we shall see, 
much of his library remained there after his death. His lectorship, whatever 
its duration, would have certainly followed the standard requirements. At the 
time, Heilig Kreuz was the major studium generale of Teutonia, where as many 
 30 The texts are included in Sturlese, “Introduzione”, p. xvi- xvii. On the beguines of Cologne 
in this period, see L. Böhringer, “Kölner Beginen im Spätmittelalter – Leben zwischen 
Kloster und Welt”, in Geschichte in Köln 53(2006), p. 7– 34.
 31 Sturlese, “Introduzione”, p. xviii.
 32 Th. Kaeppeli, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi, 4 vols (Roma: Santa Sabina, 
1970– 1993), vol. 1, p. 240; E. Meuthen, Kölner Universitätsgeschichte, Band I. Die alte 
Universität (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1988), p. 44– 45; I. Zavattero, “Berthold of Moosburg”, 
in H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy Between 500 and 
1500 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), p. 163– 165, at p. 163; A. Saccon, Intelletto e beatitudine. 
La cultura filosofica tedesca del XIV secolo (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2012), 
p. 353.
 33 This point was first emphasised by W. Senner, Johannes von Sterngassen OP und sein 
Sentenzen- Kommentar, 2 vols (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), vol. 1, p. 137– 138. See 











as 56 students were sent to study theology.34 The curriculum of these schools 
throughout the order was highly regulated and under the constant supervi-
sion of the general chapter.35 Daily lessons had the Bible and Peter Lombard’s 
Sentences as their subjects. The lector would give detailed “ordinary” lectures 
on Scripture, after which the cursor Sententiarum would lecture on the whole 
of Peter Lombard’s text. This pattern would carry on over the course of the 
year. By the first quarter of the 14th century, the structure and personnel of 
these studia had become codified. The titular lector at the school denoted the 
friar who gave the ordinary lectures on the Bible and presided over disputa-
tiones.36 Thus, if any of the works we find attributed to Berthold in the 16th- 
century catalogue of Albert de Castello relate to this lectorship, which include 
the Expositio and several other texts, it would be the Summa theologiae, whose 
existence, however, like several others listed in the catalogue entry, has been 
questioned by scholars.37
In any event, it seems unlikely that the Expositio was directly related to 
Berthold’s lectorship in Cologne. Although the Expositio touches upon top-
ics that also belong to the domain of Christian theology (i.e., the Trinity, the 
Resurrection), these are treated in the text because Berthold believed that they 
fall within the purview of philosophical reason as such. As we see below, the 
order of “natural providence” presupposes and articulates a form of causality 
based on the principle that “the good is diffusive of itself and being” (bonum 
est diffusivum sui et esse) – in Berthold’s view this principle necessarily requires 
a Trinitarian form of causality. Natural providence, moreover, extends so far as 
to include a notion of a natural, universal Resurrection that Berthold found 
propounded in the Clavis physicae, the 12th- century abridgement of John 
Scotus Eriugena’s Periphyseon. Considerations of the authority of Scripture, 
the Incarnation, the sacraments, merit and punishment, all belong to a meth-
odologically distinct domain identified as the order of “voluntary providence”. 
Following Dietrich of Freiberg, in a significant phrase, Berthold stated that the 
latter was “the completion and consummation” of natural providence.38 The 
 34 G. Löhr, Die Kölner Dominikanerschule vom 14. bis zum 16. Jahrhundert (Köln: Kölner 
Universitätsverlag Balduin Pick, 1948), p. 15.
 35 Mulchahey, First the Bow is Bent in Study, p. 352– 384.
 36 Senner, Johannes von Sterngassen, vol. 1, p. 128.
 37 See Introduction, section 2, n. 109–111, below.
 38 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli, ed. F. Retucci, 
129F, p. 182, l. 299– 302. The Expositio is cited according to the eight- volume critical edi-
tion in the Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi (cptma): Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus, Propositiones 












Expositio, then, if it fit anywhere into the curriculum of studies, would have 
been be more suited to establish the foundational and preparatory science for 
the study of Christian theology, insofar as it articulates the divinely- infused 
nature that voluntary providence would presuppose. If there was a pedagogi-
cal purpose and intended audience for Berthold’s Expositio, it would not have 
been students of general theology, but those progressing in the study of natural 
philosophy (studium naturarum).39
The four dates (1335, 1343, 1353, and 1361) relating to the executorship of Bela 
Hardevust’s will introduce us to the pastoral dimension of Berthold’s life and 
vocation. As  Humbert of Romans had put it, the care of souls was understood 
to be the goal of study itself: study is ordered to preaching, and preaching to 
the salvation of souls, which is the ultimate end (studium enim est ordinatum 
ad praedicationem; praedicatio, ad animarum salutem, quae est ultimus finis).40 
Berthold certainly remained occupied with these ultimate matters while the 
Dominicans were expelled from Cologne between 1346 and 1351, as we see in 
his identification as vicar to Bavaria in Nuremberg in 1348. Appointed by the 
provincial of Teutonia, a vicar was expected to travel widely and visit the prio-
ries and convents of the region.
Within this area was the famous community of Dominican nuns in 
Engelthal, which was a prolific centre of spiritual literature in its day.41 Traces 
Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 14- 34, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni- 
Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986); id., Expositio super Elementationem theo-
logicam Procli. Propositiones 35- 65, ed. A. Sannino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001); id., Expositio 
super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 66- 107, ed. I. Zavattero (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 2003), id., Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 108- 
135, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011); id., Expositio super Elementationem theologi-
cam Procli. Propositiones 136– 159, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007); id., Expositio 
super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 160- 183, eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz 
(Hamburg: Meiner, 2003); id., Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. 
Propositiones 184- 211, ed. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 2014).
 39 In this respect, Berthold’s project would hearken back to the efforts of the founder of 
Cologne’s studium generale, Albert the Great. Albert’s even more ambitious aim of com-
menting on the entire Aristotelian corpus, and supplying original treatises when any part 
was lacking from that purported whole, was undertaken in Cologne. Mulchahey (First the 
Bow is Bent in Study, p. 261– 262) has made the compelling suggestion that the pedagogical 
purpose of these commentaries was to support the nascent curriculum in natural philos-
ophy that was being encouraged by the Master General, Humbert of Romans.
 40 Humbert of Romans, Expositio magistri Humberti super constitutiones fratrum 
Praedicatorum, ed. J.J. Berthier, Opera de vita regulari, 2 vols (Roma: Befani, 1888), vol. 
2, p. 28.
 41 See S. Ringler, Viten- und Offenbarungsliteratur in Frauenklöstern des Mittelalters (München 
/ Zürich: Artemis- Verlag, 1980); L.P. Hindsley, The Mystics of Engelthal. Writings from a 








of Berthold’s pastoral activities can be found, even if the historical details can-
not be so easily discerned, in three writings from this monastery that appear to 
describe related, or even the same, pastoral visit(s). First, there is the Engelthal 
sister- book attributed Christina Ebner (b. 1277 – d. 1356), which relates, through 
the lens of “the overburden of grace”, the history of the monastery and the 
exemplary lives and deaths of many holy women and men who belonged to 
the community, and which was written sometime between 1328 and 1346.42 
Next are the so- called Revelations (Offenbarungen) of Adelheid Langmann (c. 
1305 – 1375), which were written approximately between 1330 and 1350, and 
likely underwent further redaction.43 Finally, there is the hagiographical biog-
raphy or so- called Gnadenvita of Christina Ebner, a work that is still unpub-
lished and whose intricate layers of composition and authorship are objects of 
ongoing research.44
Philipp Strauch was the first to note the resemblance between the sister- 
book and Offenbarungen regarding the episode in question.45 Amid a series of 
events datable to 1344 in the narrative, Adelheid recounted a mass celebrated 
by “brother Berthold of Moosburg”, during which she had a vision “with her 
bodily eye” of Christ standing “above the altar in his person” while the cele-
brant received the sacrament, but Christ did not see him and gave the final 
blessing himself.46 In the Engelthal sister- book, Strauch observed, there is 
Funktion und rhetorische Legitimation frauenmystischer Texte des 14. Jahrhunderts 
(Tübingen: Francke, 1999); J. Thali, Beten – Schreiben – Lesen. Literarisches Leben und 
Marienspiritualität im Kloster Engelthal (Tübingen: Francke, 2003).
 42 Christina Ebner, Der Nonne von Engelthal Büchlein von der Gnaden Überlast, ed. 
K. Schröder (Tübingen: Laupp, 1871).
 43 Adelheid Langmann, Die Offenbarungen der Adelheid Langmann, Klosterfrau zu Engelthal, 
ed. P. Strauch (Strassburg: Trübner, 1878).
 44 See U. Peters, Religiöse Erfahrung als literarisches Faktum. Zur Vorgeschichte und Genese 
frauenmysticher Texte des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1988), p. 155– 176; 
S. Bürkle, “Ebner, Christine”, in W. Kühlmann (ed.), Killy Literaturlexikon, vol. 3 (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2008), p. 163b- 165b.
 45 Adelheid Langmann, Die Offenbarungen, ed. P. Strauch, p. 110. Willehad Eckert argued 
that the two passages were written independently of one another and dated them 
to approximately 1350. See Eckert, “Berthold von Moosburg O.P. Ein Vertreter der 
Einheitsmetaphysik”, p. 124; id., “Berthold von Moosburg”, in K. Ruh et al. (eds), Die 
deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. Verfasserlexikon, vol. 1 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1978), p. 
816– 817, at p. 816.
 46 Adelheid Langmann, Die Offenbarungen, p. 73, l. 13– 17: Ains mols do sprach ein prister mess, 
der hiez prueder Perhtolt von Mosburk. do sah si mit leiplichen augen do er undern herren 
enpfink, daz under herre stunt ob dem altar in seiner person, und sah des pristers niht und 
er gab dem convent den segen. Bürkle, Literatur im Kloster, p. 119, interprets the text to say 
that Adelheid saw Christ standing before the altar, and that it was the celebrant himself 












also mention of a mass celebrated by one from Moosburg (dez Mosburgers 
messe), but here it was recorded as an event in the life of Anna of Weitersdorf, 
who has a vision of Christ as a 30- year- old man as she went on her way to 
the liturgy, for at that time “there was such abundant grace here”.47 Siegfried 
Ringler then noticed striking similarities between this passage in the sister- 
book with another from the Gnadenvita of Christina Ebner and, most recently, 
Susanne Bürkle has made a thorough comparison of all three passages.48 The 
Gnadenvita narrative recounts a mass celebrated by an anonymous master 
of learning (lesmeyster) in the octave after Epiphany, which was assisted by 
a large crowd, which included Anna of Weiterstorf. Several details in the nar-
rative resemble those found in the Engelthal sister- book’s account of Anna’s 
life, but in the Gnadenvita her vision of the 30- year- old Christ was received 
during the liturgy, where he appeared standing at or upon the altar, and not 
while she made her way to the chapel. The account of the mass itself in the 
Gnadenvita is also more elaborate: the lesmeyster was so overcome that, during 
the Confiteor, instead of asking for the prayers of “you, sisters”, he referred to 
the sisters as “you, innocents”, implying that he presumed the efficacy of their 
prayers. Grace abounded, the narrator recalled, for everyone who heard that 
mass. The celebrant’s admiration for the sanctity he encountered in Engelthal 
carried over into a sermon preached in the early hours of the following morn-
ing, in which he announced that all sins had been forgiven, that all those 
present were regenerated as children of God, and that all lost time had been 
restored. Several months later, the same lesmeyster would visit Engelthal once 
again, this time for ten days during Ascensiontide. This stay brought such joy to 
the convent that the sisters composed a song in remembrance of the occasion 
that, when recited, brought its singers into an ecstasy.
The relationship between these three narratives is difficult to establish. 
Following the internal chronologies of the narratives themselves, Adelheid’s 
vision of Christ during the mass celebrated by Berthold would have occurred 
in the year 1344. Susanne Bürkle has indicated that, in terms of the sister- book’s 
account of events, the narrative context of dez Mosburgers messe would date it 
either to 1313/ 1318 or shortly before 1340. Bürkle has argued that the latter is the 
more likely.49 The remarkable events recounted in the Gnadenvita, however, 
again according to Bürkle, must recall a much earlier time, probably in 1325, 
 47 Christina Ebner, Büchlein von der Gnaden Überlast, ed. K. Schröder, p. 28, l. 17– 18.
 48 Ringler, Viten- und Offenbarungsliteratur, p. 89; Bürkle, Literatur im Kloster, p. 121– 122; 
J. Theben, Die mystische Lyrik des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts. Untersuchungen – Texte – 
Repertorium (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), p. 91– 92.








for they are recounted amid a series of episodes that can be dated between 
1324 and 1328. As historical evidence these internal chronologies cannot count 
for much, since one must yet take into account complicated questions con-
cerning the literary character of these works: the order in which the narratives 
themselves were written, their interdependence, and the presence of later 
embellishments (Legendarisierung) that are typically found in such literature. 
Siegfried Ringler, following the narrative chronology more closely, maintained 
the priority of the Gnadenvita relative to the other two texts, with the sister- 
book and Adelheid’s Offenbarungen following each other in close succession. 
In this view, the later texts would have distilled the Gnadenvita’s lengthier nar-
rative of the events to focus on their impact on individual sisters in the convent 
and to name the lesmeyster. According to Susanne Bürkle, this is “not implau-
sible” as far as the variants surrounding dez Mosburgers messe are concerned. 
However, having taken a broader and comparative approach to other passages 
from the prologue of the Gnadenvita, where she observes that the prologue 
used materials already circulating in Engelthal as its foils, Bürkle argues that 
the sister- book narrative was likely the earliest composition. If so, the lesmey-
ster episode could be regarded as an elaboration of this earlier event, and as 
such would exhibit literary techniques typical of the writings from Engelthal 
and other communities of religious women in the 14th century, in which a his-
torical figure (such as Berthold of Moosburg) is reduced to his office (lesmey-
ster) as the event is creatively transformed into legend. Despite their divergent 
views about the ordering of these narratives, Ringler and Bürkle concur that 
all three passages stem from a single historical event: sometime in the 1320s or 
1340s, Berthold of Moosburg visited Engelthal, celebrated mass, and preached.
For our purposes, it is enough to include these narratives and the ques-
tions raised by them without deciding in favour of one scholarly hypothesis or 
another. Even if these narratives relate to separate visits, which has not been 
ruled out,50 what they tell us is that Berthold’s pastoral responsibilities associ-
ated him with this important centre of mystical literature in his native region, 
and that his relationship with the convent made a remarkable impression in 
the communal memory of Engelthal and finally was assimilated to an extraor-
dinary period treasured from its history. The dating of these events also sug-
gests that Berthold’s association with the monastery preceded the mention of 
his vicariate in 1348. Perhaps his relations with the community began around 
the time of his lectorship in Regensburg attested in 1327, or even earlier. We may 
note in passing that Henry of Ekkewint, the prior of the Regensburg convent 
 50 Thali, Beten – Schreiben – Lesen, p. 83. 
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from 1321 to 1326, was also known to the community at Engelthal, where his 
sermons were being read.51
After Berthold’s resignation of his executorship of Hardevust’s will in 1361 
in Cologne, likely due to his age, we have no further documentation about his 
activity. Not long after this, in 1363, some of his library, which seems to have 
been bequeathed to Heilig Kreuz, began to disperse. And so, from the forma-
tion and the pedagogical and pastoral activities of this son of Dominic, we turn 
now to reconstruct what we can of Berthold’s library, following, as far as we are 
able, the chronology of his life and career.
2 Toward a Reconstruction of Berthold’s Library
A manuscript used by Berthold early in his career, as can be established with a 
high degree of certainty, was his copy of Macrobius’ Commentarii in Somnium 
Scipionis, preserved now in ms Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.iv.31 (hence-
forth B), f. 1r- 44r.52 The text of Macrobius is accompanied by numerous glosses 
written in different inks. Among the vast majority that was written in a darker 
ink is a gloss that refers to frater Thomas Aquinas, which would date the glosses 
prior to 1323, the year of Aquinas’ canonisation.53 We will see that several other 
manuscripts used by Berthold can be dated to the same period, insofar as they 
either seem to have been used for the composition of these glosses or were 
 51 Bürkle, Literatur im Kloster, p. 105– 118; Thali, Beten – Schreiben – Lesen, p. 43. Henry of 
Ekkewint is named in the Gnadenvita of Christina Ebner and a document from Engelthal 
in 1323.
 52 This section presupposes what remains the indispensable study of Berthold’s library in 
Sturlese, “Introduzione”, p. xxiii- lix. It will provide more details about some of Berthold’s 
marginalia, take into account more recent scholarship, and propose different conclusions 
about what Berthold’s library tells us about the dating of the Expositio. On ms Basel, 
Universitätsbibliothek, F.iv.31, see Sturlese, “Introduzione”, p. xxiv- xlii; id., Dokumente und 
Forschungen, p. 73– 76; Boese, Wilhelm von Moerbeke, p. 76– 77. The ex libris of Berthold, 
whose name is visible after erasure, appears on the final folio of Macrobius’ In Somnium 
Scipionis (f. 44r): Iste liber est fratis ｢Berhtoldi de Mosburch｣ ordinis Praedicatorum provin-
ciae Theutoniae.
 53 In Somn. Scip., I.21.6, f. 25v: constat enim nvllam inter eas celerivs ceteris 
tardivsqve procedere. Nota omnes planetas esse eiusdem velocitatis, secundum auc-
torem. Idem videtur sentire Boethius in Musica, libro I, cap. 2, ubi dicit: ‘Namque alii excel-
siores, alii inferiores feruntur atque in omnes aequali incitatione volvuntur, ut per dispares 
inaequalitates ratus cursuum ordo ducatur.’ Sed frater Thomas super II De caelo et mundo 










copied by the same scribe responsible for the text of Macrobius. As for the con-
tent of glosses, Irene Caiazzo has shown that many of them are copied from a 
commentary on Macrobius that circulated anonymously, but which scholars 
have attributed to William of Conches.54 Berthold sometimes modified these 
glosses, as in the case of the accessus (see table, below), and added many more 
of his own.
After the Elementatio theologica, which was cited ten times in the glosses, 
the text cited most frequently was the De musica of Boethius, in glosses clus-
tered at beginning of Book ii of Macrobius’ Commentary (27v, 28r, 28v, 29r, 
30v, 31r, 31v, 32v). Other authorities mentioned include Albert the Great (De 
caelo: 22r; De natura loci: 32r, 33r; Meteora: 35r), Al- Farghani (19r, 19v, 25r, 32r), 
Apuleius (12v), Aquinas (De caelo: 25v), Aristotle (22r, 39r, 40v, 41r), Averroes 
(13v), Avicenna (17r), Boethius (5r, 6v, 13r, 17v), Cicero (3r, 4r, 18r, 32r), Geber 
(32r), “Gregory of Nyssa” or Nemesius (40v), Homer (5v), Isidore (30v), the 
Liber de causis (17r), Moses Maimonides (27v), Ovid (15r), Plato (3r, 4v, 18r), 
Plotinus (38r), Porphyry (5v), Ptolemy (25r, 32r), Pythagoras (6r, 6v, 9r), Robert 
Grosseteste (De sphera: 32r), Thabit ibn Qurra (19v, 25r, 30v, 32r), Valerius 
Maximus (3v), and Virgil (5v, 6r, 11v, 13v, 32r). Berthold also referred to Dietrich 
of Freiberg’s De entium universitate, a treatise that is no longer extant but is 
attested in the early catalogues.55
The following table contains all of Berthold’s glosses that mention Proclus 
or the Elementatio theologica. Its columns indicate the text from Macrobius 
being commented upon, then Berthold’s gloss, and finally any passages in the 
Expositio where the same passage from Macrobius was cited.
Most of these glosses cluster around In Somn. Scip., i.14.6- 9, where Macrobius 
explained what Cicero meant when he wrote that “minds [animi] have been 
given to human beings from those eternal fires”, and thus in what sense human 
beings have mind in common with the stars. To do this, Macrobius set out an 
 54 See I. Caiazzo, “Mains célèbres dans les marges des Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis 
de Macrobe”, in D. Jacquart, C. Burnett (eds), Scientia in margine. Études sur les margi-
nalia dans les manuscrits scientifiques du Moyen Âge à la Renaissance (Genève: Librarie 
Droz, 2005), p. 171– 189, who observes (p. 179) that Berthold used what is known today as 
the versio longior of the glosses, and either had access to a better witness of it than any 
extant copy or corrected the text himself. A partial edition of the glosses can be found in 
H. Rodnite, The Doctrine of the Trinity in William of Conches’ Glosses on Macrobius. Texts 
and Studies, PhD diss. (Columbia University, 1972).
 55 In Somn. Scip., i.17.5, f. 20r: qvod qvidem to pan, id est omne, dixervnt. Pan enim 
non est aliud quam mundus ipse; nota de ratione universitatis ex tractatu magistri Theoderici 
qui intitulatur De entium universitate. For the catalogues, see Sturlese, Dokumente und 











Accessus (f. 3r) Titulus talis est: Macrobii 
Ambrosii oriniocensis In Sompnium 
Scipionis commentum incipit. 
Macrobius dictus est quasi longa via 
[sic], utpote quia a celo incipiens 
usque ad terram extendit, et de ea 
etiam tractavit; sic vocatus est a 
macros, quod est longum, et bios, 
quod est via. Ambrosius autem 
nuncupatus est quasi deorum cibus, 
quia ambrosia est quedam herba, que 
in sacrificiis deorum apponi solebat, 
quasi cibus deorum sic appellata. 
Contraxit autem hoc nomen ab 
eventu, quia de immortalitate deorum 
et animarum, quod est quasi cibus 
eorumdem tractavit; quilibet enim 
spiritus ab antiquis, et maxime 
causalia entium principia, ut patet in 
Elementatione theologica, appellati 
sunt dii. […]
Cf. 176C, 
p. 163, l. 206 – 
p. 164, l. 218a
(i.9.1) Animarum 
originem manare de 
celo
(f. 13r) Proclus in Elementatione 
theologica 206 propositione et usque 
ad finem prosequitur istam materiam.
206F, p. 223, 
l. 245
(i.12.6) Et hec est 
essentia quam 
individuam eandem 
que dividuam Plato 
in Thimeo
(f. 15v) Quia secundum 190 elementum 
Elementationis theologice omnis anima 
media est impartibilium et specierum 
circa corpus partitarum.
193E, p. 103, 
l. 121– 123
(i.14.6) Deus, qui 
primus causa est et 
vocatur
(f. 17r) Per 11 Procli. Cf. 22C, 
p. 103, l. 190- 
193; 157B, 
p. 178, l. 41- 47
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vero de se creat 
posteriora respiciens
(f. 17r) Nota processum 
intelligentiarum et animarum 
celorum et orbium ex Avicenna, 
que positio tamen rudis est in 
comparatione dictis Procli in sua 
Elementatione theologica.
*De hoc Avicenna sup. lin. manu 
Bertholdi
Cf. 20A, 
p. 67, l. 99
(i.14.7) Habet ergo 
et purissimam ex 
mente, de qua nata 
est, rationem
(f. 17r) Omnis enim, secundum 
Proclum, anima ab intellectu proxime 
subsistit.
207E, p. 229, 
l. 151 – p. 230, 
l. 188
(i.14.7) Quod logycon 
vocatur
(f. 17r) Quia anima est divina, 
intellectualis et animalis ex Proclo et 3 
propositione De causis.
(i.14.7) Sed ex his 
primum […] sunt 
caducis
(f. 17r) Nota ex Proclo et De causis tria 
esse genera animarum: quedam enim 
sunt divine et intellectuales, quedam 
intellectuales non divine, quedam 
animales tantum.
(i.14.8) Sapientes de 
Deo hwyh nominant 
ex illo mero ac 
purissimo fonte 
mentis
(f. 17v) Nota de hoc Proclum 180 
propositione.
(i.14.9) Immo 
partem eius vix solis 
humanis corporibus 
convenire
(f. 17v) Et ideo anima humana in 
Proclo vocatur partialis (partialia cod.) 
circa finem libri.
a   Cf. Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 27– 30. 
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account of procession, describing how the hypostases of Intellect, Soul, and 
Body arise sequentially from God.56
According to Macrobius, God, the first cause (here Berthold noted Proposition 
11 of the Elementatio), produces Intellect from himself with the overflowing 
fecundity of his power. This Intellect retains a perfect likeness of its cause or 
father as long as it contemplates him (here Berthold compared Avicenna and 
Proclus) but produces Soul when it turns to what comes after it. Soul in turn is 
filled by its own father as long as it contemplates him (Berthold commented [f. 
17r]: as long as “it is noble”), but degenerates to produce bodies when it turns 
away. Therefore, the rational part of Soul (logikon) derives from Intellect (here 
Berthold noted Proposition 193 of the Elementatio), but its sensitive (aisthetikon) 
and nutritive (phytikon) parts come from itself (Berthold noted Proposition 201 
of Proclus and Proposition 3 of the Liber de causis). The rational part of the 
soul is joined with the divine, but the lower parts are bound to mortality (here 
Berthold noted Proposition 184 of the Elementatio and the Liber de causis on the 
three kinds of soul, perhaps thinking again of Proposition 3). When Soul creates 
bodies, it begins from the purest contemplation of Intellect it had from its birth, 
and thus produces the heavenly bodies and endows them with mind (here 
Berthold cited Proposition 180, where Proclus explained how every intellect is a 
whole but each in a different way: the unparticipated Intellect is an unqualified 
whole, while every partial intellect is a whole- in- parts). For Macrobius, Soul’s 
power degenerates as it inclines further toward the earth and finds that the 
mortal realm is incapable of bearing the pure divinity of Intellect. Ultimately, 
only the human body can receive the rational power. Here Berthold focused on 
the word “part” and associated it with the propositions “around the end of the 
book” of the Elementatio, where Proclus called the human soul a “partial” soul.
These glosses offer some precious hints about Berthold’s attitude toward the 
relation between Christianity and pagan philosophy at this stage of his career. 
He scorned the attempts of certain interpreters to identify the hypostases of 
God, Intellect, and Soul with the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, when he felt it was 
clear that the philosophers – not just Macrobius – were referring to God and a 
plurality of separate intelligences and heavenly souls.57 In this he was almost 
 56 For a translation and analysis of this passage, see S. Gersh, Middle Platonism and 
Neoplatonism. The Latin Tradition, 2 vols (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1986), vol. 2, p. 526– 527. For some of the marginalia, see  figure 1, below.
 57 See In Somn. Scip., i.14.6, f. 17r: hec mens qvod noys vocatvr. Nota quidam (quosdam 
cod.) mentem apud philosophos a Deo creatam dicunt esse Filium seu Verbum Dei a Patre 
genitum, et anima<m> ab utroque manantem esse omne [?] Spiritum Sanctum, quod tamen 
derisorium est, sicut ex intentione eorum in libris suis theologicis patet, loquebantur enim de 







certainly inspired by William of Conches’ criticism, found in the Chartrian’s 
glosses on the same passage (In Somn. Scip. i.14.6), of those interpreters who 
draw the parallel so directly that they endorse the heresy of subordinationism. 
Berthold’s judgement, however, made no exception even for William’s own pro-
posal, which was to substitute genuit and mittit for Macrobius’ creavit and creat 
to make the analogy more acceptable.58 Now, it is true that in the Expositio 
Berthold will appeal to the Hermetica (Asclepius, the Liber xxiv philosopho-
rum) and to Patristic testimony (Augustine, ps.- Augustine or Quodvultdeus) 
for evidence of Trinitarian doctrine among the ancient pagan theologians and 
Platonists.59 But such intimations and achievements were not his concern 
here. His criticism in the glosses was not intended to define the boundaries 
of paganism and Christianity, but to safeguard the existence of the plurality 
of intelligences and heavenly souls as they were posited by the philosophers 
(loquebantur enim de Deo, de intelligentiis, de animabus celorum) and, thus, the 
integrity of what he will come to call natural providence (providentia natura-
lis). The assimilation of the three hypostases of the philosophers to the persons 
of the Trinity would undermine the entire edifice of mediation that Berthold 
regarded as essential to philosophical cosmology. Berthold’s Trinitarianism 
in the Expositio was guided by precisely the same concern: God, the gods (or 
primordial causes), the intelligences, and heavenly souls must be Trinitarian 
principles, because this interior dynamism (of persons in God and of activi-
ties in the separate substances) is what accounts both for their causal fecun-
dity and, accordingly, the continuity of procession. Rather than resolving all 
ranks of creatures into their Trinitarian principle, Berthold would identify 
each separate substance as an expressed image of the Trinity. These principles, 
 58 ms Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Urb. lat. 1140, f. 80r- v: hic, id est 
Deus, creavit ex se mentem. Si dixisset ‘genuit’, bene dixisset, sed hoc verbum ‘creavit’ 
hereticum est. Forsitan autem ‘creavit’ posuit pro ‘genuit’. Mens [causa] Dei et Filius ab ipso 
genitus est. Mentem enim divinam in hoc loco vocat Dei Filium qui est secunda persona in 
Trinitate, ut iam apparebit in sequentibus in ipsis verbis. […] animam vero. Sic habemus 
de creatore ipso qui Pater est nec creatus nec genitus. Ergo subiungit de anima mundi que 
secundum quosdam est Spiritus Sanctus ex utroque procedens, qui omnia in mundo movet 
et vivificat […]. de se creat. <Si> (secundum cod.) hoc dicatur de Spiritu Sancto, hereti-
cum est quod creat. Non enim ex se creat Spiritum Sanctum, sed mittit. Sed forsitan ponit 
‘creare’ pro ‘mittere’. This manuscript contains a 15th- century copy of the versio longior 
of William’s Macrobius glosses. See É. Jeauneau, “Gloses de Guillaume de Conches sur 
Macrobe. Note sur les manuscrits”, in Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen 
Âge 27(1960), p. 17– 28; I. Caiazzo, Lectures médiévales de Macrobe. Les Glosae Colonienses 
super Macrobium (Paris: Vrin, 2002), p. 65– 67.
 59 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 40C, p. 39, l. 127 – p. 42, l. 234; 131B, p. 191, l. 46 – p. 194, 






in his view, can be most accurately understood only once one has read “the the-
ological books” of the philosophers and interpreted them on their own terms.
These glosses on Macrobius exhibit Berthold’s facility with the Elementatio 
theologica and the Liber de causis. They also display a certain concordism in 
his approach to philosophical cosmology, as when he noted basic agreements 
between the philosophers – Macrobius, Avicenna, Proclus, and the Liber de 
causis – concerning the four major genera of the universe (God, Intellect, Soul, 
Body). By the time we reach the Expositio, however, we will see a very different 
account of the history of philosophy that would have us separate this group 
into two camps. We may note that this outlook is anticipated here in one gloss, 
where Berthold unfavourably compared Avicenna’s account of procession 
with that of Proclus (rudis est in comparatione dictis Procli).60
The content of these glosses exerted a limited influence on the Proclus com-
mentary. Looking to the right column of the table we find only one reference 
to the Elementatio theologica in the glosses (i.9.1- 3) that matches a citation 
of the same passage of Macrobius in the Expositio (206F). Three additional 
non- Proclean parallels may be noted: (1) a citation of the In Somn. Scip., i.12.6, 
in 193E that is followed by a reference to Proposition 190 of the Elementatio, 
which was also cited in the gloss to that passage in Macrobius (15v);61 (2) a 
quotation from Ovid’s Metamorphoses is included in 206E as part of a lengthy 
series of citations from Macrobius (i.12.1- 8) and appears next to the same pas-
sage in the manuscript (f. 15r), but in the Expositio the quotation is longer;62 
(3) a description of mundus attributed to Apuleius in a gloss on In Somn. Scip., 
i.8.4 (the world is “the ordered collection of elements with their adornment”), 
which does not correspond precisely to any passage from that writer, matches 
a citation of Apuleius in 164D of the Expositio, included in a list of various 
 60 This remark looks ahead to Berthold’s comparison of “Peripatetic” and “Platonic” accounts 
of procession in his commentary on Proposition 5 of the Elementatio theologica. On this, 
see 4.2, below. Berthold may also have had in mind Proclus’ elaborate account of media-
tion between cosmic series in Propositions 108- 112 of the Elements.
 61 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 193E, p. 103, l. 121– 123: Unde et Macrobius loquens de 
anima sic dicit: ‘Et hoc est essentia, quam individuam eandemque dividuam – Plato in 
Timaeo’ ‘expressit’, unde et media est impartibilium et partibilium per 190.
 62 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 206E, p. 221, l. 178– 183. The gloss (In Somn. Scip., i.12.1, 
f. 15r): descensvs vero ipsivs, qvo anima de celo in hvivs vite inferna 
delabitvr, sic ordo digeritvr. zodiacvm ita lactevs circvlvs obliqve 
circvmflexionis occvrsv ambiendo complectitvr, vt evm qva dvo trop-
ica signa capricornvs et cancer fervntvr intersecet. has solis portas 
physici vocavervnt. Ovidius, ii Methamorphoseos dicit quod ‘biformes valve cingebant 








meanings of the word mundus;63 in this case, the definition and attribution in 
fact derived from William of Conches’ glosses on Macrobius.64
It is nevertheless reasonable to suppose that Berthold continued to use 
this copy of Macrobius or one very similar to it while writing the Expositio, 
though this does not mean that every citation of Macrobius in the commen-
tary must be corrected against the text of the Basel manuscript, as it has been 
in the critical edition, since many of Berthold’s citations in fact depended on 
Thomas of York’s Sapientiale.65 After we set aside the citations deriving from 
Thomas, those that remain reflect the corrections or interlinear glosses we 
find in Berthold’s hand in the manuscript.66 Sometimes the text of Macrobius 
quoted in the Expositio differs from Basel, with no changes indicated in the 
manuscript, but none of these instances is so drastic that it could not reflect an 
ad hoc correction, elaboration, or scribal error.67 This suggests either that the 
 63 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 164E, p. 34, l. 91– 92: dicitur mundus secundum Apuleium 
ordinata collectio elementorum cum ornatu eorundem. The gloss (In Somn. Scip., i.8.4, 
f. 12v): prvdentie vero mvndvm istvm et omnia qve mvndo insvnt divinorvm 
contemplatione despicere. Apuleius: mundus <est> ordinata elementorum collec-
tio cum ornatu eorundem. Cf. Apuleius, De mundo, ed. C. Moreschini, Apulei opera quae 
supersunt. Vol. III. De philosophia libri (Leipzig: Teubner, 1991), p. 148, l. 5- 6: mundus est 
ornata ordinatio dei munere, deorum recta custodia.
 64 See William of Conches, Glosae super Platonem, ed. É. Jeauneau (Paris: Vrin, 1965), p. 103, 
n. A. Here Jeauneau refers to ms Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Urb. 
lat. 1140, f. 59v.
 65 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 6B (Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 3 and lib. vii, c. 2); 9B (i.6); 
10A (v.21); 12C (v.21); 18A (i.6); 23E (i.20); 23I (v.16); 136A (i.6); 146L (v.21); 151A (i.14); 166G 
(vii.12); 176B (i.27); 176C (i.28); 184A (vii.15); 190B (vii.18); 199B (vii.6).
 66 Corrections in B match citations in the Expositio: Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 14I (p. 
12, l. 340=41r: nisi] in B); 17A (p. 33, l. 17=38v: nec] ne B); 17A (p. 34, l. 55=43v: occasumque] 
occasuque B); 17B (p. 35, l. 65=40r: movet] movetur B); 17B (p. 35, l. 71=40r: non] nec B); 17B 
(p. 35, l. 94=40r: exercet] exiret B); 17B (p. 36, l. 108=40v: audere] audire B); 179A / 190A (p. 
201, l. 61 / p. 79, l. 93=29v: deinde] de B); 179A / 190A (p. 202, l. 63 / p. 79, l. 94=29v: mundo] 
modo B); 206E (p. 221, l. 193=15v: enim). One exception: the correction at f. 42r (actore] 
auctore corr. sup. lin. manu Bertholdi) was not carried over in 17B (p. 36, l. 124).
Interlinear glosses in B also found in Expositio: 100I (p. 208, l. 169– 171=4v: togathon, 
id est summus. protopanton, id est primus sive princeps omnium); in 151A, where Berthold 
used the Sapientiale for the same passage from Macrobius, he did not include this gloss. 
A gloss added by Berthold in the manuscript (f. 17r: estheticon, id est sensualitas) is found 
in his citation of Macrobius at 207E; however, just two words later, the Expositio has phyt-
icon, id est generatio, which differs from the gloss (vegetatio).
Transliterations of Greek words in B also found in Expositio: 14I (p. 12, l. 311=40v: 
antokineton); 14I (p. 12, l. 325=41r: antokineti); 190A (p. 78, l. 61=9r: thetrasim); 206E (p. 221, 
l. 187=15r: tirocinia).
 67 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 17A (p. 33, l. 23– 24: moveant] moveat B); 17A (p. 34, l. 29: 












Basel manuscript was Berthold’s personal copy of Macrobius, which he cor-
rected when a better text was at hand, or that he eventually stopped using the 
Basel copy when a better text came into his possession. Evidence in favour of 
the first possibility includes the parallels in Basel and the Expositio that diverge 
from variants in the apparatus of James Willis’ edition.68 Furthermore, some 
citations of Macrobius in the Expositio were introduced with a remark resem-
bling a corresponding marginal note in the Basel manuscript.69 Finally, there 
are Berthold’s other interventions in the manuscript, such as the enumera-
tions of arguments in the margins, trefoils, and interlinear divisions of the text, 
which sometimes correspond to citations in the Expositio.70
The same Basel manuscript also contains Berthold’s copies of Proclus’ 
Tria opuscula (f. 46r- 59r: De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam; f. 59v- 
68v: De providentia et fato; f. 70r- 82va: De malorum subsistentia) and Proclus’ 
(p. 78, l. 66: epyneticon] epymeticon B); 190A (p. 78, l. 80: hoc] hos B); 206D (p. 220, l. 155: 
rationem] ratiocinationem B). In 206E, the critical edition follows B, although the Oxford 
and Vatican manuscripts share the same readings (p. 221, l. 173: dirigitur] digeritur B); (p. 
221, l. 195: materiae] modo B); (p. 221, l. 198: vocavit] notavit B). The citation at 207E differs 
from B (p. 230, l. 185: credique] crescendique B), but Berthold then paraphrases the passage 
with crescendi instead of credi (p. 230, l. 193).
 68 Macrobius, Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis, ed. J. Willis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1970). Cf. 
Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 132E (p. 203, l. 115– 119: ad unum meando] ad imum 
meandi Willis), however (expressius] pressius B); 190A (p. 78, l. 71: creata] generata Willis); 
190A (p. 79, l. 93– 94: competentiam] concordiam Willis), but cf. 179A (p. 202, l. 63: con-
cordiam); 190A (p. 79, l. 97: hoc] quo Willis); 190A (p. 79, l. 98: quem] hoc quod Willis); 
206D (p. 220, l. 156: theoricon] theoreticon Willis); 206D (p. 220, l. 163: animal] animalis 
Willis); 206D (p. 220, l. 165: arcae sita] arcessita Willis); 206D (p. 220, l. 166: hoc] haec 
Willis). When the word order in B varies from the manuscripts considered by Willis, the 
Expositio follows B: e.g., 17B (p. 35, l. 100), 179A (p. 201, l. 48; p. 203, l. 124); 190A (p. 79, l. 100); 
206D (p. 220, l. 162– 163); 206E (p. 221, l. 185). Some variants are identical in both manu-
scripts of the Expositio and in B, but do not appear in the critical edition: 179A (p. 203, 
l. 120– 121: Diocles] et add. O V B); 179A (p. 203, l. 121: septem] septimos O V B); 179A (p. 203, 
l. 124: quiddam] quoddam O V B).
 69 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 17A, p. 33, l. 13– 16: sicut recitat Macrobius Super Somnium 
Scipionis libro II circa finem et colligitur ex verbis Tullii Ciceronis I libro Tusculanarum 
quaestionum extractis ex Phaedrone Platonis, ubi disputant de animae immortalitate; cf. 
In Somn. Scip., ii.13.1, f. 38v: nam qvod semper movetvr. Hic incipit loqui de anima 
et eius immortalitate. See also Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 199E, p. 159, l. 250– 
253: Macrobius enim libro II inducens Plotinum sic inquit […]; cf. In Somn. Scip., ii.12.8, 
f. 38r: in hoc ergo libro plotinvs. Nota commendationem Plotini cum titulo libri sui.
 70 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 17B (p. 34, l. 57– 62: 39r); 17B (p. 34, l. 63 – p. 35, l. 99: 40r). 
Beside the passage quoted at 132E (see n. 68, above), Berthold wrote in B (In Somn. Scip., 
i.14.15, f. 17v): Nota de chathena aurea. Similarly, he cited Macrobius on the world soul at 








Elementatio physica (f. 82vb- 84ra).71 The corrections and glosses to the 
Opuscula were made by Berthold, as was the copy of the Elementatio physica, 
at least up to Proposition 5. Even though Berthold’s ex libris appears only after 
Macrobius (44r), and we know that that manuscript itself was probably bound 
in its current form only in the late 14th century, it has been argued convinc-
ingly by Loris Sturlese that the texts of Macrobius and the Opuscula were in 
fact copied at approximately the same time: a fragment of the beginning of De 
decem dubitationibus, found at the end of the manuscript (85r- v), which is part 
of the same quire beginning at 80r, appears to have been copied by the same 
scribe responsible for the Macrobius text and for the anonymous fragment on 
optics at 45r- v.72
There are some clues about the chronology of Berthold’s use of these texts. 
Throughout this copy of the Tria opuscula, we find Berthold using sequences 
of dots and Arabic numerals, written above the line, that clarify the word 
order and sense of William of Moerbeke’s verbum de verbo translation from 
the Greek. One would hardly expect this of a reader already familiar with its 
contents. When Berthold was reading these texts, he was studying them seri-
ously for the first time. These interventions therefore offer us a precious win-
dow onto Berthold’s process of discovery as he made his way through this new 
Proclean material. Given the importance of Proclus’ De malorum subsistentia 
for Berthold’s Expositio on Proposition 206 (on the doctrine of the soul’s cycli-
cal descent and re- ascent), where he will combine Proclus’ doctrine with pas-
sages from Macrobius on several points, it is intriguing that the Tria opuscula 
were never mentioned in the glosses on the In Somnium Scipionis, even though 
the Elementatio and Proposition 206 are. This suggests that Berthold studied 
the Tria opuscula sometime after completing the glosses on Macrobius.
In the manuscript of the Opuscula, compared to In Somnium Scipionis, 
one finds more corrections and interventions in the text but far fewer mar-
ginal glosses or references to other authorities. Apart from the Elementatio 
 71 Proclus, Tria opuscula (De providentia, libertate, malo). Latine Guilelmo de Moerbeke vert-
ente et Graece ex Isaacii Sebastocratoris aliorumque scriptis collecta, ed. H. Boese (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 1960); Proclus, Elementatio physica, ed. H. Boese, Die mittelalterliche Übersetzung 
der Stoicheiosis physike des Proclus (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1958). Also in the manuscript 
are four remedies written in Berthold’s hand (44v), an anonymous fragment on optics 
(45r- b), and the fragment identified by Loris Sturlese as Dietrich of Freiberg’s De subiecto 
theologiae, copied by Berthold (69v). The fragment on optics is edited in Sturlese, “Note 
su Bertoldo di Moosburg O.P.”, p. 254– 256. The fragment De subiecto theologiae is edited by 
Loris Sturlese in Dietrich of Freiberg, Opera omnia, vol. 3. Schriften zur Naturphilosophie 
und Metaphysik, eds J.- D. Cavigioli et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), p. 277– 282.






theologica, which Berthold cited 17 times and with the same proficiency we find 
in the Macrobius glosses, only Plato (52v), Pythagoras (58r), Aristotle (60r), and 
the Manichaeans (78v) are mentioned in the Opuscula manuscript. Berthold’s 
glosses that mention the Elementatio are listed in the following table (asterisks 
indicate interlinear references to the text in Berthold’s hand). The third col-
umn does not list all citations of the relevant passage from the Opuscula in the 
Expositio, which are often numerous, but only those cases where the specific 
proposition noted in the gloss and the proposition containing the citation of 
the Opuscula in the later commentary correspond.
Four of these 17 references to the Elementatio theologica directly correspond 
to citations of the Opuscula in the Expositio, with one additional, though more 
distant, parallel (120H). Apart from these, there are many trefoils,73 manicules,74 
and other notabilia75 corresponding to passages cited in the Expositio. These 
correspondences range throughout the Expositio but are, of course, clustered 
around the propositions where one would expect to find them, on the gods 
and their providence. They cannot, therefore, readily provide clues as to the 
order in which Berthold wrote his Expositio. They do, however, suggest that 
he continued to use this copy when composing his commentary. The variants 
in the manuscript, as well as Berthold’s corrections, match what we find in 
 73 E.g., Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prologus 17 (p. 26, l. 702 – p. 27, l. 719) and 197G 
(p. 136, l. 139 – p. 137, l. 172=64ra- b); 1F (p. 79, l. 283– 293=48ra); 13C (p. 214, l. 174– 176=70vb); 
48A (p. 95, l. 41– 48=61vb); 62A (p. 181, l. 17- 27=49va); 63E (p. 189, l. 102 – p. 190, l. 119=71rb); 
88A (p. 147, l. 43- 48) and 124B (p. 141, l. 86- 90=46vb); 102H (p. 221, l. 137- 155), 121K (p. 109, 
l. 148 – p. 110, l. 170), 170G (p. 101, l. 223- 237), and 197H (p. 138, l. 188– 206=47ra); 102I (p. 221, 
l. 170 – p. 222, l. 171=49rb); 120G (p. 102, l. 363– 372=46va); 121H (p. 108, l. 121- 125=48ra); 122B 
(p. 116, l. 72- 81=48vb); 122D (p. 117, l. 116- 121=49rb); 122E (p. 118, l. 127 – p. 119, l. 161=49rb- vb); 
124E (p. 114, l. 191- 198=47rb); 124F (p. 144, l. 207 – p. 145, l. 220=47rb); 141E (p. 50, l. 165- 
178=49rb); 142C (p. 56, l. 120- 127=49ra); 143F (p. 64, l. 146- 161=79vb- 80ra); 143F (p. 65, l. 185- 
199=81vb); 143F (p. 65, l. 200 – p. 66, l. 207=82va); 164A (p. 31, l. 16- 19) and 186G (p. 38, 
l. 293 – p. 39, l. 201=61vb); 206C (p. 218, l. 78- 89=74va).
 74 E.g., Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 6 (p. 13, l. 268- 277), 26H (p. 158, l. 202 – p. 159, 
l. 213), and 161C (p. 12, l. 46- 52=72vb- 73ra); Prol. 15 (p. 23, l. 584- 587), 20H (p. 71, l. 245 – p. 72, 
l. 249), 120H (p. 102, l. 383 – p. 103, l. 396), 188E (p. 65, l. 227- 230), and 193E (p. 103, l. 130 – 
p. 104, l. 132=59ra); Prol. 18 (p. 27, l. 719- 726), 114B (p. 44, l. 135- 140), 121M (p. 111, l. 209- 215), 
and 129B (p. 178, l. 167- 177=64rb).
 75 E.g., Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expositio tituli B (p. 38, l. 49 – p. 39, l. 67), 44C 
(p. 75, l. 80 – p. 76, l. 111), and 185L (p. 26, l. 413 – p. 27, l. 435=62ra- b); 93B (p. 168, l. 57- 
67=47vb); 122F (p. 119, l. 163- 190=50rb); 124D (p. 143, l. 138- 150) and 127B (p. 162, l. 58 – p. 163, 
l. 62=46rb); 143C (p. 61, l. 45- 58=80va); 143C (p. 62, l. 79- 109=81va- b); 143F (p. 66, l. 209- 
214=72ra); 164D (p. 32, l. 58- 59=79rb); 170M (p. 105, l. 363- 374) and 180O (p. 219, l. 257 – 
p. 220, l. 266=46rb); 185H (p. 24, l. 350- 355) and 206F (p. 223, l. 254- 260=75ra); 185L (p. 27, 







table 2 Berthold of Moosburg's Proclean glosses on Proclus, Tria opuscula
Proclus, Tria opuscula Gloss Expositio
(De decem dub., 1.3) Hec 
quidem simul omnium et 
simpliciter




170M, p. 105, 
l. 363- 374
(De decem dub., 3.9) 
Quomodo discerneret in 
cognitione
(f. 47va) Eodem 
176 propositione in 
commento.




93D, p. 169, 
l. 98- 102
(De decem dub., 5.27) Que 
enim ex hiis que ab ipsa, et 
ab ipsa
(f. 51ra) Per 56.
(De decem dub., 10.62) Quod 




Cf. 120H, p. 102, 
l. 374- 381
(De decem dub., 10.63) Omnis 
equidem deus, ut dictum 
est a me etiam prius,* 
secundum le unum habet** 







(De decem dub., 10.63) 
Duplicibus autem unitatibus* 




64F, p. 197, 
l. 155- 161.
(De mal. subs., 1.2) Quia* 
omnia […] bonum appetunt.
(f. 70rb)
*Per 7
(De mal. subs., 1.5) Propter 
quod et appetitus boni 
omnibus
(f. 70vb) Per 8.
(De mal. subs., 2.13) Omnibus 
procedentibus […] per 
similitudinem est
(f. 72va) Hoc valet 
ad intellectionem 6 
theologicis Procli.
6F, p. 135, l. 294– 
303; cf. 21F, p. 87, 
l. 417- 420; 64C, 
p. 194, l. 66 – 
p. 195, l. 73
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table 2 Berthold of Moosburg’s Proclean Glosses on Proclus, Tria opuscula (cont.)
the Expositio. What readings differ between Basel and the extant copies of 
the Expositio could be explained either as an editorial decision on Berthold’s 
part or a scribal error. In light of the foregoing, we may conclude that Berthold 
began using this copy of the Tria opuscula around 1323, probably after he had 
annotated Macrobius, and continued to use it throughout the period in which 
he wrote the Expositio.76
Two, perhaps three, other manuscripts used by Berthold could be associ-
ated with this period of his career, since they may have been the source of 
certain citations found in the Macrobius glosses that are securely datable to 
1323. The strongest connection of the three relates to the autographs of Albert 
the Great now in ms Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. Vindob. 
273.77 As Loris Sturlese first observed, a citation of Albert’s De natura loci in 
the Macrobius glosses (32r) matches a trefoil and manicule next to the same 
Proclus, Tria opuscula Gloss Expositio
(De mal. subs., 3.14) Oportet 
enim utique processus 
totorum continuum facere
(f. 72vb- 73ra) Per 28.
(De mal. subs., 10.31) Neque 
enim duo* prima: unde enim 




(De mal. subs., 10.31) Ubique 




(De mal. subs., 11.37) Quid 
enim ultra naturam boni?*
(f. 77vb)
*Per 8
 76 As Helmut Boese observed, Berthold corrected this copy against an exemplar related to 
the best extant witness of the Tria opuscula (ms Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal, lat. 473), 
which belonged to the library of the Augustinians in Paris. This is not, however, sufficient 
evidence to assert that Berthold made these corrections during an otherwise unattested 
“stay in Paris”. See C. Steel, “William of Moerbeke, translator of Proclus”, in S. Gersh (ed.), 
Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), p. 247– 263, at p. 252.
 77 On the manuscript, see Sturlese, Dokumente und Forschungen, p. 120– 126, and on its trans-






passage in the Vienna manuscript (145v).78 As Berthold would have known it, 
the manuscript contained the autographs of Albert’s commentaries on the 
Physics (from lib. viii, tr. 3, c. 1 to the end), on the De caelo, and his De natura 
loci, and De causis proprietatum elementorum (ending at lib. ii, tr. 2, c. 6), which 
the younger Dominican annotated sparingly.79 These texts probably belonged 
to the Dominican library in Cologne, where Albert originally wrote them in 
close succession, approximately between 1251 and 1254, as he began his com-
mentaries on the entire Aristotelian corpus.
Another manuscript used by Berthold (though leaving no trace in the 
Expositio) and linked to the library in Cologne is now ms Dresden, Sächsische 
Landesbibliothek, Db. 87.80 On its final folio we find an ex libris and a table 
of contents in Berthold’s hand (268v), and in three places (1r, 103r, 268v) 
the ex libris of the Dominican convent in Cologne. This suggests that the 
works originally belonged to the library and were only bound together after 
they came into Berthold’s possession. The manuscript contains the only 
extant witness of Ptolemy’s Almagest in the translation of ‘Abd al- Masīḥ of 
Winchester (1r- 71r);81 the Liber introductorius Ptolomei of Geminus of Rhodes 
(listed in the table of contents as Introductiones Ptholomaei in Almagesti), 
which is Gerard of Cremona’s translation of Geminus’ Elementa astronomiae 
(72r- 102v);82 an anonymous fragment on geometry (102v- 103r; not listed in 
the table of contents); the Almagesti minor, which is a summary of Books i- vi 
of the Almagest but reorganised on a Euclidean model, which is attributed to 
Campanus of Novara in the table of contents but in fact it is by Walter of Lille 
 78 Sturlese, “Introduzione”, p. lv and Table vi. The gloss at In Somn. Scip., ii.5.12, f. 32r: inter 
extremos vero et medivm dvo maiores vltimis, medio minores, ex vtrivsqve 
vicinitatis intemperie temperantvr, in hisqve tantvm vitales avras nat-
vra dedit incolis carpere. Nota de hoc in Spera Lynconiensis qui ostendit versus 
Austrum non esse habitationem. Sed Albertus libro De natura locorum, d. 1, cap. 7, concedit 
ipsam habitabilem et habitari.
 79 Some of Berthold’s annotations on Albert’s De caelo are transcribed in Sturlese, Dokumente 
und Forschungen, p. 124. At the time of writing, I have not compared the few citations of 
Albert’s Physica and De caelo in the Expositio with the Vienna manuscript.
 80 Sturlese, “Introduzione”, p. xlvii- xlix and Table iv.2.
 81 D. Grupe, The Latin Reception of Arabic Astronomy and Cosmology in Mid- Twelfth- Century 
Antioch. The Liber Mamonis and the Dresden Almagest, PhD diss. (The Warburg Institute, 
2013), p. 77– 78.
 82 For the Greek text and a short transcription from the Dresden manuscript, see Geminus, 
Elementa astronomiae, ed. K. Manitius (Leipzig: Teubner, 1898). For an English transla-
tion from the Greek, see J. Evans, J.L. Berggren, Geminos’ Introduction to the Phenomena. 













(104r- 161v);83 and, finally, the Liber super Almagesti of Geber (Jābir ibn Aflāḥ) 
in Gerard of Cremona’s translation, which is listed in the table of contents 
as Flores ex Almagesto (162r- 268r).84 Berthold’s hand is discernible clearly in 
one gloss (184r) and possibly in another (196v), both accompanying the text 
of Geber.85 Berthold’s two references to Ptolemy in the Macrobius glosses 
(ms Basel, ub, F.iv.31, f. 25r, 32r) or his single reference to Geber (32r) might 
reflect his study of these texts. We cannot, however, be certain of this, since 
he may have relied on other direct sources, such as Albert the Great’s and 
Thomas Aquinas’ commentaries on the De caelo, which are cited elsewhere 
in the Macrobius glosses. At any rate, this manuscript is further evidence of 
Berthold’s interest in astronomy, even if his expertise in the subject cannot 
be gleaned from the sparse traces of his reading left in these rare and tech-
nical works.
In the same Macrobius gloss that mentions Albert’s De natura loci (32r), we 
find Berthold’s sole reference to the De sphaera of Robert Grosseteste in the 
Basel manuscript. Loris Sturlese has made the interesting proposal that ms 
München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 14448, shows signs of Berthold’s 
use, particularly in its table of contents (100r), whose hand seems to match the 
ex libris and table of contents from the Dresden manuscript, and in two notes 
indicating prices of sale (28v, 50r), and in at least one interlinear gloss (70r).86 In 
the table of contents, we find listed the De sphaera of Robert Grosseteste,87 the 
Compotus of Grosseteste,88 and the Elements of Euclid, while the prices of sale 
are found at the end of the commentary on Ludolphus of Luco’s Flores gram-
maticae (2r- 28v) and the beginning of the De sphaera (50r). Sometime before 
1347, the manuscript eventually was bound in its current form in Regensburg, 
where it was conserved at the Benedictine abbey of St. Emmeram. It could 
therefore shed more light on Berthold’s activity in Regensburg. However, on 
the basis of the handwriting alone, without the ex libris we find in Dresden or 
 83 H. Zepeda, The First Latin Treatise on Ptolemy’s Astronomy. The Almagesti minor (c. 1200) 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2018).
 84 D. Juste, “Geber, Liber super Almagesti” (update: 29.01.2018), Ptolemaeus Arabus et Latinus. 
Works, url = http:// ptolemaeus.badw.de/ work/ 70.
 85 The first gloss is transcribed in Sturlese, “Note su Bertoldo di Moosburg O.P.”, p. 254, 
n. 31. Sturlese, “Introduzione”, p. xlix, also attributed the second gloss to Berthold, but the 
resemblance is not as clear.
 86 Sturlese, “Introduzione”, p. lvi- lix.
 87 Robert Grosseteste, De sphaera, ed. L. Baur, Die philosophischen Werke des Robert 
Grosseteste (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1912), p. 10– 32.















the parallel gloss and marginalia found in the Vienna autographs, I am hesitant 
to affirm that the interventions mentioned by Sturlese are Berthold’s without 
further analysis. Be that as it may, all the evidence of Berthold’s activity at this 
stage – the glosses on Dietrich’s De iride from 1318, the glosses on Macrobius 
with the authors cited in them before 1323, the autographs of Albert’s works 
on natural philosophy, and possibly the treatises in the Dresden and Munich 
manuscripts – suggests that he was engaged in teaching natural philosophy 
after his theological studies in Oxford, and had procured manuscripts to this 
end, probably in Cologne, and possibly in Regensburg.
Another text of Albert the Great that certainly came from Cologne and was 
used by Berthold, although we do not know when, is ms Köln, Historisches 
Archiv, W 258a, which is entirely made up of Albert’s autograph of the De ani-
malibus that he wrote between 1258 and 1262/ 1263, and included the treatises 
De natura et origine animae and De principiis motus processivi.89 In it we find 
Berthold’s ex libris (f. <I>r) and numerous interventions (notabilia, trefoils, and 
crosses) that have been convincingly attributed to him, which demonstrate 
the friar’s extensive and careful study of the text. This reading of De animal-
ibus was clearly undertaken independently of the commentary on Proclus, 
although a trefoil does appear beside the only unambiguous citation of the De 
animalibus in the Expositio.90 Of course, the subject matter of De animalibus is 
quite remote from “the invisible things of God” considered in the Elementatio 
theologica. Even so, for a more relevant treatise like the De natura et origine 
animae, which was cited slightly more often in the Expositio in clusters around 
Propositions 17– 18, 41, and 205– 206, we find that only one of these citations 
corresponds to the marginalia in the Cologne manuscript.91
A far more important text for Berthold’s Expositio was the Clavis physicae 
of Honorius Augustodunensis. Scholars have tended to assume that Berthold 
 89 Sturlese, “Introduzione”, p. xlvi- xlvii and Table iv.1; id., “Note su Bertoldo di Moosburg 
O.P.”, p. 257– 259.
 90 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 18B, p. 48, l. 139– 150 = f. 335v.
 91 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 41C, p. 49, l. 103 – p. 50, l. 109 = f. 310r- v. No markings 
correspond to the series of citations at 17E (f. 314v- 315v) or the citation at 206B (f. 320v). 
There are trefoils beside the passages from De natura et origine animae, tr. 1, c. 2– 6, which 
are paraphrased at 205A- C (f. 308v- 313r), but they do not correspond to the precise 
expressions that Berthold copied from Albert.
Another manuscript of Albert (not an autograph) that Berthold may have used is ms 
Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.i.21, which contains Albert the Great’s Ethica (his second 
commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, from around 1262– 1263) and his De causis et pro-
cessu universitatis a prima causa, and was copied in the 14th century. Two trefoils align 
with the only citations of Albert’s Ethica in the Expositio: 13B (p. 210, l. 48 – p. 212, l. 100 = 








discovered the Clavis sometime around 1327, when his lectorship was attested 
in Regensburg, since we know that the text circulated in two manuscripts in 
the city by 1347.92 This view was largely influenced by Marie- Thérèse d’Al-
verny’s study of the manuscript used and lightly annotated by Berthold (ms 
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 6734), which traced its origins 
to the abbey of St. Emmeram on the outskirts of the city, where Honorius 
may have once resided.93 From this it seemed natural to conclude that one 
of these two manuscripts was in fact the text used by Berthold, which would 
account for his consequential misattribution of the Clavis to a Greek abbot, 
Theodorus (even though the Clavis is listed anonymously in the library cata-
logues in question). However, in a review of Paolo Lucentini’s Platonismo medi-
evale published nearly 30 years later, d’Alverny announced that, after more a 
careful inspection of the manuscript and in consultation with other experts, 
she had revised her hypothesis about the manuscript’s Bavarian origins: the 
scribal hand would rather locate the text in the region around Cologne, while 
the extraordinary frontispieces and illustrations adorning the manuscript that 
provoked Berthold’s misattribution follow a style more characteristic of the 
Mosel valley.94
This has important consequences for the dating of the Expositio, since the 
most convincing terminus post quem had been proposed by Loris Sturlese in 
1974 on the assumption that Berthold’s Clavis came from Regensburg. If this 
were the case, and by 1327 Berthold already had at his disposal the texts that 
would become the foundations of his commentary (the Elementatio theolog-
ica, the Tria opuscula, at least some of Dietrich’s works, and the Clavis physicae 
and, we would now add, the Sapientiale of Thomas of York), then all the condi-
tions would be in place to begin the Expositio as we know it.95 Now, however, 
we must share d’Alverny’s reservations, and ask with her why Berthold could 
not have found the Clavis in “Cologne or its environs”.96 This in turn revises 
the dating of the Expositio, since we have seen that by 1323 Berthold probably 
already had access to at least one very valuable manuscript from Cologne (the 
autograph treatises on natural philosophy by Albert the Great) and possibly 
 92 Sturlese, “Introduzione”, p. xxi- xxii, xliii- xlv; P. Lucentini, “Introduzione”, in Honorius 
Augustodunensis, Clavis physicae, ed. P. Lucentini (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 
1974), p. ix– xv.
 93 M.- Th. D’Alverny, “Le cosmos symbolique du XIIe siècle”, in Archives d’histoire doctrinale et 
littéraire du Moyen Âge 20(1953), p. 31– 81, at p. 34, n. 1 and 36, n. 1.
 94 M.- Th. D’Alverny, “Paolo Lucentini, Platonismo medievale. Contribua per la storia dell’Eri-
ugenismo”, in Scriptorium 36/ 2(1982), p. 348– 351, at p. 349.
 95 Sturlese, “Introduzione”, p. xxii.












the astronomical works now in Dresden. It is conceivable that he had also 
encountered the Clavis at that time.
It is undeniable that the Eriugenian contents of the Clavis physicae would 
play a pivotal role in the execution of Berthold’s commentary on the Elementatio 
theologica. Eriugena’s thought came to Berthold from four sources: (1) the Clavis 
physicae, which was by far its most important conduit, which Berthold attrib-
uted to a Theodorus, “the abbot of Constantinople”;97 (2) the glosses appended 
to the famous Parisian Corpus Dionysiacum (ms Paris, Bibliothèque nationale 
de France, lat. 17341) which derived from Eriugena but, by the mid- 13th century, 
were indiscriminately attributed to Maximus – all of which Berthold knew only 
second- hand through Albert the Great, Ulrich of Strassburg, and Thomas of 
York;98 (3) the Liber de causis primis et secundis et fluxu quod ad ea consequitur, 
which Berthold called De causa causarum and attributed to Al- Farabi;99 and 
(4) Eriugena’s Homily on the Gospel of John, which like many other medieval 
authors Berthold attributed to Origen.100 The doctrinal and verbal correspond-
ences between these texts did not escape Berthold’s notice. In a more detailed 
analysis of Berthold’s use of these sources, I have argued that he proceeded as 
if texts 1 and 2, written by Theodorus the abbot and “Maximus the monk”, as he 
was named in the Clavis, belonged to the same Greek tradition of commentary 
on Dionysius the Areopagite.101
 97 Honorius Augustodunensis, Clavis physicae, ed. P. Lucentini (Roma: Edizioni di Storia et 
Letteratura, 1974); Honorius Augustodunensis, La Clavis physicae (316– 529) di Honorius 
Augustodunensis, ed. P. Arfé (Napoli: Liguori Editore, 2012).
 98 On this manuscript and its influence, see H.- F. Dondaine, Le Corpus dionysien de l’univer-
sité de Paris au XIIIe siècle (Roma: Edizioni di Storia et Letteratura, 1953), p. 69– 71, 88– 89, 
101, and 118.
 99 R. de Vaux, Notes et textes sur l’avicennisme latin aux confins des XIIe- XIIIe siècles 
(Paris: Vrin, 1934), p. 83– 140. See also M.- Th. D’Alverny, “Une rencontre symbolique de 
Jean Scot Érigène et d’Avicenne. Notes sur le De causis primis et secundis et fluxu qui 
consequitur eas”, in J.J. O’Meara, L. Bieler (eds), The Mind of Eriugena (Dublin: Irish 
University Press for the Royal Irish Academy, 1973), p. 170– 181. Berthold used no chap-
ter divisions for this text, and sometimes referred to it only by its incipit (Principium 
principiorum Deus est gloriosus, at 56D and 99B) or cited it only with the attribution to 
Al- Farabi (170H).
 100 See John Scotus Eriugena, L’Homélie sur le prologue de Jean, ed. É. Jeauneau (Paris: Cerf, 
1969), p. 53– 54.
 101 E. King, “Eriugenism in Berthold of Moosburg’s Expositio super Elementationem theo-
logicam Procli”, in D. Calma (ed.), Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Vol. 1. Western 
Scholarly Networks and Debates (Leiden: Brill, 2019), p. 394– 437, at 395– 414. On Berthold’s 
reception of Eriugena’s doctrine of the primordial causes, see the extensive and funda-
mental study of E. Ludueña, La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg. Un aporte 












It was under the banner of Dionysius, then, that Berthold received two cru-
cial doctrines that enabled him to navigate the most difficult passages of the 
Elementatio theologica for a Christian to accept. The notion of the primordial 
causes (causae primordiales) made by God the Father in the Word became the 
key to Berthold’s interpretation of the gods, unities, or goodnesses (unitates, 
bonitates) located between the One and beings, which could be assimilated to 
the divine processions of Dionysius and the divine ideas of Augustine. Similarly, 
the Eriugenian doctrine of the spiritual body, which belongs to the human 
as the image of God (imago Dei) in Paradise, along with Eriugena’s concom-
itant teaching about the resurrected body, became Berthold’s only Christian 
guides for interpreting Proclus’ notion in Proposition 196 of the indestructible 
spiritual body or “vehicle” (ὄχημα, susceptaculum) that is always united to the 
soul. Notwithstanding his initial hesitations, as we will see, Berthold included 
the doctrine of the spiritual body transmitted in the Clavis partly because it 
came to him with the Patristic authority of Dionysius, Gregory (=Gregory of 
Nyssa), and Maximus,102 and also because it could be explained using the 
ontology of individuation he inherited from Dietrich of Freiberg.
In the Expositio, Berthold cited passages from 93 different chapters of the 
Clavis (out of 529) for a total of 132 citations.103 In his lengthier citations, he 
identified the speakers in the dialogue, the Magister or Discipulus, who were 
depicted on one of his manuscript’s frontispieces as Theodorus the abbot of 
Constantinople and John the Monk. As was his custom with older sources, 
Berthold’s citations of the Clavis were almost always explicit, although he 
sometimes copied the text without attribution for teachings from even earlier 
authorities like Dionysius or Maximus (e.g. 119E).
In light of the distribution of citations in the Expositio, one can note that 
Berthold looked to the Clavis physicae principally in relation to the two chal-
lenging topics just mentioned: the gods and the spiritual body. The most exten-
sive and sustained concentration of citations (25) falls between Propositions 
120– 129, on the gods and their providence. The most intensive concentrations 
 102 See 5.1, n. 30, below.
 103 I follow the enumeration of the chapters of the Clavis in the critical editions of Paolo 
Lucentini and Pasquale Arfé, but it must be noted that the subject headings in the margins 
of the manuscript used by Berthold do not always correspond to them. Berthold referred 
to the Clavis physicae as a continuous whole. He used the same relative references for 
citations that are clustered close together (e.g., 2A: parum supra, aliqualiter infra), and 
passages which were far apart (in 196F, bene infra signals a leap from  chapters 105 to 272, 
but in 3A only from 137 to 142). Sometimes (e.g., 80G) he referred both to the approxi-
mate location in the manuscript (circa medium) and gives a vague reference to the subject 






are found in Propositions 196 (seven) and 210 (12), with other citations clus-
tered nearby, which are the central passages in the Elementatio on the doctrine 
of the soul’s imperishable, immaterial body or vehicle.
The following table, in the first column, indicates the marginal crosses and 
notabilia written by Berthold in his manuscript (with any brief glosses in his 
hand). The second column includes references to the critical editions of Paolo 
Lucentini and Pasquale Arfé. Finally, in the third column are any passages in 
the Expositio where these texts from the Clavis were used.104
Unlike the Macrobius and Proclus glosses in the Basel manuscript, here there 
are only the briefest of notabilia and no references to any other authorities. 
Nevertheless, there is a clear correspondence between roughly half of the mar-
ginal trefoils and the citations from the Clavis in the Expositio. As Berthold stud-
ied the Clavis, it seems from his marginalia that certain ideas especially caught 
his attention, all of which would feature later in his commentary on Proclus: the 
theory of the invisible “universal” elements mediating between what is entirely 
spiritual and what is entirely corporeal (Clavis, c. 43, 76, 83, 221, 273, 440, 442); 
the doctrine of the spiritual body (Clavis, c. 102, 103, 105, 272, 273, 486, 487); the 
primordial causes (Clavis, c. 16, 86, 91, 170); the return of all things to their causes 
(Clavis, c. 308, 441, 459); human nature as imago Dei (Clavis, c. 94, 242); the good-
ness of creation and its substantiality (Clavis, c. 361, 451); and theophany (Clavis, 
c. 13). Now, it is true that the Eriugenian doctrine of the primordial causes also 
came to Berthold in the glosses on Dionysius and the De causis primis et secundis. 
But what the Clavis had that these texts lacked were its considerations of bodies 
that are invisible (the pure elements) and spiritual (the Paradisal body). The 
Clavis thus provided doctrines that could relate the highest (primordial causes) 
and lowest (invisible and spiritual bodies) cosmological realities studied in the 
Elementatio theologica to other disciplines, whether to Christian theology or to 
the disciplines of natural philosophy that seem to have especially interested 
Berthold (optics, astronomy, the theory of the four elements, meteorology).
The Expositio, it must be said, represents the most extensive reception of 
Eriugena’s thought known to date. Nevertheless, it is worth bearing in mind that, 
unlike most of the medieval authors influenced by the Irishman,105 Berthold 
 104 A conferre indicates that a citation occurs in the Expositio that is closely related to, but 
not identical with, the text marked in the manuscript. This table omits the corrections to 
the text and the transliterations written in the margins by Berthold, which are listed by 
Sturlese, “Introduzione”, p. xliv- xlv.
 105 P. Lucentini, Platonismo medievale. Contributi per la storia dell’eriugenismo (Firenze: La 
Nuova Italia, 1980); J. Marenbon, From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre. Logic, 
Theology and Philosophy in the Early Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University 






table 3 Berthold of Moosburg’s marginalia to the Clavis physicae
Paris, BnF, lat. 6734 Clavis physicae Expositio
f. 7v 13 (p. 10, l. 4- 7) - - - - - 
f. 9r 16 (p. 12, l. 6- 10) - - - - - 
f. 16v 43 (p. 27, l. 14- 17) - - - - - 
f. 31r 76 (p. 54, l. 8) 129A, 210E, 210I
f. 35r 83 (p. 60, l. 18) - - - - - 
f. 35v 86 (p. 61, l. 1- 2) Cf. Prol. 4
f. 38v 91 (p. 66, l. 30- 31) 126B
f. 38v 91 (p. 66, l. 39- 40) 126B
f. 39v 94 (p. 68, l. 21- 22) 196F
f. 42v 102 (p. 74, l. 28- 29) 196F
f. 42v- 43r 102 (p. 74, l. 37) 196F
f. 43r 103 (p. 75, l. 10- 11) 196F
f. 43v 105 (p. 76, l. 4- 6) 196F
f. 78r 170 (p. 135, l. 9- 10) Cf. 140D
f. 97v 221 (p. 172, l. 2- 3) - - - - - 
f. 106v 242 (p. 191, l. 8- 9) - - - - - 
f. 120v
[de corpore spirituali]
272 (p. 219, l. 2- 4) 196F, 210E
f. 121r 273 (p. 221, l. 18- 19) Cf. 196F, 210C, 210M
f. 140v 308 (p. 261, l. 17- 18) - - - - - 
f. 158v 360 (p. 94, l. 1000- 1002) 18C
f. 159r 361 (p. 95, l. 1039- 1040) 18C
f. 200v
[catholica elementa]
440 (p. 168, l. 3507- 3509) - - - - - 
f. 200v 441 (p. 168, l. 3522- 3528) - - - - - 
f. 201v
[prima materies]
442 (p. 170, l. 3591- 3598) - - - - - 
f. 202r
[secunda materies]
442 (p. 170, l. 3599- 3601) - - - - - 
f. 208v 451 (p. 181, l. 3991- 3993) - - - - - 
f. 212r 459 (p. 188, l. 4206- 4207) - - - - - 
f. 228v 486 (p. 215, l. 5162- 5163) - - - - - 
f. 229v 487 (p. 216, l. 5223- 5224) - - - - - 
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seemed to be unaware that these ideas we would classify as Eriugenian derived 
from one author. To this rule there is only one exception, and it is related to 
the fact that the name Ioannes Scotus appears in the list of Doctors of the 
Church, “from whose books and teachings the commentary of the Elementatio 
theologica that follows was compiled”.106 In fact, the name Ioannes Scotus is 
found in the table of only one of the two extant manuscripts of the Expositio, 
having been inadvertently or deliberately omitted from ms Vaticano (Città 
del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2192. Whatever the reasons for 
this omission may have been, it is very unlikely that Berthold regarded John 
Scotus as the author behind the doctrines transmitted in the Clavis physicae 
or as the source behind his other three Eriugenian texts. The only explicit 
mention of Ioannes Scotus in the Expositio appears in a passage taken from 
Albert the Great’s Summa theologiae on God’s condescension to the created 
intellect in veils and theophanies that are required at the beginning of the 
intellect’s ascent. Here, John the Scot is mentioned alongside John the Saracen 
(Ioannes Saracenus) as commentators on the Areopagite.107 Since both figures 
are mentioned together in the table of Doctors of the Church, it could be that 
Berthold included them in that list simply because he believed they belonged 
to a tradition of commentary on Dionysius; since for Berthold the authority of 
Dionysius was upheld by “infallible reason”, this fact alone could make both 
commentators worthy of membership.108
In the 16th- century chronicle of Albert de Castello, the Brevis et compendi-
osa cronica de magistris generalibus et viris illustribus ordinis praedicatorum, at 
least five works are attributed to Berthold of Moosburg:
Father Berthold of Moosburg wrote a large volume on the philosophy 
of Plato, a commentary on the Elements of Proclus, another on the pole 
of the rainbow that explains Aristotle’s obscure meaning in the third 
 106 See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus, 
Propositiones 1- 13, p. 3, l. 21. Since there is no evidence to the contrary, I assume two tables 
of authors were written by Berthold himself and appended to the Expositio.
 107 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 16, p. 25, l. 665– 671. See Albert the Great, Summa 
theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei. Libri I, pars I. Quaestiones 1- 50A, ed. D. Siedler 
(Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1978), pars i, tr. 3, q. 13, c. 1, p. 40, l. 3- 11: Quod verbum Ioannes 
Scotus et Ioannes Saracenus in Commentis […].
 108 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 159C, p. 193, l. 142– 143: cum secundum Dionysium, cuius 
auctoritas praevalet, cum innitatur infallibili rationi, angeli sint immateriales. A notable 
exception to this, however, would be Thomas Gallus, who was cited at Expositio, Prol. 4 








book of the Meteorology, a Summa theologiae, and many things on 
astronomy.109
Apart from the Expositio, the other four works are otherwise unattested. It is 
interesting to observe, with Helmut Boese, that the works listed by Albert de 
Castello correspond quite closely to the materials we know independently to 
have been related to Berthold’s library and teaching.110 It is indeed difficult to 
imagine that Albert de Castello was writing with direct knowledge of Berthold’s 
works, and that there existed a “large volume” on Platonic philosophy greater 
than the Dominican’s vast commentary on the Elementatio theologica. The 
“large volume on the philosophy of Plato” might, therefore, refer to a collection 
of Neoplatonic works that could have included Macrobius, the Tria opuscula, 
and the Elementatio physica, that are now bound in ms Basel, ub, F.iv.31. The 
commentary on the pole of the rainbow could be a conjecture based on the 
glosses to Dietrich of Freiberg’s De iride in ms Basel, ub, F.iv.30. The existence 
of Berthold’s Summa theologiae, which if anything would have been the prod-
uct of his undated lectorship at Heilig Kreuz, has been questioned by Boese. 
Loris Sturlese has shown that Berthold had access to a manuscript of the 
Summa theologiae of Albert the Great superior to any other known witness 
and made use of both of its major parts.111 Since, of all the works of Albert used 
in the Expositio, the Summa theologiae was cited most, we might assume that 
this lost manuscript of the Summa also bore Berthold’s ex libris. Finally, the 
“many works on astronomy” could refer to the treatises in the Dresden manu-
script bearing Berthold’s ex libris.
 109 Albert’s chronicle appeared in three editions (1504, 1506, 1516), the last of which is pub-
lished in R. Creytens, “Les écrivains dominicains dans la chronique d’Albert de Castello 
(1516)”, in Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 30(1960), p. 227– 313, at p. 283, and Kaeppeli, 
Scriptores, vol. 1, p. 240: Fr. Bertoldus de Moysborch scripsit magnum volumen in philoso-
phia Platonis. Item super librum elementationem Procli. Item de polo yridis, exponens 
intentionem Aristotelis obscuram in tertia methaurorum. Item summam theologie. Item 
in astronomia plura. Berthold’s name, listed among other German friars under the year 
1355, was added in the edition of 1516, when the number of authors included by Albert 
increased from 75 to 275.
 110 Boese, Wilhelm von Moerbeke, p. 73– 74.
 111 L. Sturlese, “Super Dionysii Mysticam theologiam et Epistulas, ed. P. Simon (Alberti Magni 
Opera omnia, t. xxxvii, pars 2) and Summa theologiae sive de mirabilia scientia Dei, Libri 
I pars 1, Quaestiones 1- 50A, ed. D. Siedler (Alberti Magni Opera omnia, t. xxxiv, 1)”, in 
Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Classe di Lettere e Filosofia, Series iii, 10/ 
4(1980), p. 1691– 1698, at p. 1692– 1697. On this evidence, we can only surmise that it is pos-
sible that the Summa attributed to Berthold was in fact Albert’s, but not “certain” as Boese 








Sometime around the end of Berthold’s life, or perhaps following his death, 
his library began to disperse from Heilig Kreuz in Cologne. In 1363, a Dominican 
from the Viennese convent, Jodocus of Gorizia, copied Dietrich of Freiberg’s 
De origine rerum praedicamentalium and Proclus’ De decem dubitationibus 
circa providentiam (the text ends abruptly before the treatise’s tenth and final 
question) and took these from Cologne, along with the Albert autographs now 
in ms Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. Vindob. 273. Jodocus 
brought the texts either directly to Vienna or to the convent in Krems, whence 
they made their way to Vienna in 1395.112 Helmut Boese has indicated that this 
copy of Proclus, clearly written by Jodocus himself, appears to depend directly 
on Berthold’s personal text of the Opuscula that later came to Basel. He also 
surmises that the inexplicably abrupt ending of the De decem dubitationibus 
and Jodocus’ premature departure from Cologne (assuming he had intended 
to copy all the Opuscula) may have been related to the disturbance caused by 
Berthold’s death. According to Boese, then, since the colophon dates the copy 
of Dietrich’s De origine to the eve of Pentecost 1363 (20 May), and since there 
would not have been much scribal work undertaken in Whitsuntide, Berthold’s 
passing might have occurred sometime in late May or early June 1363.113 What 
is clear, in any case, is that Berthold’s copy of the Tria opuscula remained in 
Cologne until the turn of the 15th century, perhaps as late as 1407, approxi-
mately when a copy of it was made there for the library of Amplonius Rating 
in Erfurt, and when the treatises were finally bound in their current form and 
made their way from Cologne to Basel.114
The two extant manuscripts of the Expositio, both made roughly a cen-
tury after its composition, were copied in Cologne. The Vatican manuscript 
(ms Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2192) was made in 1437 by the 
Dominican Conrad Keller, who served as prior of the Rottweil convent.115 The 
 112 On this transmission, see I. Frank, “Zum Albertus- Autograph in der Österreichischen 
Nationalbibliothek und zum ‘Albertinismus’ der Wiener Dominikaner im Spätmittelalter”, 
in G. Meyer, A. Zimmermann (eds), Albertus Magnus – Doctor Universalis 1280– 1980 
(Mainz: Matthias- Grünewald- Verlag, 1980), p. 89– 117. The explicit of Jodocus’ copy of 
Dietrich and a summary of Frank’s article can be found in Sturlese, Dokumente und 
Forschungen, p. 120– 126.
 113 Boese, Wilhelm von Moerbeke, p. 72– 73.
 114 Boese, Wilhelm von Moerbeke, p. 76– 79. Loris Sturlese’s suggestion (“Introduzione”, 
p. lix, n. 54) that Berthold’s interventions can be detected in a manuscript of Dietrich 
of Freiberg’s works now in ms Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf, ca. F 72, is stated 
more cautiously in Sturlese, Dokumente und Forschungen, p. 94: “ob diese Korrekturen von 
der Hand Bertholds von Moosburg stammen, läßt sich nicht mit Sicherheit endscheiden”.










Oxford manuscript (ms Balliol College Library, Cod. 224B) was written by order 
of William Gray in Cologne in 1444, before he embarked to Padua on the next 
stage of his European tour.116 Having served as chancellor of the University of 
Oxford from 1440– 1442, William had matriculated at the University of Cologne 
on 1 December 1442 along with his two assistants, masters Richard Bole and 
Nicholas Saxton.117 These two witnesses, and the obscure but significant refer-
ence to the Expositio in Nicholas of Cusa’s Apologia doctae ignorantiae, written 
in 1449, suggest that Berthold’s work was receiving greater attention in the sec-
ond quarter of the 15th century.118
Surveying the traces of Berthold’s library, we may conclude that the only 
manuscripts whose use can be dated with any certainty are those of Macrobius 
and Proclus (ms Basel, ub, F.iv.31), with their glosses and annotations, and the 
Vienna autographs of Albert (ms önb, Cod. Vindob. 273). These, and proba-
bly the astronomical works in the Dresden manuscript (ms slb, Db. 87) and 
possibly the scientific treatises in Munich (ms bsb, Clm 14448), were known 
to Berthold around 1323. The Vienna autographs, the Dresden astronomical 
treatises, and the Cologne autograph of Albert’s De animalibus (ms ha, W 
258a), show that much of Berthold’s extant library, which seems to have been 
particularly focused on natural philosophy, was closely related to and depend-
ent upon the convent of Heilig Kreuz in Cologne. With the date of 1323 as our 
only anchor, we may suppose that Berthold’s connection with Heilig Kreuz 
preceded his appearances in the city’s records that began in 1335. As we can no 
longer associate his manuscript of the Clavis physicae directly with Regensburg 
and his lectorship there in 1327, and since we do not know whether Berthold 
discovered it in the region of Cologne, where it seems to have originated, or 
elsewhere, we must revise the most convincing terminus post quem for the 
Expositio in 1327 – not to mention the terminus post quem of 1335, which has 
been asserted on the assumption that Berthold’s lectorship in Cologne would 
have had something to do with the commentary and the internal politics of 
the order as it responded to the trial of Meister Eckhart (d. 1328). In our study 
of the Expositio, we will indeed find some striking echoes of Eckhart’s thought 
at crucial junctures of the commentary, but our survey of Berthold’s career and 
library gives us no reason to connect his lectorship, whose character was prob-
ably traditional and whose dating is unknown, with the Expositio. While we 
 116 R.M. Haines, “Grey, William (c.1414– 1478)”, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(Oxford University Press, 2004), online edition, May 2011.
 117 H. Keussen, Die Matrikel der Universität Köln. Erster Band: 1389– 1475 (Bonn: Hanstein, 
1928), p. 457.








may more strongly affirm that the commentary project was likely undertaken 
while Berthold made use of the resources of the Dominican library in Cologne, 
but we must admit now that it could have begun any time after 1323.
If the content of Berthold’s marginal annotations reveals anything about 
the formation of his commentary project, it suggests that the Tria opuscula 
was, so to speak, the major and perhaps last piece of the puzzle to fall into 
place. If the texts of Macrobius and the Opuscula were copied roughly at the 
same time, and if the glosses on Macrobius were mostly written before 1323, 
and if we find that Berthold was only beginning to master the contents of the 
Opuscula at that time (as his system of dots and numerals to parse the trans-
lation would suggest), then it is conceivable that it was with the latter that a 
new perspective on Proclus and his achievements came into full view. In the 
Macrobius glosses, we find the Elementatio theologica, the Liber de causis, and 
Avicenna cited as if Berthold held them to be basically in agreement on cen-
tral doctrines of cosmology, even if Proclus was the most sophisticated of the 
group. No special emphasis there was placed on the Good or any principles 
“beyond being” in Proclus or Dionysius. In the Expositio it was very much oth-
erwise. We will see that Berthold’s subordination of the Liber de causis and 
the entire Aristotelian tradition of the metaphysics to the Platonic science of 
the One and Good was only possible on the basis of the Tria opuscula, which 
showed Berthold a Proclus whose anthropology and account of the modes of 
knowledge and ignorance was in a deeper agreement with the De mystica theo-
logia of Dionysius than his predecessors and contemporaries had realised. This 
gave an entirely new significance and even urgency to the correct understand-
ing of the principles or “thearchy” that the best of the pagan and Christian 
Platonists located beyond thought and being. For this Proclean and Dionysian 
anthropology implied a fundamentally different approach to the divine that 
seeks union with God through supra- intellectual ignorance and through the 
awareness of a principle in the soul that is prior to intellect. In the Macrobius 
glosses, we see a Proclus of the Elementatio theologica whose doctrinal author-
ity, even if Berthold cited it more than any other text, was approximately level 
with the Peripatetic metaphysical tradition; in the Expositio, we have a Proclus 
of a soteriological science of the Good, who has left us the Elementatio theo-
logica as the rational and discursive ladder to the non- discursive apprehension 
of the divine and, within and beyond even that contemplative beatitude, to 
deification.119 As Proclus had described it in two of passages of the Opuscula, 
such was the goal of Platonic philosophy: a state of cooperative union with the 
 119 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. L, p. 49, l. 408– 414 and p. 51, 475– 483. 
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divine providence in generative silence, in which the soul “lives the divine life” 
to the extent it is able.120 Berthold drew attention to both passages in his man-
uscript of Proclus with manicules (see  figures 3 and 4, below).121 It is perhaps 
in Berthold’s first encounter with these ideas that we discern the dawn of the 
Expositio.
3 The Commentary on Proclus: Background, Purpose, and Exegetical 
Methods
The features of the Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli that 
first strike the reader are its length (amounting to eight volumes and approxi-
mately 1,900 pages in the critical edition of commentary on a text of less than 
100 pages in length), its methodical composition and repetitive style of exe-
gesis, and its critical attitude toward the Metaphysics of Aristotle and, espe-
cially, the Liber de causis. These characteristics suggest that the Expositio was 
intended to serve a pedagogical purpose within the Dominican order. In terms 
of its content, at the very least, Berthold leaves his reader with the impres-
sion that Aristotle’s Metaphysics has value exclusively as a logical considera-
tion of being and its properties. This unusual but consistent portrayal of the 
Metaphysics would entail that, while its importance would be reassessed and 
relativised by the divine science of the Platonists, it would not be abolished 
or supplanted. Berthold’s attitude in the Expositio toward the Liber de causis, 
however, was entirely negative: he presented it both as an incomparably infe-
rior realisation of the propositional or theorematic method in theology and as 
a baleful extrapolation of the logical consideration of being into the domain 
of the separate substances, as when it stated in Proposition 4 that the first of 
 120 Proclus, De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam, q. 10, §64, p. 106, l. 9- 12; id. De provi-
dentia et fato, c. 8, §32, p. 140, l. 1- 9.
 121 The other passages marked in this way in ms Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.iv.31, are: f. 
60rb (De providentia, c. 3, §5, p. 112, l. 11– 12: “the demonic Aristotle”, demonius Aristotiles); 
f. 63rb (De providentia, c. 7, §24, p. 134, l. 10– 11: Plato on virtue as a “voluntary slavery” to 
the gods that is the greatest freedom); f. 65rb (De providentia, c. 10, §38, p. 146, l. 3- 5: the 
futility of prayer if human freedom is denied); f. 67rb (De providentia, c. 13, §52, p. 162, 
l. 12– 15: souls desire to leave the body in order to enjoy deifying intelligence, deificam 
intelligentiam, superior to intellect, and hope to gain a supernatural and divine compre-
hension of all things, supernaturali hac et divinali entium comprehensione); f. 70va- b (De 
malorum subsistentia, c. 1, §4, p. 178, l. 23– 25: the oppositions of good and evil found in the 
world first take root hiddenly in the soul when the higher and rational part of the soul is 
overcome by passions); f. 73ra (De malorum subsistentia, c. 3, §14, p. 194, l. 8- 18: angels are 







 figure 1  Glosses on Macrobius, In 
Somnium Scipionis (i.14.6- 7). ms 
Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, 
F.iv.31, f. 17r
 figure 2  Gloss on Macrobius, In 
Somnium Scipionis (i.17.5). ms 
Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, 
F.iv.31, f. 20r
 figure 3  Marginalia on Proclus, De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam (q. 10, §64). ms 
Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.iv.31, f. 59ra
 figure 4  Marginalia on Proclus, De providentia et fato (c. 8, §32). ms Basel, 






created things is “being” rather than “good”. If the Liber de causis was still being 
taught in the schools – and even this must remain hypothetical given our lack 
of documentation from the German provinces of this period – then we would 
assume that Berthold set out to enshrine the Elementatio theologica in its 
place. Since the Expositio is, however, silent about its pedagogical motives or 
intended audience, we can only surmise the ends this commentary could have 
served by looking to some thematically comparable projects among Berthold’s 
Dominican predecessors from the point of view, first, of content (exegeses of 
the Liber de causis) and then of form (philosophical compilations). Since the 
most striking parallels in both instances appear mostly, though not exclusively, 
among his German Dominican contemporaries and precursors, we must say a 
word about developments in the scholarly understanding of this context.
Following the path opened by Martin Grabmann in his studies on Ulrich of 
Strassburg in the 1920s, scholars have elaborated, criticised, and refined the his-
toriographical notion of a “German Dominican school” that is thought to have 
spanned from the founding of the studium generale in Cologne in 1245 to the 
mid- 14th century. When these paths were being charted, historians focused on 
the common authorities, questions, and debates that engaged many of the phi-
losophers whose texts, for the most part, are now critically edited in the Corpus 
Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi (Ulrich of Strassburg, Dietrich of 
Freiberg, John Picardi of Lichtenberg, Henry of Lübeck, Nicholas of Strassburg, 
and Berthold of Moosburg), with other figures like Meister Eckhart, John and 
Gerard of Sterngassen, Henry Suso, and John Tauler emerging out of this intel-
lectual culture.122 When Albert the Great was held to be the founding figure in 
this current, “the German Dominican school” at times became synonymous 
with the notion of an Albertschule.123 Gradually, the closer scrutiny of the texts 
 122 Sturlese, “Alle origini della mistica speculativa tedesca”; id., “Gottebenbildlichkeit und 
Beseelung des Himmels in den Quodlibeta Heinrichs von Lübeck OP”, in Freiburger 
Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 24(1977), p. 191– 233; id., “Albert der Große und die 
deutsche philosophische Kultur des Mittelalters”, in Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie 
und Theologie 28(1981), p. 133– 147; id., “Proclo ed Ermete in Germania da Alberto Magno 
a Bertoldo di Moosburg. Per una prospettiva di ricerca sulla cultura filosofica tedesca nel 
secolo delle sue origini (1250– 1350)”, in K. Flasch (ed.), Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister 
Eckhart (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 22– 33; id., “Il dibattito sul Proclo latino nel medioevo 
fra l’università di Parigi e lo studium di Colonia”, in G. Boss, G. Seel (eds), Proclos et son 
influence. Actes du colloque de Neuchâtel, juin 1985 (Zürich: Éditions du Grand Midi, 1987), 
p. 261– 285; A. Beccarisi, “Le Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi (CPTMA)”, 
in Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 57(2010), p. 425– 430.
 123 See the discussion in A. de Libera, “Albert le Grand et la mystique allemande”, in M.J.F.M. 
Hoenen, J.H.J. Schneider, G. Wieland (eds), Philosophy and Learning. Universities in the 






gave way to a sense of greater diversity among these figures, as Ruedi Imbach 
spoke of “three models of mystical theology” in the Dominican school associ-
ated with Henry Suso, Dietrich of Freiberg, and Berthold of Moosburg.124 The 
opposed attitudes of these German authors to the thought of Thomas Aquinas 
has sometimes been used as a standard of further classification.125 But even 
Dietrich of Freiberg, one of the most outspoken critics of Thomism in the late 
13th century, differed from Albert on major doctrinal questions, as Kurt Flasch 
has shown.126 Niklaus Largier has gone furthest to question the utility of the 
notion of a German Dominican “school” altogether, given that we often lack 
solid evidence of any direct institutional links between these generations of 
thinkers and, as had become increasingly clear, such a term can obscure impor-
tant divergences among those authors.127 If the notion of a “school” implies 
too much uniformity, it seems that some heuristic tool is still needed that is 
flexible enough to underline the similarities between these authors. Perhaps 
the more pliable “regional” approach, proposed by Loris Sturlese in another 
context, with its attentiveness to common sources, questions, and debates, can 
retain the heuristic value of a “school” without assuming or imposing doctrinal 
continuities.128 But even here we must remain sensitive to the fact that, for 
 124 R. Imbach, “Die deutsche Dominikanerschule. Drei Modelle einer Theologia mystica”, 
in M. Schmidt, D.R. Bauer (eds), Grundfragen christlicher Mystik. Wissenschaftliche 
Studientagung Theologia mystica in Weingarten vom 7.- 10. November 1985 (Stuttgart- Bad 
Cannstatt: Frommann- Holzboog, 1987), p. 157– 172.
 125 L. Sturlese, “Eckhart, Teodorico e Picardi nella Summa philosophiae di Nicola di 
Strasburgo. Documenti per una storia della filosofia medievale tedesca”, in Giornale 
critico della filosofia italiana 61(1982), p. 183– 206; P. Porro, “Essere e essenza in Giovanni 
Picardi di Lichtenberg. Note sulla prima ricezione del tomismo a Colonia”, in M. Pickavé 
(ed.), Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan. A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2003), p. 226– 245. See also the special issue of the Freiburger 
Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 57(2010).
 126 K. Flasch, “Von Dietrich zu Albert”, in Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 
32(1985), p. 7– 28; id., Dietrich von Freiberg, 407– 409; id., “Dietrich von Freiberg und Siger 
von Brabant. Eine Studie zur ‘Schule’ Alberts des Großen”, in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, 
P. Porro (eds), Per perscrutationem philosophicam, p. 127– 141. See also A. Beccarisi, “Ex 
Germano in rebus divinis. ‘Spekulative’ und ‘deutsche’ Mystik im Kontext”, in Quaestio 
15(2015), p. 169– 182.
 127 N. Largier, “Die ‘deutsche Dominikanerschule’. Zur Problematik eines historiographis-
chen Konzepts”, in J. Aertsen, A. Speer (eds), Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2000), p. 202– 213.
 128 L. Sturlese, “Universality of Reason and Plurality of Philosophies in the Middle Ages. 
Geography of Readers and Isograph of Text Diffusion before the Invention of Printing”, 
in A. Musco et al. (eds), Universality of Reason, Plurality of Philosophies in the Middle 
Ages. XII Congresso internazionale di filosofia medievale. Palermo, 17– 22 September 












example, Dietrich of Freiberg was deeply influenced by his lengthy sojourns 
at the University of Paris, just as Berthold was by his more limited exposure to 
texts and ideas in Oxford.
We will see that the philosophical motivations for Berthold’s valorisation 
of Proclus arose within the thematics and debates of his German Dominican 
milieu, above all in his inheritance of the thought of Dietrich of Freiberg, and 
that this reception also led Berthold to look outside his immediate context 
for resources and inspiration. His use of Thomas of York’s Sapientiale, likely 
acquired in Oxford, is the most important in this regard. Another example is 
Berthold’s acknowledged debt to Thomas Aquinas, whom he placed before 
Albert, Ulrich, and Dietrich in the list of Doctors of the Church affixed to the 
Expositio (sanctus Thomas de Aquino). We should not underestimate Aquinas’ 
importance for any later medieval commentator on the Liber de causis or 
the Elementatio theologica, let alone a Dominican. Aquinas’ erudite compar-
ison of the Liber de causis with the Elementatio theologica and the writings 
of Dionysius, and his identification of the Liber de causis as in some sense a 
Platonic text because of its reliance on the Elementatio, was a watershed in 
this history.129 The most comprehensive survey of the medieval commentary 
traditions on the Elementatio and Liber de causis, which are still being uncov-
ered, tells us that “the Latin legacy of the Elements of Theology is bound up 
with Thomas Aquinas’ commentary on the Book of Causes”.130 Berthold was 
undoubtedly a witness to this trend.131 Aquinas’ methodical discussions of the 
Elementatio in the course of his commentary on the Liber de causis would have 
been one of the very few precedents Berthold could look to for insights into 
Proclus’ text, apart from some scattered citations in Albert’s Summa theolo-
giae and Dietrich of Freiberg. To appreciate the novelty of Berthold’s project 
when viewed from this angle, it is important that we have in the background 
the complex and ambiguous position Aquinas adopted throughout his career 
 129 Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis Expositio, ed. H.D. Saffrey (Paris: Vrin, 2002), 
prooemium, p. 3, l. 7- 10: unde videtur ab aliquo philosophorum arabum ex praedicto libro 
Procli excerptus, praesertim quia omnia quae in hoc libro continentur, multo plenius et diffu-
sius continentur in illo.
 130 D. Calma, “The Exegetical Tradition of Medieval Neoplatonism. Considerations of a 
Recently Discovered Corpus of Texts”, in D. Calma (ed.), Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages, 
I. New Commentaries on Liber de causis (ca. 1250– 1350) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), p. 11– 
52, at p. 11 and 27– 40. On Aquinas’ commentary, see A. de Libera, “Albert le Grand et 
Thomas d’Aquin interprètes du Liber de Causis”, in Revue des sciences philosophiques et 
théologiques 74(1990), p. 347– 378; C. D’Ancona, “Saint Thomas lecteur du Liber de causis”, 
in Revue thomiste 92(1992), p. 785– 817.









concerning the interrelation of the authorities of Plato, Aristotle, Dionysius, 
Proclus, and the Liber de causis.
Central to that question was the status of the separate substances. When he 
read Proclus, Aquinas re- enacted Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s doctrine of ideas 
in the Metaphysics, directing it against Proclus’ notion of “gods” beneath the One 
by interpreting these gods as “intelligibles” subsisting outside the separate intel-
lects. According to Aquinas, the Liber de causis avoided this error, which brought 
it closer to Dionysius, Aristotle, and the truth of things.132 Albert the Great had 
underscored the importance of the Liber de causis as the completion of the sci-
ence pursued in the Metaphysics.133 As Thomas stated in the prologue to his own 
commentary, citing Aristotle and John’s Gospel, the Liber de causis complements 
the Metaphysics with a philosophical science of God and the separate substances. 
The contemplation of these realities amounts to the attainment of felicity in this 
life.134 Thus the Liber de causis was understood to play no small role in mediating 
between the divine science of the philosophers and sacred doctrine.
 132 Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis Expositio, lect. 3, p. 19, l. 28 – p. 20, l. 8: Et, quia 
deos appellabant primas formas separatas in quantum sunt secundum se universales, con-
sequenter et intellectus divinos et animas divinas et corpora divina dicebant secundum 
quod habent quamdam universalem influentiam et causalitatem super subsequentia sui 
generis et inferiorum generum. Hanc autem positionem corrigit Dionysius quantum ad hoc 
quod ponebant ordinatim diversas formas separatas quas deos dicebant, ut scilicet aliud 
esset per se bonitas et aliud per se esse et aliud per se vita et sic de aliis. See also Thomas 
Aquinas, De substantiis separatis, ed. Leonina, vol. 40/ D (Roma: Santa Sabina, 1968), c. 1, 
p. 42, l. 112 – p. 43, l. 133: Id autem quod primo est in intellectu, est unum et bonum: nihil 
enim intelligit qui non intelligit unum; unum autem et bonum se consequuntur: unde ipsam 
primam ideam unius, quod nominabat secundum se unum et secundum se bonum, primum 
rerum principium esse ponebat, et hunc summum Deum esse dicebat. Sub hoc autem uno 
diversos ordines participantium et participatorum instituebat in substantiis a materia sep-
aratis: quos quidem ordines deos secundos esse dicebat, quasi quasdam unitates secundas 
post primam simplicem unitatem. Rursus, quia sicut omnes aliae species participant uno, ita 
etiam oportet quod intellectus, ad hoc quod intelligat, participet entium speciebus. Ideo sicut 
sub summo Deo, qui est unitas prima, simplex et imparticipata, sunt aliae rerum species 
quasi unitates secundae et dii secundi; ita sub ordine harum specierum sive unitatum pone-
bat ordinem intellectuum separatorum, qui participant supradictas species ad hoc quod sint 
intelligentes in actu.
 133 Cf. Albert the Great, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, ed. W. Fauser 
(Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1993), lib. ii, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 60, l. 3- 5: Propter quod et iste liber 
Philosophiae primae coniungendus est, ut finale ex isto recipiat perfectionem; lib. ii, tr. 5, 
c. 24, p. 191, l. 17– 23: In hoc ergo libro ad finem intentionis pervenimus. Ostendimus enim 
causam primam et causarum secundarum ordinem et qualiter primum universi esse est 
principium et qualiter omnium esse fluit a primo secundum opiniones Peripateticorum. 
Et haec quidem quando adiuncta fuerint xi Primae philosophiae, tunc primo opus perfec-
tum est.








The development in Aquinas’ thinking that culminated in the perspective 
adopted in his late commentary on the Liber de causis has been charted by 
Wayne Hankey.135 Central to this development was Aquinas’ understanding 
of the authority of Dionysius, which was second only to Scripture, and the 
character of his agreement with Aristotle. This concord became for Thomas 
the authoritative basis for his doctrine of God as ipsum esse subsistens and his 
anthropology of the rational soul as the substantial form of the body. In this 
respect, Aquinas was profoundly influenced by the reconciliation of Dionysius 
and Aristotle that he encountered as a student of Albert the Great at the 
studium generale in Cologne between 1248 and 1252.136 But a significant dif-
ference between the two authors appears when we consider how they under-
stood the writings of Dionysius, whom Aquinas gradually identified more 
and more as a Platonist. In his prologue to his De divinis nominibus Expositio, 
written after 1266, Aquinas acknowledged that one of the major difficulties for 
interpreters of Dionysius is that his “way of speaking” follows the Platonists, 
insofar as he seems to speak of the divine names (e.g., per se bonum) as if they 
were separate from God, who is superbonum, which is not consonant with the 
faith.137 Ultimately, however, Aquinas insisted, Dionysius held that they are not 
diverse and separate principles. For Thomas this meant that Dionysius shared 
the Aristotelian position that the intelligibles are not outside the intellect.138 
Nevertheless, Aquinas also came to believe that the Platonic approach to the 
first principles contributed something essential that corrected a shortcoming 
in Aristotle. In the Quaestiones disputatae de malo, written in 1272, Aquinas 
explicitly stated that Dionysius “was in many respects a follower of Platonic 
doctrine”, which took a correct view about the existence and number of 
demons.139 The Platonic tendency to proliferate separate principles received 
a positive interpretation in Aquinas insofar as their approach to the invisible 
world, when it is balanced by the Aristotelian corrective, makes this domain of 
reality more intelligible because the Platonists do not subject it to the strictures 
of the sublunary realm. In the final reckoning, in the late treatise De substantiis 
 135 For what follows, see W. Hankey, “The Concord of Aristotle, Proclus, the Liber de Causis 
& Blessed Dionysius in Thomas Aquinas, Student of Albertus Magnus”, in Dionysius 
34(2016), p. 137– 209, at p. 143– 203.
 136 Hankey, “The Concord”, p. 204, gives a list of passages in Albert’s commentaries on 
Dionysius where the Liber de causis is discussed.
 137 Thomas Aquinas, In librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio, ed. C. Pera 
(Torino: Marietti, 1950), prooemium, p. 1– 2.
 138 Thomas Aquinas, In librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio, c. 5, lect. 1, §634, 
p. 235.












separatis, which in many respects resembles the commentary on the Liber de 
causis,140 Aquinas presented Dionysius as the Christian correlative and con-
summation of the authoritative and comprehensive philosophical agreement 
achieved through the mutual corrections of Plato and Aristotle precisely on 
this question of the status and number of separate substances.141
Albert’s “Dionysian Peripateticism” also exerted a profound influence on 
Ulrich of Strassburg (b. 1220/ 1225 – d. 1277), who studied alongside Aquinas 
at Heilig Kreuz from approximately 1248 to 1254.142 It is intriguing to see that, 
almost exactly in step with Aquinas, Ulrich wrote a summa of theology (the 
De summo bono), that was also structured on explicitly Dionysian princi-
ples, and which also may have been intended for the nascent studia particu-
laris theologiae in the Dominican order.143 It seems there were movements 
afoot to develop pedagogical alternatives to the Sentences of Peter Lombard 
for theological study, which may have been inspired by Albert’s focus on the 
Areopagite in his lectures in Cologne.144 Like Aquinas, Ulrich had an innova-
tive understanding of the relation between Plato and Aristotle on the question 
 140 H.D. Saffrey, “Introduction”, in Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis Expositio, p. xxxv.
 141 Thomas Aquinas, De substantiis separatis, c. 18, p. 71, l. 3- 12: Quia igitur ostensum est quid 
de substantiis spiritualibus praecipui philosophi Plato et Aristotiles senserunt quantum ad 
earum originem, conditionem naturae, distinctionem et gubernationis ordinem, et in quo ab 
eis alii errantes dissenserunt: restat ostendere quid de singulis habeat christianae religionis 
assertio. Ad quod utemur praecipue Dionysii documentis, qui super alios ea quae ad spirit-
uales substantias pertinent excellentius tradidit.
 142 On Ulrich, see most recently A. Palazzo, “Ulrich of Strasbourg’s Philosophical Theology. 
Textual and Doctrinal Remarks on De summo bono”, in A. Speer, Th. Jeschke (eds), Schüler 
und Meister (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), p. 205– 242. On Albert’s “Dionysian Peripateticism”, 
see A. de Libera, Métaphysique et noétique. Albert le Grand (Paris: Vrin, 2005), p. 177– 209, 
239– 244.
 143 On the Dionysian structure of the De deo of Aquinas’ Summa theologiae, see W. Hankey, 
God in Himself. Aquinas’ Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). On the Dionysian structure of the De summo bono, 
see G. Théry, “Originalité du plan de la Summa de bono d’Ulrich de Strasbourg”, in Revue 
thomiste 27(1922), p. 376– 397; on its institutional context, see A. Palazzo, “Philosophy and 
Theology in the German Dominican Scholae in the Late Middle Ages. The Cases of Ulrich 
of Strasbourg and Berthold of Wimpfen”, in K. Emery, Jr., W. Courtenay, S. Metzger (eds), 
Philosophy and Theology in the Studia of the Religious Orders and at Papal and Royal Courts. 
Acts of the XVth International Colloquium of the Socitété internationale pour l’étude de la 
philosophie médiévale, University of Notre Dame, 8– 10 October 2008 (Turnhout: Brepols, 
2012), p. 75– 105, at p. 75– 90. On the studium particularis theologiae, see Mulchahey, First 
the Bow is Bent in Study, p. 277– 321.
 144 L. Sturlese, Storia della filosofia tedesca nel Medioevo. Il secolo XIII (Firenze: Olschki, 1996), 
p. 162; A. de Libera, Raison et foi. Archéologie d’une crise d’Albert le Grand à Jean- Paul II 












of first principles that was inspired by Albert, according to whom Aristotle 
reasoned about the separate substances using necessary arguments, while 
the Platonists proceeded by probabilities and conjecture.145 However, as 
Alessandra Beccarisi has shown, Ulrich reversed the connotations of Albert’s 
judgement: whereas Albert immediately followed this remark by delimiting 
the procedurally distinct domains of theology and philosophy for the student 
of natural philosophy, Ulrich maintained that, on the question of the separate 
substances, reasoning by conjecture must begin where necessary arguments 
end.146 This resembles Aquinas’ own departure from Albert, as well as the har-
mony of Plato and Aristotle expounded in his De substantiis separatis.
In the commentary tradition on the Liber de causis, then, it seems that 
Albert (via Ulrich) and Thomas Aquinas would have been Berthold’s two major 
interlocutors. Their influence on Berthold has only begun to be adequately rec-
ognised. Ulrich’s De summo bono has been established as a major source for 
Berthold’s doctrine of providence.147 We may also note that Ulrich was often, 
but not always, the direct source for the many references to Albert’s commen-
tary on the Liber de causis that populate the apparatus fontium of the critical 
edition of the Expositio. And if, by the time we get to Berthold, it was simply 
taken for granted that Dionysius was a Platonist (Dionysius Platonicus), then 
this is because Berthold followed in the footsteps of Aquinas and, in light of 
new ideas available to him in Proclus’ Tria opuscula that William of Moerbeke 
translated in 1280 (six years after Aquinas’ death), took them to a radical con-
clusion.148 Chief among these new ideas was the anthropology of the one of 
the soul (unum animae). Proclus introduced this principle by passing beyond 
Aristotle’s doctrine of intellectus to a Platonic and pre- Platonic tradition that 
was aware of a more hidden union or divine frenzy (divina mania) beyond 
intellectual reflexivity.149 A connection between the pagan Platonic tradition 
 145 Albert the Great, Metaphysica, ed. B. Geyer (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1960), lib. xi, tr. 3, 
c. 7, l. 19– 23: aut via Platonis aut via Aristotelis oportet nos incedere in materia ista de qua 
loquimur. Platonis autem via fundatur super propositiones probabiles, non necessarias.
 146 A. Beccarisi, “La scientia divina dei filosofi nel De summo bono di Ulrico di Strasburgo”, in 
Rivista di storia della filosofia 61(2006), p. 137– 163, citing Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo 
bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 1– 4, ed. A. de Libera (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987), lib. ii, tr. 2, c. 2 (2), 
p. 31, l. 37 – p. 32, l. 49: Sed quando coniecturando de divinis loquuntur, secundum quod 
ratio probabilius dictat, tunc bene ponunt primam causam efficientem sine motu, sicut et 
Platonici posuerunt.
 147 T. Ferro, “Berthold of Moosburg, Reader of Ulrich of Strassburg. On Natural Providence”, 
forthcoming.
 148 See, for example, Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 40C, p. 42, l. 214– 223, where Proclus’ 
gods are described as images of the Trinity.












and the De mystica theologia of Dionysius, not to mention other passages in 
De divinis nominibus concerning the cognition “above the nature of the mind”, 
was thus revealed. This new accord lay at the basis of Berthold’s reassessment 
of Dionysius’ supposed agreement with the Peripatetic tradition and espe-
cially the Liber de causis, which called into question its status as the treatise 
devoted to the science whose study leads to philosophical felicity. Nowhere is 
this clearer than when he used the De mystica theologia to single out the Liber 
de causis for criticism, along with all the other “unlearned” who are “sealed off 
in beings”, having made the mistaken assumption that, since being is the first 
thing made by God, being must also be God’s primary name.150
The problem these successors of Albert faced was to explicate the single 
truth that they assumed must exist beyond the apparent discord of natural 
philosophy and theology, and thus to secure the deeper continuity between 
the study of nature and the beatifying contemplation of the divine. Berthold 
took a stand in this lineage of interpreting Dionysius and the Liber de causis 
when he moved the Elementatio theologica and Dionysius on one side, and 
the Metaphysics and the Liber de causis on the other. In the divine science of 
the Platonists, Berthold found a conception of nature that is not “sealed off in 
beings” but grounded by and forever open to the exstasis of self- communicative 
Goodness. This was motivated at once by Berthold’s diagnosis of the human 
condition (“we who sit, as it were, in darkness and the shadow of death”) and 
by his philosophy of nature: God, for Berthold, was chiefly to be invoked by 
the name of Light, most blessed and most simple (beatissima […] simplicis-
sima lux).151 His analysis of the nature and laws of physical light, as scholars 
have noted, was the centrepiece of his understanding of the entire process of 
procession and conversion. In the Expositio’s metaphysics of light, as it is fair 
to call it, we have a new basis for the meditation of the microcosm, the mac-
rocosm, and the divine, and thus for establishing the bridge between natural 
philosophy and revealed theology.152 Once this Platonic anthropology and phi-
losophy of nature had been retrieved (for Berthold, by going all the way back 
to Hermes Trismegistus), whatever differences remained between pagan and 
Christian Platonists had only secondary importance. From the standpoint of 
 150 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 71D, p. 35, l. 123– 127: Quem quidem firmati in existenti-
bus et non opinantibus aliquid esse super entia dicunt fore esse, sicut dicit auctor De cau-
sis: ‘Prima rerum creatarum est esse’. Esse autem est actus entis. Sed tales vocat Dionysius 
indoctos, in 1 cap. De mystica theologia, ubi dicit sic: ‘Istos autem dico (subaudi: indoctos), 
qui in existentibus sunt firmati nihil super existentia supersubstantialiter esse opinantes’.
 151 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 21, p. 34, l. 975 – p. 35, l. 977. For Berthold’s echo of 
Luke 1:79 (qui in tenebris et in umbra mortis sedent), see 4.5, n. 291, below.








its content, then, the Expositio is best viewed as part of a Dominican exegetical 
tradition on the Liber de causis that held Dionysius in the highest authority, 
which Berthold emerged out of and attempted to reform.153
The broader commentary tradition on the Liber de causis antedated Albert 
and Thomas, and continued well beyond the 14th century in the universities 
and in the studia of the mendicant orders.154 Unfortunately, we know noth-
ing about its use among Dominicans in 14th- century Germany since all rele-
vant documentation from provincial chapter meetings has been lost.155 Little 
information even survives from the other provinces of the order. In 1305, the 
Dominican general chapter in Genoa decreed that schools of natural philos-
ophy (studia naturarum), the first of which was attested in the province of 
Provence in 1262, were to be instated in all provinces throughout the order.156 
The rationale behind the establishment and development of these schools in 
Provence at that time is not clear. Since Albert’s commentaries on Aristotle 
were largely completed by 1262 and certainly all finished by 1271, the same 
year Provence ratified the program in natural philosophy for the province, 
it is tempting to ponder whether there was any link between the emergence 
of these schools and the progress of Albert’s project “to make all these parts 
[of philosophy] intelligible to the Latins”.157 Outside of Provence, the estab-
lishment of these schools happened more gradually. The Roman province, 
for instance, after their initial hostility and then indifference to the teaching 
natural philosophy, only created its first eleven schools of natural philosophy 
in 1288.
According to the decree of the central authority in 1305, the studia natu-
rarum had a two- year curriculum. By 1307 in the Roman province and by 1327 in 
 153 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. K, p. 48, l. 401 – p. 49, l. 407: Ex praemissis 
summatim colligitur et forma seu modus procedendi in hoc libro et ratio nominis ipsius, 
quod a forma imponitur, scilicet elementationis theologicae, et quare non vocatur ‘prima 
philosophia’ seu ‘metaphysica’ aut ‘de pura bonitate’ aut ‘de lumine luminum’ vel ‘de causis 
causarum’ aut ‘de floribus divinorum’, sicut quidam alii consimilem tractantes materiam, 
sed in excelsum dissimiliter a praesenti auctore suas editiones vocare curarunt. This list of 
titles derives from Albert the Great, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, lib. 
ii, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 59, l. 19 – p. 61, l. 68.
 154 D. Calma, “Du néoplatonisme au réalisme et retour. Parcours latins du Liber de causis aux 
XIIIe – XVIe siècles”, in Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 54(2012), p. 217– 276, at p. 227– 238; 
id., “The Exegetical Tradition of Medieval Neoplatonism”, p. 13– 26.
 155 Palazzo, “Philosophy and Theology”, p. 75– 79.
 156 For what follows in this paragraph and the next, see Mulchahey, First the Bow is Bent in 
Study, p. 252– 277; Calma, “Du néoplatonisme au réalisme et retour”, p. 229– 233.
 157 Albert the Great, Physica, ed. P. Hossfeld (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1987– 1993), lib. i, tr. 












the province of Toulouse (which the province of Provence became after 1303), 
it had been expanded to three years. In the Italian schools, one year was spent 
with the Metaphysics, the De anima, “and related texts”, perhaps the Parva 
naturalia, and another year with the Physics, On Generation and Corruption, 
“and certain works following these”, perhaps the De caelo and the Meteorology. 
Marian Michèle Mulchahey conjectures that, following the loose correlation 
that can be discerned between the Dominican curricula and the more exten-
sive programme in arts at the University of Paris, the Liber de causis might have 
been taught alongside Aristotle’s biological treatises in the third year of study, 
but we have no direct evidence for this.158 In Toulouse, we know that the Liber 
de causis was taught by William of Leus, but this occurred in its school of the-
ology sometime between 1290/ 1291 and 1308.159 As for its schools of natural 
philosophy, later records from Toulouse in 1327 placed Aristotle’s Ethics at the 
centre of their annual curriculum with a three- year rotation of his works on 
natural philosophy. This seems not to have included the Liber de causis, which 
was mentioned only as part of the curriculum of two newly founded studia 
moralis philosophiae in 1330, where it appeared alongside Aristotle’s Ethics, 
Economica, and the Magna moralia. So while we can be quite certain that the 
studia naturarum were established in Teutonia in the early 14th century, and 
definitely by the time Berthold began teaching there in the late 1310s, we can-
not know whether the Liber de causis was part of the standard curriculum.
The Summa of Nicholas of Strassburg, written between 1315 and 1321 and pre-
served in only one manuscript (ms Vaticano [Città del], Biblioteca Apostolica 
Vaticana, Vat. lat. 3091), offers some clues about the situation in the German 
Dominican schools of natural philosophy.160 This encyclopaedic compilation 
was to be divided into four books, corresponding to the four causes (Book 
i: efficient cause; ii: material cause; iii: formal cause; iv: final cause), but it 
ends partway through the third book.161 In its prologue, Nicholas stated that 
 158 Mulchahey, First the Bow is Bent in Study, p. 271– 272.
 159 D. Carron, “A Theological Reading of the Liber de causis at the Turn of the Fourteenth 
Century. The Example of William of Leus”, in D. Calma (ed.), Neoplatonism in the Middle 
Ages, i, p. 467– 550.
 160 See Nicholas of Strassburg, Summa. Liber 2, tract. 1– 2, ed. G. Pellegrino (Hamburg: Meiner, 
2009); id., Summa. Liber 2, tract. 3– 7, ed. G. Pellegrino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2009); id., 
Summa. Liber 2, tract. 8– 14, ed. T. Suarez- Nani (Hamburg: Meiner, 1990). The critical edi-
tions of Books i and iii are in preparation.
 161 For an edition of the prologue of the Summa and a detailed table of contents, see Imbach, 
R., Lindblad, U., “Compilatio rudis ac puerilis. Hinweise und Materialien zu Nikolaus von 
Strassburg OP und seiner Summa”, in Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 










one of his aims was to assist students who had been hindered by the lack of 
books (defectus librorum) in the conventual libraries of the provinces. As Ruedi 
Imbach and Ulrika Lindblad have observed, this resonated with concerns 
raised at Dominican general chapter meetings in 1308, 1315, and 1323 about the 
state of the friars’ education in the provinces.162 Nicholas explained that his 
intention was to compile a work from the resources of the Dominican tradi-
tion, singling out Albert and Aquinas (doctorum ordinis et specialiter venerabil-
ium doctorum fratris Thomae de Aquino et domini Alberti), though the Summa 
also demonstrates his familiarity with the writings of Dietrich of Freiberg, John 
Picardi of Lichtenberg, and Hervaeus Natalis.163 In light of these declarations, 
and Nicholas’ self- deprecating characterisation of the Summa as “an unskilled 
and childish compilation” (compilatio rudis ac puerilis), Imbach and Lindblad 
have insisted that the work should not be judged according to its innovations, 
but as “an encyclopaedic manual of philosophy”.164
Gianfranco Pellegrino has made an important qualification of this verdict 
by pointing out that the Summa was intended to be much more than a florile-
gium of juxtaposed sources:  Nicholas sought to produce a coherent argument 
about the nature of wisdom itself.165 Pellegrino draws attention to Nicholas’ 
use of the commentary of William of Conches on Boethius’ Consolatio phi-
losophiae and, specifically, to his interpretation of the allegorical meaning of 
the garment worn by Lady Philosophy. The prisoner in the Consolatio learns 
that Philosophy sewed this garment for herself after it was torn apart in the 
sectarian divides that arose after the time of Plato. Pellegrino argues that this 
image must have resonated with the Dominican friar, who was confronted 
not only with the lack of books in the provincial studia, but also with the 
disaggregation of philosophical wisdom in the abundance of compendia, 
florilegia, tables, abbreviations, and concordances. What was needed for the 
reunification of wisdom was not another work in the style of pro et contra 
 162 See Imbach, Lindblad, “Compilatio rudis ac puerilis”, p. 177– 180, who argue that Nicholas 
likely had the studia naturarum in mind.
 163 Sturlese, “Eckhart, Teodorico e Picardi”; Imbach, Lindblad, “Compilatio rudis ac puerilis”, 
p. 180– 187.
 164 Imbach, Lindblad, “Compilatio rudis ac puerilis”, p. 182.
 165 G. Pellegrino, “La Summa di Nicola di Strasburgo (1315– 1320). Compilatio rudis ac puerilis 
o novus libellus?”, in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds), Per perscrutationem philosophi-
cam, p. 204– 215; id., “Novus ex veteribus libellus. Guglielmo di Conches nella Summa di 
Nicola di Strasburgo”, in C. Martello, C. Militello, A. Vella (eds), Cosmogonie e cosmologie 
nel medioevo. Atti del Convegno della Società italiana per lo studio del pensiero medievale 
(S.I.S.P.M.), Catania, 22– 24 settembre 2006 (Louvain- la- Neuve: Fédération Internationale 










Thomam, but a new book (novum libellum) that looked to the past as a source 
of renewal.166
Berthold was educated within the order as it acknowledged and responded 
to the need for a reform of studies. In 1315, when Nicholas began composing 
his Summa, Berthold was dispatched to Oxford. Like Nicholas, Berthold would 
aim to consolidate a Dominican tradition of philosophical theology. Nicholas 
was engaged, sometimes critically, with the thought of Dietrich of Freiberg, but 
generally he opted for more concordist attitude.167 Berthold, who was more 
influenced by Dietrich than any other contemporary author, shared more of 
Dietrich’s combative spirit, and in fact redoubled and redirected Dietrich’s 
criticisms beyond their original scope.168 Both Nicholas and Berthold endeav-
oured to follow Albert’s methodological principle that philosophy should pro-
ceed in the light of its own principles without theological intervention.169 Both 
Dominicans referred to their works as “compilations”.170
 166 Pellegrino, “La Summa di Nicola di Strasburgo”, p. 205: “Secondo Nicola il rinnovamento 
culturale è possibile solo in continuità con il passato perchè gli aurea tempora sono pas-
sati, ma non per sempre”.
 167 On Dietrich in Nicholas, see Sturlese, “Eckhart, Teodorico e Picardi”; Imbach, Lindblad, 
“Compilatio rudis ac puerilis”, p. 182– 189; T. Suarez- Nani, Tempo ed essere nell’autunno del 
medioevo. Il De tempore di Nicola di Strasburgo e il dibattito sulla natura ed il senso del tempo 
agli inizi del XIV secolo (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1989); U.R. Jeck, Aristoteles contra Augustinum. 
Zur Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Zeit und Seele bei den antiken Aristoteleskommentatoren 
im arabischen Aristotelismus und im 13. Jahrhundert (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1994); N. Largier, 
“Time and Temporality in the ‘German Dominican School’. Outlines of a Philosophical 
Debate Between Nicolaus of Strasbourg, Dietrich of Freiberg, Eckhart of Hoheim, and 
Ioannes Tauler”, in P. Porro (ed.), The Medieval Concept of Time. Studies on the Scholastic 
Debate and Its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p. 221– 253.
 168 E. King, “Sapiens modernus. The Reception of Dietrich of Freiberg in Berthold of 
Moosburg”, forthcoming.
 169 Berthold effectively refers to his text as a compilatio in the two tabulae auctorum (compi-
lata est). For Nicholas and Albert’s methodology, see Imbach, Lindblad, “Compilatio rudis 
ac puerilis”, p. 189: “Nikolaus bedient sich bei der Redaktion seiner compilatio rudis ac 
puerilis des albertschen Methodenprinzips einer scharfen Trennung von Philosophie und 
Theologie, um mit Hilfe von Texten aus dem Umkreis des Pariser Schulthomismus die 
Autonomie und Eigenart der deutschen Philosophie zu unterwandern und sie mit alter-
nativen Denkmodellen zu konfrontieren.”
 170 With the Expositio Berthold included a table of authorities (tabula auctorum) comprised 
of two lists, “the doctors of the Church” and “the renown philosophers”. Each list is pref-
aced with the heading, “from whose books and teachings the following Exposition of the 
Theological Elementation is compiled” (de quorum libris et sententiis infra scripta expositio 
Elementationis theologicae compilata est). In both extant manuscripts, the lists appear 
after the index. However, both lists in the Vatican manuscript read “infra scripta”, while 
the Oxford manuscript has “infra” for the doctores, and “supra” for the philosophi. See 
the “Prolegomena” to Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam 












Of Berthold it has been said that his “originality […] often consists in the 
cutting and mixing of his sources so as to make them say what they originally 
did not”.171 In one sense, this is a profoundly accurate judgement that under-
scores the need to read Berthold intertextually, by making constant compari-
sons with his sources. Leaving things there, however, one would miss the for-
est for the trees. To discover the deeper coherence of Berthold’s philosophical 
vision, one must attend to the patterns of his modifications and juxtapositions 
in his commentary- as- compilation, for there was in his view a point where all 
these lines must converge. Like Nicholas, Berthold used Boethius’ ekphrasis of 
Lady Philosophy’s garment to describe the character of his project. Berthold, 
however, did not opt for a model derived from Aristotle (the four causes) to 
preserve it intact. The most important detail in the ekphrasis, in his view, was 
the image of the ladder emblazoned on her robe, which he used as a simile for 
the individual propositions of the Elementatio theologica, which, he believed, 
revived the pristine philosophy that Plato had once articulated in theorems 
(theoremata), and which would lead not only to bliss in this life, but even deifi-
cation (omnis beatus deus).172 This was a Boethian amplification of the praises 
that Aquinas and others had bestowed upon the Liber de causis, as a science 
of the realities whose contemplation leads to felicity in this life. In terms of its 
form, practical utility, and its audience, the Summa of Nicholas of Strassburg 
is probably the closest parallel we have to the Expositio. For Berthold, however, 
the integrity and intricacy of Lady Philosophy’s garment was appreciated only 
by looking much further back than the aurea tempora of 13th- century achieve-
ments, but to the accord of her most ancient devotees.
After the loftier and exhortative prefaces to the Expositio, which are freer 
and more creative in their execution of traditional medieval literary forms, a 
reader of the commentary cannot help but notice, if not suffer, the repetitive 
style of Berthold’s exegesis of the Elementatio itself. He commented on each 
proposition using a basic and uniform structure. First, he always began by cop-
ying the proposition from the Elementatio, without Proclus’ proof. If the prop-
osition in question is the first of what Berthold regarded as a thematic group, 
he would signal the subsequent stages of the argument (e.g., Proposition 1; 
Proposition 14). Most of the time, however, Berthold would briefly state how 
the proposition in question logically followed the preceding one. He would 
 171 C. Steel, “The Neoplatonic Doctrine of Time and Eternity and its Influence on Medieval 
Philosophy”, in P. Porro (ed.), The Medieval Concept of Time. Studies on the Scholastic 
Debate and its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p. 3– 32, at p. 29.







then announce the division of his own commentary, which almost always fell 
in two parts, which he called the suppositum and the propositum, “what is sup-
posed” and “what is proposed”. The suppositum and propositum almost always 
have tripartite subdivisions corresponding to distinct arguments. These two 
principal parts are comprised mostly of tacit and explicit citations, and they 
take up most of the Expositio. Finally, Berthold copied Proclus’ own commen-
tum or demonstration, which he analysed by distilling the argument to syllo-
gisms, with frequent cross- references to earlier propositions, and rarely made 
any appeal to external authority.
Berthold’s procedure in these three parts (suppositum, propositum, commen-
tum) thus wove together two exegetical methods. Both can be said to reflect 
specifically on the literal sense of the Elementatio theologica and, accordingly, 
of the entire philosophical tradition that Berthold compiled upon its frame.173 
The first tendency was based more on tradition and authority. Berthold evi-
dently wrote the suppositum with the individual terms and concepts of the 
proposition itself in view and sought to introduce the reader to the broader 
philosophical history presupposed by these terms and by Proclus’ argument 
in the proposition. Whether those sources were later than the Elementatio 
was of no significance. A typical example is the suppositum of Proposition 
2 (“Everything, that participates one, is one and not one”):174 first, Berthold 
offered one or more general definitions or descriptions of the notion of “par-
ticipation” (in generali), which he synthesised explicitly from older sources 
(Clavis physicae, Augustine, Boethius, and Gilbert of Poitiers) and tacitly from 
contemporary ones (Dietrich of Freiberg); secondly, he enumerated the pos-
sible modalities of “participation” in particular (in speciali), which amounted 
to a kind of index of the orders of invisible substances; thirdly, he presented a 
synthesis of the general and particular that applied the background directly to 
the subject of proposition, by relating the particular modalities of participa-
tion to their common source in the One. The reader thus would be brought to 
see how succinctly this rich doctrinal background is presupposed and recapit-
ulated in Proclus’ proposition. The second principal part or propositum often 
proceeded in a similar fashion but looked ahead to the terms and arguments 
 173 On Berthold’s concern to establish the literal sense of the Elementatio and his compari-
son of manuscripts to establish the correct text, see L. Sturlese, “Einleitung”, in Berthold 
of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 66– 107, 
p. xi– xii.
 174 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, translata a Guillelmo de Morbecca, ed. H. Boese 
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1987), prop. 2, p. 3, l. 1: Omne quod participat uno et 






found in Proclus’ own demonstration of the proposition in the commentum. 
Finally, in the commentum, we find a second exegetical method, which was 
based on syllogistic analysis. Here, Berthold examined Proclus’ demonstration, 
line by line, in order to elucidate its argumentative rigour and its conformity 
to the requirements of scientific procedure. Thus, with the propositum acting 
as a bridge, these three parts comprised a seamless process of commentary 
whose emphasis shifted from authority to reason, but never indulged in any 
flights of speculation or allegorisation that could not be immediately justified 
by the specificity of Proclus’ technical language. Berthold’s attitude here was 
clearly one of subordination and fidelity to the Elementatio and the tradition 
it allowed him to recapitulate: his task was to bring the reader to share in his 
vision of its luminosity.
As we know it today from the two extant manuscripts, the Expositio is a 
work that can be easily consulted and mined for arguments and authorities, 
without needing to be read from cover to cover. Even if its assumptions and 
conclusions would rarely satisfy contemporary scholars who have many more 
texts from Proclus and his contemporaries at their disposal, its literalism and 
attentiveness to philosophical terminology means that the Expositio can still 
serve quite well as a reference work for the entire Latin medieval Platonic tra-
dition. Berthold noticed connections between authors that modern scholar-
ship only gradually came to acknowledge (e.g., Boethius and Proclus on provi-
dence; Bernard of Clairvaux and the Eriugenian Clavis physicae on deification). 
The functionalisation of the commentary as a reference work is facilitated to 
a large extent by an alphabetical index of subjects and authors that amounts 
to over 160 pages in the critical edition.175 This index presupposes a system of 
marginal pagination that divides the commentary on each proposition into 
sections that are designated with letters. For example, under the lengthy index 
entry for Anima, one finds a list of theses (e.g., “the soul is immortal because it 
is self- moved”) with references to a particular proposition and, sometimes, to a 
particular section (e.g., 17A) of the suppositum or propositum.
The index as we have it is incomplete. There are several empty entries, 
which appear more frequently beginning with the letter “I”.176 Sometimes 
two entries for an identical term are separated by several other entries, with 
one left redundant and empty (e.g., Operatio; Principium). Most references do 
not take the alphabetical subdivisions of each commentary into account and 
 175 Berthold of Moosburg, Tabula contentorum in Expositione super Elementationem theologi-
cam Procli, ed. A. Beccarisi (Pisa: Scuola Normale Superiore, 2000).
 176 Empty entries by letter: C (1); i (7); M (2); N (2); O (6); P (7); Q (2); R (1); S (9); T (2); v (2); 






refer only to the proposition number or to the title of the relevant preface (in 
prologo; in titulo; in praeambulo). The more precise references that do provide 
both the proposition number and the subsection letter are distributed evenly 
throughout the index.
We should therefore entertain the possibility that the index and this sys-
tem of subdivisions, with the functionalisation of the commentary that it 
would reflect, was either a later addition by Berthold, and was left unfinished 
at his death, or was the result of a later intervention. One indication that it 
was not part of the original plan is the fact that the internal references in the 
Expositio never make use of the alphanumeric system and are either vague (ut 
supra / infra ostensum est) or mention only the proposition number, where it 
would have been possible to give more precise information.177 The first known 
explicit reference to the Expositio (from mid- to late 14th- century Regensburg) 
would seem to suggest that the commentary circulated at one stage without 
its index and the subdivisions of the text it presupposed.178 This anonymous 
Dominican writer from Regensburg, commenting on Peter Lombard, referred 
to “theorem 8, the second principal article” (theoremate 8, articulo secundo 
principali), which, as is clear from the context, was a citation of 8D. The sup-
positum, from 8A- C, was regarded as a first principal article, and the proposi-
tum from 8D- F the second. What this suggests is that these “articles” – the 
 suppositum, propositum, and possibly the commentum – were conceived as the 
primary building- blocks of the commentary, with their distinctive scholarly 
methods, and that the text was only eventually adapted to its use as a reference 
work. At any rate, by the time the extant manuscripts of the Expositio were 
copied, both the Expositio and the index were attributed to Berthold.179 With 
these basic elements (its repetitive method, its ordering of knowledge on the 
frame of the Elementatio, its comprehensive treatment of the separate sub-
stances, its utility), the Expositio came to imitate the genre of medieval philo-
sophical “encyclopaedism”.180
 177 See, for example, Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 3D, p. 97, l. 197– 198: in principio supra 
praemissa; 11A, p. 187, l. 67: ut supra 8 circa finem signatum est.
 178 See Conclusion, section 1, below.
 179 ms Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2192, f. 362vb: Explicit 
expositio cum tabula fratris Bertholdi de Mosburch ordinis fratrum predicatorum quondam 
lectoris Coloniensis province Theotonie super Elementatione theologica Procli completa etc.
 180 On this genre, see G. Guldentops, “Henry Bate’s Encyclopaedism”, in P. Binkley (ed.), Pre- 
Modern Encyclopaedic Texts. Proceedings of the Second COMERS Congress, Groningen, 
1– 4 July 1996 (Leiden: Brill, 1997), p. 227– 237; I. Draelants, “Le ‘siècle de l’encyclopédisme’. 
Conditions et critères de définition d’un genre”, in A. Zucker (ed.), Encyclopédire. Formes 










Throughout the commentary, by far the most frequently occurring first- 
person verb is declarabo, which is found in Berthold’s introductory remarks to 
each proposition, usually with the direct objects suppositum and propositum. 
Declarare and exponere are practically synonymous terms in medieval pedagog-
ical vocabulary.181 Inasmuch as declarare connotes the active intervention and 
understanding of the interpreter, it can be contrasted with recitare, the reten-
tion or rehearsal of opinions.182 This reflects precisely the kind of compilatio 
that Berthold undertook. For him, this intervention in the philosophical tradi-
tion amounted to demonstrating (ostendam) and positing (ponam) certain the-
ses in triadic patterns – not to doctrinal innovation or novelty or, in almost every 
case except the doctrine of reincarnation, to sitting in judgement over Proclus.
As with Nicholas’ Summa, one need not regard the compilation as a lit-
erary form as inherently antithetical to a coherent, if unwittingly original, 
philosophical vision. This is certainly the case for Berthold of Moosburg. For 
Berthold, it was clear that this scholarly and exegetical activity, which sought 
to reconstruct and revive the ancient wisdom of Plato and his predecessors, 
was intrinsically related to the fulfilment of human desire. Apart from his use 
technical pedagogical vocabulary, the only moment we glimpse something 
more of Berthold’s self- understanding is at the conclusion of his Prologus, in 
his description of himself as a lowly contemplator (humilis theoricus), who 
“with Plato and Boethius”, and Lady Philosophy, acknowledges that, since the 
p. 81– 106; I. Ventura, “On Philosophical Encyclopaedism in the Fourteenth Century. The 
Catena aurea entium of Henry of Herford”, in G. de Callataÿ, B. Van den Abeele (eds), Une 
lumière venue d’ailleurs. Héritages et ouvertures dans les encyclopédies d’Orient et d’Occi-
dent au Moyen Âge. Actes du colloque de Louvain- la- Neuve, 19– 21 mai 2005 (Louvain- la- 
Neuve: Centre de recherche en histoire des sciences, 2008), p. 199– 245; ead., “Encyclopédie 
et culture philosophique au Moyen Âge. Quelques considérations”, in A. Zucker (ed.), 
Encyclopédire. Formes de l’ambition encyclopédique dans l’Antiquité et au Moyen Âge 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), p. 107– 123. On philosophical florilegia, see J. Hamesse, “Les flo-
rilèges philosophiques. Instruments de travail des intellectuels à la fin du moyen âge et à la 
Renaissance”, in L. Bianchi (ed.), Filosofia e teologia nel trecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenio 
Randi (Louvain- la- Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales, 
1994), p. 479– 508; L. Sturlese, “Philosophische Florilegien im mittelalterlichen Deutschland”, 
in K. Elm (ed.), Literarische Formen des Mittelalters. Florilegien, Kompilationen, Kollektionen 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2000), p. 39– 72, reprinted in id., Homo divinus, p. 155– 167.
 181 M. Teeuwen, The Vocabulary of Intellectual Life in the Middle Ages (Turnhout: Brepols, 
2003), p. 245– 246.
 182 J. Hamesse, “Approche terminologique de certaines méthodes d’enseignement et de 
recherche à la fin du moyen âge. Declarare, Recitare, Conclusio”, in O. Weijers (ed.), 
Vocabulary of Teaching and Research between Middle Ages and Renaissance. Proceedings 
of the Colloquium, London, Warburg Institute, 11– 12 March 1994 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1995), 






divided cannot unify itself, when seeking to know things above itself, it is most 
appropriate to supplicate the most divine light with prayer if the seeker is to 
attain unto the paternal fount of light that is at once “the principle, convey-
ance, guide, path, and boundary”:
And therefore, with Plato and Boethius, I deem it good that the lowly 
contemplator should resolutely implore the most divine light with sup-
plicant prayers, saying: O most blessed, most excellent, most revered, 
most honourable, most complete, most omnipotent, most free, most sov-
ereign, most virtuous, most simple Light; remove from those who seek 
you the innate restriction of nature, the crooked habitual ways, the indo-
lent discipline, the ignorance of the measure of intellectual capacity, the 
aversion to the light of intelligible lucidity, the dread of such subtlety, 
the degree of remoteness, the presumption of familiar intelligibility, the 
search for too much provability and demonstrability!
‘And grant, Father, that our minds may climb to your august throne, 
Grant the sight of the Fount of good, and grant light to fix upon you the 
mind’s unblinded eye! Disperse the clouds and weight of this earthly con-
cretion; shine in the splendour that is yours! For you are serenity, you are 
untroubled rest for worshippers, to see you is the end, you, the principle, 
conveyance, guide, path, and boundary – the same.’183
It was not with innovations that Berthold intended to dazzle his reader but 
by redirecting their vision to the same light that Plato and Boethius had once 
implored and beheld by its condescension. For the humilis theoricus, then, 
the philosophical apprehension of that light, and the exegetical search for the 
truth of the luminous ancient tradition that was its familiar, had to proceed by 
the only method that awakens the one of the soul (unum animae): by coming 
to know divine things “not according to ourselves”.
 183 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 21, p. 34, l. 974 – p. 35, l. 989: Igitur cum Platone et 
Boethio bonum esse reor humilem theoricum obnixe lucem divinissimam votis supplicibus 
invocare dicendo: O beatissima, excellentissima, reverendissima, honorabilissima, totalis-
sima, omnipotentissima, liberalissima, dominantissima, virtuosissima, simplicissima lux, 
aufer a te quaerentibus innatam naturae deminutionem, pravam assuefactionem et pigram 
exercitationem, ignorantiam mensurae intellectualis capacitatis, aversionem a luce intelli-
gibilis claritatis, horrorem tantae subtilitatis, distantiam longinquitatis, praesumptionem 
propriae cognoscibilitatis, inquisitionem nimiae probabilitatis et demonstrabilitatis! ‘Et da, 
Pater, augustam menti conscendere sedem, / da fontem lustrare boni, da luce reperta / in 
te conspicuos animi defigere visus! / Dissice terrenae nebulas et pondera molis / atque tuo 
splendore mica! Tu namque serenum, / tu requies tranquilla piis, te cernere finis, / princip-
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Ah, beloved, that a pagan has understood this and arrived there, 
while we remain so far from it and so unlike it, is to us a disgrace and 
a great shame. Our Lord attests to it when he says, “The kingdom of 
God is within you”.1
∵
In a sermon preached on the Gospel for Trinity Sunday, the Dominican John 
Tauler (c. 1300 – 1361) began by introducing the feast as the end and goal of all 
celebrations in the liturgical year, just as Trinity is for the rational creature. It 
is impossible, he admitted, to speak of its dignity in adequate terms, for the 
feast receives its meaning entirely from the Trinity it celebrates, and no created 
intellect can comprehend the dynamic equality and distinction of the Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit, and the joy that is theirs. For this reason, Tauler told his 
hearers, it is better for us leave the finer points of doctrine to the clerics who 
must defend the faith – better for us to experience or feel it (ze bevindende) 
than to speak about it, to have Trinity “come to birth in the ground” not in a 
rational way, but “essentially”, not in speech, but in reality.2
Notwithstanding these cautionary remarks, the preacher did not shy away 
from offering rational and self- critical guidance along the path.3 Continuing 
to develop the parallelism of celebration and celebrant, Tauler insisted that 
our approach toward the Trinitarian mystery must be through the image of 
God (imago Dei) in the soul. Just as the feast celebrating the Trinity is inef-
fable because of what it celebrates, so too for Tauler the image of God was 
not a way of making God manifest; it was rather the principle of an apo-
phatic anthropology, according to which the ground of the soul is drawn 
up into the same darkness in which the Trinity dwells: “no one can speak in 
appropriate terms about the nobility of this image”. With this as his meas-
ure, Tauler invited his audience to consider three different descriptions of 
 1 John Tauler, Predigt 60d (Trinity Sunday), in Die Predigten Taulers. Aus der Engelberger 
und der Freiburger Handschrift sowie aus Schmidts Abschriften der ehemaligen Strassburger 
Handschriften, ed. F. Vetter (Berlin: Weidmann, 1910), p. 301, l. 1- 3: Kinder, das ein heiden dis 
verstunt und darzuo kam, das wir dem also verre und also ungelich sint, das ist uns laster und 
grosse schande. Dis bezúgete unser herre do er sprach: ‘das rich Gottes ist in úch’.
 2 John Tauler, Predigt 60d (Trinity Sunday), p. 298, l. 10 – p. 299, l. 34.









the imago Dei. The first, not attributed to any authority, claims the image 
consists in the powers of memory, intellect, and will, by which the soul is 
capable of receiving the Trinity. This is inadequate, argued Tauler, because 
it simply reiterates what is apparent to everyday experience. Such potenti-
ality and transience are inadequate expressions of God. The second view, 
attributed to Thomas Aquinas, improved upon this, insofar as he stated that 
the image is only perfect when the powers are in act (wúrklich). But Tauler 
was not satisfied with this either, apparently for the same reasons. Finally, 
he continued, there are other masters whose opinion is “unspeakably supe-
rior”. They hold that in the soul’s deepest ground (grunde), the soul has the 
Trinity “essentially, actually, and subsistently” (wesentlichen und wúrklich 
und isteklich). According to their view, God has an eternal covenant (ewigen 
ordenunge) with this ground, and he can no more be separated from it than 
he can be from himself. Grace arises in the soul in the extent to which a 
person abandons oneself to this ground and turns toward it, and so, Tauler 
concluded, that is what we must do.
Now, the preacher asked, how is one to approach this ceaseless activ-
ity? Even if it is beyond speech, by what tokens can it be recognised? At 
this point, on Trinity Sunday of all days, Tauler introduced the authority 
of Proclus. He paraphrased one of the Tria opusucla, the De providentia et 
fato (8.30– 32), as follows: as long as we are occupied with images below 
us, we are incredulous that there is such a ground within us; if you want 
to experience this (daz bevinden), leave all multiplicity and cultivate the 
singular focus of intellect, and then abandon even this and “become one 
with the One” (wurt eins mit dem einen). In other words, follow the guidance 
of Proclus, who called this ground and its activity “a still, silent, dormant, 
divine, and frenzied darkness” (eine stille swigende sloffende goetteliche 
unsinnige dúnsternisse).4
This was not an aberrant turn in Tauler’s preaching. There are five refer-
ences to Proclus in Tauler’s sermons (Predigten 60d, 61, twice in 64, and 65). All 
of them, as Loris Sturlese has shown, provide clear evidence of his acquaint-
ance with Berthold’s interpretation of the Tria opuscula.5 Indeed, Tauler’s val-
orisation of Proclus, and his placement of him ambiguously alongside the best 
of the Christian teachings about the imago Dei (that is, Dietrich of Freiberg’s 
 4 John Tauler, Predigt 60d (Trinity Sunday), p. 300, l. 27 – p. 301, l. 1.
 5 L. Sturlese, “Tauler im Kontext. Die philosophischen Voraussetzungen des ‘Seelengrundes’ in 
der Lehre des deutschen Neuplatonikers Berthold von Moosburg”, in Beiträge zur Geschichte 
der deutschen Sprache und Literatur 109(1987), p. 390– 426, at p. 415– 421, reprinted in id., 
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interpretation of Augustine) corresponds closely to the tensions we will 
find in Berthold’s anthropology. Beyond these doctrinal convergences noted 
by Sturlese, one may also say that Tauler’s sense of the ramifications of the 
acknowledgement that Proclus has achieved what he did, as “a disgrace and a 
great shame” to Christians of his time, was also in profound continuity with the 
spirit of Berthold’s Expositio.6 In Berthold as in Tauler we find something much 
more volatile than the domestication of a pagan philosopher for a Christian 
audience or, for that matter, an argument about pagan philosophy as a praep-
aratio Evangelii. Instead, both Dominicans presented Proclus’ achievement as 
a challenge for Christian self- understanding. The dignity of the soul that was 
known to Proclus and had been forgotten since the time of the ancient sages 
was regarded by these preachers as a more adequate expression of the truth of 
Christianity than what they saw around them in their own day. In other words, 
they used Proclean description of God’s hidden and abiding presence in the 
soul, his “eternal ordinance”, in an operation of reform directed at the Christian 
understanding of the human as imago Dei.7
 6 See the parallel verdict in John Tauler, Predigt 61 (Nativity of John the Baptist), ed. F. Vetter, 
p. 332, l. 21 – p. 333, l. 2: Aber do kamen die grossen meister als Proculus und Plato und gab-
ent des ein klor underscheit den die dis underscheit als verre nút vinden enkonden. Sant 
Augustinus sprach das Plato das ewangelium In principio al zemole hette vor gesprochen bis 
an das wort: ‘fuit homo missus a Deo’, und das was doch mit verborgen bedekten worten, und 
dise fundent underscheit von der heiligen drivaltikeit. Kinder, dis kam alles us disem inwendigen 
grunde: dem lebtent si und wartent des. Das ist ein gros laster und schande das wir armen ver-
bliben volk, die cristen sint und als grosse helfe hant, die gnade Gotz und den heiligen glouben 
und das heilig sacrament und als manig grosse helfe, und gont recht umbe als blinde huenr und 
erkennent unser selbes nút das in uns ist, und enwissent dannan ab ze mole nút: das machet 
unser grosse manigvaltikeit und uswendikeit, und das wir als vil mit den sinnen wúrken […]. 
(“But there came the great masters like Proclus and Plato, and they gave a clear discernment 
to those who were not able to discern it so well on their own. Saint Augustine says that Plato 
had plainly explained the Gospel, In principio, as far as the phrase, fuit homo missus a Deo, 
which was however written there in hidden words. They also discovered the distinction in 
the Holy Trinity. Ah, beloved, all of this came from the inner ground, for whose sake they 
lived and which they waited upon. It is a disgrace and a great shame that we, humble suc-
cessors that we are, who are Christians and have such great aids at our disposal, the grace of 
God, the sacred faith, the holy sacrament, and so many other great aids – that we go around 
in circles like blind hens, without knowing ourselves nor what is within us, and never know 
anything about it. This is the result of our great manifoldness and outwardness, and that we 
are much too occupied with the works of the senses […]”.).
 7 Cf. K. Flasch, Meister Eckhart. Philosoph des Christentums (München: Beck, 2011), p. 190, 227, 
249– 250. English translation: K. Flasch, Meister Eckhart. Philosopher of Christianity, trans. 
A. Schindel, A. Vanides (New Haven / London: Yale University Press, 2015), p. 158: “[Eckhart] 
possessed the typical education in philosophy and theology of any Dominican of his time; 
he took up the intellectual certainties and methods of his contemporaries, reshaped them, 






The spirit of Berthold of Moosburg’s own scholarly attitude to ancient wis-
dom and his views about the content of the Platonic philosophy which was the 
crowning achievement of that wisdom, can be summarised in a phrase from 
Dionysius he often cited:
one must see that our mind has a certain power for knowing, through 
which it examines things intelligible, but a union exceeding the nature 
of the mind (the other translation says: ‘a unity superexalted beyond 
the nature of the mind’), through which the mind is conjoined to those 
things that are above it. Therefore, it is necessary to think divine things 
according to this, not according to ourselves [non secundum nos], but our 
whole selves placed outside our whole selves and deified wholly. For it is 
better to be God’s and not our own; thus, divine things will be given to 
those made to be with God.8
For Berthold, the teaching that united the greatest philosophers and theolo-
gians (Plato, Paul, Dionysius, Augustine, Boethius) was that theology must 
proceed “intellectually”, by turning away from multiplicity and images, and by 
gazing upon the simple Form or Good forming all things. This intellectual pro-
gression was understood to culminate, only after great labour and even then 
not automatically, in a “divine frenzy” beyond the mind and in a union with the 
divine providence. At the same time, since the golden age of philosophy that 
had perfectly articulated the relation of the human to the divine world above 
Christian doctrine of faith and life for his contemporaries and to make them comprehensible 
to academics and laypeople alike”; p. 191: “while the commentary on John is primarily focused 
on a reform of metaphysics and the consequent reform of Christianity, as well as on a new 
philosophy of nature, it contains reflections on ethics that make it easier for the reader to 
understand Eckhart’s German sermons. […] The grounds of reason, Eckhart writes, convince 
us that the good man, the homo divinus, is not an isolated individual but rather exists in a 
community. Eckhart’s theory of sociality presupposes his philosophical theory of wholeness. 
According to this, every member of the community simultaneously serves itself and others. 
Everything that Christians do or suffer pertains to all of them. Everything belongs to them 
in common, omnibus sanctis aut bonis sunt omnia omnium bona communia (lw 3, n. 386, 
329.6– 7). This social aspect lies in the idea of the Good itself: someone who loves the Good 
loves the good in all others”; see also p. 211.
 8 See, for example, Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeambulum C, p. 64, l. 408– 413: oportet – 
inquit – videre mentem nostram habere quidem virtutem ad intelligendum, per quam intelli-
gibilia inspicit, unitionem autem excedentem mentis naturam (alia translatio dicit: ‘unitatem 
autem superexaltatam super mentis naturam’), per quam coniungitur ad ea, quae sunt supra 
ipsam. Secundum hanc igitur divina oportet intelligere, non secundum nos, sed totos nos ipsos 
extra totos nos ipsos statutos et totos deificatos. Melius est enim esse Dei et non nostri ipsorum; 
ita enim erunt divina data cum Deo factis. Cf. Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 7.1, 865C- 868A.
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it was entirely in the past, “not according to ourselves” became an exegetical 
principle. Philosophy and exegesis were deeply intertwined in Berthold’s pro-
ject of reform.
In the three prefaces to the commentary (Prologus, Expositio tituli, 
Praeambulum), Berthold used literary forms that gave him more freedom to 
articulate the larger aims of his project. In what follows, we will consider each 
preface in turn. We will find that, when they are interpreted in light of their 
sources, the same pattern appears in all of them. Berthold took concepts, argu-
ments, and praises traditionally associated only with Christian theology and 
extended them into the domain of Platonism as such. But this was no revolu-
tionary overthrow or demotion of Christian doctrine. Rather, it was a contri-
bution to a reform of Christian philosophical theology through the recovery of 
an understanding of nature (the macrocosm) and humanity (the microcosm) 
that was held in common by the ancient pagan and Christian inheritors of 
Plato. Platonism was for Berthold in the fullest sense a natural or “philosoph-
ical revelation”,9 guiding the human toward something in its nature that it is 
naturally disposed to ignore. We recall the words of Proclus, cited approvingly 
by Tauler: as long as we are occupied with images below us, we are incredu-
lous that there is such a ground within us. Turning then to the first preface, 
the Prologus, we will find nature presented as the outward manifestation of 
the inner, “supersubtantial world” or “house of God”. At its conclusion, we will 
find the contemplator (theoricus) seeking to enter this abode, first by turning 
inward, and then by going above himself, through the imago or trace of the 
One in the soul.
 9 The expression is that of L. Sturlese, “Homo divinus. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds von 
Moosburg und die Probleme der nacheckhartschen Zeit”, in K. Ruh (ed.), Abendländische 
Mystik im Mittelalter. Symposion Kloster Engelberg 1984 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1986), p. 145– 161, 
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 chapter 1
Prologus
The first of the three prefaces to the Expositio is an academic sermon on 
Romans 1:20: “The invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are 
beheld, being understood through the things that are made”.1 The academic 
sermon was a widely used exegetical introduction (accessus) first developed 
by theologians in the 12th century, and is known by scholars also as a “ser-
mon type” prologue that displays the standard techniques of the preaching 
arts (artes praedicandi).2 In these introductions, a Scriptural passage would be 
applied to the contents of the text under discussion, even a profane one, just 
as a preacher uses a pericope at the beginning of a sermon.3 Berthold followed 
this pattern closely, and even concluded the Prologus with the prayer found at 
the centre of Boethius’ Consolatio philosophiae.
Just as a medieval preacher would ruminate over each line or each word 
of their pericope, so Berthold divided the verse from Romans into three parts 
(Invisibilia Dei / a creatura mundi / per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspi-
ciutur). Each part begins with an analysis of the phrase or lemma, and first 
unfolds several possible interpretations of its grammar: for instance, the gen-
itive in invisiblilia Dei can either be taken “intransitively”, such that it refers 
to the divine essence as Trinity and the divine ideas in the Word,4 or “tran-
sitively”, such that it denotes the procession of all things into being through 
those primordial causes.5 The second phrase, a creatura mundi, can mean that 
 1 This identification of its literary form was first made by Boese, Wilhelm von Moerbeke, 
p. 69– 70.
 2 B. Smalley, “Peter Comestor on the Gospels and his Sources”, in Recherches de théologie 
ancienne et médiévale 46(1979), p. 84– 129, at p. 109– 110; G. Dahan, “Les prologues des com-
mentaires bibliques (XIIe- XIVe siècle)”, in J. Hamesse (ed.), Les prologues médiévaux. Actes 
du Colloque international organisé par l’Academia Belgica et l’École française de Rome avec le 
concours de la F.I.D.E.M. (Rome, 26– 28 mars 1998) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), p. 427– 470, at 
p. 438– 443.
 3 One could compare Berthold’s intricate accessus with the prologues of Nicholas Trevet, a 
Dominican master in the Faculty of Theology in Oxford whose regency, as noted above, coin-
cided with Berthold’s studies there. On Trevet’s prologues, see M.L. Lord, “Virgil’s Eclogues, 
Nicholas Trevet, and the Harmony of the Spheres”, in Mediaeval Studies 54(1992), p. 186– 273, 
at p. 193– 205. Like Trevet’s accessus to his commentary on Virgil, Berthold followed his ser-
mon prologue with an Expositio tituli modelled on the Aristotelian four causes.
 4 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 3, p. 7, l. 77 – p. 9, l. 133.
 5 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 4- 6, p. 9, l. 134 – p. 14, l. 286. This grammatical distinc-













“from which” the invisible things are seen, meaning the macrocosm, or that “in 
which” they are seen, which is the microcosm or subject who contemplates 
the invisible world.6 Finally, per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur, is 
taken to refer to the diverse means through which the invisible things are con-
templated by philosophical reasoning.7
What makes the Prologus remarkable from a stylistic and cultural point 
of view is that, at the heart of the sermon, on the phrase a creatura mundi, 
Berthold included two citations of the Asclepius attributed to the pre- Platonic 
sage, Hermes Trismegistus. Berthold treated both passages as “descriptions” 
(that is, definitions that do not exhaust their subject), which he glossed by 
lemmata, using the same method he had adopted for Romans 1:20.8 The gloss 
on the Hermetic text applied to the macrocosm takes up 282 lines of the pref-
ace (Prol. 8- 13),9 and that on the microcosm 310 lines (Prol. 14- 19). Hence, over 
half of this academic sermon on Romans (989 lines) is devoted to interpret-
ing Hermes Trismegistus. Berthold was evidently making a bold statement, 
especially when one recalls that, in Romans 1:22- 31, Paul went on to reproach 
(intransitive) and distinction (transitive). Cf. Alan of Lille, Summa ‘Quoniam homines’, ed. 
P. Glorieux, in Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 20(1953), p. 113– 364, at 
p. 253, l. 35– 38: Hoc autem quod dicitur Pater esse sapiens sapientia Patris, dupliciter potest 
intelligi: vel transitive vel intransitive. Intransitive ut sit sensus: sapientia Patris id est que est 
Pater; vel transitive sapientia Patris, id est que procedit a Patre. Si ergo intransitive signatur, 
verum est Patrem esse sapientem sapientia que est Pater. Si vero transitive, falsum. See also 
the Summa fratris Alexandri, ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae, vol. 1 (Quaracchi: Collegium 
S. Bonaventurae, 1924), lib. i, pars 1, inq. 2, tr. unicus, q. 1, tit. 2, c. 3, a. 2, p. 445: Ad octavum 
dicendum quod spiritus intelligentiae potest dici dupliciter: transitive et intransitive. Intransitive, 
ut dicatur spiritus intelligentiae spiritus qui est intelligentia, et hoc modo accipitur ibi; vel transi-
tive, et sic supponit vel pro persona Filii, cuius est Spiritus Sanctus tamquam ab ipso procedens, 
vel pro effectu in creatura, quia intelligentia in nobis est a Spiritu Sancto. Intelligentia etiam, 
secundum quod ponitur intransitive, potest accipi essentialiter et personaliter: essentialiter, 
convenit toti Trinitati, et etiam potest dici 'Spiritus Sanctus est intelligentia'; personaliter, sic 
appropriatur Filio.
 6 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 7, p. 14, l. 287– 292. Furthermore, if the genitive in a 
creatura mundi is taken intransitively, then it refers to the entire universe of things; if taken 
transitively, it denotes only the created existence of certain things.
 7 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 20, p. 32, l. 881– 883: sciendum, quod diversi sapientes et 
theologi et philosophi diversis viis in ista materia processerunt.
 8 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 8- 9, p. 14, l. 296– 300: Macrocosmus, scilicet maior 
mundus, sic describitur per Trismegistum […]. Circa istam descriptionem considerandum […]; 
Prol. 14- 15, p. 23, l. 570– 578: Verum circa microcosmum, id est hominem, sciendum, quod per 
Trismegistum ubi supra sic describitur […]. Circa istam descriptionem primo occurit scire […].
 9 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 8, p. 14, l. 296– 299: Mundus est opus Dei immutabile, 
gloriosa constructio, bonum multiformi imaginum varietate compositum, machina voluntatis 










the gentiles who turned away from the creator and became idolators, and 
who were thus “without excuse” because the invisible things had been made 
known to them. As we will see, Berthold did not ignore the passages in Hermes 
describing the manipulation of divine power and the animation of man- 
made statues. He addressed these much later in the commentary, where he 
did his utmost to present these doctrines as Hermes’ failure to live up to own 
philosophical principles. The overall impression Berthold makes on his audi-
ence here is somewhat different. If one were to read Paul after reading only 
Berthold’s Prologus, one could be forgiven for assuming that the Apostle’s 
judgement in fact bears on those who turn away from the Platonic consensus 
about the invisibilia Dei: if this is what God has revealed nature to be capable 
of, then those who turn away from it are indeed without excuse.
1 Hermes Trismegistus and Thomas of York
The centrality of Hermes Trismegistus in Berthold’s thought has been the 
subject or starting point for several studies on the Expositio.10 What has not 
received sufficient attention is how Berthold’s portrait of Hermes was in fact 
drawn from various direct and indirect sources. Before Françoise Hudry and 
 10 On Berthold’s reception of Hermes, see U.R. Jeck, “Die hermetische Theorie des 
Mikrokosmos in der Metaphysik Alberts des Grossen und im Prokloskommentar des 
Berthold von Moosburg”, in Patristica et Mediaevalia 20(1999), p. 3– 18; A. Sannino, 
“Berthold of Moosburg’s Hermetic Sources”, in Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld 
Institutes 63(2000), p. 243– 258; ead., “Il concetto ermetico di natura in Bertoldo di 
Moosburg”, in P. Lucentini, I. Parri, V. Perrone Compagni (eds), Hermeticism from Late 
Antiquity to Humanism, p. 203– 221; ead., “Il Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum nella 
metafisica di Bertoldo di Moosburg”, in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds), Per per-
scrutationem philosophicam, p. 252– 272; A. Palazzo, “La ricezione di un passo ermetico 
(Asclepius 8) nel tardo medioevo. Ulrico di Strasburgo, Pietro di Tarantasia, Riccardo di 
Mediavilla, Bertoldo di Moosburg e Dionigi il Certosino”, in T. Iremadze, T. Tskhadadze, 
G. Kheoschvili (eds), Philosophy, Theology, Culture. Problems and Perspectives. Jubilee 
Volume Dedicated to the 75th Anniversary of Guram Tevzadze (Tbilisi: Nekeri / Arche, 
2007), p. 104– 25. For Hermes as an entry- point into studies on Berthold’s theory of 
intellect, see B. Mojsisch, “Die Theorie des Intellekts bei Berthold von Moosburg. Zur 
Proklosrezeption im Mittelalter”, in Th. Kobusch, B. Mojsisch, O. Summerell (eds), 
Selbst – Singularität – Subjektivität. Vom Neuplatonismus zum Deutschen Idealismus 
(Amsterdam: Grüner, 2002), p. 175– 184; I.J. Tautz, Erst- Eines, Intellekte, Intellektualität. 
Eine Studie zu Berthold von Moosburg (Hamburg: Kovač, 2002); T. Iremadze, Konzeptionen 
des Denkens im Neuplatonismus. Zur Rezeption der Proklischen Philosophie im deutschen 






Fiorella Retucci demonstrated the extent of Berthold’s reliance on Thomas of 
York,11 whom the Dominican innocuously placed at the bottom of the list of 
Doctors of the Church as frater Thomas anglicus minor, it was believed that 
Berthold was thoroughly familiar with all three of the major philosophical- 
religious Hermetic texts available at the time: the Asclepius, the Liber de vi 
rerum principiis, and the Liber xxiv philosophorum.12 Now, however, it is pos-
sible to demonstrate that Berthold relied entirely on intermediary sources for 
his citations of the Asclepius and the De vi rerum principiis, but made direct 
use of the Liber xxiv philosophorum. We begin with Thomas of York, because 
it was his Sapientiale that exerted the greatest influence on Berthold’s attitude 
toward pagan and Christian antiquity in general, and probably inspired his 
decision to interpret Romans 1:20 through Hermes.13
Thomas of York cited the Asclepius extensively in the Sapientiale (193 times). 
By way of comparison, there are 87 citations of the text in Albert the Great’s 
entire oeuvre.14 Thomas also cited the 12th- century De vi rerum principiis, 
which he attributes to Hermes, 28 times.15 Berthold cited the Asclepius 79 times 
(67 from Thomas; 6 from William of Auvergne; 4 from Albert;16 1 from Ulrich; 1 
 11 See F. Hudry’s edition of Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 18, which was a commentary on the Liber 
xxiv philosophorum that Thomas abandoned after the third maxim, in Hermes Latinus, 
Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum, p. 87– 96. For Fiorella Retucci’s publications on 
Thomas, see Introduction, section 1, n. 9, above.
 12 Sannino, “Berthold of Moosburg’s Hermetic Sources”, p. 247. On the medieval reception of 
these three texts, see P. Lucentini, “Hermes Trismegistus II. Middle Ages” in W. Hanegraaff 
(ed.), Dictionary of Gnosis and Western Esotericism, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p. 479– 483, 
and Lucentini, P., Perrone Compagni, V., “Hermetic Literature II. Latin Middle Ages”, in 
W. Hanegraaff (ed.), Dictionary of Gnosis and Western Esotericism, vol. 1, p. 499– 529. On 
the Asclepius in particular, see P. Lucentini, Platonismo, ermetismo, eresia nel medioevo 
(Louvain- la- Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales, 2007), 
p. 71– 105.
 13 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 1 (ms Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, 
Conv. Soppr. A.vi.437, f. 212va). I am very grateful to Fiorella Retucci for sharing these 
unpublished materials from the Archivum fratris Thomae Eboracensis (Thomas- Institut, 
Cologne). For the identification of Berthold’s tacit borrowings from Thomas, I have also 
benefitted immensely from Retucci, “Between Cologne and Oxford”. The first portion of 
the critical edition of the Sapientiale has been published. See Thomas of York, Sapientiale. 
Liber III, cap. 1- 20, ed. A. Punzi (Firenze: sismel – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2020).
 14 D. Porreca, “Hermes Trismegistus in Thomas of York. A 13th- Century Witness to the 
Prominence of an Ancient Sage”, in Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 
72(2005), p. 147– 275, at p. 149. This study has been invaluable for what follows.
 15 Porreca, “Hermes Trismegistus in Thomas of York”, p. 151– 152.
 16 From Albert, Berthold used two unusual titles: De natura deorum (73A, p. 44, l. 28– 29, apud 















untraced17) and the De vi rerum principiis 35 times (all from Thomas).18
For Berthold, it was paramount that the Liber xxiv philosophorum be 
included alongside these texts in the Hermetic corpus.19 Medieval think-
ers, however, were not unanimous on this attribution. Despite the fact that 
Thomas was the first author known to have quoted more than its first two 
maxims, and to have used the commentaries accompanying the maxims at 
all,20 David Porreca regards Thomas’ sole explicit attribution of the text to 
Hermes as a sign of hesitation,21 which anticipated Albert the Great’s rejection 
of the attribution.22 Berthold, however, consistently maintained its Hermetic 
authorship, and cited the Liber xxiv philosophorum 52 times.23 Although two 
or three of these citations are clearly connected to passages copied from the 
Sapientiale, Berthold was undoubtedly directly familiar with the text and its 
second commentary. Citing its prologue, he maintained that Hermes compiled 
the text and gave it its title, De regulis theologiae, and announced that he would 
insert passages from the text into the Expositio where the doctrines of Hermes 
and Proclus agree.24 While he almost always referred to the text as Hermes’ 
i, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 4, l. 85- 90) and De causis (52A, p. 119, l. 72, apud Albert the Great, Summa the-
ologiae, pars i, tr. 5, q. 23, c. 1, a. 1, p. 122, l. 30– 33: Hermes Trismegistus in Libro de causis).
 17 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 13, p. 22, l. 540– 541; 199A, p. 152, l. 34– 35: mundus est 
‘quasi organum vel machina summa Dei voluntati subiectus’.
 18 Sannino, “Berthold of Moosburg’s Hermetic Sources”, p. 253– 258, lists the citations of 
Hermes in the Expositio. One may now easily compare these with the citations from 
Thomas identified in Retucci, “Between Cologne and Oxford”.
 19 On this text, see P. Dronke, Hermes and the Sibyls. Continuations and Creations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), reprinted in id., Intellectuals and Poets 
in Medieval Europe (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1992); Z. Kaluza, “Comme une 
branche d’amandier en fleurs”.
 20 Lucentini, Perrone Compagni, “Hermetic Literature ii. Latin Middle Ages”, p. 511.
 21 Porreca, “Hermes Trismegistus in Thomas of York”, p. 152; F. Hudry, “Introduction”, in 
Hermes Latinus, Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum, p. xxvi. I interpret Thomas differ-
ently, both in light of a second citation in Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 27, which Porreca (p. 216, 
n. 304) related to Asclepius 36 but which seems closer to maxim 22 of the Liber (as Berthold 
observed, see below, n. 28), and because of the importance of the explicit reference to the 
Liber in Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 14, which established that the Trinity was known to Hermes.
 22 L. Sturlese, “Saints et magiciens. Albert le Grand en face d’Hermès Trismégiste”, in Archives 
de Philosophie 43(1980), p. 615– 634, at p. 620– 621.
 23 This figure includes his use of a rare second commentary appended to the 24 maxims of 
the Liber, on which see Hudry, “Introduction”, p. xxxvii- xlviii.
 24 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 116A, p. 59, l. 9- 16: tempore Hermetis Trismegisti, ‘con-
gregatis viginti quattuor philosophis […]’. Quas descriptiones ipse Trismegistus in unum 
compingens intitulavit ipsum libellum De regulis theologiae, ex quibus cogitavi quasdam 

















regulae or De regulis theologiae (e.g., 12E; 131B; 188B),25 he also called it De xxiv 
descriptionibus (137A), a title which likely derived from Sapientiale, i.18.26 But 
his independence from Thomas is clear when, for instance, after copying out 
Sapientiale, i.14, which contained Thomas’ only explicit attribution of the text 
to Hermes, Berthold changed the title he read there, from Viginti quattuor prop-
ositiones to De regulis theologiae, and then embellished the maxim with its cor-
responding commentum.27 Elsewhere we find Berthold specifying an imprecise 
reference to the Liber xxiv philosophorum that he found in the Sapientiale.28
At first glance it is puzzling that Berthold appeared to use De Deo deorum as 
a title for the Liber xxiv philosophorum, since he would have known that this 
was a secondary title for the Asclepius used three times by Thomas of York.29 
In one instance, while citing Thomas, Berthold referred to the Asclepius by 
that title,30 and elsewhere he repeated the attribution independently.31 One 
 25 This attribution is found in manuscripts P and V in Hudry’s stemma, which belong to the 
group transmitting the second commentary used by Berthold (see Hudry, “Introduction”, 
p. xxvii and xxix).
 26 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 18, ed. F. Hudry, p. 87, l. 5: Post haec ponam descrip-
tiones uiginti quattuor […].
 27 See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 131B, p. 193, l. 85– 88. This was Berthold’s consistent 
practice with the Sapientiale, which he relied on principally as a thesaurus of ancient 
texts. For example, after copying portions of Sapientiale, lib. iii, c. 25, in Expositio, 12E, 
p. 202, l. 172 – p. 203, l. 209, Berthold added passages from Dionysius, the Liber de causis, 
and the regulae of Hermes.
 28 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 178E, p. 196, l. 258– 260: apparet idem »per tres praeposi-
tiones, quas ponit Trismegistus« de prime Deo in Regulis suis. Nam secundum ipsum ‘Deus 
est, in quo, per quem et ex quo omnia […]’. Cf. Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 27 and 
Liber xxiv philosophorum, ed. F. Hudry, maxim 22, p. 29, l. 1- 3: Deus est ex quo est quicquid 
est non partitione, per quem est non variatione, in quo est quod est non commixtione.
 29 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 117A, p. 68, l. 10– 11: quod vii regula Trismegisti De Deo 
deorum talis est: ‘Deus est principium sine principio, processus sine variatione, finis sine fine’.
 30 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. K, p. 47, l. 368– 369: sicut dicit Trismegistus 
ad Asclepium De hellera (hellera] hedera V), id est De Deo deorum. Cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, 
c. 5 (ms Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. A.vi.437, f. 5va): sicut dicit 
Trismegistus Ad Asclepium. Vocat sermonem De edera, hoc est Deo deorum, omnium ser-
monum. Porreca, “Hermes Trismegistus in Thomas of York”, p. 189, attributes Thomas’ use 
of this title to the influence of William of Auvergne (p. 150– 151). The text from William (De 
legibus, c. 23) was cited independently by Berthold at 115B (p. 52, l. 65– 66): Hanc, inquam, 
adventionem extollit Mercurius Trismegistus dicens in libro, quem scripsit De hellera, hoc 
est De Deo deorum […].
 31 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 114A, p. 40, l. 25 – p. 41, l. 29: »Positio vero deorum non 
superstitiosa nisi nomine solum erat Platonis et Platonicam philosophiam veraciter sectan-
tium, quippe secundum Hermetem multi dicti sunt dii participatione eius, qui omnium 
est maximus, scilicet deus deorum.« Unde et liber suus vocatur De Deo deorum, hoc est 















should not, however, conclude from these instances that Berthold read the 
Asclepius first- hand, or that he conflated the Liber and the quotations from 
the Asclepius he read indirectly and assumed that both belonged to a larger 
work, the De Deo deorum. Instead, it seems more likely that Berthold knew 
that the Ad Asclepium, the De hellera and De Deo deorum referred to the same 
work. In 117A he was not citing De Deo deorum as the title for the Liber, as the 
italics in the critical edition suggest, but rather was providing a description of 
its contents. Indeed, Berthold’s custom with the Liber xxiv philosophorum was 
to take a maxim about God (prime Deus) and extend its application to the gods 
or primordial causes (omnis deus).32 Berthold’s portrait of Hermes relied pri-
marily on materials he found in Thomas of York and was elaborated by his own 
admiring use of the propositional theology of the Liber xxiv philosophorum. 
Whether or not Thomas or Albert regarded the Liber as an authentic work of 
Hermes, for Berthold this text served as a high- water mark in the development 
of ancient paganism. In 116A, as we saw, he stated that the De regulis as a com-
pilation made by Hermes of an earlier tradition. Its philosophical achievement 
for Berthold consisted in both its traditional content and its rarefied theore-
matic form.
This portrait of the Hermetic corpus in the Expositio was held together 
by internal tensions that shed light on Berthold’s understanding of pagan 
antiquity: tensions between the philosophical religion of the Asclepius, not-
withstanding some objectionable passages, and the more austere Liber xxiv 
philosophorum, on the basis of which he was able to argue that the pagans 
themselves had arrived to a philosophically sound henotheism. Berthold’s 
opening commentaries on the propositions on the gods in the Elementatio 
theologica, which are the subject of Propositions 113 to 165, contain a high 
concentration of citations of the Asclepius and the Liber xxiv philosophorum. 
Especially instructive are Berthold’s commentaries on Propositions 114– 115, 120, 
and 131, where the Asclepius played a major role (17 citations from Sapientiale 
i.10 and i.14, and from William of Auvergne) and Propositions 116– 117, 119, 123, 
126 and 131, which include nearly half of Berthold’s citations of the Liber xxiv 
philosophorum (27 citations).
Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 10 (ms Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. A.vi.437, 
f. 10rb), which had just cited Hermes’ Ad Asclepium explicitly.
 32 See, for example, Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 116A- B, p. 59, l. 9- 28; 117C, p. 69, l. 54– 56; 
119C, p. 84, l. 59– 62; 126C, p. 157, l. 99– 101, each beginning with Omnis deus. Cf. Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio, 178E, p. 196, l. 258– 259: Secundo apparet idem per tres praepositiones, 




Berthold inherited from Thomas of York a view of Hermes which placed him 
on both sides of the condemnation of idolatry.33 Both Berthold and Thomas 
confronted Hermes’ discussion in the Asclepius, c. 23- 24, of man- made statues 
that were intended to channel divine influence. Berthold included additional 
and lengthy passages from William of Auvergne condemning Hermes, “a most 
prudent man”, for holding that “gods are made by human artifice and power” 
and that they are endowed with “wonderous powers”. Hermes, “though wise 
in many things”, was on this matter foolish beyond measure.34 His idolatry 
stemmed from a failure to recognise that “the powers of God diffused in the 
world” participate in one God, and that if the human has any strength from 
itself, then even it must be greater than the work of its hands.35 Both of these 
principles, according to Berthold, make the animation of statues unintelligible.
These criticisms, however, come immediately after Berthold, following 
Thomas, placed Hermes on the side of Plato and “the true philosophisers” as 
advocates of a rigorous henotheism.36 In Proposition 114, the first to begin with 
Omnis deus, Berthold agreed with Thomas about the false assumptions that 
led the ancients to mistaken beliefs about the gods.37 He used arguments from 
Ulrich of Strassburg that associate the name Deus with providence to explain 
how this name can be extended participatively (participative) to the primordial 
 33 Cf. Porreca, “Hermes Trismegistus in Thomas of York”, p. 154– 160; Sannino, “Berthold of 
Moosburg’s Hermetic Sources”, p. 249– 251. On the principal divisions in the Latin recep-
tion of the Asclepius, between Lactantius’ favourable reception, Augustine’s denuncia-
tion in De civitate Dei (vii.23– 24, 26; xviii.29) and Quodvultdeus’ more positive portrayal 
(which, because his text was transmitted with Augustine’s sermons, was subsequently 
attributed to the bishop of Hippo), see Lucentini, “Hermes Trismegistus ii. Middle Ages”.
 34 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 115B, p. 52, l. 82– 88: Sed mirum est de errore istius pruden-
tissimi viri, quo posuit statuas cum illis exsecrationibus, quas ipse vocat consecrationes, deos 
factitios esse et humano artificio atque potentia deos effici, attribuens illis virtutes divinas 
mirificas. […] ut ipse dicit in multis sapiens, sed in hoc desipiens supra modum. Cf. William 
of Auvergne, De legibus, ed. F. Hotot, Opera omnia, vol. 1 (Paris: Thierry, 1674), c. 26, p. 85aA 
and c. 23, p. 67aB.
 35 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 115B, p. 53, l. 89– 91: Non enim advertit vel advertere voluit, 
quia ‘omne datum naturaliter et magis est apud datorem et maius, et omne causatum natu-
raliter et magis et maius apud causantem […]’.
 36 See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 114A, quoted at n. 31, above, and 115A, p. 50, l. 10– 
14: deorum quidam est Deus deorum, sicut dicitur in ii parte Timaeus Platonis, qui ‘opifex 
et pater’ esset aliorum, et illum omnes vere philosophantes singulare posuerunt eo, quod ille 
per naturam superessentialiter et principaliformiter Deus est, de quo Plato et Trismegistus 
dicunt, quod vix attingitur ab homine, cum maxime a carne avertitur.












causes and, through them, to creatures.38 Plato and Hermes were in agreement 
with this doctrine, which found a consummate expression in Dionysius, as the 
arguments from Ulrich demonstrated.
Similarly, in Proposition 115, before presenting William’s critique of Hermes 
the worshipper of graven images, Berthold appealed to the De deo Socratis of 
Apuleius as a witness to Plato’s account of “the kinds of gods”: from the inef-
fable God, who is scarcely comprehended even by the few wise who separate 
themselves from the body, through the threefold division of “highest, middle, 
and lowest” gods. According to Apuleius, Plato called the highest gods “incor-
poreal and living natures, without end or beginning”, “oriented to supreme 
beatitude through a perfect natural endowment [ingenio]”, and “good through 
themselves without participation in any outside good”, which Berthold evi-
dently understood to be an explication of Plato’s doctrine of the “lesser gods” 
in the Timaeus.39 Therefore, by the time we come to William of Auvergne’s crit-
icism of Hermes, we are disposed to read it as an internal critique that exposes 
the sage’s betrayal of his own philosophical insight (in multis sapiens, sed in hoc 
desipiens supra modum). Berthold’s interpretation of Proclus on reincarnation 
will adopt the same strategy, by framing the objectionable texts as failures to 
penetrate beyond mythical coverings to the philosophical truth that acknowl-
edged the unknown God as the source of all things.
In these two very rare critical moments in the Expositio, we glimpse what 
Berthold held to be the true standard of Platonism beyond even what he read 
in Proclus. In general, however, he was most interested in illustrating the 
agreement between the pagan and Christian sages. The Hermes of the Liber 
xxiv philosophorum, who followed the theorematic mode most suited to the-
ology, produced statements that for Berthold were entirely in agreement with 
Dionysius’ strongest and most important declarations about divine ineffability, 
which echoed what Berthold read in Apuleius about Plato’s own views: “God 
is known by the mind only through ignorance”, and “God is the darkness that 
remains in the soul after every light”.40 For Berthold, this was the highest truth 
 38 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 114B, p. 41, l. 41 – p. 43, l. 109. For a comparison of this 
passage with Ulrich’s De summo bono, see Ferro, “Berthold of Moosburg, Reader of Ulrich 
of Strassburg”, forthcoming.
 39 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 115A, p. 50, l. 10 – p. 51, l. 56. Cf. Apuleius, De deo Socratis, 
ed. C. Moreschini, Apulei opera quae supersunt. Vol. iii. De philosophia libri (Leipzig: 
Teubner, 1991), c. 3, p. 11, l. 3- 10; c. 1, p. 7, l. 1- 9; and p. 10, l. 12 – p. 11, l. 2.
 40 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 123M, p. 135, l. 347– 348: Huic alludit Trismegistus xxiii 
regula, cum dicit: ‘Deus est, qui sola ignorantia mente cognoscitur’; 123M, p. 137, l. 393– 
394: Huic alludit Trismegistus xxi regula dicens: ‘Deus est tenebra in anima post omnem 








about God that united the greatest philosophers of antiquity, and Hermes had 
stated it with perfect clarity.
Berthold adopted from Thomas one further motif regarding the concord 
of Hermes and Plato, which undergirded the Dominican’s Christian henothe-
istic interpretation of Proclus: the notion that the Liber xxiv philosophorum 
and the Asclepius attest to the Hermes’ knowledge of God as Trinity.41 The 
Trinitarian interpretation of the Liber’s first maxim (monas monadem gign-
ens, in se unum reflectens ardorem), which was frequently transmitted alone 
or alongside the second maxim on God as “the infinite sphere, whose centre 
is everywhere and circumference nowhere”, began in the 12th century with 
Alan of Lille, who attributed the first maxim to Cicero, and with Alexander 
Neckam, who ascribed it to Hermes.42 Berthold’s source in 131B, on the pagan 
knowledge of the Son and Holy Spirit, was Sapientiale i.14, where Thomas 
developed Augustine’s judgement about the fundamental agreement between 
the books of the Platonists (libri Platonicorum) and the first verses of John’s 
Gospel using ps.- Augustine (Quodvultdeus) on the Sibylline oracles, as well 
as the Asclepius on the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son. Thomas 
then expanded this dossier of materials, which resembles what we find 
first in Peter Abelard, to argue that the pagans (Hermes, Seneca, Porphyry, 
and Macrobius) also had genuine knowledge of the Holy Spirit.43 Berthold 
adopted all of this but innovated from Thomas in two ways: first, by offer-
ing Trinitarian exegeses of other maxims in the Liber xxiv philosophorum;44 
and secondly, and more importantly, by interpreting this history through the 
philosophy of Dietrich of Freiberg, whom he followed for the remainder of 
his comments on Proposition 131. For Dietrich, the abundant causal overflow 
proposition with maxims from the Liber xxiv philosophorum: the eminence of the super-
unifical first principle (123K: maxim 16), how it is known through ignorance (123L: maxim 
23), and the divine nothingness (123L: maxim 21). This alone is clear evidence of Berthold’s 
commitment to the view that Hermes anticipated the Platonic theology of Proclus and 
Dionysius and showed his perfect apprehension of these mysteries by expressing his the-
ology in a theorematic form. Maxim 21, incidentally, seems also to have been known to 
John Tauler, who referred to its author as a saint. See John Tauler, Predigt 56 (Nineteenth 
Sunday after Trinity), ed. F. Vetter, p. 263, l. 31 – p. 264, l. 1: ein heilig schribet: ‘Got ist ein 
vinsternisse nach allem liechte, sunder dem vinsternisse siner unbekantheit’.
 41 F. Retucci, “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theo-
logicam Procli. Propositiones 108– 135, p. xiv– xviii.
 42 Hudry, “Introduction”, p. xxv- xxvi.
 43 On Abelard’s originality in combining these sources, see J. Marenbon, Pagans and 
Philosophers. The Problem of Paganism from Augustine to Leibniz (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2015), p. 74– 78.










of God and the separate intelligences (their ebullitio) is understood to be a 
result of an internal Trinitarian dynamism (quaedam interioris respectiva 
transfusio).45
On this second point, one should note that the lengthiest consideration of 
pagan knowledge of the Trinity in the Expositio is found here, in Proposition 
131 (“Every god begins its proper operation from itself ”).46 Berthold’s basic 
assumption was that unless the best of the pagans already knew that the 
fecundity of the divine nature requires such an “interior transfusion”, and 
that this is most fully realised in the Trinity and mirrored in lower principles, 
they could not have articulated the theology he found traced in Hermes and 
the Timaeus, and restored in the Elementatio. Hermes and Plato understood 
that there is a relation of subordination between God or the One and the 
gods that participate the divine providence. But it was Proclus who articu-
lated the logic of proportionality that took what is said of God in Hermes’ 
maxims and applied it analogously to the secondary principles. Thomas of 
York’s account of the pagan knowledge of God in antiquity was thus put 
in the service of a theory of causality that, although it was only explicated 
by Berthold’s German Dominican predecessors, was now presented in the 
Expositio as the truth known to these ancient philosophers. Berthold never 
alluded to any contemporary authorities for this theory; his central concern 
was to recover the ancient consensus and present it as such. He therefore 
concluded his commentary on Proposition 131 by suggesting that this had 
been Plato’s intention all along: “Therefore, in this way, every god is a ‘crafts-
man and begetter of its own universe’, as Plato says of the primarily God in 
the Timaeus.”47
Returning now to the Prologus, we notice that Berthold’s lengthy glosses on 
the Hermetic description of the macrocosm were also thoroughly indebted to 
Thomas of York, especially Sapientiale vii.1. For each lemma of the Hermetic 
text, Berthold copied from Thomas citations of authors including Hermes, 
Plato, Cicero, and Pliny, but added numerous texts of his own from Scripture, 
Dionysius, Proclus, the Clavis physicae. In Berthold’s sermon, this cloud of wit-
nesses praises the world as a perfectly crafted, immutable, and variegated work 
that is filled with divine glory.
 45 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 131D- F, p. 195, l. 128 – p. 198, l. 237.
 46 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 131, p. 66, l. 1: Omnis deus a se ipso propriam opera-
tionem orditur.
 47 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 131F, p. 198, l. 236– 237: Sic ergo omnis deus est ‘opifex et 








Thomas of York thus provided the basic components for this section of 
the Prologus, with its reverential and awestruck attitude toward nature. But 
Berthold’s modifications of the Sapientiale show that he was keen to empha-
sise how the visible world’s splendour is a consequence of its rootedness in the 
intelligible and supersubstantial worlds. For example, early in his remarks on 
the macrocosm, Berthold stated that Hermes called the entire world a work 
(opus) rather than a creation (creatura), as Paul did, “perhaps because of the 
primordial causes” that precede the creation of the world, as Dionysius and 
his commentator, Maximus, agreed.48 Plato and Boethius also concur that the 
visible world was drawn out of the invisible world.49 The invisible world, for its 
part, is “immutable”. The contemplator may ponder how immutability is com-
municated to the visible world when as the world is viewed as a whole, which 
is presided over by the world soul (anima totalis).50 From this standpoint, the 
entire order is understood to be a glorious edifice (gloriosa constructio) that, as 
Cicero wrote, is the common abode and domicile of gods and human beings. 
Then, focusing on the terms “abode” and “domicile”, Berthold proceeded to give 
an elaborate description of this house that “wisdom, the infinite sphere, whose 
centre is everywhere and circumference nowhere, has built for itself”. This, he 
explained, is house that the Father has made first in the divine Word.51 The 
seven columns of wisdom’s abode referred to in Scripture (Proverbs 9:1), con-
tinued Berthold, are in fact the seven intentions that comprise the primordial 
causes: goodness, infinity, being, life, intellectuality, animateness, and physi-
cality. The final picture, then, is tripartite. These columns or primordial causes 
comprise are the “supersubstantial” foundations of the “substantial” invisible 
world, from which this visible world takes its origin.52
At the end of each explanation of a syntagm from Hermes’ description of 
the macrocosm, Berthold invited his audience to share in the philosophers’ 
vision (Ecce!) of the splendour of this world and its archetype, each time using 
the words of Scripture to voice his praise.53 Two instances of these Scriptural 
conclusions are especially illustrative of Berthold’s attitude to pagan wisdom. 
The first, which we simply note in passing, is the final phrase of the section 
devoted to the macrocosm, where Berthold combined Psalm 92, the Timaeus, 
 48 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 9, p. 14, l. 300 – p. 15, l. 320.
 49 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 9, p. 15, l. 328– 337.
 50 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 10, p. 16, l. 364 – p. 17, l. 385.
 51 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 11, p. 17, l. 404 – p. 20, l. 476.
 52 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 10, p. 16, l. 364– 365.
 53 On the role of Scripture in the Expositio, see also P. Hellmeier, “The Meaning of the 














and the Asclepius into one sentence.54 But a more daring combination, and 
more typical of Berthold’s procedure in the Prologus as a whole, was when he 
exclaimed with the Psalmist:
Oh, what “glorious things of you are spoken, city of God”! For your entire 
edifice rises up into a holy and wonderful temple, into which you too, pri-
mordial causes, have been built together for a habitation of God through 
the Holy Spirit.55
The echo of Ephesians 2:20- 22 is remarkable in its connotation.56 Whereas 
the epistle referred to the Church as “the household of God”, founded on 
Christ as its cornerstone, in whom the redeemed are built up and are made 
“fellow- citizens with the saints”, Berthold addressed the same words directly 
to the primordial causes (vos primordiales causae coaedificamini), the foun-
dations of the invisible and visible world that are in the divine Word. For 
Berthold, these divine principles were the means of deification for those 
seeking God. The Word remained the cornerstone, but the power of deifica-
tion Berthold found refracted in the principles that inhabit it. For the soul to 
become God’s temple, it must enter and conform itself to God’s habitation. 
By extending the scope of Ephesians 2:20- 22 from Christ, the saints, and the 
Church, to the Word and the primordial causes as the house or temple of God, 
Berthold moved within the exegetical possibilities opened by the motif of the 
macrocosm and microcosm: what is true of human nature (the saints) has 
its universal correlative in the cosmos (the primordial causes). Once again, 
we should assume that this interpretative extension was not intended as a 
denigration of the Church or an evacuation of its value, but rather as a tes-
tament to the splendour of these natural realities as the philosophers had 
apprehended them. Only such words sufficed to express that glory. The con-
sequence of this extension, however, was to admit that the best of the pagans 
found the way to God’s abode, simultaneously through nature and through 
the soul’s own ground.
 54 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 13, p. 22, l. 566– 568: ‘In operibus manuum tua-
rum exultabo’, quia tu Deus, a quo omnis ‘invidia longe relegata est’, ‘operi tui sine invidia 
suffragaris’.
 55 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 11, p. 19, l. 473 – p. 20, l. 476: O quam ‘gloriosa dicta 
sunt de te, civitas Dei!’: omnis enim tui aedificatio crescit in templum sanctum et mirabile, in 
quo et vos primordiales causae coaedificamini in habitaculum Dei in Spiritum sanctum.
 56 Cf. Ephesians 2:20– 22: ipso summo angulari lapide Christo Jesu: in quo omnis aedificatio 
constructa crescit in templum sanctum in Domino, in quo et vos coaedificamini in habitacu-








2 Hermes Trismegistus and Albert the Great
Hermes Trismegistus still held the central position of authority in Berthold’s 
presentation of the microcosm (Prol. 14- 19). Here again his remarks were 
structured as a lemmatic commentary on a passage from the Asclepius. This 
time, however, Berthold’s direct source for Hermes was not Thomas of York, 
but Albert the Great. At the beginning of his commentary on Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, Albert assembled the following lines from the Asclepius, which 
for Berthold became a description of the microcosm:
The human is the nexus of God and the world [homo est nexus Dei et 
mundi], existing beyond the world through two kinds of scientific inquiry 
[per duplicem indagationem], namely, the physical and the quadrivial. 
Both are perfected through human reason. In this way the human is prop-
erly called the governor of the world [mundi gubernator]. He is, however, 
subjoined to God, receiving his beauties that are not immersed in the 
world, in extension and time, through a divine likeness, which is the light 
of the simple intellect, which he participates from the God of gods.57
If Thomas provided the key to recovering the ancient pagan attitude toward 
the world as the manifestation of the hidden and Triune God, then Albert was 
equally instrumental in providing Berthold with an anthropology and a theory 
of intellectual, scientific progress that could explain how those philosophers 
achieved their discovery, and what the consequences of this realisation were 
for their activity within the world.
This anthropology located the Expositio firmly within the intellectual cul-
ture of Berthold’s German Dominican predecessors, Albert the Great, Ulrich 
of Strassburg, Dietrich of Freiberg, and Meister Eckhart, and his contempo-
raries Henry Suso and John Tauler. Loris Sturlese has convincingly argued that 
 57 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 14, p. 23, l. 570– 577: Homo est nexus Dei et mundi 
super mundum per duplicem indagationem existens, physicam videlicet et doctrinalem, 
quorum utrumque virtute rationis humanae perficitur, et hoc modo mundi gubernator pro-
prie vocatur. Subnexus autem Deo, pulchritudines eius non immersas mundo, hoc est con-
tinuo et tempori, accipiens per similitudinem divinam, quae est lumen simplices intellectus, 
quod a Deo deorum participat. Cf. Albert the Great, Metaphysica, lib. i, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 2, l. 5- 15. 
Albert used the Hermetic notion of man as the nexus Dei et mundi in three other works. 
See Albert the Great, De animalibus, ed. H. Stadler, 2 vols (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 
1916– 1920), vol. 2, lib. xxii, tr. 1, c. 5, §9, p. 1353, l. 16– 20; id., De intellectu et intelligibili, ed. 
A. Borgnet, Opera omnia, vol. 9 (Paris: Vivès, 1890), lib. ii, tr. unicus, c. 9, p. 517b; id., Ethica, 





a characteristic trait of all these authors was the urgency they felt to demon-
strate the hidden, abiding dignity that belongs to the human as an intellectual 
creature or imago Dei.58 At the origin of this tradition was Albert’s synthesis of 
Hermes with the noetic doctrines of Al- Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, in his 
theories of human nature, intellectual progress, and perfection, which can be 
summarised in the philosopheme taken from the Asclepius, homo est nexus Dei 
et mundi.59
To the more familiar notion that the human being exists at the boundary 
of the eternal and the temporal, the immortal and the mortal, this image of a 
nexus added the further, dynamic connotation relating both to the ascent and 
descent of human activity to and from the divine. As the paean in  chapters 6- 
11 of the Asclepius declared, to live in accordance with its twofold condition, 
humanity is called “to adore the heavens” through the sciences, the arts, eth-
ical discipline, and above all, wonder, praise, and reverence for the immortal, 
and “to govern the earth”.60 As Albert put it, the divinisation of the intellect 
attained through long study (studium longum) enables the human to realise its 
rightful dignity as governor (gubernator) of the world.61 Albert described the 
precise nature of this governance in different ways, sometimes emphasising 
its operative or magical aspects, such as the participated capacity to produce 
 58 L. Sturlese, “Intelletto acquisito e divino. La dottrina filosofica di Alberto il Grande sulla 
perfezione della ragione umana”, in Giornale critico della filosofia italiana 82/ 2(2003), 
p. 161– 189, at p. 189; id., Vernunft und Glück. Die Lehre vom intellectus adeptus und die 
mentale Glückseligkeit bei Albert dem Grossen (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 2005), p. 28– 31; 
id., Homo divinus, p. 1– 13.
 59 Sturlese, “Saints et magiciens”; id., “Intelletto acquisito e divino”, p. 186– 187. The phrase 
is described as a philosopheme by A. Palazzo, “Le fonti ermetiche nel De summo bono di 
Ulrico di Strasburgo”, in P. Lucentini, I. Parri, V. Perrone Compagni (eds), Hermetism from 
Late Antiquity to Humanism, p. 189– 202, p. 196. Following Stephen Gersh, I understand 
“philosopheme” to mean a basic unit of philosophical discourse that differs from a “doc-
trine” in that it does not have to be employed entirely consciously by an author who uses 
it, and it does not, in principle, need to be capable of demonstrative formulation. See 
S. Gersh, “The First Principles of Latin Neoplatonism. Augustine, Macrobius, Boethius”, in 
Vivarium 50(2012), p. 113– 138, at p. 116– 117.
 60 Asclepius, ed. C. Moreschini, Apulei opera quae supersunt. Vol. iii. De philosophia libri 
(Leipzig: Teubner, 1991), c. 8, p. 47, l. 4- 7: Itaque hominem conformat ex animi et corporis, 
id est ex aeterna atque mortali natura, ut animal ita conformatum utraeque origini suae 
satisfacere possit, et mirari atque <ad>orare caelestia et incolere atque gubernare terrena. 
Cf. Genesis 1:28.
 61 Albert the Great, De somno et vigilia, ed. A. Borgnet, Opera omnia, vol. 9 (Paris: Vivès, 











fascinations or to transform matter,62 while at other times he spoke of a kind of 
intellectual prophecy that follows upon perfection in the sciences.63 Berthold 
will take up this second side of Albert.
Berthold’s main concern in his exegesis of the Hermetic description of the 
microcosm was to establish the agreement between the anthropologies of 
Dionysius and Proclus, and especially relative to their notion of a “unity” or a 
“one of the soul” (unum animae) beyond intellect. To explain the structure and 
dynamics of this Platonic anthropology, Berthold constantly and tacitly made 
recourse to the works of his German Dominican forebears. As we proceed 
in our reading of his Prologus and Expositio tituli, we will see that Berthold 
united two distinct anthropological currents coming from his predecessors. 
With Albert the Great and Ulrich of Strassburg, he conceived of intellectual 
perfection in terms of an arduous scientific effort, which concurred with what 
he found in Proclus’ De providentia et fato about the ascending modes of cogni-
tion from sense- perception and opinion to divine union beyond intellect. With 
Dietrich of Freiberg and Meister Eckhart, and like his contemporaries Henry 
Suso and John Tauler, he presented the restoration of the imago Dei alongside 
a critique of a lower form of rationality which cannot do justice to the inher-
ent dignity of the spirit. Berthold’s interpretation of the De mystica theologia 
tended to accentuate this element, although he found it in the De providentia 
et fato as well.
Both currents were already in play as Berthold began his lemmatic com-
mentary on Albert’s assembly of lines from the Asclepius describing the micro-
cosm. He started by focusing on the hierarchical connotation of the term 
nexus, which implies relations to the lower and to the higher, and asserted that 
all conjunction occurs through likeness.64 If the human is the nexus of God 
and the world, then it must resemble both terms. Accordingly, the human has 
four principal parts. The first three parts – body, soul, and intellect – are treated 
as self- evident (tria manifesta sunt) to everyday awareness. However, there is 
also a “one or unity” (unum sive unitas) in the soul that, as Proclus stated, is a 
“hidden vestige of the One” (secretum unius vestigium), which is more divine 
 62 Albert the Great, De animalibus, lib. xxii, tr. 1, c. 5, §9, p. 1353, l. 16– 25; id., De intellectu 
et intelligibili, lib. ii, tr. unicus, c. 11, p. 519b. On Albert’s complex and developing views 
about these magical and operative abilities, see A. Palazzo, “Albert the Great’s Doctrine 
of Fascination in the Context of his Philosophical System”, in L. Honnefelder, H. Möhle, 
S. Bullido del Barrio (eds), Via Alberti. Texte – Quellen – Interpretationen (Münster 
i.W.: Aschendorff, 2009), p. 135– 215.
 63 This was the interpretation of Albert favoured also by Ulrich of Strassburg. See Palazzo, 
“Le fonti ermetiche”, p. 195– 196.








than intellect. Berthold then cited Dionysius to add that this union (unitio) or 
unity (unitas) is lifted high above the nature of mind and is that through which 
the nature of mind is conjoined (coniungitur) to what is above it. Humanity 
resembles the macrocosmic realities below it through the body and soul, and 
those above it through the intellect and the unum animae.
In Berthold’s treatment of the next lemma (duplex indagatio), Albert the 
Great’s anthropology and noetics were his principal inspiration (Prol. 16). 
Berthold’s remarks on the notion of scientific progression were mostly a tacit 
copy from Albert’s Metaphysica i.1.1, which is summarised in what follows, 
though Berthold made three important modifications to his source that will be 
noted as we proceed. Albert began his Metaphysica by observing that the natu-
ral and quadrivial sciences had now been treated in other commentaries, and 
that each science has perfected the intellect in its own way: natural science 
perfected intellect insofar as it is related to time; quadrivial science perfected 
it in its relation to space.65 Furthermore, the sciences can be arranged in a cer-
tain order. Natural sciences, because of their mutable objects, cannot achieve 
certainty and are inherently mixed with opinion. The quadrivial sciences pro-
duce stable knowledge because of the way they consider their objects, even 
though their objects are not in themselves separate from matter. With the lat-
ter sciences, Albert stated, one has reached the level of stable forms (formae 
stantes) and the threshold of metaphysics. Albert’s main authority here had 
been the prologue of Ptolemy’s Almagest. Berthold, however, at this point in 
his tacit paraphrase, moved from the Metaphysica to Albert’s Summa theolo-
giae, where Albert offered a similar argument about opinion and the physical 
sciences but attributed it to Plato’s Phaedo. The reasons for this first modifi-
cation, not to mention the facility with Albert’s works it demonstrates, are 
obvious.
Before concluding his analysis of the duplex indagatio that prepares for the 
study of the divine science, Berthold touched on the term governor (guber-
nator) that he found in the description of the microcosm from the Asclepius. 
Albert had offered no explanation of this term in the Metaphysica, so once 
again Berthold had to depart from his principal source:
It is clear now that, through these sciences, and especially through 
astronomy and astrology, the human being is properly called ‘the gover-
nor’ of the sensible world. Among all who philosophise, to the astrologers 
alone it is granted by divine obligation to be inquirers of the celestial 
 65 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 16, p. 23, l. 604 – p. 24, l. 635. 
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decrees from the consideration of causes that are primary, natural, per se, 
essential, and sempiternal, and to be aware of things to come. For these 
thinkers never depart from the principles of nature and natural science, 
just as Haly in his Commentary on the Quadripartitus commends [us] to 
follow Ptolemy, and moreover because, according to Al- Farabi in On the 
Origin of the Sciences, the wise man is the measure of all things, dwelling 
among the elements and parts of the world, gaining the highest delights. 
And thus, according to Proclus in question 10 of On Providence, he rules 
the world with the gods.66
At the summit of the duplex indagatio and at threshold of the divine science, 
then, is the science of the stars, whose practice is exemplified in Ptolemy. 
As the author of the mathematical Almagest and juridical Tetrabiblos 
(Quadripartitus), Ptolemy both had achieved perfection in the quadrivial 
sciences and had used this knowledge for action in the world – this is why for 
Berthold, following Ptolemy’s commentator Haly (‘Alī ibn Riḍwān, d. 1061), he 
was worthy of imitation. In Ptolemy, the two sides of the nexus Dei et mundi 
were brought together, demonstrating the intrinsic connection between the 
duplex indagatio and humanity’s rightful role as gubernator. As Berthold 
explained, it is because the astrologer is familiar with essential and eter-
nal causes that he can act in the world as its governor. This was high praise, 
but most remarkable was how Berthold described the practical activity of 
the astrologer by invoking one of the loftiest passages in the Tria opuscula, 
where Proclus, following Plato’s Phaedrus, stated that a soul who travels with 
the gods through the heavenly circuit governs the world with them (dispensat 
mundum cum diis).67 In our attempts to imagine how such a notion in Proclus 
would be understood by a 14th- century Dominican scholar, its presence in this 
 66 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 16, p. 24, l. 636 – p. 25, l. 646: Ex praemissis satis 
patet, quomodo et physica et doctrinalia perficiantur virtute rationis humanae. Quod autem 
per eas et specialiter astronomiam et astrologiam homo mundi sensibilis vocetur proprie 
gubernator, apparet. Tum quia astrologis solis inter omnes philosophantes divino munere 
communicatum est decretorum caelestium ex consideratione causarum naturalium pri-
marum per se et essentialium ac sempiternarum in futurorum eventibus scrutatores esse et 
conscios: Nequaquam enim a principiis naturae et naturalis scientiae discedunt, quemad-
modum Haly in Commento Quadripartiti commendat procedere Ptolemaeum. Tum etiam 
quia secundum Alfarabium libro De ortu scientiarum sapiens est mensura omnium rerum, 
elementa et partes mundi inhabitans, summas delectationes acquirens. Haec ille. Et sic 
secundum Proclum 10 quaest. De providentia dispensat mundum cum dis.
 67 The source was not De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam, as Berthold recalled, but 






context is highly instructive. Throughout the Expositio, the phrase dispensat 
mundum cum diis will be associated with the providential cognition of the 
unum animae, the highest principle in human nature, which is to be awakened 
in the study of the subject matter treated in the Elementatio theologica. If this 
is somehow synonymous with the practice of the science of the stars, in both 
its mathematical and juridical aspects, then we must always keep this associa-
tion in mind as we make our way through the commentary. In other words, the 
divine science of Proclus and the mystical theology of Dionysius do not lose 
their connection with the study of natural philosophy. This continuity must be 
preserved if the human is to be a nexus Dei et mundi.
These remarks on the gubernator signal that Berthold did not interpret the 
ecstatic cognition of the unum animae as a rejection of rational activity, but as 
identical to, or at least fundamentally continuous with, a kind of intellectual 
or natural prophecy.68 Some clarity on this matter can be gained by looking 
to Berthold’s source in Albert. Here he did not look to the Metaphysica, which 
did not gloss the term gubernator. Nor was it Albert’s De animalibus xxii.1.5 
(a text which Berthold knew in its autograph copy), which had discussed the 
Hermetic nexus and the term gubernator, since Berthold’s notion of govern-
ance included none of the operative- magical abilities mentioned by Albert 
in that text. Berthold’s source was very likely a passage occurring immedi-
ately prior to Albert’s mention of the Hermetic nexus Dei et mundi in the De 
intellectu et intelligibili.69 In this chapter, Albert presented his notion of the 
 68 On the notion of natural prophecy in Avicenna, who was a major source for Albert 
the Great on this question, see D.N. Hasse, Avicenna’s De anima in the Latin West. The 
Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160– 1300 (London / Torino: The Warburg 
Institute / Nino Aragno Editore, 2000), p. 154– 174. For a less positive verdict on the human 
capacity for certain prognostication, which is difficult to reconcile with Prol. 16, see 
Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 120A, p. 91, l. 36– 41: futura contingentia nusquam habere 
possunt immobilem veritatem nisi in isto, qui est immobilis et simpliciter immutabilis, qui est 
Deus, sicut dicit Cicero De divinatione libro I cap. 23, quod ‘futurae res in causis’ primordi-
alibus ‘sunt conditae’ sicut res ‘in seminibus’; et ideo, qui tenet causas futuorum, tenet omnia 
futura; homo autem per signa potest scire futura, non per causas, et talis scientia dicitur 
potius coniectura.
 69 Albert the Great, De intellectu et intelligibili, lib. ii, tr. unicus, c. 9, p. 517a: Anima igitur 
humana concipiendo lumen cui applicatur intellectus agens in ipsa illustratus, applicatur 
lumen intelligentiarum, et amplius clarescit in illo: et sicut dicit Alfarabius, in ipso efficitur 
sicut stellae coeli, et intellectus huic lumini beate et pure permixtus, peritissimus efficitur 
astrorum, et prognosticationum quae sunt in astris. Et ideo dicit Ptolemaeus, quod ‘scientia 
astrorum facit hominem pulchritudinem coelestem amare’. In illo autem lumine conforta-
tus consurgit intellectus in lumen divinum, quod nomen non habet et inenarrabile est: quia 
proprio nomine non innotescit: sed ut recipitur, innotescit: et primum in quo recipitur, est 






assimilative intellect (intellectus assimilativus), which is the level of scientific 
perfection that follows after the already exalted state of the acquired intel-
lect (intellectus adeptus).70 The latter denotes the stage at which, after long 
study, one attains or “acquires” their own intellect, inasmuch as one possesses 
the totality of intelligibles that the possible intellect is naturally disposed to 
receive through the unified light of the agent intellect. Since, for Albert, the 
human, insofar as it is human, is intellect itself, the acquired intellect corre-
sponds to self- knowledge.71 The assimilative intellect signifies the next stage, 
in which the human ascends gradually, to the extent permitted to it, to the 
divine intellect through the simpler lights of the separate intellects.72 Here it 
becomes united with the ever simpler and more comprehensive forms of the 
nomine proprio, sed nomine sui causati. Et ideo dixit Hermes ‘Deum deorum non proprie 
percipi nomine proprio, sed vix mente attingitur ab his qui a corpore per longum studium 
separantur’: iungitur igitur illi ultimo et lumini suo, et mixtus illi lumini aliquid participat 
divinitatis. Propter quod dicit Avicenna, quod aliquando illi lumini vere permixtus intellectus 
futura praeordinat et praedicit, et quasi Deus quidem esse perhibetur. Iste igitur est intellec-
tus assimilativus.
 70 On the acquired intellect, see also Albert the Great, De anima, ed. C. Stroick (Münster 
i.W.: Aschendorff, 1968), lib. iii, tr. 3, c. 11, p. 221, l. 6 – p. 223, l. 38. On the development of 
Albert’s doctrine of the acquired intellect, see C. Steel, “Medieval Philosophy: an Impossible 
Project? Thomas Aquinas and the ‘Averroistic’ Ideal of Happiness”, in J. Aertsen, A. Speer 
(eds), Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1998), p. 152– 174; id., Die 
Adler und die Nachteule. Thomas und Albert über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik (Münster 
i.W.: Aschendorff, 2001); H. Anzulewicz, “Entwicklung und Stellung der Intellekttheorie 
im System des Albertus Magnus”, in Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen 
Âge 70(2003), p. 165– 218, at p. 188– 198; De Libera, Métaphysique et noétique, p. 196– 
200 and 300– 344; Sturlese, Vernunft und Glück; J. Müller, “Der Einfluß der arabischen 
Intellektspekulation auf die Ethik des Albertus Magnus”, in A. Speer, L. Wegener (eds), 
Wissen über Grenzen. Arabisches Wissen und lateinisches Mittelalter (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
2006), p. 545– 568.
 71 Albert the Great, De intellectu et intelligibili, lib. ii, tr. unicus, c. 8, p. 514b- 515b: Adeptus 
igitur intellectus est, quando per studium aliquis verum et proprium suum adipiscitur intel-
lectum, quasi totius laboris utilitatem et fructum. […] Et ideo dixit Plato, quod verissima phi-
losophiae definitio est suiipsius cognitio. […] in illis maxime intellectus invenit se secundum 
naturam propriam, eo quod homo in quantum homo solus est intellectus. On Albert’s use of 
the formula homo inquantum homo solus est intellectus, see H. Anzulewicz, “Anthropology. 
The Concept of Man in Albert the Great”, in I.M. Resnick (ed.), A Companion to Albert the 
Great. Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences (Leiden: Brill, 2013), p. 325– 346, at p. 340– 344.
 72 Albert the Great, De intellectu et intelligibili, lib. ii, tr. unicus, c. 9, p. 516a: Est autem intel-
lectus assimilativus, in quo homo quantum possibile sive fas est proportionabiliter surgit ad 
intellectum divinum, qui est lumen et causa omnium. Fit autem hoc cum per omnia in effectu 
factus intellectus perfecte adeptus est seipsum et lumen agentis, et ex omnium luminibus 









world (formae mundi), which have been compared to laws of nature,73 until 
it eventually reaches union with God (intellectus divinus). That this passage 
was Berthold’s inspiration for his comments on the microcosm as guberna-
tor is clear from a comparison from the authorities used by both Dominicans. 
Whereas Albert had cited Al- Farabi, Ptolemy, Hermes, and Avicenna on the 
assimilative intellect, Berthold described the astrologer’s scientific and opera-
tive knowledge using Al- Farabi, Ptolemy, and Proclus, with Hermes of course 
in the background.
Before considering the significance of Berthold’s substitution of the unum 
animae for Albert’s intellectus assimilativus, we should briefly note Berthold’s 
third and final transformation of Albert’s Metaphysica in Prologus 16. In his 
prologue to the Metaphysica, Albert had spoken of the divine science pur-
sued by Aristotle using a phrase from Ethica Nicomachea x.7, that the life of 
contemplation, the activity that has no further goal beyond itself, belongs to 
the human, not as human, but insofar as something divine exists in him.74 
Berthold, however, consistent with his central claim that the human resembles 
the world above it by virtue of the intellect and the “one” that is hidden from 
everyday awareness, made the distinction between the human and “the divine 
in him” hinge on the difference between intellect and the unum animae:
These two kinds of scientific inquiry form the steps and conveyances to 
divinising wisdom [sapientiam divinalem], which belongs to the human, 
not as human, but as divine. For, according to Proclus in the text men-
tioned above, the human is divine through the one that is more divine 
than intellect: “the soul, attaining this and settling itself within it, is 
divine and lives by divine life, to the extent permitted to it”.75
The same pattern appears in all three of Berthold’s modifications of Albert. 
Wherever possible, he sought Platonic alternatives for the authorities used 
by Albert in his account of the order and progression of the sciences (the 
Phaedo for the Almagest; Proclus for Avicenna on intellectual prophecy; 
Proclus for Aristotle on “the divine in us”). This comparison of Prol. 16 with its 
sources illustrates both the aims and limitations of Berthold’s criticism of the 
Peripatetic divine science: Berthold approached Proclus through an Albertist 
 73 On the notion of forma mundi, see Sturlese, Vernunft und Glück, p. 18– 23.
 74 Albert the Great, Metaphysica, lib. i, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 1, l. 57 – p. 2, l. 4.
 75 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 16, p. 25, l. 647– 649. The “text mentioned above” 
refers to the incorrect citation of De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam for the 








lens and understood the novel concept of the unum animae in such a way that 
it could be made to substitute fairly seamlessly for and improve upon Albert’s 
doctrine of the stages of intellectual perfection (intellectus adeptus, intellectus 
assimilativus).
In one sense, it is not difficult to appreciate the resemblance Berthold saw 
there, especially if we compare the Proclean dispensat mundum cum diis with 
Albert’s Avicennian view of natural prophecy: both describe the capacity for 
prognostication and action in the world achieved by a person whose intel-
lect is conjoined with the immutable laws or principles of the cosmic order. 
But if we were to reduce Berthold entirely to his tacit sources or dismiss the 
result as a garbled pastiche, we would miss the point of his substitution. For 
Berthold, at least, it could not be that Avicenna’s and Proclus’ teachings were 
simply identical. This is clear already from Berthold’s insistence that “the 
divine in us” is precisely not the intellect that can be raised to higher stages 
of actualisation or perfection, but the unum animae that is already some-
how “more divine than intellect”. Now, a complete account this modification 
must await Berthold’s elaborate theory of “the three motions of the soul” in 
the Expositio tituli A- D. There we will find the resources to explain what is still 
only implicit here: namely, that the exalted stage of self- knowledge (intellec-
tus adeptus) must pass into a more fundamental, non- reflexive cognition, as 
the soul becomes established more and more in the cognition that is already 
underway in its own ground. The non- reflexive cognition of the unum animae 
is ultimately what will replace the Albertist intellectus assimilativus.
What immediately followed in Prol. 17, which is Berthold’s commentary on 
the lemma “subjoined to God” (subnexus autem Deo), anticipated this larger 
shift. There he introduced the reader to the compatible doctrines of divine 
union he discerned in the De mystica theologia and the De providentia et fato 
by citing both texts at length.76 The agreement of Proclus and Dionysius was 
predicated on the notion of the unum animae defined as a non- reflexive cog-
nition above the mind. In the De mystica theologia, Dionysius advised Timothy 
to abandon all sense- perception and intellective activity, for in this way “the 
divine man rises up in ignorance” (divinus homo ignote consurgat) to union 
“with him, who is beyond all substance and knowing”. This realises the peace of 
God that passes all understanding (intellectus) – the understanding, Berthold 
added, citing the Timaeus (51e), that is itself “only proper to God and a few cho-
sen people”. It is through the one or unity (unitas) that exceeds the nature of 
the mind that the soul “enters the divine darkness” (intrat divinam caliginem) 
 76 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 17, p. 26, l. 675 – p. 27, l. 727. 
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or “the supersubstantial world” that is the primordial causes,77 in which God 
is seen “by not seeing him” (per ipsum non videre). Berthold then cited Proclus’ 
account of the fives modes of cognition, which culminates in a cognition 
higher that anything Aristotle ever insinuated, though it was known to Plato 
and the theologians before him, who called it a truly “divine frenzy” (divina 
mania). At the height of the intellectual ascent, Proclus wrote, the soul has one 
state in which it knows itself and its object through a kind of immediacy or 
contact, which is intellectual intuition (intellectus); it has another state where, 
“thinking, the soul is ignorant of itself and other things” (et se ipsam et illa igno-
rat) and, “because of that, casting forth its one, it loves to be at peace, enclosing 
itself from cognitions, having been made silent”.78 Juxtaposing Dionysius and 
Proclus in this way, Berthold brought out their common teaching of an ascent 
from senses to the intellect, and finally to the abandonment of intellectual 
activity in an ignorance, peace, or silence that partakes of the divine knowing 
(cognoscet solummodo, qualiter di omnia indicibiliter cognoscunt singuli).
These modalities of self- knowledge and self- forgetting that “knows as the 
gods know” and thus becomes capable of a kind of natural prophecy were 
latent in Albert’s De intellectu et intelligibili. As noted already, Albert had 
described the intellectus adeptus as self- knowledge (suiipsius cognitio) and the 
intellectus assimilativus as an extension of the intellect out from all lights and 
self- knowledge (ex omnium luminibus et notitia sui extendit se). Berthold accen-
tuated the difference between these two stages by drawing out the Dionysian 
resonances of Albert’s language.79
 77 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 19, p. 31, l. 845– 46: Suo enim uno ingreditur homo 
mundum supersubstantialem.
 78 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 17, p. 27, l. 713– 719, citing Proclus, De providentia 
et fato, c. 8, §31, p. 140, l. 9- 16: Intelligens quidem anima et se ipsam cognoscit et quae-
cumque intelligit contingentia, sicut diximus; similiter intelligens [superintelligens Boese] 
autem et se ipsam et illa ignorat, quo adiacens le unum quietem amat clausa cognitionibus, 
muta facta. Et enim quomodo utique adiaciet indicibilissimo omnium aliter quam sopo-
rans, quae in ipsa garrulamina? Fiat igitur unum, ut videat le unum, magis autem ut non 
videat: videns enim intellectuale videbit et non supra intellectum et quoddam unum intel-
liget et non le autounum. The abbreviation in Berthold’s copy of the Tria opuscula (ms 
Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.iv.31, f. 64rb: sr) could be read either similiter intelligens 
or superintelligens, but from the manuscripts of the Expositio, it is clear Berthold read 
similiter.
 79 Albert’s allusions to Dionysius became even stronger later in De intellectu et intelligi-
bili, lib. ii, tr. unicus, c. 10, p. 518a- b: Haec autem puritas [intellectus] ex quatuor efficitur, 
quorum unum est studium pulchritudinis. Secundum est acquisitio multae illuminationis. 
Tertium autem excessus separationis a continuo et tempore. Et quartum, applicatio cum 
lumine superioris ordinis. […] Inter autem quatuor ista primum est purgatio ab impedimen-








Albert: Est autem intellectus assimilativus, in quo homo quantum possibile 
sive fas est proportionabiliter surgit ad intellectum divinum, qui est lumen 
et causa omnium.
Berthold: Divinus homo ignote consurgit, sicut est possibile, ad eius uni-
tionem, qui est super omnem substantiam et cognitionem.
Whereas Albert was clearly describing two different states of intellectual per-
fection, Berthold’s theory contained an additional layer of complexity in that 
he understood the unum animae as a principle in the soul that is deeper than 
intellect itself. To a large extent, this was a hallmark of Dietrich of Freiberg’s 
influence, for whom the agent intellect was to be regarded as a substance and 
as the essential cause of the soul. The tension between these two models in 
Berthold’s thought is nowhere clearer than in his choice in Prol. 17, which 
became his custom in the Expositio, to cite both the “new” and “old” translations 
of De divinis nominibus 7.1 on the union (unitio) or unity (unitas) – in Greek, 
ἕνωσις – beyond the nature of the mind. The unitive cognition that Berthold 
found in Dionysius and Proclus was both a state to be achieved only by the 
few (unitio), following Albert, and a fact about human nature as such (unitas), 
following Dietrich. But as we will see fully in Chapter 2, these two threads also 
crossed. Berthold will ultimately accept Dietrich’s account of the conditions 
under which that union is achieved by the few (raptus). But insofar as he mod-
ified Dietrich’s theory of God’s abiding presence in the soul by construing the 
unum animae as a phase of intellect that is higher than self- knowledge, which 
Proclus called “the flower of the intellect”, Berthold’s unum resembled Albert’s 
intellectus assimilativus more than anything we find in Dietrich.80
By way of comparison with Berthold, we may note how Ulrich of Strassburg 
developed his own synthesis of the Dionysian and Peripatetic strands within 
Albert’s theories of the intellectual ascent to God in Book i of De summo bono. 
There Ulrich outlined five ways by which the natural knowledge of God is 
attained: (1) by natural instinct; (2) by negation of the divine attributes known 
through philosophy or by negation of God’s revealed names in Scripture; 
(3) by causality, when God’s perfections are known through the creatures of 
the world;81 (4) by eminence, when the imperfect mode of these perfections 
est purgatio ab impedimento quarto: quia nisi quis excedat mente continuum et tempus, non 
consurgit ad concipienda divina. Quartum est summa perfectio quae in hac vita contingere 
potest homini.
 80 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 17, p. 27, l. 721.
 81 Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber I, ed. B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1989), 
lib. i, tr. 1, c. 5, p. 14, l. 9- 11, anticipated Berthold’s Prologus when he interpreted the lemma 







as they are found and named in creatures is negated of God; (5) by the stages 
of intellectual ascent outlined in Albert’s De intellectu et intelligibili, which 
we have found in the background of Berthold’s lemmatic commentary on the 
Hermetic microcosm. For Ulrich, the second, third, and fourth ways directly 
corresponded to the theologies pursued in three treatises by Dionysius: the De 
symbolica theologia (not extant), the De divinis nominibus, and the De mystica 
theologia, respectively.82
It is clear that the first four ways, and possibly even the fifth, are related 
for Ulrich according to the interplay of affirmation and negation.83 Ulrich lik-
ened the first, the way of instinct, to the innate but indeterminate or inchoate 
presence of the principles of scientific knowledge in the possible intellect. 
This confused knowledge (notitia confusa) is awakened by experience and 
becomes determinate. For Ulrich, the mere experience of causality is enough 
to arouse this instinctual knowledge of God. From this affirmative knowl-
edge comes the second way, by negation, which goes further to determine, for 
example, that God is not a body but a spirit, not an accident, but a substance. 
Then, beginning from this negative standpoint, the third way affirms all the 
perfections of God that it is better to be than not (good, living, knowing, one, 
etc.). In the fourth way the imperfect mode by which these are known and 
named in creatures is negated of God who, for example, is not “substantial” 
but “super- substantial”. Following Albert’s commentary on the De mystica the-
ologia, Ulrich held that this fourth way moves from the more evident to the 
more hidden, negating these perfections of God until our intellect is left “in 
a certain confused state” (in quodam confuso). This ignorance is the inverse 
of the notitia confusa with which a person began, in that one arrives to an 
indeterminacy and darkness that is beyond and not beneath thought. Ulrich 
described the fourth way in terms that evoked the beginning of the De mys-
tica theologia: “in negations one must leave behind sense and intellect, inso-
far as all things are known to it in created things, and one must go beyond all 
beings, not only material but even intellectual beings. And thus by exceeding 
 82 On De summo bono, lib. i, tr. 1, see A. de Libera, La mystique rhénane. D’Albert le Grand à 
Maître Eckhart (Paris: Seuil, 1994), p. 104– 114; A. Palazzo, “La sapientia nel De summo bono 
di Ulrico di Strasburgo”, in Quaestio 5(2005), p. 495– 512; Beccarisi, “La scientia divina dei 
filosofi”; I. Zavattero, “Bonum beatitudinis. Felicità e beatitudine nel De summo bono di 
Ulrico di Strasburgo”, in Memorie Domenicane 42(2011), p. 283– 313.
 83 Cf. Hankey, God in Himself, p. 54– 56, which finds another kind of progression from the 
indeterminate to the determinate in the quinque viae of Thomas Aquinas, Summa theolo-






oneself, the intellect must be united to God, just as intellect and intellected 
are one”.84
But how does the fifth way, the way of intellectual progression modelled 
on Albert’s De intellectu et intelligibili, relate to these four? The fifth way could 
be read as a summary of the entire process of affirmation and negation, since 
it begins with the actualisation of the possible intellect (as in the first way) 
and ends in union with God (as in the fourth way). Another, more plausible, 
interpretation would regard the fifth way as a continuation of the dialectic 
of affirmation and negation. For Ulrich, at the summit of the fifth way, God 
is known affirmatively by his likeness. This likeness is a light composed from 
three sources: the light of the human intellect, the light of the separate intel-
ligences, and the divine light. In this knowledge through likeness (per simili-
tudinem), one knows not only that God exists (quia est Deus) but something 
of his quiddity (quiditas), which Ulrich distinguished from the knowledge of 
God per essentiam that depends on grace. Here a person seems to have gone 
beyond the culmination of the fourth way, where the human intellect was left 
in quodam confuso, for it follows that if God’s quiddity is somehow known in 
the likeness of intellectual light, then God is in himself an intellectual light 
beyond all negations.85
 84 Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. i, tr. 1, c. 6, p. 17, l. 52– 56: sed in negationibus 
oportet dimittere sensum et intellectum quantum ad omnia sibi in rebus creatis nota et 
oportet transcendere omnia entia, non solum materialia, sed etiam intellectualia, et sic exce-
dendo se ipsum oportet intellectum uniri Deo, sicut intellectus et intellectum sunt unum.
 85 That the name “intellect” would be carried across the threshold of the negations of the 
De mystica theologia is consistent with a motif we find in the generation of German 
Dominican philosophers inspired by Meister Eckhart, who were willing to deny (determi-
nate) being of God and affirm that he is pure intellect or intellectuality. Henry Suso stated 
this view succinctly in his Little Book of Truth, in which he set out to defend Eckhart’s 
orthodoxy. In Suso’s description of the divine nature near the beginning of the treatise, 
which explicitly appealed to the authority of Dionysius, the highest negative name for 
God, “an eternal nothing” (ein ewiges niht), passes over to the most satisfactory affirma-
tion: God is “a living intellectuality” (ein lebendú […] vernúnftikeit). See Henry Suso, Daz 
buechli der warheit, ed. K. Bihlmeyer, Deutsche Schriften (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1907), 
c. 1, p. 329, l. 4- 12: wan waz man ime des in soelicher wise zuo leit, daz ist alles in etlicher 
wise falsch, und ire loeggenunge ist war. Und us dem so moehte man ime sprechen ein ewiges 
niht; aber doch, so man von eime dinge reden sol, wie úbertreffenlich ald úbermerklich es 
ist, so muoz man im etwaz namen schepfen. Diser stiller einveltikeit wesen ist ir leben und 
ir leben ist ir wesen. Es ist ein lebendú, wesendú, istigú vernúnftikeit, daz sich selber ver-
stat, und ist und lebt selber in im selber und ist daz selb. (“Whatever one can attribute to 
[God] in this [creaturely] manner is, in a sense, all incorrect, and its negation is true. 
Consequently one could call him an eternal nothing. And yet, if one is to speak of how 
unsurpassable or above comprehension something is, one still has to create names for it. 






Whereas Ulrich held that the positive knowledge of God through his intel-
lectual likeness is the culmination of the mind’s ascent, Berthold shifted the 
balance back toward Dionysius and the De mystica theologia, with its account 
of the soul’s ascent to God in ignorance. Ultimately, in Berthold’s view, as one 
passes beyond intellectual activity, one is left with no positive knowledge of 
God apart from his existence. Nor was this cognition of God attainable with-
out some kind of divine condescension or grace. For this was a state of silence 
known to the philosophers that, Berthold argued, even the theologians should 
honour.86
3 Approaching and Entering the House of God
Berthold’s treatment of the third lemma of Romans 1:20 (per ea, quae facta sunt, 
intellecta conspiciuntur) that concluded the Prologus described “the diverse 
ways” by which “the diverse wise ones, both theologians and philosophers” 
ascended to the invisibilia Dei.87 Within this proliferation of paths, Berthold’s 
accounts of the diverse ways of knowing God reveal a common pattern: the 
movement from the senses to discursive reason, from reason to non- discursive 
intellect, and finally from intellect to non- reflexive union.
The first way mentioned by Berthold came from the De mystica theologia, 
where Dionysius taught Timothy the way of leaving behind sense and cogni-
tion and, as far as possible, approaching union with God through ignorance, 
and gave the example of Moses: when “the deiform soul arrives to the summit 
of contemplation” (ad verticem contemplationis), it “contemplates the place 
where God is” (contemplatur locum, ubi Deus est) and “enters into the darkness 
of ignorance”. Berthold then turned to Augustine’s report of the three ways, as 
subsisting intellectuality, which understands itself, exists and lives in itself and is this 
self.”) English translation: Henry Suso, The Exemplar, with Two German Sermons, trans. 
F. Tobin (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1989), p. 309, modified.
 86 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 68, l. 555– 556: haec honorabilissima prin-
cipia, per quae ascenditur in prime unius et prime boni anitatem, ne dicam quiditatem; 
123K, p. 133, l. 271- 276: Si ergo nemo sapientium inquirit generaliter de omni superessen-
tiali principio, quid sit, quoniam definiri non potest, sed ex proprietatibus suis, inter quas 
veluti terminos a sibi cognatis cognoscitur, ut supra dictum est, non quid sit, quis theologus 
interrogare praesumat de prime unius superuniali superessentia, quid sit, cum purissime 
intelligat ipsum exsuperare quasi in infinitum etiam indicibilia et incognoscibilia propter 
supersubstantialem unionem?







it were (quasi tribus viis), by which “Plato and his followers arrived at knowl-
edge of the invisible things of God”. These were ethics, natural philosophy, and 
logic. With an important qualification, Berthold noted that these were not 
really distinct ways at all; for Socrates, the Pythagoreans, and Plato, these were 
in fact three parts (tres partes) of perfect philosophy. This clarification cued 
Berthold’s lengthy citation of Augustine’s famous question De ideis, which 
merged the three paths into one. For Augustine, the turn away from the senses 
and the passions (ethics) belongs intrinsically to the mind’s laborious ascent 
to the vision of the divine ideas in the Word. These ideas are the principles 
of being (natural philosophy) and knowing (logic). Once it has become pure 
(pura), the soul beholds these ideas through its highest power, intelligence 
(intelligentia), and adheres to God in charity (caritate cohaeserit). This loving 
vision of the ideas, Augustine concluded, makes the soul most blessed (qua-
rum visione fit beatissima).
In the extraordinary conclusion to the Prologus, Berthold doubled back to 
integrate these three parts of perfect philosophy with the path of the De mys-
tica theologia. Here Augustine’s notion of a beatifying vision of the divine ideas 
by the pure soul in love was located in a more stratified account of the ascent to 
God. In this progression, the ocular metaphors of the De ideis are almost iden-
tified with, but ultimately subordinated to, a higher cognition characterised 
by the spiritual senses of hearing, touch, and taste. Here Berthold was likely 
inspired by the Dionysian account of the entry into “the darkness of ignorance” 
as the abandonment of sights and seers (ab ipsis absolvitur visis et videntibus). 
Augustine had concluded his De ideis by noting that, while many have named 
the ideas in various ways (formae, species, rationes, etc.), to very few has it been 
given to see them as they are in truth. Indeed, added Berthold, but among their 
number was the one who sang in Psalm 42:
Like as the hart desires the water- brooks, so longs my soul after you, O 
God. My soul is athirst for God, yea, even for the living God: when shall 
I come to appear before the presence of God? My tears have been my 
meat day and night, while they daily say unto me, Where is now your 
God? These things I remembered, and I poured out my soul within 
me: for I shall pass over into the place of the wonderful tabernacle, even 
to the house of God: with the voice of praise and thanksgiving, the sound 
of one who feasts.88
 88 The Coverdale translation is here modified after the Vulgate. 
 
96 Chapter 1
Berthold’s focused on the final two verses, which he explained using the gloss 
of Peter Lombard, who had turned these verses into a miniature odyssey of 
the soul as it journeys from the exterior to the interior world, and from there 
finally to superior realities in its search of God. Berthold tacitly interpolated 
into this narrative the structure of “the six degrees of contemplation” from 
Richard of St. Victor’s Beniamin maior i.6, which Berthold partially modified 
using Boethius and Proclus.89
Following Peter Lombard, Berthold explained the phrase “I remembered” 
(recordatus sum) or, alternatively, “I meditated upon” (meditatus sum) from 
Psalm 42 in terms of the search for the invisible things of God through the vis-
ible things of the world and then, when this proves unsuccessful, in the lower 
powers of the soul. Leaving the exterior instruments of the bodily senses, the 
mind begins to contemplate its powers and tries to see (videret) God within 
itself. This, Berthold added, is to seek God by the first two kinds of contem-
plation mentioned by Richard of St. Victor (in imagination according to imag-
ination; in imagination according to reason). The mind then turns to reason-
ing (noverit) to seek God within itself. This corresponds to Richard’s third and 
fourth degrees of contemplation (in reason according to imagination; in rea-
son according to reason). This is what the psalmist meant by “I poured out, that 
is, I enlarged my soul within me” (effudi, id est dilatavi, in me animam meam). 
But still God is not found. Therefore, the soul must “pass over” and go “above 
itself” to think what is beyond it:
But because my mind finds God neither in exterior things nor within the 
soul, I shall pass over, that is, ‘I shall go beyond myself ’, to things intellec-
tual, as it were, in this sense: ‘I have dilated my soul to know those things 
that are above it’ (so that it might seek God in intelligence according to 
reason). For if the soul remains in itself, and does not go beyond itself, it 
will not see God, who is beyond. But why have I done this? Because in this 
way (that is, through intelligence, that eye, which according to Boethius, 
is higher than imagination and reason – ‘for surpassing the boundary of 
 89 Richard of St. Victor, De contemplatione (Beniamin maior), ed. J. Grosfillier (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2013), lib. i, c. 6, 70B, p. 102, l. 5 – p. 104, l. 10. The way Berthold marked off the 
beginning and end of citations from the rest of gloss at Prol. 20, p. 34, l. 948– 951, and his 
proficiency with the technical language Richard’s treatise displayed at Expositio, 202A- 
B, p. 182, l. 55 – p. 184, l. 95, suggest to me that he added the sixfold model himself and 
did not find it in his source material from Peter Lombard. His citation of Bonaventure’s 
Itinerarium that immediately follows the narrative also implies that he recognised the 





the universe it views that simple Form by the pure apex of the mind’ – in 
this way, I think,) I shall pass over or I shall enter (by the one of the soul) 
into the place of the wonderful tabernacle (that is, into light inaccessible, 
which is the primordial causes), even to the abode of God: ‘with the voice 
of praise and of thanksgiving is the sound of one who feasts’. I know not 
what hymns or songs, sweet to one’s heart, are resounding in that eternal 
festival. Here, one is taken up [rapitur] like a hart to the water- brooks 
and is soothed with the voice of exultation and eternal praise; here, there 
resounds to the mind the wondrous sweetness of the shouts of those who 
feast, of the banqueters calling out.90
The first things to note about this passage are Berthold’s modifications of 
Richard of St. Victor, who provided the basic structure of the ascent. Prior to 
the passage cited here, Berthold had directly incorporated the first four kinds 
of contemplation from Richard of St. Victor’s treatise, but he modified the fifth 
and sixth by using more overtly Platonic alternatives. Richard identified the 
fifth kind of contemplation with what is above reason but not beyond reason 
(supra rationem sed non praeter rationem), while the sixth concerns what is 
above reason and apparently beyond reason (supra rationem et videtur esse 
praeter rationem). In the same passage from Beniamin maior i.6, Richard had 
also stated that the six kinds can be arranged into three pairs (in imagination, 
in reason, and in intelligence). Berthold effectively merged the sixfold and 
threefold models when he identified the fifth kind of contemplation as intel-
ligentia, but he departed from Richard by citing Boethius’ Consolatio (intel-
ligentiae […] celsior oculus). Richard’s sixth kind, moreover, has clearly been 
replaced by the Dionysian and Proclean unum animae. The basic threefold and 
sixfold structures of the contemplative ascent, therefore, remained unchanged 
 90 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 20, p. 34, l. 953– 67: Sed quia nec in exterioribus nec 
in anima Deum invenit, transibo, id est super me ibo, scilicet ad intellectualia, quasi: dilatavi 
animam meam ad intelligendum supra se ipsam, (ut quaereret Deum intelligentia secun-
dum rationem). Si enim anima in se maneret, se non excedens Deum non videret, qui ultra 
est. Sed quare hoc feci? Quoniam hoc modo, (scilicet per intelligentiam, cui celsior secundum 
Boethium oculus existit, quam imaginationis et rationis – ‘superegressa namque universi-
tatis ambitum illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie contuetur’ – , hoc, inquam, modo) 
transibo vel ingrediar (per unum animae) in locum tabernaculi admirabilis (scilicet lucem 
inaccessibilem, hoc est primordiales causas) usque ad domum Dei in voce exultationis et 
confessionis sonus epulantis. De aeterna enim festivitate sonat, nescio, quid canorum 
vel sonorum et dulce cordi eius, unde rapitur sicut cervus ad fontes aquarum et mulcetur 





by Berthold. This will take on more significance later when we consider how 
the relation between nature and grace in Richard’s contemplative doctrine 
influenced Berthold’s understanding of Boethian intelligentia and the higher 
unum animae.
The transition between the fourth and fifth kinds of contemplation in 
Berthold’s narrative occurs at the moment the mind passes from seeking God 
at its own level (in reason according to reason) to the apprehension of realities 
above reason. At the summit of the fourth degree, Berthold wrote, the mind 
has enlarged or dilated itself with the desire to ascend higher (ad intelligendum 
supra se ipsam, ut quaereret Deum intelligentia secundum rationem). In the 
fifth mode, intelligence alone is active. Its object, according to Boethius, is “the 
simple Form beyond the boundary of the universe”. Strikingly, in Berthold’s 
account, this fifth kind passes seamlessly into the sixth (per intelligentiam […] 
transibo vel ingrediar per unum animae). We may nevertheless note some clear 
differences in Berthold’s descriptions of their activities: one is ocular (celsior 
oculus existit), and the other is a state of ignorance better described using 
metaphors of sound, touch, and taste that merge synesthetically (nescio, quid 
canorum vel sonorum et dulce cordi eius […] mulcetur voce exultationis; sonat ei 
mira suavitas); one is the beginning of self- transcendence, which still beholds 
the simple Form as something extrinsic to itself, while the other marks the 
entry into the house of God (in lucem inaccessibilem), and the partaking of the 
exuberance of the banquet celebrated there. This subtle but clear distinction 
between two phases of the soul’s highest power (intelligentia) will be consist-
ent throughout the Expositio, although different passages in the commentary 
will contribute new features to this basic structure. Finally, one should note 
that the verb rapitur, appearing at the conclusion of the narrative, would apply 
to both phases of intelligentia, since the mind cannot ascend above its own sta-
tion of reason (the fourth degree) by its own power. Thus “the blessed vision” 
achieved by pure intelligentia in Augustine’s De ideis was unfolded by Berthold 
into a more detailed recital of the soul’s ascent that finds in that vision a higher 
element of excess or ignorance, perhaps already anticipated by Augustine’s 
phrase caritate cohaeserit, which marks the approach and entry to the house 
of God.
Comparing this passage from the Prologus with the original gloss on Psalm 
42 by Peter Lombard, we find that Berthold has made the same modification 
as that noted already with the habitaculum Dei of Ephesians 2:21- 22, where 
he extended a passage that originally referred to the saints and the Church 
founded on Christ the cornerstone and applied it to the primordial causes in 
the Word. Here, similarly, Peter Lombard had glossed the verses from Psalm 42:5 
(transibo in locum tabernaculi admirabilis, usque ad domum Dei), relative to the 
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Church, the image of the heavenly Jerusalem.91 Berthold, however, looked to 
two other verses to offer a different portrayal of God’s habitation: God dwells in 
light inaccessible (1 Timothy 6:16) and has made the shadows his hiding place 
(Psalm 18:12).92 These “shadows” are the supersubstantial unities. They are the 
place of God (locus Dei), which Moses contemplated, according to Dionysius, 
before he ascended into the darkness of ignorance (ad caliginem ignorantiae 
intrat).93 This model of ascent, cited shortly before the gloss on Psalm 42, 
no doubt informed Berthold’s modifications of Richard of St. Victor: Moses, 
in other words, proceeded from an extrinsic apprehension of the primordial 
causes as a group, which itself is achieved only with great difficulty, to an active 
union with them, which would occur following the cessation of intellectual 
activity.94
The Prologus thus returned at its end to its beginning, with the invisibilia 
Dei that Paul, after his rapture into the third heaven (in tertium caelum rap-
tus), declared the best of the pagans knew through a natural revelation.95 The 
vivid impression left by the whole Prologus is that any difference between 
the pagans referred to by Paul and the greatest Christian theologians like 
Augustine, Boethius, and Dionysius, is relativised by the dignity of the lofty 
principles they pursued and reached: the invisibilia Dei. Berthold’s goal in this 
 91 Peter Lombard, Commentaria in Psalmos, In Ps. 41:4, pl 191, 417B: ‘In locum tabernaculi 
admirabilis’, id est in praesentem Ecclesiam, quae est quaedam imago et species futurae 
Jerusalem, quae, dum videtur, amplius illa desideratur, et amplius in ista gemit. Ideo digit 
ingrediar in locum tabernaculi, quia extra locum tabernaculi huius aliquis quarens Deum, 
errat.
 92 These two verses are discussed in Albert the Great, Super Dionysii Mysticam theologiam et 
Epistulas, ed. P. Simon (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1978), Epistula v, p. 493, l. 21– 26.
 93 Berthold regularly used these verses to identify the primordial causes as God’s abode. See, 
for example, Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 9, 16, 17, and 19. See also 115E, 123L, 
and 162F.
 94 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 20, p. 32, l. 888– 893: Item per sui ipsius excessum et 
ab omnibus absolutionem et sursum actionem, et ponit exemplum de Mose. Et tunc, scilicet 
quando deiformis anima ad verticem contemplationis pervenerit, contemplatur locum, ubi 
Deus est, ‘et tunc ab ipsis absolvitur visis et videntibus et ad caliginem ignorantiae intrat’; 
Prol. 21, p. 34, l. 968– 969: cum quanta difficultate anima etiam deiformis effecta in hac vita 
ascendat ad conspectum fontis paternae lucis, cuius splendor gloriae est Verbum.
 95 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 1, p. 5, l. 5- 8: Summus divinalis sapientiae theologus 
Paulus secretorum Dei conscius utpote in tertium caelum raptus loquens de mundanae phi-
losophiae sapientibus, postquam dixerat: ‘Quod notum est Dei, manifestum est illis: Deus 
enim illis revelavit’, subiungit: ‘Invisibilia Dei’ etc. Cf. 2 Corinthians 12:4: quoniam raptus est 
in paradisum: et audivit arcana verba, quæ non licet homini loqui. It may be that Berthold 
understood the threefold movement (exterior, interior, superior; imagination, reason, 












academic sermon was to direct his audience’s attention to principles that are 
by definition hidden from everyday awareness and rationality. These are the 
primordial causes at the level of the macrocosm, and the unum animae in 
the microcosm. For the soul to become a temple of God, to fulfil its nature the 
nexus Dei et mundi, it must be raised to enter that “place” where God always 
dwells. In the language of the invisibilia Dei “transitively understood”, this was 
simply another way of saying that the soul is to be conformed to the Word. As 
Berthold presented it in the Prologus, that was the common enterprise of the 
best ancient philosophers.
Berthold’s method in the Prologus was deliberately more rhetorical than 
demonstrative, marshalling a tide of pagan and Christian authorities, whose 
words he interwove with Scripture and used to explicate the inspired utter-
ances of the ancient sage Hermes. Behind its complex form, the real novelty 
for his audience, as Berthold surely would have realised, would have been 
the Tria opuscula of Proclus, which were almost as unknown to his contem-
poraries as the principles they divulged. The most important passages in the 
Prologus, therefore, were those in which Berthold showed how Proclus’ texts 
explicated and revived the authoritative doctrines of Paul’s disciple Dionysius. 
Berthold made it abundantly clear that the final goal of their common philos-
ophy, which he called divinalis sapientia, was beatitude and deification. This, 
of course, was not something the rhetoric of the Prologus could bring about. 
But the sheer impact of these combined authorities would at least make the 
audience aware that these hidden principles in themselves and in the cosmos 
were real, even if forgotten.
God’s abiding and actual presence in the soul’s ground, as Tauler put it, was 
his “eternal ordinance”. But as one learns in his sermon on Trinity Sunday, of 
the theologians, only an unnamed master (Dietrich of Freiberg) and Proclus 
properly understood this – even Thomas Aquinas  was found wanting on this 
question. Berthold and Tauler followed Proclus and Dionysius when they 
insisted that, even though this dignity belongs to human nature in itself (and 
the macrocosm, Berthold would add), it is forgotten and concealed as indi-
viduals busy themselves with the rabble of multiplicity.96 Neither Tauler nor 
Berthold denied the need for some form of divine assistance to raise the soul 
to its full realisation. Paradoxically, humankind intrinsically stood in need of a 
 96 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 17, p. 27, l. 724– 728: Donec autem circa ea, quae deor-
sum, volvimur, increduliter habemus circa haec omnia divino cognoscente impartibiliter et 
superaeternaliter’. Haec ille. Ad idem consentit Dionysius 1 et 2 cap. Mysticae theologiae. 
Cf. Prol. 21, p. 34, l. 968– 973: […] a qua longe est mens hominis sollicitudinibus distracta, 




revelation, but what was revealed to it was its own nature. As Tauler declared 
immediately before citing Proclus, grace arises in the soul to the extent it aban-
dons itself to its own ground. Like Berthold, as we will see, Tauler was fully 
aware that the ancient Platonists had a doctrine of grace. Berthold ended the 
Prologus by acknowledging, “with Plato and Boethius”, that since the divided 
cannot unify itself, prayer was required if the mind was to be raised by the 
simplest Light (simplicissima lux) to see that Light, which is at once “the prin-
ciple, conveyance, guide, path, and boundary”.97 The common prayer of the 
Platonists supplicates the Good to accomplish its own action in and through 
the soul, which amounts to raising it from reason to intelligence (intelligentia):
Remove from those who seek you the innate restriction of nature, the 
crooked habitual ways, the indolent discipline, ignorance of the meas-
ure of intellectual capacity, the aversion to the light of intelligible lucid-
ity, the dread of such subtlety, the degree of remoteness, the presump-
tion of familiar intelligibility, the search for too much provability and 
demonstrability.98
The innate restrictions of nature must be removed so that one may come to a 
truer sense of the limits of one’s own intellectual capacity. The prayer implies 
that the tendency of human thinking, when it proceeds “according to itself”, is 
to seek after what is familiar, and to assume that discursive reason can resolve 
every question beginning from familiar principles (“the search for too much 
provability and demonstrability”). The Prologus has attempted to orient the 
mind toward more hidden principles by turning back to the consensus of the 
ancient theology, by acknowledging the difficulty of the endeavour, and by 
admitting the soul’s present condition of distraction and weakness. After this 
 97 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 21, p. 34, l. 974 – p. 35, l. 989, following Boethius, 
Consolatio philosophiae, ed. C. Moreschini (München / Leipzig: Saur, 20052), lib. iii, prosa 
9, p. 79, l. 94– 97. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 114B, p. 44, l. 120– 140: Per gratiam, 
secundum quod dicit Dionysius 12 cap. Angelicae hierarchiae […]. Ad idem facit auctor De 
fato et providentia 8 cap. circa finem […]. While discussing the intellectus assimilativus, 
Albert the Great had stated that the philosophers ordered their supplications and prayers 
toward the illumination from the higher intelligences. See Albert the Great, De intellectu 
et intelligibili, lib. ii, tr. unicus, c. 9, p. 516b: et haec est irradiatio de qua multum locuti sunt 
Philosophi, et ordinaverunt propter illam supplicationes et orationes.
 98 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 21, p. 35, l. 977– 982: aufer a te quaerentibus inna-
tam naturae deminutionem, pravam assuefactionem et pigram exercitationem, ignoran-
tiam mensurae intellectualis capacitatis, aversionem a luce intelligibilis claritatis, horrorem 
tantae subtilitatis, distantiam longinquitatis, praesumptionem propriae cognoscibilitatis, 






diagnosis, the Expositio tituli will show that Proclus is the supreme philosoph-
ical guide into divinalis sapientia, with the Elementatio theologica serving as 
the ladder for discursive reason that leads the mind toward that most simple 
Light. The Elementatio can do this, Berthold will argue, precisely because it 
functions as a kind of intellectual exercise that assists the soul that has now 
started to reverse its habitual ways of reasoning about itself and the world. 
Only by this reversal can the mind be raised from its dividedness and begin 
to apprehend the Light that is at once “the principle, conveyance, guide, path, 
and boundary”.
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 chapter 2
Expositio tituli
Only to these worthy people should the dignity of wisdom con-
tained in this Theological Elementation be uncovered. And so are 
they led into these theorems as into a certain byway that is beyond 
the common path of reasonings.1
∵
Berthold’s Expositio tituli is an analysis of the incipit of the Elementatio theolog-
ica according to the four causes (efficient, material, formal, and final). Like the 
Prologus, it is a sophisticated example of a traditional literary form, in this case 
the accessus ad auctorem.2 Berthold’s accessus can be categorised, following 
the taxonomy of Richard Hunt, as a “type C” introduction, which treats some 
combination of a text’s intentio, materia, finis, modus agendi (ordo), nomen 
auctoris, titulus, or utilitas.3 By the mid- 12th century this kind of introduction 
was commonly employed.4 The Aristotelianised version modelled on the four 
causes and adopted here by Berthold developed from it.5 Berthold would have 
encountered several examples of this, probably in the work of Nicholas Trevet 
in Oxford and certainly in Albert the Great’s commentaries on Scripture and 
 1 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. K, p. 48, l. 390– 393: Hi soli digni sunt, ut eis 
sapientiae, quae in ista Elementatione theologica continetur, dignitas exeratur; et ideo in 
quoddam quasi diversorium extra publicam rationem viam in ista theoremata perducuntur. 
Cf. Gilbert of Poitiers, Expositio in Boecii librum de bonorum ebdomade, ed. N. Häring, The 
Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval 
Studies, 1966), prol., §7, p. 184, l. 32– 38. The literal rendering of Elementatio theologica in 
my translations of Berthold follows from his speculations about the meaning of the title in 
Expos. tit. I- K.
 2 See A.J. Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship. Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later 
Middle Ages (Aldershot: Wildwood, 19882), p. 40– 58, and Dahan, “Les prologues”, p. 433– 438.
 3 R. Hunt, “The Introductions to the Artes in the Twelfth Century”, in Studia mediaevalia in 
honorem R.J. Martin (Brugge: De Tempel, 1948), p. 84– 112.
 4 N. Häring, “Commentary and Hermeneutics”, in R. Benson, G. Constable (eds), Renaissance 
and Renewal in the Twelfth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 173– 200, at p. 185– 190.













on the Dionysian corpus.6 Like Albert and Nicholas, Berthold placed his acces-
sus ad auctorem after a “sermon- type” prologue.
The Expositio tituli took the broader discussion of the Hermetic macro-
cosm and microcosm from the Prologus, and the diagnosis of the human con-
dition it implied, and presented Proclus as the exemplary divine man whose 
texts can lead the desirous soul to the vision of God. In this second preface, 
Thomas of York and his discussion of pagan knowledge of the universe and 
God continued to be a major source for Berthold, especially in his analyses of 
the text’s efficient cause (Proclus himself and the ways by which he came to 
know God) and the final cause (the goal of the Elementatio is to bring to frui-
tion the innate desire for beatifying wisdom). As for the material cause of the 
Elementatio theologica, Berthold now looked to another German Dominican 
source, Dietrich of Freiberg, and his version of the distinction of natural and 
voluntary providence, which Ulrich of Strassburg had first developed from 
Augustine’s De Genesi ad litteram. Dietrich’s doctrine of the intellectus adep-
tus will also be taken up by Berthold as he articulated the precise stages of 
the contemplative life that Proclus fully realised. Finally, regarding the formal 
cause or structural principle of the Elementatio, Berthold drew upon Boethius 
and the 12th- century commentary tradition on his De Trinitate and De hebdo-
madibus, for their account of why theology should proceed according to a the-
orematic form.
1 Plato’s Theorems
The seeds for Berthold’s discussions of the efficient and formal causes were 
sown in the miniature history of the Platonic tradition that opened the 
Expositio tituli:
Proclus exceeded by far [procul excellebat] all the followers of Plato 
and thus surpassed everyone in ability [praepollebat], such that there 
emanated forth from him most of all, as it once had from Plotinus, ‘the 
very voice of Plato,’ which, as Augustine attests in Book 3 of Against the 
Academicians, ‘is the purest and most lucid in all of philosophy, after the 
clouds of error have been cleared away’ and all the coverings [integumen-
tis], with which the first Platonists and especially the Academicians had 
 6 On Nicholas, see Lord, “Virgil’s Eclogues”, p. 198 and 204. On Albert, see Dahan, “Les pro-





concealed Plato’s wisdom. For it was customary among them, as Cicero 
says and Augustine recounts in the same work, ‘to conceal his doctrine 
and not reveal it to anyone, except to those who had lived with them up 
to old age’. And thus Proclus, like Plotinus, as is recounted in the same 
text, ‘was deemed to be so similar’ to Plato ‘that one would have supposed 
that they lived at the same time; but since so many centuries had elapsed, 
one had to suppose that Plato was reborn in him’.7
In this brief history, Berthold combined two separate passages in Augustine’s 
Contra Academicos and, in so doing, drastically altered their original meaning, 
because he associated Cicero’s report about concealment within the Academy 
(for Augustine this concerned the avowed skepticism of the Academy which, 
in his view, hid a more positive form of knowledge) with Augustine’s own ver-
dict about the errors that accrued to Plato’s doctrines over the centuries, until 
Philo and, finally, Plotinus regained their pristine origin.8 In Berthold’s ren-
dering, any interpretation of Plato that would take the myths literally has not 
reached the esoteric truth of Plato’s teaching.
Berthold’s reasons for reading Augustine in this way have to do with his 
more fundamental assumptions about the ideal method and goal of theology. 
These assumptions only become apparent over the course of the Expositio 
 7 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. A, p. 37, l. 14– 24: Ipse enim omnes Platonis secta-
tores procul excellebat et in philosophia sic omnibus praepollebat, ut emicaret maxime in eo sicut 
et in Plotino ‘os illud Platonis, quod – sicut testatur Augustinus iii libro Contra Academicos – in 
philosophia purgatissimum est et lucidissimum demotis nubibus erroris’ et integumentis omni-
bus, quibus Platonici primi et maxime Academici suam sapientiam obvolvebant. Mos enim fuit 
eis, ut dicit Cicero, prout recitat Augustinus ubi supra, ‘occultandi sententiam suam nec eam 
cuiquam, nisi qui secum ad senectutem usque vixisset, aperire consueverunt’. Ita enim ipse 
Proclus sicut et Plotinus, prout recitatur ibidem, Platonis ‘similis iudicatus est, ut simul eos vix-
isse, tantum autem interest temporis, ut in hoc ille revixisse putandus sit’. Cf. Augustine, Contra 
Academicos, iii.18.41 and iii.20.43. For a complete picture of Berthold’s understanding of the 
Platonic tradition, see also Expos. tit. G- H, p. 43, l. 212 – p. 45, l. 275.
 8 As we will see later in Berthold’s criticism of Macrobius and Proclus on reincarnation, 
Berthold seems to have thought of these coverings (integumenta) in terms of mythical fables. 
In his glosses on Macrobius, he copied William’s statement that pagan myths were integu-
menta which concealed philosophical truth. In ms Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.iv.31, In 
Somn. Scip., i.2.17, f. 4v: sed qvia scivnt inimicam esse natvrae apertam nvdam-
qve expositionem svi. Si quis enim diceret rusticis quid re vera sit Ceres et alia que de ea 
sub integumentis figurantur, scilicet quod Ceres non est aliud quam naturalis vis terre produ-
cendi segetes. Item quod non alia de causa nec aliter vannus ei adtribuitur nisi quod pertinet 
ad purgationem frumenti nullum incuteret eis terrorem. On the theory of integumenta, see 
É. Jeauneau, “L’usage de la notion d’integumentum à travers les gloses de Guillaume de 






tituli. We glimpse them already in Berthold’s description of the two causes of 
Proclus’ excellence or, in other words, the two ways in which the voice of Plato 
spoke through him. First was the fact that “he gave order to Plato’s very own 
theorems in the present book”. The notion that Plato originally transmitted 
his philosophy in theorems (theoremata) seems to have been, in part, based 
on Berthold’s extrapolation of a remark made by Eustratius that “Plato passed 
on theorems concerning the first Good that are above contempt”.9 In his revi-
sion of Augustine’s history, then, Berthold wanted us to understand that Plato’s 
originally theorematic philosophy was transmitted secretively in the Academy, 
concealed with mythical coverings, and was eventually restored in its defini-
tive form, first by Plotinus, and then by Proclus in the Elementatio theologica.10 
This achievement is directly related to the second cause of Proclus’ excellence, 
which is discussed at length momentarily. This consisted in the fact that, as the 
Tria opuscula attest, Proclus exhaustively traversed the three spiritual motions 
of the soul described by Dionysius. The Elementatio theologica represented 
only one of these motions.11
In addition to Eustratius’ passing remark, in his account of the first cause 
of Proclus’ excellence Berthold evidently had in mind a tradition of theology 
that associated the theorematic method with secrecy. This tradition went back 
to Boethius’ De hebdomadibus and was invoked later in the Expositio tituli.12 
The De hebdomadibus was structured with a prologue followed by seven prop-
ositions, which served as the rules (regulae) for the remainder of Boethius’ 
argument explaining how created substances are good in virtue of their very 
existence without being substantial goods. In his prologue, Boethius men-
tioned two kinds of “common conceptions of the mind”: the truth of some 
common conceptions is self- evident and is acknowledged immediately by 
whoever understands the terms, while the truth of other common conceptions 
 9 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. A, p. 37, l. 26– 29. See S. Gersh, “Berthold of 
Moosburg, Nicholas of Cusa, and Marsilio Ficino as Historians of Philosophy”, forthcoming.
 10 Berthold held that Augustine was familiar with this esoteric tradition. In Thomas of York 
(Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 16), he would have found some of Augustine’s descriptions of God 
distilled into a theorematic form. Thomas made the same reduction with descriptions of 
God coming from the pagan sapientes mundi (lib. i, c. 17), before beginning a commentary 
on the Liber xxiv philosophorum (lib. i, c. 18). This was anticipated at Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 1, 
cited by Berthold at Expos. tit. E (p. 41, l. 163– 166), where Thomas stated that Augustine 
recited Plato’s propositions (propositiones Platonis, quas recitat Augustinus), and gave 
examples of the theorems (Deus est lumen omnium; Deus est veritatis illustrator, etc.) that 
would reappear in Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 16.
 11 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. A- D, p. 37, l. 30 – p. 41, l. 147.










is recognised only by those who have received prior training. The seven regu-
lae would belong to this second category. As Boethius explained, the theore-
matic method is useful both as a personal aid to memorisation and private 
contemplation, and as a way of warding off ridicule or misunderstanding by 
the unlearned. Since the obscurity of brevity is itself “the faithful guardian of a 
secret”, the theorems will speak only to those who are worthy to receive them.13 
The commentary of Gilbert of Poitiers on the prologue of De hebdomadibus, 
also cited by Berthold, described this secrecy in terms of veiling and unveil-
ing: these theorems of Boethius’ treatise, or for Berthold the propositions of 
the Elementatio theologica, should be revealed only to those who “are less car-
ried away by the fickleness of praise than attracted by the most longed- for, 
unveiled image of truth itself” (veritatis ipsius revelata desiderantissimaque 
imagine). Only to the worthy (digni) should the worthiness (dignitas) of the 
theorems be uncovered (exeratur).14 Boethius therefore belonged to the same 
Platonic tradition described by Augustine, with its use of coverings and its 
custom of secrecy. Here, however, the propositional form was the veil, not the 
mythical integumenta. Berthold evidently judged that the difficulty of proposi-
tional theology was enough to deter any who do not resolutely desire the truth.
Berthold’s interpretations of Augustine and Gilbert were finally brought 
together using Boethius’ programmatic remark in the De Trinitate: “In physics 
one must apply oneself rationally, in mathematics scientifically, and in theol-
ogy intellectually, not being led astray by imaginings, but rather by looking into 
the Form itself, which is a true form and not an image”.15 One must turn away 
from the multiplicity of images, to which our thinking inclines, and look to 
the single Form or unified image of the truth. The truth of intellect, so we are 
to understand, is expressed in propositions, whose apprehension requires the 
abandonment of images. It was this Boethian tradition, projected back onto 
Augustine’s history of Platonism that was corroborated by Eustratius, that led 
Berthold to regard the Elementatio theologica as a kind of spiritual exercise that 
leads the mind along “a certain byway beyond the common path of reasonings 
 13 Boethius, Quomodo substantiae in eo, quod sint, bonae sint, cum non sint substantialia 
bona, ed. C. Moreschini, p. 186, l. 11 – p. 187, l. 14: Prohinc tu ne sis obscuritatibus brevitatis 
adversus, quae cum sint arcani fida custodia tum id habent commodi, quod cum his solis qui 
digni sunt conloquuntur. See also J.- L. Solère, “L’ordre axiomatique comme modèle d’écri-
ture philosophique dans l’Antiquité et au Moyen Âge”, in Revue d’histoire des sciences 56/ 
2(2003), p. 323– 345, at p. 328– 334.
 14 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. K, p. 48, l. 388– 391.
 15 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. K, p. 48, l. 394– 398. The compatibility of such 
a view with that of Moses Maimonides was not lost on Berthold, who cited the parable of 








[extra publicam rationum viam]”.16 Along with Hermes Trismegistus (of the 
Liber xxiv philosophorum), Plato, and Boethius, then, the Elementatio theolog-
ica stood as the greatest representative of a venerable tradition of theorematic 
theology.17 The Liber de causis, however, along with other treatises purported 
to have discussed similar material, was relegated by Berthold to a rank defini-
tively inferior to the Elementatio theologica.18
2 The Three Motions of the Soul
For Berthold of Moosburg, Proclus’ achievement in the tradition of theoremat-
ics perfected only one of the three possible paths or “motions” by which the 
soul could come to know God. Berthold would have us view the Elementatio 
theologica as a kind of philosophical rite of passage, by recalling us to the fact 
that Proclus, as the Tria opuscula show, had gone even further. The discursive 
knowledge of God attained in the Elementatio was not seen by him as an end 
in itself but as a ladder to a higher goal.
In De divinis nominibus 4.8- 9 (704D- 705B), Dionysius spoke of three motions 
exercised both by souls (circular, direct, spiral), as they ascend to God, and 
by angels, in their knowledge of God and their providential operations. In 
Thomas of York’s Sapientiale (lib. i, c. 6), this remark was unfolded into a gen-
eralised theory about the three ways the pagans ascended to a knowledge of 
God. Inspired by Thomas, Berthold then applied this model directly to Proclus 
and the three ways he ascended to the knowledge of the highest Good by the 
 16 See also D. O’Meara, “La science métaphysique (ou théologie) de Proclus comme exer-
cise spirituel”, in A.- P. Segonds, C. Steel (eds), Proclus et la théologie platonicienne. Actes 
du Colloque International de Louvain (13- 16 mai 1998) en l’honneur de H.D. Saffrey et L.G. 
Westerink (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2000), p. 279– 290.
 17 Berthold used other theorematic works in the Expositio. He was directly familiar with 
Alan of Lille’s Regulae caelestis iuris (Expos. tit. K, Praeamb. A, 21D, 21F, 176 commentum). 
He seems to have known Nicholas of Amiens’ De arte catholicae fidei through Thomas 
of York (7E, 9B, 11F, 12E, 18D, 20A, 35B, 137E, 150B, 150D, 162D, 168B). Berthold also knew 
first- hand the Liber de intelligentiis of Adam Pulchrae Mulieris (Prol. 19, 21E, 36C, 36E, 
143K, 143L, 183A), which he sometimes attributed to Alan (Prol. 19, 143K), but elsewhere 
he expressed his uncertainty about the attribution he found in the manuscript (183A, 
p. 236, l. 80- 81: libellus De intelligentiis intitulatus, nescio, cuius auctoris, libet ascribatur 
Alano), perhaps because the Liber cited Alan by name. See the Liber de intelligentiis, ed. 
C. Baeumker, Witelo. Ein Philosoph und Naturforscher des xiii. Jahrhunderts (Münster 
i.W.: Aschendorff, 1908), prop. 20, p. 26, l. 15– 17.
 18 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. K, p. 48, l. 401 – p. 49, l. 407, cited at 










natural light of intellect (Expos. tit. B- D): the circular motion is introspective; 
the direct motion is an immediate ascent from creatures to “the direct vision of 
God”; the oblique motion uses “common notions” and discursive reasoning.19
To have a complete picture of Berthold’s position on the modalities of the 
soul’s knowledge of God, one needs to combine these central passages from 
Expos. tit. B- D with other texts from the Expositio. Read on their own, these 
passages in the Expositio tituli, which speak of the Proclus ascending to the 
knowledge of God “by the guidance of the natural light of the intellect” (ductu 
luminis naturalis intellectus), and then summarise each motion without imply-
ing any order between them, could easily give the impression that all three 
motions are equally and immediately available to the soul and can be perfectly 
achieved by a person’s natural powers, independently of divine assistance. 
But this was not Berthold’s view, as will become clear when Expos. tit. B- D is 
supplemented with other passages that either treat the three motions explic-
itly (131A, 185G- M), which show there is an order among the three motions, 
or those that discuss the Proclean proof- texts Berthold associated with those 
motions in greater detail (123D, 202A- F), which show how divine grace is oper-
ative in the ordered ascent through the motions.20 Since Berthold’s aim in the 
Expositio tituli was to demonstrate that Proclus had in fact exercised all three 
motions, these nuances were not necessary. But they are required for a full 
account of his understanding of Platonism. Already before Proclus, according 
to Berthold, “Plato pursued the cognition of God and the highest craftsman 
by all of these ways”, such that in Proclus we find nothing that is not a restora-
tion of Plato’s philosophy to its complete and original form.21 As we will see, 
Berthold’s commitment to Dietrich of Freiberg’s noetics led him to depart from 
Thomas of York. In sum, we may say that, according to Berthold, the circular 
motion belongs approximately to the same level as the direct motion, and each 
 19 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. A, p. 37, l. 30 – p. 38, l. 34: in hoc apparet excel-
lentia eius, quod per triplicem motum, quos ascribit divinus Dionysius 4 cap. De divinis 
nominibus K […] ascendendo pervenit, quantum fuit possibile homini mortali ductu lumi-
nis naturalis intellectus, in notitiam summi boni. Cf. 131A, p. 190, l. 11- 13: qualiter sapientes 
mundi per triplicem motum […] ascenderunt, ut cognoscerent Deum esse. On Berthold’s 
modifications of Dionysius, see L. Sturlese, “Berthold of Moosburg, the unum animae, and 
Deification”, forthcoming. Later, in Expos. tit. E- F, we find that Berthold even borrowed 
Thomas’ praises of wisdom itself (Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 1 and 3) and applied them directly 
to Proclus!
 20 See also I. Zavattero, “La figura e il pensiero di Proclo in Bertoldo di Moosburg”, in arkete. 
Rivista di studi filosofici 1(2005), p. 51– 67, at p. 60, who has rightly emphasised that, in the 
Expositio tituli, Berthold treats Proclus as a pagan enlightened by grace (“un ‘infedele’ toc-
cato dalla ‘grazia’ ”).








of these higher motions either follows from a special grace or following the 
perfection of the oblique motion, which makes the mind more receptive to 
that divine gift.
In the Expositio tituli (unlike the more faithful reproduction of Thomas’ 
doctrine of the three motions we will see in 131A), the circular motion begins 
not with the senses but by seeking God through introspection and by directly 
beholding the soul’s innate content. Here Berthold cited Proclus on how, qui-
eting its lower activities, the soul beholds “the harmonic reasons” from which 
it is constituted, the “many lives of which it is the completion”, and “recollects 
that it is itself a rational world” and an image of that from which it has come. 
Then, returning to its highest intelligence (summa intelligentia), the soul gazes 
upon its “sister souls” in the world, the intellectual substances above them 
and, prior to these, the unities of the gods.22 According to Berthold, Boethius’ 
definition of intelligentia, which we encountered already in his gloss on Psalm 
42, expressed the same doctrine in a summary form: “there exists a higher eye 
of intelligence, for surpassing the bounds of the universe it views that simple 
Form by the pure apex of the mind [pura acies mentis]”.23 The principal distinc-
tion here, therefore, is between ratio and intelligentia, the former conceived as 
proper to the soul, while the latter is the higher mode by which it looks beyond 
itself to the simple Form flowing through the universe.
In the Expositio tituli, the difference between the circular motion on the 
one hand, and the direct and oblique on the other, was that the direct and 
oblique begin from the senses. On this question Berthold followed Thomas 
closely.24 The oblique motion begins from creatures regarded as “vestiges”. By a 
process of laborious inquiry (per laboriosam investigationem), the soul divides, 
defines, uses common principles, passes from known to unknown, from things 
sensible to things intelligible, until it comes to the highest Good. This is the 
 22 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. B, p. 38, l. 49 – p. 39, l. 71, using Proclus, De prov-
identia, c. 6, §18- 19. In Thomas’ account, followed more closely in 131A, the self- conversion 
in the circular motion is related to the soul’s inherent need for self- sufficiency that it finds 
only in God.
 23 It is not necessary to modify the texts of the Oxford and Vatican manuscripts (intellecti-
vam | intellectivae) after Basel (intelligentiam | intelligentiae). Berthold used both terms 
synonymously for a mode of knowing beyond intellectus. See Berthold of Moosburg, 
Expositio, 44C, p. 75, l. 100 – p. 76, l. 116: where intelligentialem is used interchangeably 
with intelligentialis and intellectivalis (p. 76, l. 112- 116). Cf. 185L, p. 27, l. 436: intelligentiae; 
186H, p. 39, l. 312 and p. 40, l. 337: intelligentialis; 202D, p. 186, l. 152: intelligentiam.
 24 See also Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 131A, p. 191, l. 28- 30: Motus autem animi praeter 
istum circularem est duplex, scilicet obliquus et rectus, quia potest inspicere ipsum creatum 









path of discursive reason (per ratiocinationem). The Elementatio theologica 
itself, Berthold claimed, is proof that Proclus has ascended by this motion. He 
then gave Proclean proof- texts for each of the oblique motion’s three starting- 
points (these starting- points were directly taken from the Sapientiale): Proclus 
ascended from “the condition of [God’s] works”, in the first 12 propositions of 
the Elementatio; from “the governance of what is created”, in Proposition 120 
and thereafter, as well as in De decem dubitationibus; and from “the reconcilia-
tion of contraries”, as in Proposition 20 on the four genera (maneries) of being 
(Nature, Soul, Intellect, One), which are arranged insofar as the divided and 
lower presupposes the unified and higher, and in De malorum existentia.25 The 
De providentia et fato was not mentioned here because, it seems, at least some 
of this treatise was more exemplary of the direct and circular motions.
In the Sapientiale, followed closely by Berthold in 131A, Thomas had 
explained the relation between the oblique and the direct motion as follows. 
He described how the few pagans (infidelis) capable of completing the oblique 
motion then commenced the direct motion (motus directus), which he intrigu-
ingly identified with a “direct vision of God” (directa visio ipsius).26 The direct 
motion begins also with the senses, but sets out from creatures regarded as 
“tokens, images, and signs” rather than vestiges, ascending to God “intellectu-
ally” rather than “intelligibly”, “unitively” rather than “digressively”. One could 
say that the excellence of the direct motion is a function of the lucidity of the 
contemplator’s vision, in which the creature has become semiotically trans-
parent to its divine exemplar. In Berthold’s terms, this would be identical to 
“the perspicacity of the mind” (perspicacitas animi) that the Elementatio theo-
logica aimed to cultivate.27
For his Proclean proof- text of the direct motion in the Expositio tituli, 
Berthold gave Proclus’ summary of Platonic dialectic that is above scien-
tific knowledge (scientia). Practicing dialectic, a person skilfully gathers and 
divides species, and ascends from the many to the One. At the summit of dia-
lectic is the intuition (intellectus, epibole) of simple beings and the primary 
terms of demonstrations, beyond which, Proclus declared, Aristotle did not 
ascend. Scientia belongs properly to the soul as discursive and temporal in its 
activity, while intellectus belongs to it insofar as soul is an image of its prior 
 25 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. D, p. 40, l. 110 – p. 41, l. 145. Cf. Thomas of York, 
Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 7. As was his custom, Berthold specified and expanded Thomas’ refer-
ences, this time to Boethius’ Consolatio.
 26 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 131A, p. 191, l. 28- 44; Expos. tit. C- D, p. 39, l. 73 – p. 40, l. 118. 
See note 29, below.








principle. Then there is the cognition above intellect, “which the theologians 
before Plato also divulged, calling it a truly divine madness”, and which Proclus 
identified as the activity of the one of the soul (unum animae). There, the 
soul “loves to be at peace, enclosing itself from cognitions, having been made 
silent, and keeping quiet with inward silence”. As Berthold showed more exten-
sively in Prol. 17, Dionysius’ teaching about the union (unitio) or unity (unitas) 
above mind, agrees (concordat) with this doctrine.28 Therefore, whereas the 
oblique motion culminates with the knowledge of the highest Good, which 
is very much distinct from its discursive beginning- points, the direct motion 
for Berthold seems to be a more rapid progression through the same steps. It 
is possible that the means and the end in the direct motion are also more inti-
mately related: perhaps the movement is so rapid precisely because the soul 
is firmly established in this hidden and unitary principle. Berthold’s notion of 
the perspicacitas animi would imply something like this unity of content and 
method. Certainly, the unitive cognition of the unum animae is integrated into 
the direct motion in a way it is not present in the oblique.
Both Thomas and Berthold maintained that the direct motion was 
“given” to the philosophers (paucis datus est infidelibus), who fell into two 
groups: those who were given it in its fulness by a special grace (per gratiam 
specialem) and those who received it after perfecting the arduous oblique 
motion of discursive reason.29 How did Berthold understand this in terms 
 28 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. C, p. 39, l. 73 – p. 40, l. 108.
 29 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 131A, p. 191, l. 40- 44, citing Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 6 (ms 
Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. A.vi.437, f. 6vb): Primus istorum duo-
rum motuum [= motus obliquus] fuit in philosophis: Quod enim notum est Dei, manifestum 
est illis. Secundus autem motus [= motus rectus] paucis datus est infidelibus et, si quibus 
datus, hoc tenuiter propter hoc, quod iste motus non est datus multis in sua excellentia nisi 
per gratiam specialem aut non nisi propter praecedentem obliquam animi motionem et hoc 
perfectam, quod paucissimis datum est. In Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 6, not cited by Berthold, 
Thomas went on to speak of a lesser “vestige” of the direct motion among those who, 
“by a simple reflection [simplici speculatione], rise from creatures to the creator through 
the contemplation of creatures” (Attamen huiusmodi motus, qualecumque vestigium fuit 
in quibusdam, qui simplici speculatione surrexerunt a creaturis in creatorem per ipsarum 
creaturarum considerationem). Thomas explained this vestige using passages from Cicero 
(De natura deorum ii.37) transmitting the parable from Aristotle’s De philosophia about 
the inhabitants of an ornate cave, who know of the gods only by report (fama). Suddenly, 
an earthquake splits its entrance, and they gaze upon an immense world of beauty, order, 
and power. Without any disputation (remota omni disputandi facultate) or discursive rea-
soning they recognize the existence of an intelligence that has made all things. Perhaps 
Thomas referred to this as a “vestige” of the direct motion as a way of separating this 
momentary intuition (simplex speculatio) from the more perfect exercise of the direct 
motion that is enabled either by a special grace (we might think of St. Paul) or after a 






of his own doctrine of the perfection of the oblique motion and the begin-
ning of the direct motion? A glance at 131A has clarified that Berthold, like 
Thomas, maintained that the three motions fell into a certain order, despite 
the impression given by Expos. tit. B- D. The status of the circular motion, 
however, will require further explanation. To determine their precise order 
for Berthold, we must look to Berthold’s reception of Dietrich of Freiberg’s 
notion of the acquired intellect (intellectus adeptus). Dietrich’s intellectus 
adeptus differed in several respects from Albert’s, not least by placing the 
emphasis squarely on the necessity of grace for its attainment, for deferring 
its realisation until the beatific vision, and for describing its temporary enjoy-
ment as a rapture (raptus). Berthold will incorporate Dietrich’s intellectus 
adeptus into the Expositio relative to the culmination of the oblique motion 
and to the exercise of the circular and direct motions. However, as was noted 
already, Berthold’s notion of the unum animae will also retain some features 
of Albert’s higher stage of the intellectus assimilativus that cannot be derived 
from Dietrich’s writings.
The central passage for this synthesis is 123D, where Berthold produced the 
most extensively glossed and schematised version of the proof- text (De provi-
dentia et fato 8.28- 31) for Proclus’ exercise of the direct motion used in Expos. 
tit. C.30 Berthold arranged the modes of cognition presented by Proclus into 
five levels, and subdivided most of them into higher, lower, and medial oper-
ations. First and lowest is the exterior sense, whose objects are the extrinsic 
qualities of beings immediately present to it. The second, called the interior 
sense or imaginative power, is more intrinsic and spiritual because its objects 
are quantities and common sensibles that can be apprehended in the absence 
of the being in which they inhere. The third mode is the discursive or “particu-
lar” reason (ratio particularis). Its lowest function is related to the imagination 
and to the unstable objects of the physical world: through many “probable 
reasons” this lower function gives rise to “belief” and thus becomes opinion. 
In the superior function of the particular reason, when it is conjoined with 
the universal reason (ratio universalis), it is “scientific”, and applies itself to 
pure mathematicals. These provide the stability required for necessary knowl-
edge. These stable principles are used by the particular reason in its medial 
operation, where it deals with mathematical objects applied to the physical 
world (res mathematicas applicatas ad physicum), for instance in the quadriv-
ial arts and in sciences like optics. All of this recalls Berthold’s adaptation of 
Albert’s Metaphysica in the Prologus on the twofold inquiry (duplex indagatio) 
 30 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 123D, p. 127, l. 94 – p. 129, l. 155. 
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that human reason has brought to perfection before it begins the study of 
metaphysics.
The fourth mode of cognition is exercised by the ratio universalis, which 
constitutes the quidditative being of a thing by apprehending its essential 
parts in definitional knowledge.31 This was effectively Dietrich of Freiberg’s 
notion of the intellectus possibilis. Berthold elaborated this theory by giving 
the possible intellect three hierarchically ordered operations.32 Its lower func-
tion, which is related to the particular reason, deals with “logical intentions”, 
which are presumably second intentions like “genus”, “species”, and so on. With 
its medial function it is occupied with “metaphysical intentions”, which can 
perhaps be identified with extra- mental intentions like “human” or “horse”. In 
the context of Berthold’s citation of Proclus’ De providentia et fato, these two 
operations of Dietrich’s ratio universalis were associated with the composing 
and dividing activities of dialectic, and with the apprehension of the relation-
ship of the principles of the quadrivial sciences to one another until it arrives 
to the unhypothetical first principle.33 Finally, the higher operation of the uni-
versal reason no longer proceeds by analyses, divisions, demonstrations, but 
as “the intelligence of simple beings” it contemplates simple beings by simple 
intuitions (epybolis simplicibus) and with immediate visions (antopticis).34 In 
Berthold’s synthesis, the science of metaphysics as Aristotle pursued it was 
thus confined to the level of the possible intellect – the consequences of this 
will be felt when we consider his criticism of the doctrine of the transcenden-
tals in Chapter 4, below.
Finally, with the fifth mode of cognition we have the first mention of the 
agent intellect and the culmination of the entire ascent, as far as human cog-
nition is concerned:
 31 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 123D, p. 129, l. 129- 131; Praeamb. C, p. 64, l. 389- 390: rationi 
universali, quam intellectum possibilem vocamus.
 32 Dietrich spoke of the cooperation of the particular and the universal reason in the 
formation of demonstrations. See Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, ed. 
B. Mojsisch, Opera omnia, vol. 1. Schriften zur Intellekttheorie (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977), lib. 
iii.27.1 – iii.28.1, p. 200, l. 24 – p. 201, l. 59.
 33 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 123D, p. 129, l. 133- 134: Quoad ista duo ascendit ad unum 
primum principium et usque ad insuppositum.
 34 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 123D, p. 129, l. 144- 147: Quoad sui autem superius non 
adhuc utimur methodibus et resolutionibus aut compositionibus aut divisionibus aut 
demonstrationibus, sed epybolis, id est adiectionibus, simplicibus et velut antopticis, id est 












The fifth level is the agent intellect, having become the form of this uni-
versal reason according to its higher part. This is called the acquired 
intellect [intellectus adeptus] and ‘the one’ of this part of our intellectual 
power, ‘no longer operating intellectually and joined to the One. For all 
things are known by like: the sensible by sense, scientific objects by sci-
ence, the intelligibles by intellect, and the One by the unifical’. This is 
‘the most divine cognition of God, which is known through ignorance 
according to the cognition above mind, when the mind, having departed 
from everything else, and then also sending itself away, is united with the 
super- resplendent rays, and is illuminated hither and yon by the inscru-
table depth of wisdom’.35
Berthold’s apparently straightforward identification here of the acquired 
intellect and unum animae is singular in the Expositio, and has led to some 
divergent recent interpretations of his thought on this important issue. In an 
earlier study, I made this passage from 123D central to an interpretation of 
Berthold’s thought that placed him fundamentally in continuity with Dietrich 
of Freiberg’s theory of the soul’s return to and intellectual union with God. The 
similarities between Dietrich’s intellectus adeptus and Berthold’s unum ani-
mae, and their agreement that a rapture is required for wayfarer to enjoy this 
highest form of cognition, seemed so strong that the the divergence between 
the two authors was reduced there to a merely verbal difference: for Berthold, 
once a person has the acquired intellect, the cognition of the unum animae 
follows spontaneously.36 In a more extensive consideration of this question 
in Berthold, Paul Hellmeier has argued that this apparent identification of the 
intellectus adeptus and unum in 123D should in fact be understood merely as a 
mistake on Berthold’s part. For Hellmeier, 123D is inconsistent with the clear 
 35 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 123D, p. 129, l. 148- 155: Quintus gradus est intellectus 
agens factus forma praedictae rationis universalis secundum sui ipsius rationis superius, et 
vocatur intellectus adeptus et ‘unum’ ipsius partis nostrae intellectualis, ‘non adhuc intellec-
tuale excitantem et hoc coaptantem uni. Omnia enim simili cognoscuntur: sensibile sensu, 
intelligibile intellectu, unum uniali’. Haec est ‘divinissima Dei cognitio, quae est per ignoran-
tiam cognita secundum cognitionem super mentem, quando mens ab aliis omnibus rece-
dens, postea et se ipsam dimittens unita est supersplendentibus radiis divinorum, inde et ibi 
non scrutabili profundo sapientiae illuminata’. Cf. Proclus, De providentia et fato, c. 8, §31, 
p. 140, l. 6- 9, and Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 7.3, 872A- B.







subordination of intellect to the unum animae outlined in several other pas-
sages in the Expositio.37
I would now maintain that the truth is somewhere in the middle of these 
interpretations. I continue to hold that 123D is crucial for understanding 
Berthold’s intentions, not least because I do not believe that Berthold would 
make a mistake in the most elaborate discussion of the modes of cognition in 
the Expositio. Hellmeier is right to propose that there is a clear and consistent 
subordination of intellect to the unum animae in Berthold. But the ambiguity 
in 123D can be explained in another way without dismissing it as an error. If 
there is any problem with 123D, it was rather that Berthold was not being pre-
cise enough.
Berthold was consistent in maintaining that the intellectus adeptus and unum 
animae belong to the same mode or level of cognition – the attainment of the 
latter follows on the former. However, what Berthold did not make sufficiently 
clear was that he continued to apply a pattern of higher and lower subdivisions 
within this fifth mode. In other words, the acquired intellect should be under-
stood as the lower phase and the unum animae the upper phase of the same 
level (intelligentia). Perhaps he did not separate them into distinct “operations” 
because, strictly speaking, one cannot exercise the unum animae independently 
of the intellectus adeptus and, again, as soon as the acquired intellect is reached, 
it passes spontaneously into the unum animae. If we entertain the possibility 
that the acquired intellect and the unum are related in this way, we can see 
that Berthold has not only synthesised the Albertine distinction of acquired 
and assimilated intellects with the theory of the acquired intellect derived fun-
damentally from Dietrich of Freiberg: as we shall see, by rendering the differ-
ence between Dietrich’s adeptus and Albert’s assimilativus in the language of 
Dionysius and Proclus, Berthold has produced a doctrine that in fact closely 
resembled a position on the nature of beatitude taken by Meister Eckhart.
The relationship between the agent intellect and the unum animae is some-
times presented very ambiguously in the Expositio. In two passages discuss-
ing the soul’s most intrinsic and essential principle, which were inspired by 
Dietrich,38 one has the impression that for Berthold the unum animae was 
nothing else than the facies of Augustine or the intellectus agens of Aristotle:
 37 P. Hellmeier, “Der Intellekt ist nicht genug. Das proklische unum in nobis bei Berthold von 
Moosburg”, in Philosophisches Jahrbuch 126/ 2(2019), p. 202– 226, at p. 219– 221. Hellmeier 
very insightfully emphasises the influence of Albert on Berthold’s theory, although 
I do not share the opinion that Albert was more important than Dietrich for Berthold’s 
synthesis.






The rational soul not only lives animately, but also intellectually, and con-
sequently has in itself the principle of its motion, namely ‘the one of the 
soul itself ’, which some call ‘the deiform unity’, others ‘the hidden recess 
of the mind’ or ‘face’, but others call it ‘the agent intellect’.39
However, this intellective power is the higher, essential part of the soul, 
which Aristotle calls ‘the agent intellect’, Augustine ‘the hidden recess of 
the mind’, and Dionysius ‘the union’ or ‘the unity’ (as the other transla-
tion says) ‘exceeding the nature of the mind’ […] but the author calls it 
‘the one of the soul’.40
Like 123D, these passages show that Berthold did not want to posit a sharp 
divide between the agent intellect and the unum animae. Nevertheless, given 
his commitment to the subordination of Aristotle to Plato on this central 
question of anthropology, it is difficult to imagine that he would not want to 
establish some difference between the two, and this makes his apparent equiv-
ocations here rather perplexing. In isolation, these passages give us very little 
explanation. Fortunately, the ambiguity can be resolved by context. In both 
cases, Berthold was discussing the immediate and essential principle of the 
soul, and so we must be sensitive to the fact that, according to the law of medi-
ation, the intellect and not the unum animae would be the proximate princi-
ple of its essence.41 By including the Proclean and Dionysian unum alongside 
the intellectus agens Berthold was in fact consistent in his view that for the 
Platonists the more universal cause is more active than the secondary cause. 
Although the two principles are placed at the same level, for Berthold the agent 
intellect is the immediate and essential principle of the soul only in virtue of 
the more causally efficacious unum animae.42
Berthold’s lemmatic commentary in the Prologus on the phrase “light of the 
simple intellect” (lumen simplicis intellectus), from the Hermetic description 
 39 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 188E, p. 65, l. 204– 207: quae non solum vivit animealiter, 
sed etiam intellectualiter, et per consequens habet in se principium sui motus, scilicet ‘unum 
ipsius animae’, quod quidem vocant ‘deiformem unitatem’, alii vero ‘abditum mentis’ sive 
‘faciem’, quidem autem ‘intellectum agentem’.
 40 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 193E, p. 103, l. 123 – p. 104, l. 134: tale autem intellectivum 
existens pars animae essentialis superior, quod Aristoteles vocat ‘intellectum agentem’, 
Augustinus ‘abditum mentis’, Dionysius vero ‘unitionem’ sive ‘unitatem’ (ut dicit alia transla-
tio) ‘excedentem mentis naturam’, […] sed auctor vocat ‘unum animae’.
 41 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 68E, p. 17, l. 93- 95: Similiter intellectus agens cum uno 
sui, qui etiam est totum in parte et pars totius potestativi ex partibus, quod est anima, conti-
net in se virtute totam residuam substantiam animae, in qua convenit cum corde.










of the microcosm, presented the same doctrine.43 Berthold had just explained 
how the human receives “through the imago Dei” the “beauties not immersed in 
the world”, which are the three levels of gods or separate substances (according 
to cause: God; according to essence: the gods; according to participation: their 
orders).44 There is, he noted, a twofold similarity in the imago. In one respect, 
the human is an image of the primordial cause of intellect (prime intellectus) 
and is similar to intelligible beauties, and thus it is called “the simple intellect”. 
As an image of the One, however, the human resembles the first principle and 
the primordial causes themselves, and as such the imago is the unum animae 
or “the light of the simple intellect”.
Through the unum animae, the mind enters the supersubstantial world 
where, as Dionysius wrote, “the simple, absolute, and unchanging theological 
mysteries lie hidden away in the super- resplendent darkness of the silence 
teaching hiddenly, the darkness […] that fills to excess with beyond- beautiful 
lucidities minds that are dispossessed of eyes [non habentes oculos mentes]”.45 
Berthold’s comments on this passage specified that the oculus mentalis is the 
agent or the simple intellect, “which is also light, as Aristotle says”. But the 
unum is more luciform (luciformius) than the simple intellect and, therefore, 
is more truly the imago Dei. However, following the semantic register of Psalm 
4:7 (Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine), Berthold’s vocabulary 
immediately became Augustinian, when he added that the unum animae can 
be identified with the soul’s face (facies sive vultus), the hidden depth of the 
mind (abditum mentis), and the superior reason (ratio superior) that is always 
turned to the divine light. As with 123D, 188E, and 193E, we find that the agent 
intellect and the unum animae are brought closely together, though Berthold 
nevertheless maintained a decisive but subtle distinction between them: the 
agent intellect must be acquired and then “dispossessed”.
A similar distinction can be found in Propositions 185 and 202, which con-
tain Berthold’s analyses of the same Dionysian and Proclean texts used already 
to describe the three motions of the soul. These passages are the most illus-
trative of the doctrine of the intellectus adeptus that was presupposed in 123D. 
In Propositions 185 and 202, William of Moerbeke’s intriguing translation of 
ψυχαὶ ὀπαδοί (the souls participating intellect who are always “attendant” upon 
 43 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 19, p. 30, l. 838 – p. 32, l. 878.
 44 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 18- 19, p. 27, l. 729 – p. 30, l. 837. The phrasing at Prol. 
17, p. 26, l. 691- 693, indicates that Dietrich’s theory of the agent intellect as the imago Dei 
was a primary inspiration for this portion of the Prologus.
 45 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 19, p. 31, l. 851- 857. Cf. Dionysius, De mystica theolo-








the gods) as animae contemplatrices provoked Berthold to set out a theory 
of contemplation.46 At the basis of this theory was Dietrich’s doctrine of the 
acquired intellect, which Berthold adjusted to fit the demands of Proclus’ dis-
tinction between the perpetual “attendance” or contemplation of divine and 
intellectual souls and the episodic “attendance” of human souls.
In the De visione beatifica, Dietrich had addressed certain arguments of “the 
philosophers”, whose views on the relation of the agent and possible intellects 
seemed to resemble his own. He stated that they raised “the same, or at least 
a similar, question” as he had regarding the possibility of intellectual beati-
tude, although their answers will differ in a crucial respect.47 The philosophers 
maintain that the agent intellect is sometimes (aliquando) united to the possi-
ble intellect or the essence of the soul as a formal cause in this life (in hac vita), 
since the agent intellect is both the primary efficient cause of cognition, mak-
ing the possible intellect to know in act, and is the form or light of the possible 
intellect’s intelligible objects, which are the secondary cause of its knowing.48 
Dietrich then summarised the philosophers’ views about the determinate ratio 
that descends from the agent intellect and provides the possible intellect with 
its content. It is the principle by which the possible intellect is actualised and 
constitutes its quidditative knowledge of a thing. These rationes flow imme-
diately from the eternal reasons in God into the agent intellect, where they 
are in some way determined or limited, and thence proceed into the possi-
ble intellect. According to Dietrich, the philosophers’ position, if left here, 
would have the unacceptable consequence of making God the formal cause 
of every act of intellection.49 Dietrich responded to this by underscoring the 
difference between thinking a thing by its ratio and thinking it essentially (per 
essentiam). Only the latter cognition, which belongs to the agent intellect, is 
a “likeness of the universe of being” and embraces all things in its essential 
activity. Therefore, the possible intellect does not enjoy the beatific vision 
whenever it knows any determinate ratio – it does not know God directly – but 
only when it receives a ratio that amplifies the scope of its cognition to this 
universal or “essential” extent, that makes it adequate to the cognition of the 
 46 In Proclus, De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam, q. 10, §65, cited at Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio, 134F, p. 218, l. 140, William transliterated the term and offered a more 
prosaic translation: opadoy, id est assequentes.
 47 Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, 4.2.1 (1), p. 106, l. 40- 43.
 48 Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, 4.2.1 (2- 7), p. 106, l. 44 – p. 107, l. 83. Dietrich 
shared the view he attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias, Al- Farabi, and Averroes that 
the actualised possible intellect is identical to the intelligible species.










agent intellect. Now, the possible intellect always uses a ratio to express the 
formal parts of a thing, which are the principles of a thing’s being and its being- 
known. Since the human intellect always knows by these determinate rationes, 
it is incapable of knowing the simpler quiddities of the separate intellects, “if 
they exist”.50 All the more, then, must the possibility of beatitude through the 
intellectus adeptus, when the possible intellect will be united to the agent intel-
lect by the amplitude of such a ratio, be understood as a Scriptural promise 
and not a natural fact.51
For Dietrich, therefore, the acquired intellect is attained only in heaven (in 
patria), when the blessed think by the divine mode of cognition that is perpet-
ually active in the individuated agent intellects that are the grounding prin-
ciples of their souls.52 Importantly for Berthold, Dietrich also acknowledged 
the possibility of a transitory enjoyment of this cognition, giving the example 
of St. Benedict who, according to Gregory the Great (Dialogues ii.35) “saw the 
whole universe in a certain elevation of the mind” or rapture.53 Dietrich likely 
found in this report a verification of his view that the ratio that beatifies the 
intellect comes directly from God and includes in its simplicity the ambit of 
the entire universe. It elevates or expands the possible intellect to the essential 
cognition of the agent intellect. But it is also clear from his passing reference 
to Benedict’s vision (sed qualiter hoc contigerit, Deo committendum iudico), that 
this kind of transitory experience was not his primary concern in the De visione 
beatifica. Dietrich was more interested in articulating the necessary conditions 
of intellectual activity and beatitude than in verifying its exceptional historical 
realisations.
 50 Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, 4.2.1 (13- 14), p. 109, l. 131- 145.
 51 Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, 4.3 (1), p. 111, l. 29- 31: Aliter igitur procedendum 
ad propositum supposito hoc, quod per scripturam veritatis nobis promittitur, eo, quod per 
rationem solam hoc concludi non potest, videlicet quod in beata vita visuri simus Deum in 
claritate suae essentiae.
 52 Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, 4.2.1 (4), p. 107, l. 56- 59: Ex hoc enim nunc secun-
dum statum huius vitae non intelligimus ea intellectione, qua ipse intelligit, quia secundum 
hunc statum non est nobis unitus ut forma, sed solum ut principium intellectorum in nobis.
 53 Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, 1.1.4 (5), p. 29, l. 27- 33: Et ex hoc arguit 
Commentator Super iii De anima, quod, si intellectus agens, qui est intellectus per essen-
tiam et semper in actu, aliquando uniatur nobis ut forma, per ipsum intelligemus omnia 
entia. Quod videtur aliqualiter concordare cum eo, quod legitur de sancto Benedicto, vide-
licet quod in quadam mentis elevatione vidit totum universum. Sed qualiter hoc contigerit, 
Deo committendum iudico. On the interpretation of Benedict’s vision in medieval thought 
and art, see M. Kupfer, “The Cosmic Vision of Saint Benedict, e specula and in speculo”, in 
N. Bouloux, A. Dan, G. Tolias (eds), Orbis disciplinae. Hommages en l’honneur de Patrick 










Berthold understood the details of Dietrich’s theory very well, and repeated 
his view that the acquired intellect is not a natural fact but must fall within the 
order of voluntary providence, “the completion and consummation of natural 
providence”, for it pertains “only to God’s grace and good merits”.54 This con-
cluding passage from his commentary Proposition 202 most fully displays his 
agreement with Dietrich on this matter:
Now, although intellectual souls are below divine souls, yet they are 
expanded above partial [=human] souls. For these, although they par-
ticipate intellect by intellectual activity, are unable to participate [their] 
proximate intellect or intellectual essence, the acquisition of which 
[cuius adeptione], such that it would be their form, they lack as long as 
they are in becoming; otherwise, they would not have inclined away from 
intellectual activity. For what acts essentially acts always, and souls who 
have acquired their essential intellect [animae intellectum essentialem 
adeptae] do exactly this. For this reason, [human souls] are more fittingly 
called “rational” than “intellectual”. However, by a gift of God, at some 
moment [aliquando] even in this mortal life, they are elevated not only 
by their intellectual power, but even by their unifical power or one [suo 
uniali seu uno] to the height of contemplation, to a vision, not only of the 
gods, whom God has established as his dwelling- place, but even of him, 
the Lord God almighty and the great King above all gods.
But after this life, meritorious and well- pleasing souls by the grace of 
God (that is, by the light of glory), will have their own intellects formally 
united to themselves, and thus their blessed vision will be fulfilled insofar 
as they shall see God, Lord of gods, face to face – [having become] mir-
rors throughout all eternity. But intellectual souls do not lack this; indeed, 
they always have it by a gift of the primarily God.55
 54 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 129F, p. 182, l. 288– 302. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione 
beatifica, 4.3.2 (2- 4), p. 114, l. 3- 20.
 55 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 202F, p. 187, l. 217 – p. 188, l. 233: Verum licet [animae 
intellectuales] sint inferiores divinis animabus, tamen superexpansae sunt partialibus, 
quae, licet participent intellectu per intellectualem operationem, non potentes intellectu 
proxime participare seu intellectuali essentia, cuius adeptione ita, quod sit eis forma, car-
ent, quamdiu sunt in generatione, quia alias non deciderent ab intellectuali operatione – 
operans enim per essentiam semper operatur, sicut faciunt animae intellectum essentialem 
adeptae, propter quod et magis vocantur rationales quam intellectuales – , tamen dono 
Dei aliquando etiam in hac mortali vita, non iam suo intellectuali, sed etiam suo uniali 
seu uno altitudine contemplationis elevantur in visionem non solum deorum, quos posuit 
prime Deus suum latibulum, sed etiam eius, qui est Deus magnus dominus et rex magnus 






While the relation of the intellectus adeptus and grace described here is per-
fectly consistent with Dietrich’s teaching, Berthold has made the relation 
less hypothetical by transposing it into the cosmological framework of the 
Elementatio. For Berthold, heavenly or “intellectual” souls must already enjoy 
the same cognition that will belong to the blessed in patria. At the same time, 
and even more forcefully than Dietrich, Berthold emphasised the necessity 
of grace for the acquired intellect, and even reintroduced the notion of “the 
light of glory” (lumen gloriae) that had been explicitly rejected by Dietrich.56 
However, one should not rush to characterise this as a misreading of or radical 
departure from Dietrich; it was rather an attempt to reintroduce the lumen 
gloriae after Dietrich’s criticisms. The intelligible species or ratio descending 
from God in which (rather than under which) the possible intellect knows the 
divine essence in its amplitude could easily be regarded as a gift enabling it to 
approximate the intrinsic vision of God that belongs inherently to the agent 
intellect as an intellectus in actu per essentiam. In this sense, Berthold would be 
attempting to safeguard Dietrich’s theory from naturalistic misinterpretations 
by putting the emphasis squarely on the necessity of grace.
Berthold’s reception of Dietrich on this score can be compared with the 
nearly identical conclusions drawn in the vernacular treatise Ler von der 
selikeyt (The Doctrine of Beatitude), written sometime between 1302 and 1323.57 
gloriae) habebunt sibi proprios intellectus formaliter unitos, et sic complebitur eorum visio 
beata, inquantum videbunt Deum deorum dominum facie ad faciem specula in aeterna. 
Tali autem unione non carent intellectuales animae, verum semper habent eam dono prime 
Dei. There are three options for interpreting the phrase specula in aeterna: (1) specula, the 
nominative plural of speculum, is in apposition to animae (as translated above); (2) spec-
ula is the ablative singular of “watchtower” (“from a watchtower”); (3) as a poetic word 
order, in specula aeterna (“in eternal mirrors”). In aeterna itself could signify either a 
temporal designation (“through all eternity”) or, less likely, a multiplicity of objects seen 
(looking “in things eternal”). The sense of the passage is clearly that the beatific vision 
presupposes the intellectus adeptus, when the agent intellect, which could be described 
as a “mirror” of God’s light in the rest of the soul, is now united with the soul in a new way 
(as thoroughly as form is united to matter). Since blessed souls could therefore be called 
“mirrors”, I have translated following the first option. If this was Berthold’s intent, he was 
likely evoking 2 Cor. 3:18 (Nos vero omnes, revelata facie gloriam Domini speculantes, in 
eamdem imaginem transformamur a claritate in claritatem, tamquam a Domini Spiritu) 
in addition to 1 Cor. 13:12 (facie ad faciem). It cannot be excluded that Berthold was also 
alluding to the Boethian notion of “the watchtower of providence”, given that the intellec-
tus adeptus is so closely related in the Expositio to cognitio providentialis. See Conclusion, 
section 2, n. 96. For his patient discussion of this passage with me, I am very grateful to 
Paul Hellmeier op.
 56 Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, 3.2.3, p. 72, l. 39 – p. 73, l. 79.
 57 The text is edited with a commentary in N. Winkler, Von der wirkenden und möglichen 







This treatise addressed the question of the primacy of the agent or possible 
intellect in the beatific vision. Its author advocated Dietrich’s views above 
those of Thomas Aquinas and even above the doctrine of emptiness or passiv-
ity ascribed to Meister Eckhart (daz saelicheit lige an got lîden). The text also 
went beyond anything we find in Dietrich to explore some of the ethical con-
sequences of his noetics.
The anonymous author’s central argument was that an intellectual sub-
stance like the agent intellect cannot be deprived of its natural operation. 
Following Dietrich’s arguments about the agent intellect as an imago Dei that is 
always actually thinking God, itself, and the universe of beings, the author goes 
further than any declaration we have in Dietrich to state that the imago or scin-
tilla animae is “blessed by nature” (saelec sî von nâtûren).58 Such expressions 
come rather close to the fifth thesis attributed to the beguines and beghards 
censured at the Council of Vienne in 1311– 1312: “that any intellectual nature in 
itself is naturally blessed, and that the soul does not need the light of glory to 
elevate it to see God and enjoy him blissfully”.59 For the anonymous author, 
however, this theory of natural beatitude was not inconsistent with the tenet 
that the possible intellect still requires divine grace in order to be transformed 
by the agent intellect.60 Nevertheless, his position about the natural beatitude 
of the agent intellect led the author to develop certain original ethical the-
ories, including a presentist understanding of hell as each mortal sin, which 
thereby becomes an “eternal middle” standing between the soul and the enjoy-
ment of this immediate vision of God already underway but “hidden” in the 
Gruyter, 2013). See also Sturlese, “Alle origini della mistica speculativa tedesca”, p. 48– 87; 
id., “Traktat von der Seligkeit”, in K. Ruh et al. (eds), Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. 
Verfasserlexikon, vol. 9 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1995), p. 998– 1002; N. Largier, “Das Glück des 
Menschen. Diskussionen über beatitudo und Vernunft in volkssprachlichen Texten des 14. 
Jahrhunderts”, in J. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., A. Speer (eds), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. 
Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001), p. 827– 855; A. Beccarisi, “Dietrich in the Netherlands. A New 
Document in the Lower Rhenish Vernacular”, in J. Biard, D. Calma, R. Imbach (eds), 
Recherches sur Dietrich de Freiberg (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), p. 221– 237; Saccon, Intelletto 
e beatitudine, p. 161– 173.
 58 Ler von der selikeyt, ed. N. Winkler, p. 42, l. 16 – p. 43, l. 2; p. 44, l. 9; and p. 45, l. 14.
 59 Constitution Ad nostrum qui, in H. Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum, ed. P. 
Hünermann (Freiberg / Basel / Wien: Herder, 200946), §895: Quinto quod quaelibet intel-
lectualis natura in se ipsa naturaliter est beata quod que anima non indiget lumine gloriae 
ipsam elevante ad deum videndum et eo beate fruendum. See also R. Lerner, The Heresy of 
the Free Spirit in the Later Middle Ages (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 
61– 84.








intellect.61 Although the anonymous author explicitly ascribed his doctrine of 
the natural beatitude of the imago Dei to Dietrich,62 it is important to bear in 
mind that he has made no recourse to the distinction of the orders of natural 
and voluntary providence, of nature and grace, that Dietrich was so careful 
to observe.63 All the same, here and in the position censured by the Council 
of Vienne, one may discern the explosive potential in Dietrich’s theory for a 
reform of Christian self- understanding through a philosophical account of the 
dignity of the intellectual creature. This potential was creatively harnessed by 
the anonymous author and, more carefully, by Berthold of Moosburg and John 
Tauler. For Dietrich, Berthold, and Tauler, this path of “natural beatitude” was 
definitively the road not taken. For Dietrich and for Berthold, beatitude for 
human beings is only beatitude when it is communicated to the entire person; 
it makes no sense to say a “part” of the soul is always blessed because it always 
gazes upon God or the divine ideas. What matters is how this cognition can be 
participated by the entire soul, and this necessarily depends on grace. The Ler 
von der selikeyt did not observe this intrinsic connection between beatitude 
and grace.
Berthold’s integration of Dietrich’s theory into a Proclean and Dionysian 
framework intensified both sides of this relationship, that is, the actuality of 
beatitude as well as the need for divine grace. Like the Ler, Berthold placed 
greater emphasis than Dietrich on the possibility of the soul’s foretaste of beat-
itude in this life, rather than deferring it to the eschatological future. His doc-
trine of contemplation in Propositions 185 and 202 consistently maintained 
that a transitory enjoyment of divine union is in fact granted by a gift of God 
sometimes (aliquando) to human souls and always (incessanter) to heavenly 
souls. Berthold’s focalisation of Thomas of York’s interpretation Dionysius’ 
three motions on the historical figure of Proclus demanded that it be so. In 
 61 Ler von der selikeyt, p. 44, l. 19 – p. 45, l. 11. These coincide with the author’s use of an 
Eckhartian motif: to dispose oneself to receive divine grace, one’s possible intellect must 
rid itself of all images. See Ler von der selikeyt, p. 45, l. 15 – p. 46, l. 7.
 62 Ler von der selikeyt, p. 41, l. 8- 11; p. 42, l. 8- 15.
 63 Sturlese, “Alle origini della mistica speculativa tedesca”, p. 64– 68. In his history of debates 
on the beatific vision, Christian Trottmann correctly emphasised the importance of 
Dietrich’s view about the intelligible species, derived from his reading of Alexander, 
Al- Farabi, and Averroes, for his rejection of the Thomistic lumen gloriae. However, his 
conclusion (La vision béatifique. Des disputes scholastiques à sa définition par Benoît xii 
[Paris: École française de Rome, 1995], p. 335) that “la thèse de Dietrich de Freiberg ne per-
met pas de penser la caractère surnaturel de la vision béatifique puisqu’elle ne procède 
pas d’une grâce” is an even less balanced account of Dietrich’s own theory than what we 








turn, the text of the Elementatio shaped the doctrine Berthold presented: con-
templation must be an activity exercised equally by human and heavenly 
souls. With this came a stronger focus on the circular motion, which Berthold 
to be the contemplation characteristic of heavenly souls, than anything in 
Thomas of York.64 Here we see once again how closely Berthold associated the 
highest level of intellect and the unum animae: in Proposition 185, he applied 
Dionysius’ words (“it is granted [conceditur] to few souls to be admitted [admit-
tantur] to such heights of contemplation”) relative both to the intelligentia at 
the summit of the circular motion,65 and to the union or unity above mind.66 
In Proposition 202, Berthold classified a series of passages from Bernard of 
Clairvaux, Richard of St. Victor, Dionysius, and Proclus, according to whether 
they pertain to contemplation in this life (in via), in heaven (in patria), or to 
both. As with Proposition 185, he made it clear that the difference between 
contemplation in via and in patria concerns not the quality but the stability of 
contemplation, when the aliquando changes to incessanter.67 Even now, that 
is, the souls moving the heavens exercise steadfastly and unswervingly (firme 
et indeclinabiliter) the highest intelligence (intelligentia), which Berthold 
described with the same text used for the circular motion in Expos. tit. B, in 
which the soul looked within itself and above itself, to its “sister souls”, the 
intelligences, and the divine unities. This in turn gives way to the cognition 
above mind of the unum animae that is the basis for their providential cooper-
ation with God.68 Thus, for Berthold, there is a certain beatitude in nature, but 
it belongs to these heavenly “contemplative” souls, which are already in patria 
through a divine gift.
In all these passages – the proximate essential cause of the soul (188E, 
193E), the two dimensions of the imago Dei (Prol. 19), the modes of cognition 
(123D), the kinds of contemplation (185G- M, 202A- F), and also the figure of the 
 64 For intelligentia of the circular motion as the highest kind of cognition, see also Berthold 
of Moosburg, Expositio, 44C, p. 75, l. 100 – p. 76, l. 120 (operatio intelligentialis is above, 
supra, the operatio intellectualis); 63C, p. 188, l. 62- 66; 185L, p. 26, l. 412 – p. 28, l. 455 (intel-
ligentia as the highest mode of cognition).
 65 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 185M, p. 28, l. 457– 471: quia anima non semper movetur 
motu circulari, ut fiat informis uniens se unitis virtutibus, nec semper est statuta se tota extra 
se totam et supra se totam in unitionem excedentis mentis, per quam coniungitur diis per 
recursum sui ad summam intelligentiam, […] ideo non semper contemplatur deos, licet ali-
quando. Quod tamen paucis conceditur animabus, ut ad tantam contemplationis eminen-
tiam admittantur, iuxta illud, quod dicit Dionysius.
 66 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 185I, p. 25, l. 369- 379.
 67 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 202C, p. 185, l. 147 – p. 186, l. 172.











astronomer (Prol. 16) – have shown how closely Berthold associated the agent 
intellect, or its state of formal union with the possible intellect, and the unum 
animae. The comparison of the model of the three motions of the soul in Expos. 
tit. B- D and 131A with Berthold’s analysis of their Proclean proof- texts in 123D, 
185G- M, and 202A- F lead us to conclude that Berthold remained fundamen-
tally in agreement Dietrich in his understanding of the conditions of possibil-
ity for this beatifying cognition to occur. However, he accentuated Dietrich’s 
marginal reference of Benedict’s rapture because of the need to account for 
the historical attainment of this cognition in its perfection in Proclus himself 
and, consequently, following the letter of the Elementatio, in heavenly or “con-
templative” souls. Berthold’s modifications of Albert the Great’s De intellectu 
et intelligibili in Prol. 16 must, therefore, be interpreted in this light, so that the 
state of the intellectus adeptus, the summit of self- knowledge and the capac-
ity for a kind of natural prophecy, would itself be understood as a transitory 
state.69 If Berthold also intended to replace Albert’s intellectus assimilativus 
with the unum animae, then this too should be interpreted through the lens 
of 123D and Berthold’s adaptation of Dietrich: once the soul is unified with its 
own agent intellect (intellectus adeptus), permanently or temporarily, it is then 
sent forth into the divine light in ignorance (intellectus assimilativus / unum 
animae). It was in this sense, then, that Berthold presented the unum animae 
and its cognition through ignorance as the higher operation or phase of the 
fifth mode in 123D, while the intellectus adeptus is that same mode as directed 
toward the possible intellect below it. This is consistent with every case exam-
ined so far: the two always go together, whether they are enjoyed by a transi-
tory raptus in this life, either by a special grace or after the accomplished habit 
of the oblique motion, or permanently in patria.
Berthold’s transformation of Dietrich’s doctrine of beatitude is also consist-
ent what we saw in 188E and 193E, where the agent intellect was still held to 
be the soul’s proximate essential cause, with the unum animae added as its 
deeper phase. In one sense, there is very little difference between the intellec-
tus adeptus and the unum animae: once a person has the cognition of the intel-
lectus adeptus, they have the cognition of the unum. But by adding a deeper 
or higher modality to this cognition, directly under the inspiration of Proclus 
 69 Most scholars would see this as a significant departure from Albert, although M. Führer, 
“The Agent Intellect in the Writings of Meister Dietrich of Freiberg and its Influence 
on the Cologne School”, in K.- H. Kandler, B. Mojsisch, B. Stammkötter (eds), Dietrich 
von Freiberg. Neue Perspektiven seiner Philosophie, Theologie und Naturwissenschaft 
(Amsterdam: Grüner, 1999), p. 69– 88, has argued that Dietrich was a true follower of 




and Dionysius, and perhaps also in line with Albert, Berthold definitively sub-
ordinated the reflexive character of the acquired intellect and its identifica-
tion with self- knowledge to the non- reflexive knowledge through ignorance 
of the unum. Overall, however, the closest contemporary parallel one can find 
for the notion of a simultaneous identity and difference of reflexivity and non- 
reflexivity is not found in Albert or Dietrich, but in a passage from Meister 
Eckhart’s sermon Von dem edeln Menschen (On the Nobleman):
I say that as man, the soul, the spirit, contemplates God, he also knows 
and perceives himself perceiving; that is, he perceives that he is contem-
plating and perceiving God. Now some people have thought, and it seems 
quite plausible, that the flower and core of blessedness consists in knowl-
edge, when the spirit knows that it knows God. For if I possessed all joy, 
and I did not know it, how could that help me and what joy would that 
be to me? Yet I say certainly that this is not so. It is only true that with-
out that the soul would not be blessed; but blessedness does not consist 
in this, for the first thing in which blessedness consists is when the soul 
contemplates God directly. From there, out of God’s ground, it takes all 
its being and its life and makes everything that it is, and it knows noth-
ing about knowing or about love or about anything at all. It comes to 
rest completely and only in the being of God, and it knows nothing there 
except being and God. But when the soul knows and perceives that it 
contemplates, perceives and loves God, this is in the natural order a going 
out and a return to the starting point.70
 70 Meister Eckhart, Liber “Benedictus”. Von dem edeln Menschen, in Die deutschen Werke, ed. 
J. Quint, vol. 5 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963), p. 116, l. 21 – p. 117, l. 4: Ich spriche: sô der 
mensche, diu sêle, der geist schouwet got, sô weiz er ouch und bekennet sich bekennende, daz 
ist: er bekennet, daz er schouwet und bekennet got. Nû hât gedunket etlîche liute und schînet 
gar gelouplich, daz bluome und kerne der saelicheit lige in bekantnisse, dâ der geist beken-
net, daz er got bekennet; wan, daz ich alle wunne haete und ich des niht enwiste, waz hülfe 
mich daz und waz wunne waere mir daz? Doch enspriche ich sicherlîche des niht. Aleine 
ist daz wâr, daz diu sêle âne daz doch niht saelic waere, doch enliget diu saelicheit dar ane 
niht; wan daz êrste, dâ saelicheit ane geliget, daz ist, sô diu sêle schouwet got blôz. Dâ nimet 
si allez ir wesen und ir leben und schepfet allez, daz si ist, von dem grunde gotes und enweiz 
von wizzenne niht noch von minne noch von nihte alzemâle. Si gestillet ganze und aleine 
in dem wesene gotes, si enweiz niht dan wesen dâ und got. Sô si aber weiz und bekennet, 
daz si got schouwet, bekennet und minnet, daz ist ein ûzslac und ein widerslac ûf daz êrste 
nâch natiurlîcher ordenunge. English translation: Meister Eckhart, The Essential Sermons, 
Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense, trans. E. Colledge, B. McGinn (Mahwah: Paulist 




Eckhart did not deny that reflexivity is a necessary aspect of beatitude. Rather, 
he took issue with the argument that beatitude consists primarily in the reflex-
ive knowledge whereby one knows that one knows God. In some sense, as 
Eckhart acknowledged, one can understand why a person would suppose that 
reflexivity alone is both necessary and sufficient for beatitude – if I had all 
the joy or riches in the world and was not aware of it, what good would that 
be to me? In other words, as we saw for Dietrich and Berthold in contrast to 
the Ler von der selikeyt, beatitude is only beatitude when it is communicated 
to the entire soul. But what Eckhart was arguing was that there is in beatitude 
a kernel of non- reflexivity in which the soul, in all of its powers, is completely 
oriented toward God and not to itself; this is the root of beatitude and the prior 
moment, so to speak, that makes possible the appropriation of that bliss to the 
self in reflexivity.
Eckhart made a similar argument and the same criticism in his commentary 
on the Gospel of John, where he referred to a fuller discussion of the issue in 
the Opus quaestionum, which is no longer extant.71 In his commentary on John 
1:12 (“As many as received him, he gave power to become sons of God”), Eckhart 
began by noting that anything that “receives” or participates something else, 
insofar as it is receptive, is in itself empty and in a passive potency. The exist-
ence of this passive power is completely derived from and dependent upon 
its object. This is because a potency exists entirely in relation to its activity, 
and in this case the potency in act has the same act of existence as the object 
in act. Following Aristotle (De anima iii.2, 425b26), Eckhart gave the example 
of a sense faculty and sense object: both the eye and the object seen become 
entirely identical in act.72 The disproportion in the analogy, which Eckhart 
thought applied more perfectly to intellectual realities, is that the object seen 
does not give existence to the eye insofar as it is an eye or a being. Nevertheless, 
the seeing- eye and the seen- object are intrinsically related to one another in 
this way. If you take away the seeing- eye, then there is no seen- object, and vice 
versa. “To see and to be seen” in act “are one and the same thing”. Their active 
union is logically prior to their distinction. The ethical consequences of the 
 71 Meister Eckhart, Expositio sancti evangelii secundum Iohannem, in Die lateinischen Werke, 
eds A. Zimmermann, L. Sturlese, vol. 3 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1994), §106– 108 (John 
1:12- 13), p. 90, l. 9 – p. 93, l. 8, and §679 (John 17:3), p. 593, l. 1 – p. 594, l. 2. These pas-
sages clarify the target of Eckhart’s criticism. For a discussion of Eckhart in the context 
of other responses to John of Paris’ argument about reflexivity in the beatific vision, see 
Th. Jeschke, Deus ut tentus vel visus. Die Debatte um die Seligkeit im reflexiven Akt (ca. 
1293– 1320) (Leiden: Brill, 2011), p. 260– 274.






Gospel’s natural philosophical truth, as Eckhart presented it, are captured in 
John 17:3 (“This is eternal life, to know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ 
whom you have sent”). That is, to “receive” the Word, a person become entirely 
like a potency related to its act or, in other words, one must be pure existence 
for God (deo esse). This is nothing else than to be ignorant of oneself and all 
else besides God himself and what exists in God that is God himself. This is 
effectively to participate in the life of the Incarnate Word and, as Eckhart indi-
cated in his opening comments on John 1:12, to be conformed to “the same 
image”. This, he concluded, is what Augustine meant in the Confessiones, when 
he exclaimed that, “Unfortunate is the person who knows everything else, but 
does not know you; blessed is the person who knows you, even if he is ignorant 
of all these things”.
The same argument appeared again in a briefer form in Eckhart’s commen-
tary on John 17:3, where the two portions of the verse (haec est vita aeterna / 
ut cognoscant te verum deum solum, etc.) prompted him to discuss the kind of 
“eternal life” that is proper to the intellectual nature in beatitude.73 Here we 
find one of Eckhart’s rare references to the hidden depth of the mind (abdi-
tum mentis) of Augustine’s De Trinitate, in which the mind always remembers, 
thinks, and loves God. Immediately after this, Eckhart reiterated the point that 
beatitude does not consist primarily in a reflexive act, since blessedness con-
sists in being oriented to nothing apart from God.
Interestingly, in Eckhart’s summary of his commentary on John’s prologue, 
when he came to the same verse from John 1:12 (“As many as received him”, etc.), 
which first prompted the criticism about reflexivity, he made the only mention 
in his entire corpus of the doctrine of the intellectus adeptus. He attributed this 
notion to “the philosophers”, as example of how a lower intellectual principle 
is gradually conformed to a higher intellectual principle – that is, how a person 
comes to share in the complete relatedness to the Father that is characteristic 
of the Word: the light of agent intellect penetrates more and more into the 
imaginative power through a process of extrinsic efficient causality (“altera-
tion”), until the lower is related to it as matter is to form, and the proper opera-
tion of the higher is communicated to the lower (“generation”), which has now 
been transformed “into the same image”.74
There are of course significant differences in the means by which Eckhart 
and Berthold arrived at their similar conclusions about non- reflexivity and 
 73 Meister Eckhart, Expositio sancti evangelii secundum Iohannem, §679 (John 17:3), p. 593, 
l. 1 – p. 594, l. 2.







beatitude. In Eckhart, the soul is oriented non- reflexively to God as being, 
whereas for Berthold the highest principle in the soul is an image of what is 
prior to being. For Eckhart, the soul’s emptiness or receptivity corresponds to 
its complete directedness towards God, but for Berthold the unum animae is 
in each soul as a ceaselessly active principle. While Eckhart did not ignore the 
mediations or “alterations” that precede birth or “generation”, his emphasis fell 
on their dialectical interrelation – one is temporal and finite, the other is eter-
nal and infinite – which corresponded to his greater stress on the immediacy 
of the birth, even if it is almost infinitely distant from everyday experience. 
In the Expositio, however, Berthold located the De mystica theologia and the 
hidden cognition of the unum animae at the summit of a long and arduous 
progression of scientific understanding, that eventually reaches the compre-
hensive vision of the intellectus adeptus and finally moves beyond this into the 
divine darkness.
What the example of Eckhart does suggest, at least, is that some discussion 
about reflexivity in the beatific vision was underway in the German Dominican 
milieu in the mid- 1310s and early 1320s, when Eckhart wrote the commentary 
on John and the Liber “Benedictus”.75 Similar though their conclusions are, 
before we hurry to posit any influence, we must acknowledge that a sufficient 
explanation of Berthold’s doctrine and his synthesis of Albert and Dietrich, 
who were clearly his direct sources, was provided simply by the texts of Proclus 
(De providentia et fato 8.31- 32) and Dionysius (De mystica theologia 1 and 3; De 
divinis nominibus 7.1). As we proceed further into the Expositio, we will see how 
this distinction of reflexivity and non- reflexivity was integrated into Berthold’s 
cosmology and theory of deification. Berthold understood Goodness and “the 
ecstasy of divine love” to be at the root of God’s own Trinitarian life and cre-
ative will; likewise, an intellectual creature actively exercises providence with 
the gods in a state that is prior to reflexive understanding, which participates 
in that same spontaneous action.
As for the three motions of the soul, moreover, the passages on contempla-
tion from 185K- M and 202C show us that the unum animae is a feature not only 
of the direct motion, but also of the circular motion, which in its perfection is 
also “immovably fixed on one and the same object” through “the highest intel-
ligence”.76 Therefore, whenever Berthold used the term intelligentia, which he 
 75 On the dating of both works, see Meister Eckhart, Das Buch der göttlichen Tröstung, trans. 
K. Flasch (München: Beck, 2007), p. 120– 121.
 76 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 185K- M, p. 25, l. 384 – p. 28, l. 471, especially p. 28, l. 457– 
460: anima [partialis] non semper movetur motu circulari, ut fiat informis uniens se uni-
tis virtutibus, nec semper est statuta se tota extra se totam et supra se totam in unitionem 






found in Proclus and Boethius, we should understand by it the combination 
of the intellectus adeptus and the unum animae or, in other words, the intel-
lect in its providential operation. Notwithstanding his use of Thomas of York’s 
description of the circular motion at 131A, where it was identified as the rest-
less heart’s search for God, Berthold seems have preferred the account he dis-
cerned in Proclus and Boethius, which made the circular motion identical in 
content to the direct motion, except for the fact that it does not begin from the 
senses. This interiority what makes it most appropriate for the heavenly souls. 
A human soul partakes of the circular motion to the extent that it can sepa-
rate itself from the body, quieting itself and beholding its innate content that 
has been recollected through prior learning (the oblique motion). The direct 
motion then amounts to the rapid or possibly instantaneous progression along 
the same path charted arduously by the oblique motion, from creatures to 
their source in the supersubstantial world. The unum animae is more closely 
associated with the direct motion in the Expositio tituli and 131A because, when 
creatures have become transparent to their source, it is a sign that the unum 
animae has been awakened.
While for Berthold it is indisputable that Proclus exercised all three motions 
through “the guidance of the natural light of the intellect” (as is said the 
Expositio tituli), from 131A it has become clear that there is an order among 
these motions, and that the oblique almost always precedes the direct motion. 
Following 185 and 202, we may infer further that the circular motion, under-
stood through Proclus rather than Thomas’ account given in 131A, is not imme-
diately accessible to the soul. We cannot deny that for Berthold Platonic phi-
losophy was meant to be argumentatively defended and made available to the 
rational creature as such, rather than merely being founded on an inscrutable 
experience – for Berthold, that was the entire point of the Elementatio theo-
logica and the oblique motion. But we should not conclude from 131A that the 
202C, p. 186, l. 152– 170: Hae [animae totales] enim non recurrunt aliquando ad ipsam 
summam ipsarum intelligentiam, sed firme et indeclinabiliter secundum statum suum per-
petuum in ipsa stant, per quam, ut dicit auctor loquens de una et singulari anima libro De 
fato et providentia, cap. 6 in fine, ‘videt quidem sorores ipsius […].’ Haec auctor, qui licet 
loquatur de contemplatione possibili animae in vita praesenti, tamen nihilominus verum 
est de contemplatione aeternali, prout talis contemplatio stat fixa immobiliter et secundum 
unum et idem obiectum. Talis enim anima simplicem et beatum adepta intellectum sive in 
sui in esse constitutione, sicut omnis anima totalis se habet, sive sui ab hoc ergastulo libera-
tione operans contemplatione divinissima, qualis est anima humana beata, omnis, inquam, 
talis anima non est quietans se ipsam ab exterioribus motibus vel interioribus, qui nulli ibi 
sunt, sed deus facta, ut animae possibile, cognoscet solum, qualiter dii omnia indicibiliter 
cognoscunt singuli secundum le unum, quod sui ipsorum.
132 Chapter 2
providential cognition of the unum animae in the direct or circular motion 
automatically follows from the perfection of the oblique motion. Berthold’s 
stronger affirmation about the possibility of contemplation in this life, building 
on Dietrich’s passing reference to Benedict’s vision of the cosmos in a single ray 
of light, was conceived in terms of a raptus that coincided with the Dionysian 
and Proclean instructions about silencing every intellectual operation in order 
to be made receptive for God’s activity in the soul.77 While souls animating the 
heavens “possesses [adepta] a simple and blessed intellect” by nature through 
a gift of God, this possession comes to human souls only “by liberation from 
this prison- house”, when the soul will achieve a stillness beyond striving.78
Berthold read Dietrich and Thomas in light of each other: from Thomas he 
took the view that the philosophers had in fact arrived to a direct vision of God; 
following Dietrich, he understood this in terms of the transitory enjoyment in 
this life of the acquired intellect and, going beyond Dietrich to the Platonists, 
of its non- reflexive ground. Whether by a “special grace” to one who was 
seemly unprepared, like Paul on the road to Damascus, or to one how has per-
fected the oblique motion, like Proclus, this transitory vision was given (datus). 
The difference, therefore, must consist in the fact that the perfected oblique 
motion, the work of laborious study and investigation into divine realities, bet-
ter disposes the soul to receive that gift. But if we construe the transition from 
the oblique motion to the higher and deifying motions as only an automatic 
process, we risk obscuring the centrality of raptus in Berthold’s contempla-
tive theory. As we saw in Chapter 1, rapture so integral to his understanding 
of contemplative union that it featured at the beginning of the Prologus, with 
Paul (summus divinalis sapientiae theologus Paulus […] raptus), and at its con-
clusion, with the final stage of the restless and arduous ascent to God found 
in Psalm 42, when the soul is lifted beyond itself to intelligentia and the unum 
animae as the hart is drawn up to the water- brooks (rapitur sicut cervus).79
This relation of reason and grace can be clarified further if we consider the 
fundamentally Boethian character of Berthold’s treatment of the goal or final 
cause of the Elementatio theologica in the Expositio tituli.80 Using the Consolatio 
philosophiae, Berthold compared Proclus’ propositions to the ladder depicted 
on Lady Philosophy’s garment, by which the “contemplator” ascends from “the 
 77 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 202B, p. 185, l. 132- 144; 211E, p. 264, l. 222- 228.
 78 See n. 76, above.
 79 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 1, p. 5, l. 5- 6; Prol. 20, p. 34, l. 964- 965. Cf. 211E, p. 263, 
l. 215- 218: non fit secundum habitum permanentem in hac vita, licet raptim et secundum 
quendam transitum fiat aliquibus.











divine by participation” to “the divine by essence” (the gods) and from there to 
“the divine as cause” (God). As Lady Philosophy taught, the contemplation of 
the fount of all goods, where all things are held together at once (cuncta simul), 
makes a person not only blessed (beatus), “but even god” (sed etiam deus) by 
participation. Berthold went on to relate the Π and Θ depicted on her garment, 
representing the practical and theoretical lives, to Augustine’s report that Plato’s 
philosophy strove both for moral and rational perfection (opus et scientia). 
Finally, citing Avicebron, Berthold declared that the “final cause of humankind” 
is “the striving to the higher world”, achieved through “knowledge and activity” 
(scientia et operatio), which “liberate the soul from the captivity of nature, [and] 
cleanse it from its darkness and obscurity”. This emphasis on intellectual and 
moral ascesis culminated with a brief prayer: “that we may ascend through this 
[the vision of the primordial causes] to contemplate the highest Good, the pri-
marily Good, may we be carried across with his support, who is the mediator of 
God and humanity, Jesus Christ”. If we are to interpret these passages as some-
thing more than rhetorical ornamentation, which we certainly must do in view 
of Berthold’s allegiance to Dietrich of Freiberg’s conception of beatitude and 
the role of grace, then we must conclude that, for the passage from the divided-
ness of reason (the oblique motion) to the unified vision of the acquired intel-
lect and the unum animae – the vision of the divine light as at once beginning, 
middle, and end of all things at the end of the Prologus; or the deifying vision 
of all goods cuncta simul here at the conclusion of the Expositio tituli – divine 
assistance is required for the natural light of reason to realise its hidden and nat-
ural operation. Just as, “with Plato and Boethius”, he understood that the divided 
cannot unify itself, and so too he could acknowledge that for Proclus deification 
occurs through grace.81 As Berthold saw it, then, the purpose of the Elementatio 
theologica, was to help the soul build the speculative habit, the discursive aware-
ness and science of the primordial causes and the hidden depth in the soul’s 
own ground, that will dispose it to receive the vision of all goods cuncta simul.
3 The Two Orders of Providence
Berthold’s conception of a doctrine of grace that was internal to ancient 
Platonism is consistent with his transformation of the doctrine of double 
providence that he inherited from his German Dominican predecessors. The 
central text introducing this notion is Expos. tit. i, but once again we must sup-
plement Berthold’s preface with other passages from his commentary for a 





complete account. Berthold explicitly referred to either providentia naturalis 
or providentia voluntaria in 41 subsections of his commentary, and in all but 
ten he treated them as a pair. The brief entries for providentia and providentia 
naturalis in the Tabula contentorum (there is no entry for providentia volun-
taria) helpfully point the reader to Proposition 120, where the theme of provi-
dence is first introduced by Proclus, and to Proposition 141 where, according to 
his commentator, Proclus “shows that providence is twofold”.
Berthold generally acknowledged that the origin of the distinction was 
found in Augustine (De Genesi ad litteram viii.9.17). Only in 141A, however, did 
he provide a full quotation of the relevant text. Commenting on Genesis 2:15 
(“And the Lord God took man, and placed him in the Paradise Eden, to work 
upon it and maintain it [ut operaretur et custodiret illum]”), and casting the 
mind’s eye upon the universe likened to a great tree of beings (quamdam mag-
nam arborem rerum), Augustine distinguished between God’s “hidden govern-
ance” that “gives growth to trees and plants”, and that which governs voluntary 
agents, such as angels and humans.82 The heavens and the earth are ordered 
by the first, which extends to “anything that is borne by an interior natural 
motion”. The second pertains to agriculture, to the arts, and the ordering of 
societies both angelic and human. Berthold paraphrased the first as “the order 
and connexion of essential and substantial causes” (ordo et conexio causarum 
essentialium et substantialium).
This phrase shows the influence on Berthold of Dietrich of Freiberg (causa 
essentialis) and Ulrich of Strassburg who, following Albert the Great, used 
the Hermetic definition of fate as a conexio causarum.83 The importance of 
Ulrich as the originator of this formative interpretation of Augustine in the 
German Dominican context has recently started to receive due attention from 
scholars.84 This was not lost on Berthold, who began Proposition 120, the cen-
tral passage signalled by the index, with a citation from Ulrich:
 82 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 141A, p. 45, l. 11- 26.
 83 The principal text in Albert the Great is Physica, lib. ii, tr. 2, c. 19, p. 126, l. 25- 40. See also 
Albert the Great, De fato, ed. P. Simon (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1975), a. 2, p. 68, l. 1- 4. 
On these texts, see A. Palazzo, “The Scientific Significance of Fate and Celestial Influences 
in Some Mature Works by Albert the Great. De fato, De somno et vigilia, De intellectu et 
intelligibili, Mineralia”, in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds), Per perscrutationem phil-
osophicam, p. 55– 78; id., “Albert the Great’s Doctrine of Fate”, in L. Sturlese (ed.), Mantik, 
Schicksal und Freiheit im Mittelalter (Köln: Böhlau, 2011), p. 65– 95; id, “Regna duo duorum. 
Berthold of Moosburg’s Theory of Providence and Fate”, forthcoming.
 84 Beccarisi, “La scientia divina dei filosofi”; ead., “Einleitung”, in Ulrich of Strassburg, De 
summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 5- 6, ed. A. Beccarisi (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), p. xvi- xx; 








Although the primarily Good, the God who is beyond- blessed beyond 
all things, makes all things primarily through himself and governs them 
through providence, nevertheless, in order that the dignity of causality 
and divine cooperation, which is the most divine of all works, be not 
absent from the universe (to which all levels of divine goodness that can 
possibly exist are communicated), God also works through causes that 
are second to himself, that is, through the primordial causes. And these 
are ordered in two ways according to the double mode of providence, 
which Augustine distinguishes in Book 8 of his Hexaemeron, saying that 
‘the twin activity of providence is found to be partly natural, and partly 
voluntary’.85
Berthold then juxtaposed Augustine’s vertical distinction with the horizon-
tal subordination of fate to providence in Boethius and Proclus.86 Boethius 
identified providentia with the order of causes as they are beheld in the 
simplicity and stability of the divine mind, and fatum with the explicated, 
manifold, and temporal disposition of causes in the sensible world. As Lady 
Philosophy instructed the prisoner in the Consolatio, to the extent that a per-
son seeks satisfaction in inherently divided and transitory goods, they will 
remain subjected to fate. For Boethius and Proclus, entities nearer to the One 
are embraced only by providence, and are exempt from the fated, variegated 
connection of causes. A person will be free only to the extent that he draws 
nearer to the divine origin and mode of cognition that constitutes provi-
dence. Yet for Ulrich and Berthold, there is a sense in which the highest sec-
ondary causes, the primordial causes, are both fated, as explicated from the 
divine mind, and providential, in that they participate and cooperate directly 
 85 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 120E, p. 100, l. 295- 302. Cf. Ulrich of Strassburg, De 
summo bono, ed. A. Beccarisi, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 18 (9), p. 145, l. 258 – p. 146, l. 265: Licet prime 
bonum super omnia superbenedictus Deus per se principaliter omnia efficiat et per provi-
dentiam gubernet, tamen, ut dignitas causalitatis et divinae cooperationis, quae est divin-
issimum operum, non deesset universo, cui communicati sunt omnes gradus divinae boni-
tatis possibiles existere, operatur etiam per secundas causas a se, scilicet per primordiales. 
Et istae sunt ordinatae dupliciter secundum duplicem modum providentiae, quae distinguit 
Augustinus viii Hexaemeron sui dicens, quod ‘gemina operatio providentiae invenitur, par-
tim naturalis, partim voluntaria’.
 86 Gersh, Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism, vol. 2, p. 701– 705, argues that while the extent 
of Proclus’ influence on Boethius has been debated, on the question of providence and 
fate that influence is effectively beyond dispute. Berthold was perhaps the first scholar 
to note the connection at Expositio, 141B, p. 46, l. 42 – p. 48, l. 109. On this passage, see 






in God’s power.87 One way to resolve this ambiguity between the two models 
would be to say that, for Berthold, fate and providence are only distinct where 
the operation of a thing differs from its essence – that is, either in the sensible 
world or among accidental and volitional agents like angels and human indi-
viduals. In this way, we may assume that Berthold intended to superimpose 
both the Augustinian and Boethian models of providence: the human being 
is subject to fate in becoming, but begins to exercise providence with the gods 
when it is capable of raising its contemplation to the stable order of being.
The other major source for Berthold’s interpretation of gemina providentia 
was a fragment (ms Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.iv.31, f. 69va- vb), which 
Berthold himself copied. Loris Sturlese has identified it as a portion of a lost 
treatise by Dietrich of Freiberg, the De subiecto theologiae listed in the early 
catalogues of Dietrich’s works, and there are no solid reasons to doubt this 
attribution.88
The fragment appears to contain Dietrich’s determination of a question 
concerning the unity of theological science.89 Its references to “partial books” 
and “treatises” suggest that the fragment derived from a prologue to a larger 
theological work, perhaps a Sentences commentary.90 It begins by using the 
example of the physical sciences in order to outline the different kinds of 
unity that a science may possess.91 Following “hearsay and probability” 
rather than “properties of the things themselves and the manifold truth of 
reflection”, some have held “by a logical reflection” that things as diverse as 
the incorporeal and the corporeal can be treated under a single, univocal 
genus (i.e., substance). Dietrich rejected this approach and argued that the 
structural unity of a science must conform to the realities themselves. For, 
 87 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 114B, p. 43, l. 92– 94: Inquantum tamen prime bonum 
explet providentiam suam per primordiales causas, sic actus providentiae primitus est in 
diis […] et per consequens nomen Dei. Cf. Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 
5, c. 16 (5), p. 110, l. 60- 61: Inquantum tamen providentiam suam Deus explet per fatum, sic 
actus providentiae participantur a creaturis, et per consequens nomen Dei.
 88 Sturlese, “Introduzione”, p. xvi- xxxiv; Dietrich of Freiberg, Opera omnia, vol. 3, p. 277; 
Flasch, Dietrich von Freiberg, p. 502.
 89 Dietrich of Freiberg, De subiecto theologiae, ed. L. Sturlese, 2.2, p. 279, l. 10: in proposito 
circa subiectum naturalis scientiae considerandum; 3.1, p. 280, l. 33- 34: tertio sumendum in 
proposita quaestione.
 90 Dietrich of Freiberg, De subiecto theologiae, 3.3, p. 280, l. 44- 58.
 91 Dietrich of Freiberg, De subiecto theologiae, 2.2, p. 279, l. 10: Sic in proposito circa subiec-
tum naturalis scientiae considerandum; 3.1- 2, p. 280, l. 33- 36: Tertio sumendum in proposita 
quaestione proprium subiectum et ipsius unitatem, quo etiam ipsa scientia theologica uni-
tatem habet. Ubi considerandum, quod sicut in his, quae gratia exempli seu manuductionis 












as Aristotle showed, physics cannot have a univocal and logical unity since 
one cannot subsume heavenly and sublunary beings univocally under one 
genus; as Averroes clarified, their properties stand in a completely equivocal 
relation to one another. Instead of a univocal and logical unity, then, Dietrich 
proposed a unity of proportionality (proportionalitas), where A:B :: C:D. That 
is, just as sublunary bodies are composed of their principles, so analogously 
heavenly bodies are composed of theirs. Motion and other natural properties 
are comparable only according to the notions of their respective principles 
within each genus.
Dietrich then made the distinction that Berthold would follow in the 
Expositio tituli between a science’s subject (subiectum) and its matter (mate-
ria). Dietrich first discussed natural substance, and then reasoned about how 
the structure of the science should follow from this.92 Among natural beings, 
any one of the principles or components from which a substance is consti-
tuted may be considered by itself, such that it is understood to relate to its 
unifying substance as a kind of “matter”. Alternatively, the aggregate of prin-
ciples may be considered under the aspect of the whole, and thus as “some-
thing complete, existing in act according to one formal reason”, which “is sub-
ject [subicitur] to an agent and the properties bestowed by the agent”. Failing 
to observe this distinction between subject and matter in theology, Dietrich 
continued, the less circumspect (minus considerantes) have supposed its sub-
ject must be something particular like totus Christus, res et signa, “the works 
of creation and restoration”, or even “God himself”. For Dietrich, these are in 
fact the particular “matters” which are integrated into a more comprehen-
sive whole or “subject” by virtue of “a notion common to all”. These different 
“matters” are related by proportionality so that, as in the physical sciences, 
they must be reduced to the unity of proportion or attribution to some single 
term (ad aliquod unum). For example, just as rewards are due to the just, so 
penalties are to the wicked; just as God will judge the good, so he will judge 
the wicked. These proportionalities must be reduced to a common unity that 
is the basis for the analogy. As an example of this correct procedure, Dietrich 
cited Proposition 21 of the Elementatio theologica, on the four genera or 
maneries of nature, soul, intellect, and the One, and Proclus’ reduction of all 
agreement to some one that is the primary analogate or root and principle 
(radix et ratio) of the order.93
 92 Dietrich of Freiberg, De subiecto theologiae, 3.1- 4, p. 280, l. 33 – p. 281, l. 68.
 93 See also Dietrich of Freiberg, De cognitione entium separatorum, ed. H. Steffan, in R. Imbach 
et al. (eds), Opera omnia, vol. 2. Schriften zur Metaphysik und Theologie (Hamburg: Meiner, 






In this science (in hac scientia), Dietrich continued, “the whole universe 
of beings” is treated, either according to the order of natural providence or 
voluntary providence.94 The subject that unifies its various “matters” is divine 
being (ens divinum), which primarily, simply, and essentially belongs to God. 
Other things are and are said to be divine by analogical attribution. Examples 
of this kind of attribution come from Averroes (In Metaphysicam iv, comm. 2), 
who used the familiar example of health: plants and medicine are the efficient 
causes of health by attribution, that is, by virtue of their relation, to the art of 
medicine; exercise is called “healthy” because health is its final cause; finally, 
accidents are attributed to a substance as to a subject, as something “more 
formal” that properly has the notion of “being”, while the accidents themselves 
are “dispositions of being”. Thus, “beings are attributed to God” as their prin-
ciple (efficient cause), as their end (final cause) and even in the third sense as 
accidents are to their subject, insofar as sacramental actions are performed in 
persona Christi with regard to the works of salvation and redemption.
Dietrich then introduced the two orders of providence to distinguish 
between two kinds of theology, the theology of the philosophers and “our the-
ology of the saints”.95 The philosophers, he observed, use precisely this kind 
of analogical consideration in their first philosophy, which they call “divine 
science or theology” rather than “metaphysics” because ens divinum belongs 
first to what is “divine by essence” and secondarily to the ordered universe in 
relation to it. Nevertheless, “our science, which truly and simply we call the-
ology, is distinguished from the divine science of the philosophers”. For the 
philosophers’ divine science considers the universe only relative to “natural 
providence”, according to which the first cause governs things by their innate 
modes and natural properties. In this perspective, beings are not understood 
relate to an end beyond the order of nature. “Our divine science of the saints”, 
however, views beings under the order of “voluntary providence”, in which are 
found the notions of merit and reward, as well as matters bearing on a good 
and holy life and the attainment of eternal bliss. This divine science looks to 
an end beyond the limits of this world, “when the divine science of the wise of 
this world is destroyed”.96
 94 Dietrich of Freiberg, De subiecto theologiae, 3.5- 7, p. 281, l. 69- 91. See n. 122, below.
 95 Dietrich of Freiberg, De subiecto theologiae, 3.8- 10, p. 281, l. 92 – p. 282, l. 112.
 96 Dietrich of Freiberg, De subiecto theologiae, 3.9, p. 281, l. 100 – p. 282, l. 109: Scientia enim 
divina philosophorum considerat universitatem entium secundum ordinem providentiae 
naturalis, quo videlicet res stant in sui natura et secundum suos modos et proprietates nat-
urales gubernantur per principem universitatis, nec ultra hunc naturae ordinem aliquem 
ulteriorem finem attendit. Nostra autem divina sanctorum scientia attenditur in entibus, 








Because of this final argument, the fragment has come to occupy an uneasy 
place in Dietrich’s corpus. Without directly denying its authenticity, Kurt Flasch 
has argued that the short text displays internal and external inconsistencies.97 
The internal ones, “which the writer of the fragment did not notice”,98 appear 
relative to the unity of theology itself – a potentially devasting criticism, as this 
was ostensibly the text’s primary concern. Flasch is right to note that Dietrich 
presented us simultaneously with a unified picture of theology (in hac scien-
tia) embracing both orders of providence grounded in an analogical model 
culminating in ens divinum, alongside his claim that “our divine science of the 
saints” differs from pagan divine science. But this apparent inconsistency can 
be addressed, for we have seen already that Dietrich argue that several physi-
cal sciences (in physicis) can be placed under the singular heading of natural 
philosophy (philosophia naturalis) which, just as in the consideration of the-
ology, is referred to using the phrase in hac scientia.99 The fragment uses this 
formal model applied to both natural philosophy and theology, based on the 
distinction between matter and subject, in the rationalistic and combative way 
we would expect of Dietrich.100 That is, it prefers a pagan philosopher’s under-
standing of the formal structure theology to the models of “the less circum-
spect”, who would include no lesser authorities than Augustine, Cassiodorus, 
Hugh of St. Victor, and Thomas Aquinas! While Proclus’ model of proportional-
ity, in which various matters are analogically united by a common subject (ens 
divinum), is the most adequately conformed to the nature of things, the limi-
tation of the content of his theology, according to the fragment, is that it does 
not see that human freedom and the ethical life relates to an order beyond the 
confines of natural necessity.
The concern about the apparent internal and external doctrinal inconsist-
encies in the De subiecto theologiae is, however, related to a larger question 
about its relation to the methodology of natural and voluntary providence 
in Dietrich’s works as a whole.101 It is often assumed that the precedent for 
ratio meriti et praemii et ea, quae attenduntur circa bonam et sanctam vitam et adeptionem 
aeternae beatitudinis et perventionem ad finem ulteriorem sive in bono sive in malo etiam 
post terminum huius mundi, quando scientia divina sapientium huius mundi destruetur, i 
Cor., 13.
 97 Flasch, Dietrich von Freiberg, p. 502– 512. See also C. König- Pralong, Le bon usage des 
savoirs. Scolastique, philosophie et politique culturelle (Paris: Vrin, 2011), p. 250– 252.
 98 Flasch, Dietrich von Freiberg, p. 509.
 99 Dietrich of Freiberg, De subiecto theologiae, 2.2- 3, p. 279, l. 10- 29.
 100 Cf. Flasch, Dietrich von Freiberg, p. 563; König- Pralong, Le bon usage des savoirs, p. 248.
 101 Sturlese, “Introduzione”, p. xxvi- xxxiv; id., “Il De animatione caeli di Teodorico di Freiberg”, 
in R. Creytens, P. Künzle (eds), Xenia Medii Aevi historiam illustrantia, oblata Thomae 












Dietrich’s methodology should be sought primarily in Albert’s philosophical 
commentaries.102 As for the De subiecto theologiae itself, most scholars gener-
ally minimise its importance for Dietrich’s thought, or use it only as a confir-
mation of Dietrich’s commitment to the methodological autonomy of natural 
philosophy. Others have pushed in the opposite direction, and argued that 
Dietrich’s philosophical works should rather be understood as preparatory and 
provisional in relation to his theology oeuvre which, alas!, is largely no longer 
extant. Dietrich’s position, as I understand it, was somewhere in the middle of 
these two options. In my view, it is largely thanks to the De subiecto theologiae 
that we can appreciate one of the most fascinating aspects of Dietrich’s meth-
odology throughout his works: his hypothetical approach to the philosophy of 
the separate substances.
p. 183– 197; R. Imbach, “Metaphysik, Theologie und Politik. Zur Diskussion zwischen 
Nikolaus von Strassburg und Dietrich von Freiberg über die Atrennbarkeit der Akzidentien”, 
in Theologie und Philosophie 61(1986), p. 359– 395; A. de Libera, “Philosophie et théologie 
chez Albert le Grand et dans l’école dominicaine Allemande”, in A. Zimmermann (ed.), 
Die Kölner Universität im Mittelalter (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1989), p. 49– 67; Sturlese, Storia 
della filosofia tedesca nel Medioevo, p. 204– 213; C. Trottmann, “La théologie des théolo-
giens et celle des philosophes”, in Revue thomiste 98(1998), p. 531– 561; K.- H. Kandler, 
“Theologie und Philosophie nach Dietrich von Freibergs Traktat De subiecto theologiae”, in 
J. Aertsen, A. Speer (eds), Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?, p. 642– 647; id., “Theologische 
Implikationen der Philosophie Dietrichs von Freiberg”, in K.- H. Kandler, B. Mojsisch, 
B. Stammkötter (eds), Dietrich von Freiberg. Neue Perspektiven, p. 121– 134; T. Suarez- Nani, 
“Substances séparées, intelligences et anges chez Thierry de Freiberg”, in K.- H. Kandler, 
B. Mojsisch, B. Stammkötter (eds), Dietrich von Freiberg. Neue Perspektiven, p. 49– 67; K.- 
H. Kandler, “Anima beata vel homo glorificatus possit progredi in aliquam naturalem cog-
nitionem. Bemerkungen zu eschatologischen Gedanken des Dietrich von Freiberg, vor 
allem zu seinem Traktat De dotibus corporum gloriosorum”, in J. Aertsen, M. Pickavé (eds), 
Ende und Vollendung. Eschatologische Perspektiven im Mittelalter (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
2002), p. 434– 447; T. Suarez- Nani, Les anges et la philosophie. Subjectivité et fonction cos-
mologique des substances séparées à la fin du XIIIe siècle (Paris: Vrin, 2002); De Libera, 
Métaphysique et noétique, p. 344– 349; Beccarisi, “La scientia divina dei filosofi”; Flasch, 
Dietrich von Freiberg, p. 191– 193, 512– 514, 573– 584; C. König- Pralong, “Dietrich de Freiberg, 
métaphysicien allemand antithomiste”, Revue thomiste 108(2008), p. 57– 79; Führer, M., 
Gersh, S., “Dietrich of Freiberg and Berthold of Moosburg”, in S. Gersh (ed.), Interpreting 
Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 
p. 299– 317, at p. 308– 309.
 102 Cf. Albert the Great, De generatione et corruptione, ed. P. Hossfeld (Münster 
i.W.: Aschendorff, 1980), lib. i, tr. 1, c. 22, p. 129, l. 13- 16: Si autem quis dicat, quod cessabit 
voluntate dei aliquando generatio, sicut aliquando non fuerit et post hoc coepit, dico, quod 
nihil ad me de dei miraculis, cum ego de naturalibus disseram; id., Metaphysica, lib. xi, tr. 
3, c. 7, p. 542, l. 25- 28: Theologica autem non conveniunt cum philosophicis in principiis, 
quia fundantur super revelationem et inspirationem et non super rationem, et ideo de illis in 




The polemical agenda of the most relevant of Dietrich’s writings on this 
question should be kept in mind.103 In the triptych of treatises De tribus diffi-
cilibus quaestionibus, Dietrich mounted an assault on an anonymous group of 
communiter loquentes (“run- of- the- mill babblers”) for their failure to observe 
the methodological distinction between natural and revealed theology: in De 
animatione caeli, he rejected the widespread claim that angels rather than 
souls move the heavenly bodies; in De visione beatifica, he targeted the thesis 
that the beatific vision occurs through the possible intellect; and in De acci-
dentibus, he ridiculed the notion that an accident could subsist apart from its 
subject.104 In each case, Dietrich implied that the promotion of a certain phil-
osophical position out of theological scruples (the Scriptures do not mention 
heavenly souls, therefore angels must move the heavens; in the beatific vision, 
God stands in for the agent intellect, the noblest part of the soul; extended 
quantity serves as a surrogate substance for other accidents in the Eucharistic 
transformation) has detrimental consequences for reason itself. Dietrich held 
that if exceptions were made haphazardly to the assumption that the uni-
verse has a rational order, with intelligible rules and patterns, then the entire 
philosophical edifice would be compromised. Dietrich’s rationalism was cap-
tured by the motto he ascribed to Augustine at pivotal points in his works, 
either at their outset or when fictive interlocutors challenged him for stray-
ing far beyond what is permitted by the letter of Scripture: “Whatever is to 
be posited by right reason, God should be said to have done” (quidquid recta 
ratione ponendum est, Deum fecisse fatendum est).105 By allowing theologi-
cal scruples to influence metaphysical argumentation, these thinkers effec-
tively undermine the coherence and certitude of theological science. As Kurt 
Flasch has put it, Dietrich developed Augustine’s notion of gemina providentia 
into a methodology that insulated “immanent- philosophical inquiries against 
 103 König- Pralong, Le bon usage des savoirs, p. 228– 231.
 104 Dietrich of Freiberg, Tractatus de tribus difficilibus quaestionibus. Prologus generalis, ed. 
L. Sturlese, in Opera omnia, vol. 3, p. 9, l. 4- 6: De tribus articulis de numero difficilium quaes-
tionum importunitate requirentium cogor scribere, a quo supersedere debui propter commu-
niter loquentes.
 105 Dietrich of Freiberg, De animatione caeli, ed. L. Sturlese, in Opera omnia, vol. 3, 1.2, p. 13, 
l. 7- 9; id., De cognitione entium separatorum, 9.3, p. 176, l. 82- 85; id., De intellectu et intelligi-
bili, ii.20.2, p. 160, l. 4- 8; id., De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis, 
ed. M.R. Pagnoni- Sturlese, in Opera omnia, vol. 2, 28.10, p. 329, l. 85- 86. Cf. Augustine, De 
libero arbitrio, lib. iii, c. 5, §13: Quicquid enim tibi vera ratione melius occurrerit scias fecisse 
deum tamquam bonorum omnium conditorem. Dietrich’s phrasing has a precise parallel in 
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet iv, eds G. Wilson, G. Etzkorn (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 








theological intervention”.106 Rather than isolating the two disciplines, this 
became an instrument of critique, “a metaphysical sublimation of revealed 
theology”, in which metaphysics could correct theological doctrine.107
These points are undeniable. But they must be balanced by another impor-
tant aspect of Dietrich’s methodology, namely, his self- critical approach to the 
use of these rules as he repeatedly noted the hypothetical character of reason-
ing according to necessary relations.108 In over 40 different passages concern-
ing the existence of the separate intelligences or the heavenly souls posited by 
the philosophers, Dietrich added some version of the caveat “if they exist”.109 
Using a similar turn of phrase, Dietrich stated repeatedly that we “rationally 
conjecture” about such things as the existence of heavenly souls.110 In other 
words, following the dictates of reason and the principles of mediation and 
proportionality, their existence is necessary.111 However, as Dietrich routinely 
 106 K. Flasch, “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologi-
cam Procli. Prologus, Propositiones 1- 13, p. xi– xxxviii, at p. xxxi; id., Dietrich von Freiberg, 
p. 191– 193, 342, 506, 512– 514.
 107 Flasch, Dietrich von Freiberg, p. 563; König- Pralong, Le bon usage des savoirs, p. 248.
 108 This aspect has been noted by Sturlese, “Il De animatione caeli”, p. 220– 221, as well as 
Suarez- Nani, Les anges et la philosophie, p. 64; Flasch, Dietrich von Freiberg, p. 204– 206, 
284, 299– 300, 310; König- Pralong, Le bon usage des savoirs, p. 247– 248.
 109 Dietrich of Freiberg, De cognitione entium separatorum, 1.3- 4, 2.3, 3.1, 5.2- 3, 14.1, 27.2- 3, 
36.2, 37.1, 37.8, 39.2, 39.4, 44.9, 86.6; id., De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae 
resurrectionis, 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 2.2, 6.2, 9.1, 16.1, 18.2, 19.3, 23.4, 28.4; id., De animatione caeli, 7.5, 
9.1, 11.4, 15.1; id., De visione beatifica, 3.2.9.2 (4), 3.2.9.8 (1), 4.2.1 (14); id., De intellectu et 
intelligibili, ii.34.1, iii.25.1, iii.30.2; id., De mensuris, ed. R. Rehn, in Opera omnia, vol. 3, 
2.11, 2.43, 8.3; id., De origine rerum praedicamentalium, ed. L. Sturlese, in Opera omnia, vol. 
3, 1.14, 3.37; id., Quaestio utrum in Deo sit aliqua vis cognitiva inferior intellectu, ed. M.R. 
Pagnoni- Sturlese, in Opera omnia, vol. 3, 1.1.4, 1.3.4; id., De dotibus corporum gloriosorum, 
ed. L. Sturlese, in Opera omnia, vol. 2, 24.5; id., De accidentibus, ed. M.R. Pagnoni- Sturlese, 
in Opera omnia, vol. 3, 8.2.
 110 Dietrich of Freiberg, De animatione caeli, 5.3, p. 16, l. 20: rationabiliter conicimus; 20.1, 
p. 30, l. 78: rationi, qua conicimus; id., De cognitione entium separatorum, 44.9, p. 210, 
l. 101: rationabiliter conicitur; 81.4, p. 243, l. 97: rationabiliter conicitur; id., De dotibus cor-
porum gloriosorum, 13.3, p. 279, l. 30: rationabiliter conicitur; id., De magis et minus, eds 
R. Imbach, H. Steffan, in Opera omnia, vol. 2, 14.3, p. 58, l. 75: rationabiliter conicitur; id., De 
substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis, 11.1, p. 311, l. 76– 77: possumus et 
de eis conicere tamquam a simili ex tertia manerie entium conceptionalium; 14.1, p. 313, l. 13– 
14: aliqualiter conicere possumus de locis dictorum entium realium; id., De visione beatifica, 
4.1 (6), p. 106, l. 33– 34: tamen circa hoc probabiliter ex ratione conicere.
 111 On the law of mediation (lex divinitatis), see Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, 
prooem. (2), p. 13, l. 14- 27. Cf. Albert the Great, Super Dionysium De caelesti hierarchia, eds 
P. Simon, W. Kübel (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1993), p. 2, l. 19: Haec enim est lex divinita-














acknowledged, even though the existence of these separate principles was 
regarded by reason as necessary, it cannot not be asserted with certainty.
We should give these claims their full weight when attempting to situate 
the De subiecto theologiae within Dietrich’s larger corpus.112 The hypothetical 
character of Dietrich’s thought on these matters explains why he would use 
metaphysics to critique certain theologians while simultaneously subordi-
nating the theology of the philosophers to “our theology of the saints”, and 
even go so far to speak of the eschatological destruction of worldly wisdom. 
Prioritising the concluding Pauline passage of the De subiecto theologiae, Karl- 
Hermann Kandler has responded to Kurt Flasch’s interpretation by arguing 
that Dietrich’s philosophical treatises should be understood as preparations 
for his lost theological works.113 The major difficulty here is that we cannot 
assess a theological corpus that barely exists. Kandler’s emphasis would do jus-
tice to the hypothetical nature of Dietrich’s philosophical theology, but it does 
not sufficiently capture the critical edge of the rational necessity it wielded 
against the communiter loquentes. Dietrich was very willing, for instance, to 
promote several theses that were censured in 1277 (e.g., in the numbering of 
Denifle and Chatelain, articles 30, 43, 44, 54, 64, 70, 73, 84, 85, 92, 94, 95, 102, 115, 
and 138– 141).114 But this does not mean was he using the Augustinian model of 
providence for purely naturalistic ends. Dietrich found support for his ration-
alism in Augustine and Aristotle together. For him, it is necessary to suppose 
that God acts according to reason, and to grasp the essentially ordered totality 
of the universe by beginning with the Aristotelian principle that each thing 
exists for the sake of its proper operation.115 In sum, while advocating for an 
integral and coherent pursuit of natural divine science according to its own 
lights, which can even challenge theological theses, Dietrich retained a scepti-
cism that acknowledged the provisionality of its conclusions; they are neces-
sary from our standpoint, they are the best the wayfarer has at their disposal, 
but there will come a time when this reasoning by conjecture will pass away. 
As his citation of 1 Corinthians 13:8 at the end of the De subiecto theologiae 
 112 According to Flasch, Dietrich von Freiberg, p. 205, the contradiction involved in positing 
necessary beings as hypotheses did not occur to Dietrich. I would instead propose that we 
regard it as one of Dietrich’s most provocative methodological innovations.
 113 Kandler, “Theologie und Philosophie”; id., “Theologische Implikationen”.
 114 K. Flasch, D’Averroès à Maître Eckhart. Les sources arabes de la ‘mystique’ allemande 
(Paris: Vrin, 2008), p. 96– 97; D. Calma, “La connaissance réflexive de l’intellect agent. 
Le ‘premier averroïsme’ et Dietrich de Freiberg”, in J. Biard, D. Calma, R. Imbach (eds), 
Recherches sur Dietrich de Freiberg, p. 63– 105, at p. 76.
 115 E.g., Dietrich of Freiberg, De animatione caeli, 1.2, p. 13, l. 10– 14; 5.3, p. 16, l. 19 – p. 17, l. 30; 










implies (“Charity never fails; but whether there be prophecies, they shall fail; 
whether there be tongues, they shall cease; whether there is knowledge, it will 
be destroyed [scientia destruetur]”), it is in ethical life that a person is in direct 
contact with the reality that abides. In this respect, it is unfortunate that more 
attention has not been given to the influence of Albert’s theological works on 
the De subiecto theologiae, for these seem to offer closer parallels to Dietrich’s 
argument than Albert’s commentaries on Aristotle.116
The uncompromising rhetoric of this Pauline conclusion was consistent 
with milder remarks made elsewhere in Dietrich’s corpus, even though on 
first glance it might seem otherwise. Kurt Flasch has noted a tension between 
the De subiecto theologiae and a passage in the De cognitione entium separa-
torum, where Dietrich stated that separated souls retain some of the knowl-
edge they acquired during their embodiment, in addition to their innate 
knowledge.117 Furthermore, as Dietrich made clear in De visione beatifica, 
 116 An exception to this is Trottmann, “La théologie des théologiens et celle des philoso-
phes”, p. 542– 544, who has argued the De subiecto was also in agreement with Albert’s 
account of the relation of metaphysics and theology in his theological works, accord-
ing to which the reasoning about God as the first cause gives way to the free movement 
toward God and eschatological beatitude: “[Dietrich] est en cela fidèle à l’essentiel de 
l’enseignement de son maître”. If this fragment indeed was related to Dietrich’s lectures 
on the Sentences, then he may have been influenced by Albert’s verdict that Aristotle did 
not pursue divine science in relation to a beatifying end beyond creatures. See Albert the 
Great, In I Sententiarum, ed. A. Borgnet, Opera omnia, vol. 25 (Paris: Vivès, 1893), d. 1, a. 4, 
p. 18b. In Albert’s discussion of the transcendentals in the same commentary, he argued 
that Aristotle understood ens only as the final conception reached by an intellectual reso-
lution and bonum only as a property of moving being, whereas the saints (sancti) treated 
being and the other transcendentals insofar as they flow from the first cause. See Albert 
the Great, In I Sententiarum, ed. A. Borgnet, Opera omnia, vol. 26 (Paris: Vivès, 1893), 
d. 46, a. 14, p. 450a, and the analysis of J. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental 
Thought. From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 
p. 183– 186.
 117 Dietrich of Freiberg, De cognitione entium separatorum, 95.2– 3, p. 259, l. 73 – p. 260, 
l. 86: Habitum est enim supra, quod anima separata habet eorum memoriam, quae experta 
est in vita. Sunt autem quidam habitus scientiales, in quibus adipiscendis indigetur expe-
rientia sensuali, ut sunt multae medicinae et perspectiva et aliae quaedam scientiae nat-
urales. Hae scientiae seu habitus earum manent in anima separata virtute experientiae 
praecedentis, eadem ratione saltem, qua notitia aliarum rerum, quas expertae sunt, manent 
in eis, immo multo fortius ex eo, quod adiuncta ratione scientiali cum experientia fortifica-
tur talis notitia in eis. De his autem scientiarum habitibus, qui sunt pure intellectuales, ut 
sunt scientiae arithmeticae et geometriae vel similes, sive habuerint eas in hac vita sive non 
habuerint, dicendum, quod huiusmodi habitus ex integro habent animae separatae secun-
dum statum naturae suae non solum quoad talium artium principia, sicut aliquis possest 







voluntary providence is “the completion and consummation” of natural prov-
idence,118 and not its destruction. Here, as Flasch rightly observes, voluntary 
providence plays “a secondary role” in relation to the affirmations of natural 
providence.119
If we foreground Dietrich’s hypothetical approach to the natural divine sci-
ence of the philosophers, these apparent tensions can be resolved. We may 
begin by recalling a passage from the De dotibus corporum gloriosorum that 
echoed the argument about voluntary providence from the De visione beatifica 
and clarified its meaning:
As to what pertains to the beatific vision of those who have glorified bod-
ies, something must now be said that presupposes what has been said 
elsewhere and perhaps in more detail. Here one must first consider how 
the blessed soul or the glorified human being, with their beatific vision 
intact and unhindered, could progress toward some new natural cogni-
tion. The response to this is plain and clear because that blessed vision 
exceeds every natural cognition and differs from it generically. But those 
things that differ generically can exist together in the same thing, because 
they are not opposed to one another as contraries, just like quantity and 
quality that exist in the same subject.120
 118 Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, 4.3.2 (3– 4), p. 114, l. 8- 21, cited in Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio,  129F, p. 182, l. 288– 302: Et ad hoc, quod talis ordo causalis salvetur 
ex integro, quo formalitas causaliter determinetur ab una in aliam, rationabile est totam 
huius ordinis dispositionem inveniri in uno aliquo, et hoc est ens, quod participat intellectu, 
quo apprehendit quiditates rerum in suis propriis rationibus, quo intellectu secundum 
genus nihil est superius nisi intellectus separatus, qui intelligit per suam essentiam. Et in 
hoc attenditur quaedam immediatio inter hunc intellectum et illum. Unde possibile, immo 
rationabile est hunc superiorem fieri formam huius inferioris. Et dico rationabile esse hoc et 
non dico necessarium esse, quia huiusmodi non fit ex necessitate ordinis, qui attenditur in 
providentia naturali, sed contingit ex sola Dei gratia et bonis meritis, quod pertinet ad ordi-
nem voluntariae providentiae, qui est complementum et consummatio ordinis providentiae 
naturalis, quem duplicem ordinem in universo distinguit Augustinus viii Super Genesim.
 119 Flasch, Dietrich von Freiberg, p. 574, n. 30.
 120 Dietrich of Freiberg, De dotibus corporum gloriosorum, 23.1– 3, p. 286, l. 66– 74: De eo autem, 
quod pertinet ad beatam eorum [hominum habentium corpora gloriosa] visionem, nunc 
ultimo aliquid dicendum, salvis his, quae alibi dicta sunt, fortassis magis exquisite. Et primo 
hic considerandum, quomodo salva et non intercepta illa beata visione anima beata vel 
homo glorificatus possit progredi in aliquam novam naturalem cognitionem. Ad hoc patet 
responsio et est in promptu, quia illa beata visio excedit omnem naturalem cognitionem 
et differt etiam genere. Sed ea, quae differunt genere, compatiuntur se in eodem, quia sibi 








This plainly affirms that natural knowledge will persist and even progress for 
the saints after the Resurrection and will not interfere with their enjoyment of 
the beatific vision – an even stronger affirmation of the preservation of natural 
knowledge than what we saw in De cognitione entium separatorum.
This text also helps us reconcile the other two passages with the De subiecto 
theologiae because it shows that it is necessary to make distinction in Dietrich’s 
views about natural knowledge, between the divine science of the philoso-
phers (the target of the De subiecto) and natural knowledge in general (the 
subject of the passages from De cognitione and De dotibus). As the latter two 
passages show, the stable knowledge that the soul acquires while in its mortal 
frame will abide after death, as will its innate content that is recollected in its 
embodiment. What passes away is only the soul’s imperfect and conjectural 
knowledge about the realities that are above its ken. For Dietrich, the soul’s 
knowledge of the simple substances is imperfect because they do not have a 
quiddity or a definition,121 and thus cannot be known with the certainty of a 
demonstrative syllogism. The De subiecto is arguing that charity is more impor-
tant for the wayfarer in this life than this partial knowledge, important though 
it is and even necessary within its own domain. Dietrich, in other words, was 
pleading for the deferral of the authority that the theologians would prefer to 
exert imminently on the divine science of the philosophers by suspending the 
laws and patterns of reason. His habitual caveats about the existence of sep-
arate intelligences and heavenly souls (“if they exist”) are not a contradiction 
Dietrich failed to notice, but rather are a sign of his self- critical awareness of 
the greater framework within which natural and necessary reasoning about 
the separate substances occurs.
Berthold used the De subiecto theologiae fragment only once in the Expositio. 
He modified its terminology to describe the subject of Proclus’ science and 
replaced some of the authorities cited by Dietrich with others.122 The universe 
 121 Dietrich of Freiberg, De quiditatibus entium, eds R. Imbach, J.- D. Cavigioli, in Opera omnia, 
vol. 3, 3.1– 4, p. 101, l. 3 – p. 103, l. 64.
 122 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. i, p. 46, l. 319 – p. 47, l. 341 Cf. Dietrich of 
Freiberg, De subiecto theologiae, 3.5– 6, p. 281, l. 69– 87: Et quia totus iste liber tractat de 
rerum divinarum universitate secundum processum eius a summo bono et regressum in 
ipsum, et hoc secundum dispositionem et proprios modos earum inditos ipsis rebus divinis 
ab eo, quod est divinum principaliformiter sive secundum causam, et hoc secundum ordi-
nem providentiae naturalis, non iam proprie voluntariae, iuxta distinctionem Augustini viii 
Super Genesim ad litteram, necesse est omnia convenire, de quibus hic tractatur, in una 
ratione subiecti, propter quam etiam ista philosophia est una scientia. Quod subiectum voce-
tur, sicut et vere est, bonum divinum, quod simpliciter et absolute causaliter seu principali-
formiter convenit omnium primo principio, reliquis autem bonis, puta divinis per essentiam 






of divine things (Dietrich had written: “the universe of beings”) proceeds from 
and returns to God according to the orders of natural and voluntary provi-
dence. For Berthold, the Elementatio theologica concerns the domain of nat-
ural providence (as Dietrich himself implied) and, therefore, treats ens divi-
num according to the three modes of an essential order: God (bonum absolute 
causaliter seu principaliformiter), the gods (bonitates per essentiam), and their 
subordinate participants (bonitates per participationem). Instead of Dietrich’s 
examples relating to health to explain the analogy of attribution (efficient, 
final, substantial) between creatures and God as ens divinum, Berthold cited 
two “rules” (regulae) of Hermes and two chapters from Avicebron’s Fons vitae, 
which establish that God is the true foundation or ratio subiecti, for he is a 
“principle without principle”, and “in comparison to him all substances are like 
accidents, and every accident is as nothing”.123 This modification was not only 
doxographical. As we will recall, Dietrich gave only the examples of sacramen-
tal actions in persona Christi for the analogical relation of accidents to sub-
stance, forcing Berthold to give an argument from the natural order to explain 
the substantial dependency of created goods on the Good itself.
At first glance, it seems that Berthold has merely transposed Dietrich’s argu-
ment into a Proclean context. Behind these more superficial modifications, 
however, was a more profound departure from his source. Berthold construed 
the difference of natural and voluntary providence in terms that he derived 
entirely from his reading of the Elementatio theologica and Dionysius, rather 
than follow Dietrich’s elegant separation of pagan philosophy and revealed 
theology. In the Praeambulum especially we will see how Dietrich’s mark of 
ownership (theologia nostra) in Berthold passed from Christian theology to 
the divine science of the Platonists. For Berthold, the ambitions of Dietrich’s 
quos distinguit Averroes super principium iv Metaphysicae, scilicet ut ad efficiens primum 
et finem ultimum nec non ut accidentia ad subiecti, cum Deus, qui est summum bonum, 
non solum sit ‘principium sine principio, processus sine variatione, finis sine fine’, ut dicitur 7 
regula Trismegisti, verum etiam ‘Deus est, cuius comparatione substantia est accidens, acci-
dens vero nihil’ per 6 ibidem. Dicit autem substantiam quamcumque esse accidens ratione 
dependentiae eius ad primum, cui soli competit ratio subiecti, non ut existentis in potentia 
passiva, sed activa, qua sustentat, qui efficit universa, et de tali accidentis ratione loquitur 
Avencebrol libro iii Fontis vitae cap. 36 et 54. Ex praedictis apparet, quod bonum divinum 
secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis est subiectum huius libri.
 123 The same pairing of Hermes (Liber xxiv philosophorum, maxim 6) and Avicebron (Fons 
vitae, lib. iii, c. 36 and c. 54) appears elsewhere: Expositio, 2B (p. 84, l. 74– 77), with 
the regulae of Boethius, and 150G (p. 127, l. 250– 52). The agreement of Avicebron and 
Boethius in 2B might have reinforced Berthold’s strange stipulation that the De unitate et 





philosophical theology could only be realised when it was translated back into 
the ancient Platonic science of the One and the Good. The influence of Thomas 
of York, who showed Berthold that the pagans had achieved a robust knowledge 
of God, meant that this focalisation of Dietrich’s thought on Proclus necessarily 
entailed the abandonment of Dietrich’s sceptical and hypothetical approach 
to reasoning about ens divinum within natural providence. If this Platonism 
demanded that we reason about the separate substances “not according to 
ourselves”, then its rational conclusions had to receive the mind’s assent if the 
exercise was to have its effect of liberating the soul from its captivity to its own 
abstractions. Berthold, in other words, sought not to elaborate a hypothetical 
cosmology, but to recover its perfect realisation in the distant past. This more 
fundamental shift was presupposed when, as we will see, Berthold rebranded 
Augustine’s two orders of providence with Platonic equivalents: antarkia for 
natural providence and hierarchia for voluntary providence.
At the first mention of the twin orders of providence (gemina providentia) 
in the Expositio, without explaining the sources or meaning of the distinction, 
Berthold signalled that the familiar boundaries of nature and grace, of natural 
and voluntary providence, were breaking down:
These are the invisible things of God taken transitively, which are dis-
cussed most subtly in this Theological Elementation within the domain 
of natural providence. For there are also the invisible things of God of 
voluntary providence, such as the angels, which, as Proclus says in On 
the Existence of Evils,  chapter 3, are ‘the class that is the interpreter of the 
gods, existing in continuity with the gods. This class knows the mind of 
the gods and brings the divine will to light […]’.124
Where a reader of Ulrich or Dietrich would expect to find a Scriptural or 
Christian authority invoked to explain the nature of the entities in the order 
of voluntary providence, Berthold went directly to Proclus, who not only 
spoke about angels but identified them explicitly as those who reveal the 
divine will (elucidat divinam voluntatem), uttering forth the silence of the gods 
(pronuntians illorum silentium). For Berthold, what Dionysius and Proclus 
 124 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 5- 6, p. 13, l. 264– 270: Ista sunt invisibilia Dei transi-
tive accepta, de quibus in ista elementatione theologica subtilissime pertractatur, quantum 
pertinet ad providentiam naturalem. Sunt praeterea invisibilia Dei providentiae voluntariae, 
puta angeli, qui, ut dicit Proclus De malorum existentia 3 cap., sunt ‘genus interpretativum 
deorum continuum existens dis. Et intellectum novit deorum et elucidat divinam voluntatem 




taught about the angels was effectively identical.125 In two other passages 
(Propositions 26 and 161), Berthold in fact clarified Dionysius using Proclus, 
to say that the angels, which are highest in the order of voluntary providence, 
immediately follow upon the primordial causes or “gods” rather than God him-
self. According to natural providence, wrote Berthold, the order of infinities 
(infinitates) immediately follows the gods, while in voluntary providence “the 
order of angels and especially the first and highest [the order of seraphim] is 
immediately conjoined outside the gods”, as Proclus made clear and Dionysius 
implies (huic alludit Dionysius).126 An argument in 26H explains why Berthold 
used this verb alludit. Here he gave a number of references to passages in 
Dionysius that place the seraphim directly beneath the thearchy (thearchia); 
however (autem), he remarked, “If I cast the eye of consideration to natural 
providence, then the angels are continuous with the gods and not God himself, 
according to Proclus’ intent in De malorum existentia”.127 For Berthold, there-
fore, the seraphim are of course the highest in the order of voluntary provi-
dence. But these remarks also suggest he understood this order to be ontologi-
cally embedded within the order of natural providence.128 What this means is 
that, within the perspective of voluntary providence, the gods are regarded as 
effectively one with the Trinity. Dionysius could be said to “imply” this doctrine 
since, in Berthold’s view, the term “thearchy” designates God and the primordial 
causes collectively.129 From the standpoint of natural providence, however, the 
gods are regarded as a separate phase of an essential order – they are the divine 
“according to essence”, subordinate to God “according to cause” – and in this 
 125 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 16E, p. 28, l. 168– 170.
 126 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 161C, p. 12, l. 34 – p. 13, l. 62: Verum quoad voluntariam 
providentiam ordo angelorum et specialiter primus et supremus immediate iungitur extra 
diis, sicut dicit auctor libro De malorum existentia […]. Huic alludit Dionysius […]. In the 
passage cited, however, Dionysius described the angelic order as circa Dei substantiam 
semper, et attente ipsi et ante alios sine medio unitum (De caelesti hierarchia, 6.2, 200D).
 127 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 26H, p. 158, l. 192 – p. 159, l. 213: Si autem ad providentiam 
naturalem oculum considerationis coniecero, tunc angeli sunt continui dis, non iam prime 
Deo secundum intentionem auctoris 3 cap. De malorum existentia […]. The phrase is rem-
iniscent of Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram viii.9.17 (oculus cogitationis attollitur), and is 
echoed elsewhere (e.g., Expositio, 9F, p. 175, l. 307– 310).
 128 On the ambiguous place of the angels in Dietrich’s doctrine of gemina providentia, see 
Suarez- Nani, Les anges et la philosophie, p. 146.
 129 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 4, p. 11, l. 201 – p. 12, l. 217; 10A, p. 178, l. 61– 66: Quem 
etiam ordinem Dionysius ii Epistula ad Gaium vocat ‘thearchiam’ et ‘boni principatum’, 
super quem est prime Deus, qui et prime bonum; 113A- B, p. 34, l. 45– 52 and p. 35, l. 82– 
83: Ista deitas thearchiae secundum Platonicos inexistit divinis per essentiam. […] Unde 












more discursive standpoint the seraphim would immediately follow “the gods”, 
and God only mediately. 
We have already noted the second and more striking example of Berthold’s 
use of Proclus as an authority in the domain of voluntary providence. This is 
found in Proposition 114, the first subsection of which (114A) was discussed 
above relative to the philosophically acceptable and non- superstitious doc-
trine of polytheism shared by Hermes and the true followers of Plato. In 114B, 
Berthold turned to Ulrich’s doctrine of divine providence to account for the 
different senses of the words deus and deitas: the Good unfolds its providence 
through the primordial causes (Ulrich: per fatum), and thereby shares “the dig-
nity of causality and of divine cooperation” with secondary causes.130 Berthold 
then brings us immediately to the two domains of providence, since deus is said 
of participants “either by nature or by grace, according to the order of twofold 
providence”.131 Discussing the order of grace or voluntary providence, Berthold 
first provided a lengthy citation of Dionysius (De caelesti hierarchia 12.3, 293B), 
on the saints who become participants of the divine by seeking to imitate God 
as much as possible. Immediately following this, Berthold argued that Proclus 
“makes the same point” (ad idem facit auctor) when he spoke about the cogni-
tion beyond intellect in De providentia et fato 8.32.132 Both passages on Proclus 
 130 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 114B, p. 43, l. 92– 100.
 131 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 114B, p. 44, l. 117– 119: Dicitur tamen hoc nomen ‘deus’ esse 
de participantibus aliquam proprietatem divinam, et hoc sive per naturam sive per gratiam, 
secundum ordinem duplicis providentiae, naturalis videlicet et voluntariae. The first two 
clauses come from Albert the Great, Summa theologiae, lib. i, tr. 6, q. 29, c. 1, a. 1, p. 216, 
l. 61– 64. In this passage, Albert discussed acceptable meanings of participated divinity in 
Scripture, “the poets, and certain philosophers”, namely, in Apuleius, the Liber de causis, 
Hermes, and the Timaeus. It is noteworthy that Berthold interpolated the distinction of 
natural and voluntary providence into Albert’s mention of nature and grace.
 132 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 114B, p. 44, l. 117– 128 and 135– 140: Per gratiam, secundum 
quod dicit Dionysius 12 cap. Angelicae hierarchiae: ‘Invenies autem, quod et deos theologia 
vocat et caelestes et super nos substantias, et apud nos Dei amicissimos mirabiles et sanctos 
viros (alia translatio: et quidem divinum secretum superessentialiter simul omnibus et remo-
tum et supercollocatum et nullum ab eorum, quae sunt, simile nominari proprie et omn-
ino valet. Verumtamen quaecumque et intellectualium et rationalium ad unitatem eius et 
qualiscumque virtus universaliter convertitur et ad divinas ipsius illuminationes, quantum 
possibile, incessabiliter extenditur secundum virtutem, si iustem dicere, divina imitatione 
et divina univocatione digna facta est) […]’. Ad idem facit auctor De fato et providentia 8 
cap. […] ubi loquitur de cognitione animae super intellectum: ‘Hanc, o amice, divinissimam 
enter operationem animae aliquis operans, soli credens sibi ipsi, scilicet flori intellectus, et 
quietans se ipsum non ab exterioribus motibus, sed ab interioribus, deus factus ut animae 









as a theologian of voluntary providence (on angels and deification), we may 
note, were among the few singled out by Berthold with manicules in his copy 
of the Tria opuscula.133
Berthold’s textual basis for bringing the pagan and Christian Platonists 
together on the doctrine of grace and deification was their common appeal 
to the notion of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, likeness to God as far as pos-
sible (Dionysius: convertitur ad divinas illuminationes quantum possibile […] 
divina imitatione et divina univocatione digna facta est; Proclus: deus factus 
ut animae possibile).134 Berthold would have found this caveat (ut animae 
possibile) in each of the Tria opuscula.135 Along with this verbal agreement 
we may recall their shared doctrine of contemplation Berthold presented 
in Proposition 202, which was defined in terms of the ceaseless striving for 
the divine, the unification of the self, and conjunction with God through the 
unum animae:136
Contemplation is the steadfast and unswerving extension of an intel-
lectual substance, exceeding itself and all beings and non- beings unre-
strainably, into the supersubstantial ray of divine shadows, as is meet and 
right.137
Loris Sturlese has observed that the standard ways of conveying the mediation 
of grace, in the Church and the sacraments, were not emphasised, let alone 
even mentioned by Berthold, and that the Dominican’s stress in the Expositio 
fell rather on the difficulty of the philosophical effort involved in the ascent to 
God through the oblique motion.138 Berthold’s passing references to the order 
of voluntary providence did not touch on these themes of sacramental grace. 
But in light of the foregoing considerations of the three motions of the soul 
and the two orders of providence, it seems we must admit yet again that for 
Berthold the philosophical effort itself, if it was to pass from discursivity of the 
 133 See Introduction, section 2, n. 74, above.
 134 Plato, Theaetetus, 176b. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 161C, p. 12, l. 31– 34, defined deifi-
cation using Dionysius: deificatio sit ad Deum, sicut est possibile, assimilatio et unitio.
 135 Proclus, De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam, q. 10, §64; De providentia et fato, c. 8, 
§32; De malorum subsistentia, c. 7, §24.
 136 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 202B, p. 184, l. 97– 117. For Proclus, see Expositio, 202C, 
p. 186, l. 152– 171.
 137 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 202A, p. 181, l. 22– 24: Contemplatio est substantiae intel-
lectualis se ipsam et omnia existentia et non existentia excedentis irretentibiliter, firma et 
indeclinabilis ad supersubstantialem divinarum tenebrarum radium, sicut decet, extensio.














Elementatio to its higher end, required a form of divine assistance.139 The labo-
rious investigation of the oblique motion is available to everyone, although 
Berthold has made it clear that following Plato’s theorems earnestly will take a 
person along “a certain byway that is beyond the common path of reasonings”. 
Returning briefly to Proposition 202, where all the proof- texts for the direct 
and circular motions are found, we will see that this definition of contempla-
tion held for all three spiritual motions. By way of summary, then, let us return 
to Berthold’s account of contemplation to see how the three motions and the 
two orders of providence are unified within a single progression.
Before citing the relevant passages from Dionysius and Proclus on con-
templation, Berthold included the six kinds of contemplation discussed by 
Richard of St. Victor, which he had used tacitly in the gloss on Psalm 42 at the 
conclusion of the Prologus. He then cited several passages from Book v of the 
Beniamin maior, in which Richard outlined a threefold order of contemplation 
and subdivided each stage into the three causes that give rise to it and bring 
it to perfection.140 First is the enlarging of the mind (dilatatio mentis), which 
does not pass beyond the limit of human industry, and is subdivided into 
teaching, mental exercise, and attention (traditio, exercitatio, attentio), which 
are its causes. Second comes the lightening of the mind (sublevatio mentis), 
corresponding to the liveliness of intelligence (intelligentiae vivacitas), when 
the mind is inspired and illumined by heavenly light, and is sometimes (ali-
quando) elevated above knowledge, above human industry, and above nature 
(supra scientiam, supra industriam, supra naturam). Here the mind sees reali-
ties that are above it, but cannot yet free itself from its habitual weight.
The third and highest stage is the dispossession of the mind (alienatio 
mentis), which is brought about by the abundance of devotion, wonder, and 
exultation (magnitudo devotionis, admirationis, exultationis). The abundance 
of devotion, through the interplay of the soul’s fervent desire and divine assis-
tance, makes it receptive to a divine gift: “when the mind burns excessively 
with the flame of heavenly desire, it becomes worthy to see something from 
a divine revelation, so that it is helped to reach those theoretical ecstasies”.141 
 139 This was not itself entirely novel. According to Thomas Aquinas, God, if he pleases, grants 
sanctifying grace to the pagan philosophers in view of their realisation of a natural capac-
ity as rational creatures to love God above all else. See A. Oliva, “La contemplation des 
philosophes selon Thomas d’Aquin”, in Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 
96(2012), p. 585– 662, at p. 605– 612.
 140 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 202B, p. 183, l. 64 – p. 184, l. 95.
 141 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 202B, p. 183, l. 79– 81, citing Richard of St. Victor, Beniamin 








The abundance of wonder is kindled by the vision it receives of a reality that 
is beyond all hope and conception (aestimatio); this wonder arouses attention, 
and with attention comes thinking (cognitio). In this attentiveness, as the mind 
climbs to higher and higher realities (dum mens humana semper ad altiora cres-
cit), it eventually reaches a point where it leaves the bounds of human capacity 
altogether (dum diu crescendo tandem aliquando humanae capacitatis metas 
excedit). This is finally perfected in the abundance of joy and the exultation in 
which the mind goes out of itself entirely.
In Proposition 202, Berthold juxtaposed Richard’s two classifications of 
contemplation, the six “genera” and the three “modes” (dilatatio, sublevatio, 
alienatio), without explicitly establishing any correlation between them. For 
more recent interpreters of Richard, there is a sense in which the three modes 
describe the qualities common to all six genera. As Jean Châtillon has put it, 
the sixfold division describes the objects of contemplation and the faculties 
that apprehend them, whereas the three modes correspond to the different 
states of the mind as it contemplates its object.142 But there is another sense, 
as Châtillon also observed, in which the end of the Beniamin maior, with these 
three modes, returned to the sixfold classification from its beginning, such that 
dilatatio would refer to the first four degrees (in imagination and according to 
imagination; in imagination according to reason; in reason according to imag-
ination; in reason according to reason), which are all contemplative activities 
within the bounds of human effort; sublevatio to the fifth (above reason, but 
not beyond reason), when the mind is inspired and illumined by God, but it 
has not yet left its habitual ways behind; and alienatio to the sixth (above rea-
son, and seems to be beyond reason), when the mind is totally absorbed in 
devotion, wonder, and praise.143
Both interpretations are available to a reader of the Expositio from the 
materials taken from Richard in 202A- B. The second option gains additional 
confirmation in view of the meditation on Psalm 42 in the Prologus. We can 
now see just how perceptively Berthold merged the sixfold and threefold mod-
els around the precise terms used by the Psalmist and in Lombard’s gloss.144 
nimio caelestis desiderii incendio uritur, aliquid ex divina revelatione videre mereatur, unde 
ad illos theoricos excessus adiuvetur.
 142 J. Châtillon, “Les trois modes de la contemplation selon Richard de Saint- Victor”, in 
Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique 41(1940), p. 3– 26, at p. 23; see also p. 14 and 16, and the 
studies cited there.
 143 Châtillon, “Les trois modes”, p. 23– 26. This interpretation is followed by J. Grosfillier, 
“Introduction”, in Richard of St. Victor, De contemplatione (Beniamin maior), p. 46.








According to Berthold, effudi, id est dilatavi, animam meam corresponds to the 
summit of the search for God in the fourth kind of contemplation and the 
desire to pass over into the fifth (dilatavi animam meam ad intelligendum supra 
se ipsam). The fifth kind or the eye of intelligence that beholds the simple Form 
would align with the second mode, the sublevatio mentis, when the intelligence 
is inspired and illuminated with a revelation (202B: intelligentia humana divin-
itus inspirata et illo caelesti lumine irradiata), and sometimes passes beyond 
knowledge, human industry, and nature. Nevertheless, it remains weighed 
down to some extent because it is still reflexive (Prol. 20: ut quaereret Deum 
intelligentia secundum rationem). The sixth kind of contemplation, the entry 
into the primordial causes or “house of God”, would align with the three causes 
of third and highest mode (alienatio mentis), especially wonder (ingrediar per 
unum animae in locum tabernaculi admirabilis) and praise (in voce exultationis).
If we read this synthesis from the Prologus back into the citations from 
Richard in 202B, we can see clearly how the dynamics of nature and grace 
unfold in the soul’s ascent to God through a continuous process of contem-
plation that embraces the distinct activities of all three spiritual motions. 
Berthold’s penultimate citation from Richard remarked that some have tended 
to speak about “contemplation” and “speculation” as if they were synonymous. 
Strictly speaking, however, contemplation occurs when one no longer sees the 
truth through a mirror (per speculum) but unveiled and without any trace of 
shadow.145 Speculation, then, corresponds to the first four kinds of contempla-
tion which, in the gloss on Psalm 42, relate to the search for God in the material 
world and in the soul. We might say that these speculative stages are presup-
posed by the science of the Elementatio, as Berthold’s discussion of physics and 
quadrivial science (duplex indagatio) from Albert’s Metaphysics commentary 
implied, and do not fall within its purview in the strict sense. The mode of dil-
atatio mentis, however (corresponding to the fourth kind), when the mind has 
prepared itself to the extent it is able and yet still desires to pass from know-
ing “in reason according to reason” to intelligentia, would correspond precisely 
to the laborious study of Proclus’ propositions in the oblique motion, which 
constitute a spiritual exercise leading the soul “beyond the common path of 
reasonings”. The Platonic theorems, in other words, prepare the mind for the 
passage from speculation, integuments or veils, to contemplation in the strict 
sense. Berthold insisted that these theorems should be revealed only to those 
 145 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 202B, p. 183, l. 90– 92, citing Richard of St. Victor, 
Beniamin maior, lib. v, c. 14, 187A- B, p. 558, l. 108– 111: aptius tamen et expressius specula-
tionem dicimus, quando per speculum cernimus; contemplationem vero, quando veritatem 




who have been attracted by the most longed- for unveiled image of truth.146 
Therefore, the oblique motion pursued through the Elementatio should be 
seen as the highest activity a person can undertake by their own effort – that 
is, the highest kind of “speculation” or dilatatio mentis that “enlarges” the soul 
through the three causes of teaching (traditio, where Richard had “art”, ars), 
exercise (exercitatio), and attention (attentio). It is a form of contemplation 
in the broad sense that prepares the way for imageless contemplation in the 
strict sense.
As Berthold’s final citation of Richard in 202B stated, the two higher modes 
(sublevatio and alienatio), unlike dilatatio, should both be understood as gifts 
from God:
No one from their own powers expects such an exultation or lightening 
of the heart or ascribes it to their merits. It is certain that this is the result 
not of human merit, but of a divine gift.147
These two highest modes, which correspond to contemplation in the strict 
sense because they are beyond veils and images, align with the fifth and 
sixth levels identified in the Prologus as the activities of intelligentia and the 
unum animae. Berthold thus invited his reader to interpret the Proclean and 
Dionysian proof- texts for the circular and direct motions of the soul, cited in 
the remainder of the commentary on Proposition 202, in light of Richard of 
St. Victor’s theory of contemplation. At no point did he express any hesitation 
about Richard’s theory, nor did he indicate that it diverged from the shared 
view of Proclus and Dionysius: on the contrary, all of them were describing 
contemplation as it can be realised in this life (contemplatio viae).
We may deduce from this that the vision of pure Form by intelligentia in 
the sublevatio mentis corresponds to the intellectus adeptus of 123D. If the 
 146 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. K, p. 48, l. 389– 391: […] veritatis ipsius revelata 
desiderantissimaque imagine pertrahuntur. Hi soli digni sunt, ut eis sapientiae, quae in ista 
elementatione theologica continetur, dignitas exeratur. Cf. Gilbert of Poitiers, Expositio in 
Boecii librum de bonorum ebdomade, prol., n. 7, p. 184, l. 32– 38.
 147 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 202B, p. 184, l. 93– 95, citing Richard of St. Victor, 
Beniamin maior, lib. v, c. 15, 187C, p. 558, l. 4- 6: Nemo autem tantam cordis exultationem vel 
sublevationem de suis viribus praesumat vel suis meritis ascribat. Constat hoc sane non mer-
iti humani, sed muneris esse divini. This is not inconsistent with Richard’s earlier statement 
that sublevatio occurs through the combination of human industry and grace (Beniamin 
maior, lib. v, c. 2, 170B, p. 508, l. 17- 19). Châtillon, “Les trois modes”, p. 19, observes, that the 
passive verbs used to describe this mode at Beniamin maior, lib. v, c. 4, 172D (inspirata and 






intellectus adeptus should indeed be regarded as the lowest phase of this high-
est level of the human modes of knowing in 123D, its activity was identified 
clearly as such in the gloss on Psalm 42 in the Prologus as the fifth kind of 
contemplation, “in intelligence according to reason”. This would follow inas-
much as the immediate relation of agent and possible intellects still implies 
the downward facing operation of intelligentia as it relates to the ratio univer-
salis or possible intellect. Finally, alienatio corresponds to the non- reflexivity 
of the unum animae, which is the higher phase of the same level in 123D. 
Therefore, whereas the oblique motion corresponds to the dilatatio mentis, the 
circular and direct motions, each in their own way, culminate in the sublevatio 
and alienatio mentis – one begins from within, the other from without, but 
both depend on a concourse of the mind’s attention and enlargement, fervent 
desire, and both are received as a divine gift or grace. This, for Berthold, was 
the unanimous doctrine of contemplation shared by Proclus, Dionysius, and 
the Christian doctors.
This incorporation of both registers of nature and grace in the Platonic 
divine science on the basis of their common contemplative doctrine was 
assumed by Berthold when he translated the doctrine of natural and voluntary 
providence into the Platonic terminology of self- sufficiency (antarkia) and 
hierarchy (hierarchia). According to Berthold, in Proposition 9 Proclus proved 
the existence of self- sufficient (antarkes) principles that are perfect through 
themselves. This corrected the view of Avicenna and Al- Ghazali, who placed 
self- sufficiency beneath perfection because they defined sufficiency as some-
thing that is acquired after a prior state of imperfection.148 With Eustratius 
and Dionysius, Berthold maintained that what is self- sufficient always has its 
inherent good perfectly (cui bonum perfecte ingenitum est), requiring noth-
ing outside itself. These self- sufficient principles will play a pivotal role in 
Berthold’s cosmology, where “secondary founts”, as recipients of “the superper-
fect”, “supersufficient”, “superabundant” efficient causality of the Good, have in 
and from themselves “the plenitude of their own goodness” as formal causes, 
and therefore can exercise proportional “superabundant” causality within 
their own order.149 In Proposition 10, Berthold coined the term antarkia to 
define precisely (stricte) the order of gods or “per se goodnesses”.150 The imma-
terial orders beneath the gods are self- sufficient to greater or lesser degrees; 
 148 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 9A, p. 167, l. 18 – p. 168, l. 36.
 149 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 9B, p. 169, l. 102- 105: supersufficiens bonum est duplex, 
quia vel est tale simpliciter vel in genere, quod etiam magis proprie dicitur supersufficiens 
virtus vel ens vel vita etc., cum talia determinent bonum ad quoddam bonum.








they are all regarded as beings that exist like species (entia secundum speciem), 
spanning “the order of infinities” down to “intellectual hypostases”, which are 
all “self- sufficient by themselves entire but not entirely” (se totis licet non total-
iter), meaning that they are self- sufficient in substance, power, and operation, 
but are constituted out of a plurality of formal principles. Souls, finally, are 
self- sufficient in their substance but not in their operation. All these entities 
are self- sufficient (antarkes) by analogy to the gods.151
According to Berthold, hierarchia is to God and the gods in voluntary provi-
dence what antarkia (the order of self- sufficient, per se principles) is in natural 
providence.152 When commenting on the term deificatus in the Elementatio 
and, more rarely, when confronted with Proclus’ mentions of intellectus divinus 
(e.g., 181D), Berthold relied principally on a pair of Dionysian texts which asso-
ciate “hierarchy” with “deification”:
De ecclesiastica hierarchia 1.3, 376A: ‘Deification is assimilation and union 
with God, as far as possible’ or, according to the other translation, ‘like-
ness and unity’ (‘Deificatio est ad Deum, sicut est possibile, et assimilatio et 
unitio’ vel secundum aliam translationem ‘similitudo et unitas’).
De caelesti hierarchia 3.2, 165A: The goal of hierarchy is assimilation and 
union with God, as far as possible (Intentio igitur hierarchiae est ad Deum, 
sicut est possibile, assimilatio et unitio).153
Thus it was certainly not the case that Dionysius for Berthold was only an 
authority in voluntary providence, although he sometimes spoke like “a the-
ologian”,154 or that Proclus only had insights into the order of natural provi-
dence: Dionysius transmitted the Platonic doctrine of the Good and the pri-
mordial causes as the “thearchy”; Proclus, more rarely, discussed the angels 
and the outlines of a notion of hierarchy and deification by participation. This 
unification of both orders of gemina providentia in the Platonic divine science 
 151 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 9B, p. 170, l. 129 – p. 171, l. 147; 9E, p. 173, l. 214- 218, and 
p. 174, l. 281 – p. 175, l. 295.
 152 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 10A, p. 179, l. 99- 102: Ex praedictis apparet differentia 
inter antarkiam et hierarchiam, quia antarkia est ordo divinus secundum condiciones supra 
positas in description emanans a Deo iuxta dispositionem providentiae naturalis; hierarchia 
vero est ordo divinus emanans a Deo iuxta dispositionem providentiae voluntariae.
 153 The adjective deificatus occurs in Propositions 135, 138, 153, 160. Berthold cited De eccle-
siastica hierarchia, 1.3, 376A, in the following propositions: 121B, 129B (Proclus: exdeatam 
[ἐκθεουμένης]), 134B, 135G, 138C, 160B, 160E, 161C, 161D, 181C, 181D. He cited the passage 
from De caelesti hierarchia, 3.2, 165A, three times: 10A, 145A, 153F.










also had an exegetical advantage, which we have just witnessed. The relation-
ship of proportionality between the two orders enabled Berthold to apply texts 
from Dionysius about hierarchy to the order of natural providence.155 Even if 
the Elementatio theologica did not concern voluntary providence, Berthold 
went out of his way to show that Proclus’ authority extended there as well, just 
as Dionysius did to the order of natural providence, and that Platonism itself 
transcended the divide of pagan and Christian, nature and grace.
 155 See, for example, Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 140E, p. 41, l. 103- 136; 156A, p. 169, l. 12- 
21; 156D, p. 172, l. 130 – p. 173, l. 166; 158A- B, p. 184, l. 10 – p. 185, l. 35; 162G, p. 21, l. 159- 171; 
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 chapter 3
Praeambulum libri
The habit of our divinising beyond- wisdom exceeds every other 
habit, not only of the sciences, but even the habit of intellect that is 
wisdom, through which Aristotle receives the principles of his first 
philosophy, which is merely of beings.1
∵
Berthold has moved from the consensus of authorities in the Prologus to the 
focalisation of ancient wisdom on Proclus and his works in the Expositio tituli. 
The third and final preface to the Expositio is a Praeambulum to the first thirteen 
Propositions, and establishes the rational and scientific validity of the knowl-
edge transmitted in the Elementatio theologica. In sequence, the three prefaces 
thus display roughly the same pattern found in each of Berthold’s commen-
taries (suppositum, propositum, commentum), which move from the general 
and authoritative background to the textual specificity of the Elementatio, and 
finally to demonstration alone.
In Berthold’s view, Proclus’ first thirteen propositions formed a coherent 
group, which established the existence of the One and the Good, demon-
strated that the two names refer to the same first principle, and showed that 
everything that is one or is good derives from that principle. The Praeambulum 
aimed to account for the two “complex principles” or propositions that Proclus 
assumed in these arguments. Since these propositions are so fundamental 
for the remainder of the Elementatio, these two principles can be regarded as 
“the foundations” of Proclus’ philosophy. According to Berthold, Proposition 1 
(Omnis multitudo etc.) assumed “that there is multitude” (multitudinem esse) 
and moved from the many to the One, while Proposition 7 (Omne productivum 
etc.) presupposed that “the productive exists” (productivum esse) and estab-
lished the existence of the Good. At Proposition 13, after six Propositions each, 
 1 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 65, l. 454 – p. 66, l. 458: Igitur habitus istius 
nostrae divinalis supersapientiae excedit omnem alium habitum, non solum scientiarum, sed 
etiam habitum intellectus, scilicet sapientiam, per quem Aristoteles in sua prima philosophia, 





Proclus showed that “the Good is identical with the One” (bonum uni idem). 
Since Proclus’ arguments in his proofs for Propositions 1 and 7 take these prin-
ciples for granted, Berthold felt compelled, somewhat surprisingly, to address 
doubts as to whether the science of the Elementatio theologica is a true science 
at all:
Proclus assumes these two principles, upon which the edifice of this 
entire philosophy depends as upon its own foundations, as if they are 
grasped through the reception of the senses and in no way are intel-
lected, known, or apprehended by any other scientific habit, but only are 
believed, just as the theology that concerns the divine Good according 
to the order of voluntary providence is founded upon principles that are 
believed, which are the articles of the Christian faith.2
The argument of the Praeambulum will be that a science founded on principles 
that are only believed (credita) is nevertheless a science in the genuine sense.3 
Berthold divided the Praeambulum into three sections, discussing (A) scien-
tific principles in general, (B) the three kinds of scientific principles, as well as 
the properties and character of these principles in particular, and (C) the true 
and properly scientific procedure of Proclus’ theology.
The way Berthold has presented the analogy between Proclus’ science 
and Christian theology (both begin from believed principles, but with the 
distinction of natural and voluntary providence), following so soon after his 
use of Dietrich of Freiberg’s De subiecto theologiae in the Expositio tituli, have 
understandably led commentators to assume that Berthold’s Praeambulum 
remained faithful to Dietrich’s strict and methodological separation of the 
divine science of the philosophers and revealed theology.4 Having looked at 
 2 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. A, p. 53, l. 15- 22: Ista duo principia, quibus totius 
istius philosophiae structura sicut propriis fundamentis innititur, auctor supponit sicut per 
sensus acceptionem nota et nullo modo vel intellecta vel scita vel aliquo alio habitu scientiali 
apprehensa, sed solum credita, sicut et theologia, quae est de bono divino secundum ordinem 
providentiae voluntariae, fundatur in principiis creditis, quae sunt articuli fidei Christianae. 
Propter quod a plerisque dubitari solet de utraque theologia et sapientiali et divinali, an sit sci-
entia secundum veram scientiae rationem.
 3 The notion that the articles of faith are genuine principles of the science of theology 
begins with William of Auxerre. See M.- D. Chenu, La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle 
(Paris: Vrin, 19573), p. 12– 13.
 4 See most recently R. Imbach, “Au- delà de la métaphysique. Notule sur l’importance du 
Commentaire de Berthold de Moosburg OP sur les Éléments de théologie”, in D. Calma (ed.), 








the broader intertextual patterns in the Prologus and Expositio tituli, we have 
found that Berthold decidedly and repeatedly blurred these boundaries in 
light of the textual evidence that confronted him. The Praeambulum was no 
exception to this pattern. Now, it is clear that Berthold held that the articles of 
faith are the principles of the science of Christian theology, which holds sway 
over the domain of voluntary providence. But through a consideration of the 
Praeambulum with a view to its tacit sources, I will suggest that Berthold con-
ceived of that theology under the banner of a broader Platonic divine science 
that united both orders of providence. Unlike Dietrich, who had maintained a 
clear subordination of “the divine science of the philosophers” to “our theol-
ogy of the saints”, Berthold’s confrontation with the soteriological Platonism of 
Proclus and Dionysius made this position impossible. Both sciences of natural 
and voluntary providence begin from belief and both terminate in a deifying 
apprehension of God. The dignity that Berthold’s predecessors and contempo-
raries reserved for Christian theology and the habit of faith that it cultivated 
was thus extended to the natural revelation of supersapientia and the unum 
animae awakened through speculation and contemplation.
1 Theology as a Science
Like the Prologus and the Expositio tituli, Berthold wrote the Praeambulum 
with the Sapientiale of Thomas of York near at hand. And, like those two pref-
aces, Thomas was synthesised with the anthropology and noetics of a German 
Dominican authority, and both were finally transformed and subordinated to 
the definitive philosophical concord of the Platonists (Dionysius, Proclus, and 
Boethius). This time, however, we must proceed carefully because Berthold’s 
German Dominican source is, it seems, no longer extant. As Loris Sturlese first 
observed, the final phrase of the introductory passage just cited, and perhaps 
also a good deal of the Praeambulum, echoes Dietrich of Freiberg’s lost trea-
tise, De theologia, quod sit scientia secundum perfectam rationem scientiae, as it 
was listed in an early catalogue of his works.5 Now that Berthold’s reliance on 
 5 See the text cited in n. 2, above. Sturlese, “Il De animatione caeli di Teodorico di Freiberg”, 
p. 194, n. 84: “che Bertoldo dipenda da tale quaestio, o comunque da posizioni teodoriciane, è 
mia netta impressione: ma non posso per ora dimostrario”. See also L. Sturlese, “Introduction”, 
in Berthold of Moosburg, “Commentaire des Éléments de théologie de Proclus. Préambule 
du livre”, in R. Imbach, M.- H. Méléard (eds), Philosophes médiévaux. Anthologie de textes phi-
losophiques (XIIIe- XIVe siècles) (Paris: Union générale d’éditions, 1986), p. 335– 346, at p. 342– 
343: “[…] surtout on peut envisager l’éventualité que derrière le texte du Préambule se cam-





Thomas of York has been recognised, the range of material that could derive 
from Dietrich has now been considerably narrowed. Indeed, what remain are 
the pivotal epistemological passages in sections B and C that explain how a 
legitimate science can begin from belief. If we entertain the possibility that 
Dietrich was the source of these arguments and transpose them back into 
the Parisian context within which Dietrich would have written such a trea-
tise on theology, certain puzzling aspects of the Praeambulum are clarified. 
The surprising doubt raised “by many” about the scientific credentials of 
the Elementatio theologica can be explained: this remark was copied from 
Dietrich’s defence of the scientific status of theology in Paris. There were not in 
fact “many” who doubted the legitimacy of the Elementatio theologica, though 
there were who questioned the scientific status of Christian theology in the 
late 13th century. I will propose that the Praeambulum followed Dietrich’s De 
theologia by drawing an important analogy between the scientific procedure 
of revealed theology and that of every other science (except the purely math-
ematical), including metaphysics. Berthold would have found in this analogy 
the resources to show that metaphysics or, in this case, Proclus’ philosophy, 
even though it begins from believed principles (because it begins from the 
senses), is still a genuine science. But since Berthold’s soteriological Platonism 
was not Dietrich’s divine science of the philosophers, this meant that the cen-
tral element of disproportion in the analogy of metaphysics and revealed the-
ology that may also have been present in the De theologia was left unaddressed 
by Berthold – I will suggest that this disproportion would have concerned the 
relation between natural and voluntary assent or belief.
Let us first imagine what the context for Dietrich’s lost De theologia might 
have been. While Dietrich was in Paris as a baccalaureus and lecturing on the 
Sentences, sometime between 1282– 1292,6 debates concerning the scientific 
status of theology conceived according to the model derived from Aristotle’s 
Posterior Analytics reach “a fever pitch”.7 Followers of Thomas Aquinas invoked 
the deductive model of Aristotle’s text and argued that theology is a science 
in the strong sense, in that our theology is subalternated to the higher science 
scientia secundum perfectam rationem scientiae”. The lost treatise is listed in the Stams cata-
logue, compiled sometime before 1330, perhaps as early as 1312– 1314. On the Stams catalogue, 
see Sturlese, Dokumente und Forschungen, p. 128– 131.
 6 Sturlese, Dokumente und Forschungen, p. 4; Flasch, Dietrich von Freiberg, p. 30.
 7 S. Brown, “Duo Candelabra Parisiensia. Prosper of Reggio in Emilia’s Portrait of the Enduring 
Presence of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines regarding the Nature of Theological 







possessed by God and the blessed. They often drew an analogy with the human 
sciences: an expert geometer knows demonstratively what the practitioner of 
optics assumes – that is, the geometer knows the reason why (propter quid), 
while the optician knows the fact that (quia) – but this does not undermine the 
scientific status of optics.8 Among the most innovative and polarised reactions 
to Aquinas in this debate came from Henry of Ghent (d. 1293) and Godfrey 
of Fontaines (d. 1309). Both went back to the Posterior Analytics to criticise 
the subalternation theory on its own grounds. For Henry of Ghent, we must 
look beyond Aristotle to Christian authorities in order to ground the subalter-
nation theory. Henry proposed his famous notion of the middle light (lumen 
medium), which the theologian possesses between the obscure light of faith, 
which every believer has, and the clear light of glory of God and the blessed.9 
Godfrey of Fontaines also went back to Aristotle but opposed both Henry and 
the Thomists. Godfrey argued that we simply must give up calling theology a 
science in the strict sense. In his fourth and eighth Quodlibets from 1287 and 
1292,10 which probably coincided with Dietrich’s baccalaureate,11 he argued 
against the subalternation theory, contending that any science that receives 
its principles from a higher science through mere belief cannot be a science in 
the strict sense of the term:
Therefore, to say that the principles of theology or the knowledge of 
anything in theology itself [are merely believed], or that in the one who 
is said to be knowledgeable in theology [these principles] are merely 
believed and are not known or intellected [sunt solum credita et non 
scita vel intellecta], and thus merely possess the certitude of adhesion, 
and nevertheless produce the certitude of knowledge in the conclusions 
reached from them, is to say that the conclusions would be better known 
 8 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ia, q. 1, a. 2. On this doctrine and its reception, see J.- 
P. Torrell, “Le savoir théologique chez les premiers thomistes”, in Revue thomiste 97(1997), 
p. 9– 30, at p. 16– 19 and 26– 29.
 9 See, for instance, Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet XII, ed. J. Decorte, Opera omnia XVI 
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1987), q. 2, p. 14, l. 20 – p. 15, l. 23.
 10 For the chronology, see J. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines. 
A Study in Late Thirteenth- Century Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1981), p. xxvii- xxviii. On Godfrey and his criticisms of Henry, see König- 
Pralong, Le bon usage des savoirs, p. 111– 123.
 11 Dietrich’s De origine rerum praedicamentalium seems to use Godfrey’s Quodlibet ii (1286) 
and Henry’s Quodlibet xiv (1290/ 1291). See L. Sturlese, Storia della filosofia tedesca nel 
Medioevo, p. 185– 188; Flasch, Dietrich von Freiberg, p. 162– 165; P. Porro, “Res praedicamenti 
e ratio praedicamenti. Una nota su Teodorico di Freiberg e Enrico di Gand”, in J. Biard, 









than the principles, and so have a twofold certitude, whereas the princi-
ples would have but one [kind of certitude]. This is to say contradictory 
things and greatly to dishonour sacred theology and its teachers, by prop-
agating such lies about theology to those drawn to it.12
Godfrey based this argument on a distinction between the certitude of evidence, 
which belongs to scientia, and the certitude of adhesion, which belongs to faith. 
The latter comes from assent to authority and, he maintained, is weak and imper-
fect compared to the certitude of scientific evidence.13 According to Godfrey, one 
cannot deduce stronger conclusions from weaker principles.14 Therefore, since 
theology relies on principles that are only believed, which are grounded on certi-
tude of adhesion to authority, Godfrey concluded in 1293/ 1294 (after Dietrich had 
left Paris) that “theology is less properly a science than natural science”.15
The ensuing debate lasted well into the 14th century, with important 
responses to Godfrey coming from Duns Scotus, James of Metz, Hervaeus 
Natalis, and Bernard of Auvergne.16 What concern us are not these details but 
 12 Godfrey of Fontaines, Les quatres premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines, eds M. de 
Wulf, A. Pelzer, (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie de l’Université, 1904), iv, q. 10, 
p. 262: Dicere ergo quod principia theologiae […] sive apud illum qui dicitur esse sciens the-
ologiam sunt solum credita et non scita vel intellecta et sic solum certitudinem adhaesionis 
habentia, et tamen efficiunt certitudinem scientiae in conclusionibus ex ipsis elicitis, est 
dicere quod conclusiones sint notiores principiis, scilicet duplicem certitudinem habentes, 
cum principia non habeant nisi unam. Et hoc est dicere contradictoria et multum derogare 
sacrae theologiae et doctoribus ipsius, tales fictiones de ipsa theologia attractantibus ipsam 
propalare.
 13 Godfrey of Fontaines, Le huitième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. J. Hoffmans 
(Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie de l’Université, 1924), viii, q. 7, p. 73: notitia 
debilis vel imperfecta ad evidentiam, sed firma quantum ad adhaesionem, quia innititur 
auctoritati solum et non rei in se vel ostensae per rationem evidentem.
 14 Godfrey of Fontaines, Les quatres premiers Quodlibets, iv, q. 10, p. 262.
 15 Godfrey of Fontaines, Le neuvième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. J. Hoffmans 
(Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie de l’Université, 1928), ix, q. 20, p. 292: Ergo 
videtur quod theologia sit minus proprie scientia quam naturalis non tantum propter hoc, 
quia scilicet habet evidentiam quae requiritur ad scientiam, sed minorem quam naturalis, – 
immo etiam quia nec habet evidentiam quae requiritur ad illam scientiam quae debet dici 
proprie scientia. Propter quod dicendum esset illis, qui dicunt modo supradicto theologiam 
esse scientiam proprie dictam, dicentes hoc se credere, quia infinitae auctoritates sanctorum 
quibus in hoc credendum est videntur hoc dicere, quod non est ita. Immo nec una sola auc-
toritas viri magnae auctoritatis invenitur per quam possit hoc evidenter persuaderi.
 16 J.- P. Torrell, Recherches thomasiennes. Études revues et augmentées (Paris: Vrin, 2000), 
p. 173, n. 4. For the subsequent debate, see J. Leclercq, “La théologie comme science dans 
la littérature quodlibétique”, in Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 11(1939), 












simply the fact that after Godfrey no one held that theology is a science in 
the strictest demonstrative sense. Those who continued to regard it as demon-
strative had to admit some flexibility into their notions of what constituted 
a demonstrative science. The Praeambulum was no exception to this pattern.
If the key passages from sections B and C of the Praeambulum are read as 
traces of Dietrich’s lost treatise on the scientific status of theology, we can 
surmise that Dietrich largely accepted the way in which Godfrey had framed 
his own position in terms of the certitude of evidence and the certitude of 
adhesion. But Dietrich’s original response would have been to focus on the role 
that belief plays in every particular science that begins from without (quasi 
ab extrinseco), including metaphysics and theology, and indeed every science 
except the purely mathematical disciplines. In a sense, this argument would 
have amounted to an intensification of Godfrey’s focus on subjective certitude, 
but in so doing it redefined what constitutes a true science: the stability of first 
principles is to be found within the cognitive process by which the subject 
grasps universal propositions.17
With this background in mind, we will proceed gradually through the 
Praeambulum. All of section A, which serves as a terminological dossier for 
in R. Berndt, M. Lutz- Bachmann, R.M.W. Stammberger (eds), Scientia und Disciplina. 
Wissenstheorie und Wissenschaftspraxis im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Akademie 
Verlag, 2002), p. 79– 90; P. Porro, “Tra l’oscurità della fede e il chiarore della visione. Il 
dibattito sullo statuto scientifico della teologia agli inizi del XIV secolo”, in L. Bianchi, 
C. Crisciani (eds), Forme e oggetti della conoscenza nel XIV secolo. Studi in ricordo di Maria 
Elena Reina (Firenze: sismel – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2014), p. 195– 256.
 17 C. König- Pralong, “Expérience et sciences de la nature chez Dietrich de Freiberg et 
Berthold de Moosburg”, in L. Bianchi, C. Crisciani (eds), Forme e oggetti della conoscenza 
nel XIV secolo, p. 107– 133, compares the Praeamble with Dietrich of Freiberg’s extant trea-
tises, and offers some valuable insights on the status of experimental sciences in Dietrich’s 
works, especially through comparison with Roger Bacon. König- Pralong rightly under-
scores an important innovation in the scientific epistemology of the Praeambulum, which 
autonomises purely mathematical sciences and the experimental- inductive sciences 
which, for the first time, are distinguished not according to their objects but according to 
the mode of apprehending the truth of the propositions comprising these sciences (p. 125, 
128– 129). However, I do not find the differences between the Praeambulum and Dietrich’s 
works noted in her study substantive enough to rule out the possibility that the central 
portions of the Praeambulum derived from Dietrich. To be sure, the division between 
analytical and experimental sciences was presented austerely in the Praeambulum, but 
its argument would still make room for the mixed methods that we find mentioned in 
the prologue of Dietrich’s De iride. Moreover, it obscures the purpose of the Praeambulum 
to conclude, as König- Pralong suggests, that for Berthold Platonic science has the same 
certitude as mathematics (p. 129, p. 132– 133). The argument of the Praeambulum becomes 
clearer if we read it as a theological text, and when its sources and interlocutors are 




Berthold’s argument, was taken from Sapientiale iii.23.18 These passages 
explained how every science uses its rules and principles as its “proper foun-
dations”. These principles are already known and assumed (ex praecognitis) 
as the basis for syllogistic reasoning and are “the most certain propositions 
received from common teachings”. These propositions, although they are 
commonly called simply “by the name of principles”, in fact receive different 
names in each science, as Alan of Lille explained.19 Following Eustratius, we 
may divide principles into three kinds:
Axioms (dignitates): believed (credita) through self- evidence.
Hypotheses (suppositiones): lack self- evidence; belief in them is con-
ceded following teaching or demonstration.
Postulates (petitiones): lack self- evidence; their truth is not conceded but 
is granted for the sake of the argument.20
These principles are used in different ways in demonstrative syllogisms. The 
truth of an axiomatic proposition is grasped immediately because of the 
identity of subject and predicate or, in the case of a syllogism, because of the 
identity of the middle term with either extreme. A second group called the-
ses (positiones) is subdivided into hypotheses (suppositiones) and definitions 
(definitiones). In general, a thesis is someone’s opinion that is gathered from 
their philosophy. It is not grasped by all and its necessity is not immediately 
understood. If it is presented as having been demonstrated in a higher science, 
as in optics one appeals to geometry, and if it seems probable to a student of 
the subalternated science, it is called a hypothesis (suppositio). If it does not 
seem probable, it is a postulate (petitio). Unlike axioms and theses, definitions 
do not predicate one thing of another; they are neither affirmative nor nega-
tive but are a simple understanding regarding one explicated thing (intellectus 
quodammodo simplex cadens super unum explicitum).21
 18 For an edition of passages from Sapientiale, lib. iii, c. 23, see F. Retucci, “Nuovi percorsi 
del platonismo medievale. I commentari bizantini all’Etica Nicomachea nel Sapientiale 
di Tommaso di York”, in Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 24(2013), 
p. 85– 120.
 19 Here Berthold added a reference to Expos. tit. K, p. 47, l. 349– 367.
 20 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. A, p. 54, l. 53– 63.
 21 One need not situate Berthold among his contemporaries John Buridan and Gregory of 
Rimini who held that science concerns propositions and not things (cf. König- Pralong, 











Berthold began Section B with an outline of the three properties or proper 
modes that the three kinds of principles presented in section A can assume. He 
arranged these modes in terms of the various degrees of commonality found 
among principles: some principles descend into every science, others only into 
some sciences, while those in the third group are proper only to one science. 
Once these modes of commonality have been explained, this classification 
will be used to discuss the different modes of certitude proper to each kind of 
principle.
The “most- common” principles, by virtue of their universality, descend into 
every science: for example, there is the principle of non- contradiction or the 
principle that words (voces) have determinate significations. The “modes or 
conditions” of such principles are to be “the most secure of all” and beyond 
deceit; they are true for everyone, everywhere, and always (omnibus ubique et 
semper), and thus are present by nature and not by instruction. Berthold tells 
us that these principles concern “being as being”, since being (ens) is “the most 
universal of all formal intentions” – however, he added cryptically, “according 
to Plato it is otherwise”.22
The second group comprises “common” principles. These are proportion-
ately taken up by some, though not all, sciences. Examples come from Euclid’s 
“common conceptions of the mind”: “the whole is greater than the part” or “if 
equals are subtracted from equals, then the remainders are equal”.23
The third group includes principles proper to particular sciences that have 
no proportional or analogical commonality across diverse sciences. For exam-
ple, it is a principle only in geometry that “all right angles are equal”, only in 
optics that “light and colour move sight”, or only in physics that there is move-
ment in nature.
 22 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 56, l. 116- 119: ens, quod est universalissima 
omnium intentionum formalium secundum Aristotelem, licet aliter sit secundum Platonem. 
Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De origine rerum praedicamentalium, 1.25, p. 144, l. 239- 241: inten-
tio enim entis prima et formalissima est omnium intentionum; 3.8, p. 159, l. 40 – p. 160, 
l. 48: ratio entis […] est prima et formalissima omnium intentionum; 5.36, p. 191, l. 351- 
358: ens, quae est prima et formalissima omnium intentionum. Cf. id., De intellectu et intel-
ligibili, ii.15.1, p. 156, l. 9- 10: quantum ad primam et simplicissimam et universalissimam 
intentionem, scilicet esse.
 23 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 56, l. 123- 126: quas communes animi con-
ceptiones vocant et ponuntur in principio Euclidis, puta, ‘si ab aequalibus aequalia demas’, 
etc., et ‘omne totum est maius sua parte’. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De iride et de radialibus 
impressionibus, eds M.R. Pagnoni- Sturlese, L. Sturlese, in Opera omnia, vol. 4. Schriften 
zur Naturwissenschaft, Briefe, eds M.R. Pagnoni- Sturlese et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1985), 
i.4.8, p. 128, l. 58- 59: per communem animi conceptionem, scilicet ‘si aequalia ab aequalibus 






We then come to the various modes of certitude found in these three kinds 
of principles. The most- common and common principles are known through 
intellect (intellectus). Here Berthold used Thomas of York to explain how the 
habit of intellect differs from the other habits presented by Aristotle in Book 
vi of the Nicomachean Ethics. But the most important point, around which 
the argument of the Praeambulum hinges, concerns the principles unique 
to particular sciences. Only in some sciences (the purely mathematical), are 
particular principles apprehended by intellect. The particular principles of all 
other sciences, as we shall see, have a different mode of certitude and truth. 
The notion of a veritable science will have to have sufficient latitude to include 
these, which by far comprise most disciplines normally regarded as sciences.
Therefore, each science must be considered separately to determine, first, 
whether it is purely mathematical and, if not, how it relates to the physical 
world. Purely mathematical sciences like geometry and arithmetic have the 
same certitude as the most- common and common principles, for their prin-
ciples are known through intellect and not sense- experience. In such cases, 
exemplified by Euclid, the orders of nature and our knowledge are parallel: “we 
apprehend the proper principles of such sciences by intellect in the first steps 
in the progress in these sciences”.24
Sciences relating to the physical world apprehend truth in another way and 
have a different degree of certitude. These sciences include physics and ethics, 
where what is prior by nature comes later in the order of knowing because the 
sciences begin with sense- perception. Here Aristotle’s dictum holds true: every 
art and intellective discipline begins from the prior cognition of the senses.25 
The principles in these sciences are universals derived from sense, memory, and 
experience. For example, in physics sense- perception establishes “that there 
is motion” and, in medicine, experience establishes “that scammony purges 
bile”. In optics and astronomy an instrument is used to capture an experimen-
tum. In these sciences, there is no necessary relation between experience and 
the universal proposition or principle derived from it.26 Therefore, whereas 
intellect apprehends the principles of purely mathematical sciences as well 
as most- common and common principles, which have an intrinsic mode of 
certitude and truth, the principles of every other particular science “have their 
cause and reason as it were from the outside” (quasi ab extrinseco).27 Belonging 
 24 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 58, l. 177- 178.
 25 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 59, l. 204- 209.
 26 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 62, l. 331- 334.










to this second group are “the principles of metaphysical or divine sciences”.28 
It is relative to this domain of exteriority that the text will make the decisive 
argument that extends the true notion of a science to disciplines founded on 
believed principles (credita).
Any proposition or principle derived from sense- experience in sciences in 
this second group is “only believed and in no way known or intellected” (as 
Godfrey had said of revealed theology), since it lacks the necessity of intel-
lect.29 These principles, insofar as they are believed, are “apprehended under 
the certitude of the ‘true’, [which] cannot possibly be otherwise”. This appre-
hension has three components: (1) the “apprehended” is what reason objec-
tively deals with in thinking, such as “this, which is moved, exists”;30 (2) it is 
“true” by the equality of the thing apprehended and intellect, which occurs 
through “a combination or composition of speech”;31 finally, (3) “certitude” 
is “the firm and unshakeable assent of reason” concerning the thing appre-
hended as true.
 28 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 60, l. 271- 274: alia est cognitio principio-
rum communissimorum, communium et propriorum in scientiis pure mathematicis, quia 
intellectus, alia vero metaphysicorum seu divinorum, physicorum et ad physica relatorum, 
quia acceptio secundum sensum.
 29 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 59, l. 217- 229: Sic igitur procedente inda-
gatione per viam sensus et experientiae in praemissis scientiis sumptum est unum univer-
sale pro ipsarum scientiarum principio, quod principium in quacumque huiusmodi scientia 
solum creditum est et nullo modo scitum nec intellectum, quia nec ex propria ratione termi-
norum cognitum est, quod esset intelligere, nec ex aliquibus principiis aliis seu causis conclu-
sum et ita nullo modo scitum, sed, ut dictum est, solum est creditum, et sic apprehensum sub 
certitudine veri, quod impossibile est aliter se habere. Dico autem [1] ‘apprehensum’ id, circa 
quod obiective negotiatur ratio per cognitionem, ut hoc, quod est motum, esse; [2] ‘verum’ 
autem hic intelligo ipsam aequalitatem sive consonantiam rei apprehensae et intellectus, 
quae quantum ad rationem et modum attenditur circa complexionem sive compositionem 
locutionis; [3] ‘certitudo’ autem de ipsa veritate rei apprehensae est firmus et indeclinabilis 
assensus rationis in rem sic apprehensam. For Godfrey, see n. 12- 13, above.
 30 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 60, l. 249- 250, clarifies that these are first 
intentions. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De origine rerum praedicamentalium, 5.47, p. 194, l. 463- 
468: Circa quaedam enim entia sic negotiatur intellectus […]; 5.54, p. 197, l. 566- 568: Unde 
huiusmodi entia proprie dicuntur res rationis, non autem ea, quae sunt primae intentionis, 
quae important aliquam rem naturae et circa quae negotiatur intellectus tamquam circa res 
naturae.
 31 Presumably by affirmation and negation, and second intentions. This rare expression, 
complexio locutionis, appears also in Dietrich of Freiberg, De origine rerum praedicamen-
talium, 5.54, p. 197, l. 559- 562: Possunt enim non entia, sicut et entia, in complexionem locu-
tionis et in praedicationem affirmativam vel negativam venire […]; id., De natura contrario-










Within this framework, the Praeambulum then compared mathematical 
and physical sciences. What is known demonstratively (scitum) by intellect is 
also “apprehended by reason under the certitude of truth”, but the principle 
that is believed (creditum) differs from it in two respects: (a) by its mode of 
certitude and (b) in the order of apprehension. (a) Scientia takes its certitude 
from the intrinsic evidence of the thing, that is, from the intention and rational 
relations that the terms have to one another in a complex proposition, whether 
immediately in the case of first principles, or mediately when a conclusion is 
deduced from prior principles. By contrast, the certitude of faith derives not 
from intrinsic evidence but has its cause and reason from without (quasi ab 
extrinseco), such as “from the clear authority of an expert, from whose truth 
the intellect cannot reasonably dissent”.32 At this stage one should note how 
closely scientia and fides align with what Godfrey called the certitude of evi-
dence, where knowledge begins with per se principles that lead to clear conclu-
sions, and the certitude of adhesion, which begins from authority.
(b) The second difference between scientia and fides concerns the order of 
apprehension. In scientia, the evidence of the thing arises from the intention 
and rational relation of the terms which are, so to speak, “the intrinsic prin-
ciple of cognition found in the thing”.33 The thing itself is by nature appre-
hended first, prior to truth or falsehood, which both arise from the combining 
activity of intellect. By contrast, in belief, the authority of an expert comes 
first, “in whose truth reason declares our trust must absolutely be placed and 
the will inclines to it”.34 In belief, the order of apprehension begins with truth 
as such and not with the intrinsic evidence of the thing. Any necessity lacking 
in the evidence of the terms is supplied by the authority of an expert, which 
provides the secure foundation of truth.
At this point, Berthold gave a summary of what has been concluded so 
far concerning principles in general. No principle is ever demonstrated; wis-
dom declares (manifestare) but does not demonstrate principles. The habit of 
 32 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 60, l. 241- 242: puta ex evidenti auctoritate 
alicuius experti, a cuius veritate intellectus rationabiliter dissentire non potest.
 33 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 60, l. 248- 250: quae sunt quasi intrinsecum 
cognitionis principium repertum apud rem ipsam, prout est ens et res primae intentionis. Cf. 
Dietrich of Freiberg, De accidentibus, 8.4, p. 64, l. 110- 113: universitas entium, quae sunt res 
primae intentionis et vere res naturae, in duplicem maneriem rerum distinguitur secundum 
duas differentias entis in eo, quod ens, quae est prima et simplicissima omnium formalium 
intentionum repertarum in rebus; id., De visione beatifica, 3.2.9.1 (3), p. 86, l. 26- 33.
 34 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 60, l. 254- 56: Quia enim causam et 
rationem suae certitudinis non habet a re ipsa, sed ab auctoritate alicuius experti, cuius ver-








principles of first certitude (which would correspond to most- common, com-
mon, and purely mathematical principles) is innate. For Aristotle, this habit 
is only in potency before being actualised by sense- cognition, but for Plato, 
according to Boethius, there is already in us “the seed of truth”, which is always 
active, even if it “is aroused by instruction fanning the ember”.35
What remains to be determined is whether there can be a true science (vera 
scientia) which begins from belief. Section C of the Praeambulum argues in the 
affirmative, and proceeds by establishing an analogy between theology and 
natural science. Godfrey refused to accept such a comparison. But the argu-
ment in the Praeambulum allows for it insofar as it has found a role for belief in 
the physical sciences. Berthold will then argue that Platonic wisdom (divinalis 
sapientia) has the same scientific structure, proportionately speaking (propor-
tionaliter loquendo), as the other genuine sciences, except the purely mathe-
matical.36 That is, it uses most- common principles (e.g., non- contradiction) 
and common principles (e.g., “the whole is greater than the part”), which are 
apprehended by the intellect. As for the two principles unique to this science, 
“there is multitude” and “there is producer and produced”, Berthold will affirm 
that Proclus assumes them and “proceeds perfectly following the scientific 
mode”. In this most divine science (divinissima scientia), these two principles 
are known in a way analogous (proportionaliter) to the sciences concerning 
things conjoined to motion or change. Although Berthold did not make this 
clear, we should assume that we need to understand both the elements of 
similarity and difference in the analogy of (Platonic) theology and the natural 
sciences.
In terms of their similarity, this theology resembles the physical sciences in 
which there is no intrinsic or necessary connection between sense- experience 
and the universal proposition that serves as its principle: these principles must 
 35 Thomas of York, following Eustratius, had also criticised Aristotle in the name of the 
Platonists regarding our knowledge of first principles. See Sapientiale, lib. iii, c. 24, in 
Retucci, “Nuovi percorsi”, p. 93– 94. According to Eustratius, the need for sense- perception 
is not intrinsic to humanity but is a result of the Fall. See M. Trizio, “Neoplatonic Source- 
Material in Eustratios of Nicaea’s Commentary on Book vi of the Nicomachean Ethics”, 
in C. Barber, D. Jenkins (eds), Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics 
(Leiden: Brill, 2009), p. 71– 110, at p. 99– 101; id., “On the Byzantine Fortune of Eustratios 
of Nicea’s Commentary on Books i and vi of the Nicomachean Ethics”, in B. Bydén, 
K. Ierodiakonou (eds), The Many Faces of Byzantine Philosophy (Athens: The Norwegian 
Institute at Athens, 2012), p. 200– 224, at p. 209– 216.
 36 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 61, l. 307– 309: omnino eodem modo pro-
portionaliter loquendo secundum proprium modum scientiae procedit haec divinalis sapi-






be believed. The Praeambulum explains this with an important account of the 
cognitive structure of belief which, however, differs subtly from the account of 
the secure foundation provided by belief in authority in section B:
Therefore, in taking this universal principle from sense- experiences there 
is nothing but a conjectural inference under the aspect of the true and 
not under the aspect of being, as has been said. Accordingly, it is received 
as believed, not as intellected or known [ut creditum, non ut intellectum 
vel scitum]. As has been said, it is taken by a certain conjecture, but still 
with the firm and unwavering assent of reason. This firmness and unwa-
vering assent arises from a certain natural instinct founded in the power 
that at once distinguishes, collects, and gathers, which we call the cogita-
tive. In and through this power the simple and pure intentions of things, 
separated from their images, to use the phrase of Averroes, are appre-
hended, distinguished, collected, and gathered.37
The production of the conjectural inference and the firm belief in it both occur 
entirely in and through the cogitative power. The “true” as such, rather than the 
thing itself, is still primary, but its stability comes not from authority, as section 
B argued, but from the cogitative power, which separates the intentions stored 
in memory and acquired by sense- perception. Its activity, in other words, is at 
once rational and natural or automatic. The parallels between the Praeambulum 
and Dietrich’s extant works are strongest here, especially in the description of 
the cogitative power and its close association with the estimative faculty,38 in its 
 37 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 62, l. 340- 349: Igitur in sumptione talis 
universalis principii ex sensibilibus experimentis non est nisi quaedam coniecturalis illatio 
sub ratione veri et non sub ratione talis entis secundum praemissa, et ideo solum accipitur 
ut creditum, non ut intellectum vel scitum, et, ut dictum est, sumitur secundum quandam 
coniecturam, cum firmo tamen et indeclinabili assensu rationis. Quae firmitas et indeclina-
bilis assensus surgit ex naturali quodam instinctu fundato in virtute distinctiva et collectiva 
simul et collativa, quam cogitativam dicimus, in qua seu per quam apprehenduntur, dis-
tinguuntur, colliguntur, conferuntur simplices et purae rerum intentiones separatae a suis 
idolis, ut verbo Averrois utar.
 38 Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, iii.27.2, p. 200, l. 26- 32: Ratio particula-
ris, quam etiam aestimativam seu cogitativam vocant, est vis distinctiva, quae componit et 
dividit et versatur circa intentiones rerum, etiamsi sint res universales, universales, inquam, 
secundum considerationem, inquantum videlicet considerat rem aliquam absque principiis 
secundum considerationem individuantibus seu particulantibus eam. Et hoc est, quod ille 
commentator Averroes dicit, scilicet quod denudate rem a suo idolo, id est ab accidentibus, 
sub quibus imaginativa rem considerat. See also id., De origine rerum praedicamentalium, 






phrasing,39 and its terminology of conjecture.40 A mechanism like this could 
serve as the beginning of a reply to Godfrey of Fontaines, in that it has effec-
tively extended the certitude of adhesion beyond the domain of revealed the-
ology to all physical sciences. There is an act of belief in all non- mathematical 
scientific habits.
This account of induction, appealing to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 
ii.19 and Metaphysics i.1, also resembles Dietrich’s presentation of dialec-
tical demonstrations in De intellectu et intelligibili. The reference in the 
Praeambulum to “the weaker mode of argumentation” that proceeds “by induc-
tion or by example” recalls Dietrich’s description of how from “sense, mem-
ory, and experience” there arises “a sort of logical or dialectical universal” that 
properly speaking pertains to “our cogitative power”. If, Dietrich continued, a 
definition is made from such terms, and from these definitions propositions 
are developed to reach conclusions, this is called a demonstration only in an 
attenuated sense.41 For a dialectical universal is not truly universal; it is only an 
intention stripped of individuating, particular components so that, for exam-
ple, “human” or “horse” subsequently can be predicated of many things, rather 
than the individual “Socrates”, which can be predicated only of one.42 Similarly, 
we read in the Praeambulum that the universal arising from this weaker mode 
of argumentation or induction – from many sense- perceptions, from memory, 
and from experience – is “beyond the particulars but not really separate” from 
them (praeter particularia non quasi separatum).
The Praeambulum will not, however, leave us with only dialectical demon-
strations for all non- mathematical sciences – nor, for that matter, would 
Dietrich.43 For Dietrich, the basis for necessary and demonstrative knowledge 
l. 120; iii.17.1, p. 190, l. 3- 9; iii.33.1- 2, p. 204, l. 28- 53; id., Quaestio utrum in Deo sit aliqua vis 
cognitiva inferior intellectu, 1.4.2.2 (11), p. 302, l. 78- 88; id., De visione beatifica, 3.2.9.7 (4), 
p. 98, l. 21- 33; 4.3.2 (9), p. 115, l. 40- 54; id., De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae 
resurrectionis, 4.6, p. 306, l. 96- 101.
 39 Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, prooem. (4), p. 14, l. 40; 1.2.2.1 (8), p. 47, l. 51: ut 
verbo eius [Augustini] utar; 3.2.4 (10), p. 75, l. 48: ut verbis eius [Aristotelis] utar; id., De intel-
lectu et intelligibili, iii.2.1, p. 179, l. 21; id., De magis et minus, 11.4, p. 55, l. 68; id., De anima-
tione caeli, 9.1, p. 20, l. 48- 49; 10.4, p. 22, l. 96- 97; id., De iride et de radialibus impressionibus, 
iv.23.5, p. 265, l. 112: ut verbis Philosophi utar; id., De intelligentiis et motoribus caelorum, ed. 
L. Sturlese, in Opera omnia, vol. 2, 5.10, p. 360, l. 94- 95: ut verbis philosophorum utar.
 40 See 2.3, n. 110, above.
 41 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 62, l. 334- 339. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De 
intellectu et intelligibili, iii.33.1, p. 204, l. 28- 36; id., De natura contrariorum, 56.2, p. 123, 
l. 31 – p. 124, l. 37.
 42 Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, iii.27.2- 3, p. 200, l. 26- 42.
 43 On Dietrich’s theory of demonstration, see W. Wallace, The Scientific Methodology of 











is the ratio definitiva that is constituted in the possible intellect, which appre-
hends the quiddity of a thing through the parts of its definition or its causes.44 
This ratio is apprehended in different ways in the sciences, depending on 
the number of causes taken into account, whether formal causes alone (as 
in metaphysics and mathematics) or all four causes (as in the other physi-
cal sciences).45 In some cases, for example in the study of the rainbow and 
other radiant meteorological phenomena, these procedures will yield mixed 
demonstrations, since the properties being studied are physical but the middle 
terms of the demonstrations are mathematical and are derived from optics.46 
Certain entities like accidents, however, cannot be understood independently 
of the substance in which they inhere (“snub” cannot be understood inde-
pendently of “nose”; inversely, “nose” is the more formal element in the defi-
nition of “snub” that makes it intelligible).47 Since their definition includes 
something extrinsic to the thing defined, accidents do not have a quiddity in 
the strict sense. They do, however, have a quiddity in our way of understanding 
them – that is, one can give an answer to the question “What is an accident?” 
or “What is the colour white?”, even though these have no reality apart from 
the substance in which they inhere. Dietrich would call the answers to such 
questions “logical definitions” or universals, and a demonstration founded on 
such a definition is “logical” or “dialectical”. In his view, the failure to observe 
this difference has led many to suppose that accidents are in fact separable 
from their substances simply because we can understand them in this logi-
cal fashion. For Dietrich the same rules also impose themselves on the other 
end of the ontological spectrum: we have already noted that for Dietrich the 
separate substances, because they are simple, also do not have a quiddity in 
the strict sense. For this reason, we can infer that the part of metaphysics that 
reflects on the existence of such substances, rather than the part that studies 
(Fribourg: University Press, 1959), p. 38– 76; De Libera, La mystique rhénane, p. 361– 373. 
On the cogitative power, see especially A. de Libera, “D’Averroès en Augustin. Intellect et 
cogitative selon Dietrich de Freiberg”, in J. Biard, D. Calma, R. Imbach (eds), Recherches 
sur Dietrich de Freiberg, p. 15– 62, at p. 52– 62.
 44 Dietrich of Freiberg, De origine rerum praedicamentalium, 5.26, p. 187, l. 221- 226; id., De 
intellectu et intelligibili, iii.28.1, p. 201, l. 45- 59.
 45 Dietrich of Freiberg, De origine rerum praedicamentalium, 5.60- 67, p. 199, l. 630 – p. 201, 
l. 698. Metaphysics and mathematics differ in how they conceive the formal ratio: met-
aphysics considers being as being, while metaphysics looks only to a determinate genus 
of being; mathematics considers its subject according to the quiddity and form found 
concretely in nature; mathematics considers the form as abstracted.
 46 Dietrich of Freiberg, De iride et de radialibus impressionibus, prol. (5), p. 122, l. 35- 38; 1.2, 
p. 124, l. 57 – p. 125, l. 86.










the attributes and properties of being as being, would also remain at the level 
of probability and dialectics.48
Now, at this point, Dietrich would have to offer an account of how, even 
though a person begins with a “logical universal”, one nevertheless arrives 
in some non- mathematical sciences to attain the necessary knowledge of 
proper demonstration. Dietrich’s reflections on this subject, limited though 
they are, can be presented as follows. In the formation of a speculative habit, 
there are two active principles: the agent intellect and, in relation to the cog-
itative power, the heart. We act primarily in this process through our cogita-
tive power, by which we reflect on the universal intentions of things, but these 
are only completely realised in the possible intellect.49 The cogitative power, 
by “denuding” the intention of the substance from its images and accidental 
“idols”, places the possible intellect in a disposition to receive the intelligible 
species directly from the agent intellect.50 For Dietrich, in other words, the 
agent intellect does not abstract the species from the imaginative or cogita-
tive power. Instead, the possible intellect emanates from the agent intellect 
(procedit enim ab eo intelligendo ipsum), first by thinking the agent intellect 
as its productive principle under the aspect of a determinate ratio, and then 
it thinks that determinate intention as such.51 The contracting disposition 
produced in the cogitative is related to the determinate intelligible species as 
matter is related to the form.52 That is, although the possible intellect and the 
cogitative are turned toward the same object, they are not turned toward one 
another: the possible intellect never turns away from the agent intellect, and 
relates to its object by the intelligible species, while the cogitative relates to 
its object by the intentions it separates from the “idols”. This means that the 
cogitative can apprehend an object that is in itself self- evident and necessary, 
even though it does not apprehend the object as such.53 In this life, the possi-
ble intellect always depends on the disposition it receives from the cogitative 
 48 See 2.3, n. 121, above.
 49 Dietrich of Freiberg, De habitibus, ed. H. Steffan, in Opera omnia, vol. 2, 11.3- 4, p. 15, l. 16- 24.
 50 Dietrich of Freiberg, De origine rerum praedicamentalium, 5.26, p. 187, l. 226 – p. 188, 
232: alioquin non differret intellectus a virtute cogitativa, quae etiam sic intentionem sub-
stantiae denudare potest, ut nuda apud ipsam maneat denudata ab omnibus imaginibus, ut 
Averroes loquitur, et appendiciis accidentialibus. Et sic est intentio substantiae in ea disposi-
tione, ut secundum eam fiat virtute intellectus agentis forma in intellectu possibili, qua ipsi 
formae seu rei secundum suam formam determinantur sua principia. Et ex hoc iam habet 
forma rationem quiditatis et ipsa res esse quiditativum.
 51 Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, iii.36.1- 2, p. 208, l. 25- 41.
 52 Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, 4.3.2 (9), p. 115, l. 48- 54.














and, therefore, it never knows without phantasms.54 Presumably this is how 
Dietrich would explain the way in which a demonstrative scientific habit is 
formed from premises that are initially believed. Unfortunately, Berthold does 
not provide us with any further clues in the Praeambulum or elsewhere in the 
Expositio about how this process occurs.
2 “Our Divinising Theology”
A more obvious and unresolved ambiguity in the Praeambulum relates to its 
assumption that we can draw a valid analogy between what we might call, ech-
oing Godfrey’s language, the certitude of adhesion to authority and the certi-
tude of adhesion to a conjectural inference. The Praeambulum has maintained 
that, in the order of apprehension, both kinds of certitude in some sense come 
from without (quasi ab extrinseco), and both are grasped primarily as true with 
enough firmness to serve as a basis for scientific inquiry. Nevertheless, if this 
argument originally derived from a theological debate, we would expect to find 
an explanation of the element of difference in the analogy, namely, how the-
ology is as scientific as natural philosophy and yet retains its exalted position 
as the noblest of the disciplines. Berthold will take one route to establish this 
conclusion, but he will not appeal to a mechanism of belief or to notions of 
authority and conjecture to do so. One can easily conceive another path to a 
similar result relative to Christian theology in particular that would also clarify 
the ambiguous relationship between authority and inference: one, for exam-
ple, proceeds automatically (the conjecture) and one is voluntary (assent to 
authority).
If Berthold was indeed using Dietrich’s De theologia, then at this point he 
would have had to diverge, in his characteristic way, from his source. For if we 
accept the reconstruction of a Parisian context for Dietrich’s De theologia, and 
recall his Pauline discussion of the two orders of providence in the fragment 
De subiecto theologiae, we can easily imagine one way to resolve the ambiguity 
between authority and conjecture: the natural, automatic assent of the cogi-
tative power would pertain to what the De subiecto called “the divine science 
of the philosophers”, whereas the free assent to sacred authority would relate 
to our science (nostra scientia), theology as such (theologia simpliciter), our 
divine science of the saints (nostra divina sanctorum scientia).55 Up this point 
 54 Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, iii.36.3- 4, p. 208, l. 42- 54.








in the Praeambulum, “the principles of metaphysical or divine sciences” had 
been spoken of as if they were on equal footing, where it was possible to move 
between belief in authority to belief in the conjectural inference for the sake 
of the argument. But we know from the De subiecto that such an undifferenti-
ated sense of theology (in hac scientia) with ens divinum as its unifying subject 
must be divided, in an eschatological perspective, into the two orders of prov-
idence: the divine science of the saints looks and will abide beyond the lim-
its of this world, whereas the divine science of the philosophers is as finite 
as the order of nature. While the philosophers’ theology, like every natural 
science, begins from believed principles, and nevertheless is a legitimate sci-
ence, the free assent to the authority of the highest truth surpasses it in certi-
tude. Metaphysics, as the study of being and as theology, begins with princi-
ples deriving from sense, memory, and experience in the cogitative power. But 
even though the cogitative gives spontaneous, firm assent, it is not infallible,56 
especially where no quidditative knowledge is available to our intellect. While 
it is entirely conceivable that Dietrich would place metaphysics as ontology 
on the solid ground of demonstrative knowledge that reasons about formal 
causes, he consistently maintained that our natural knowledge of the sepa-
rate substances remains tentative, even though our conclusions can reach a 
level of hypothetical necessity. For Dietrich, as we have seen, only in ethics and 
the order of voluntary providence do we reach the things themselves, for faith 
begets charity, and charity does not fail.
Berthold, however, took the difference in the proportion between theology 
and the other sciences, including metaphysics, in another direction. His depar-
ture from the spirit of Dietrich’s De subiecto theologiae is clear simply from the 
fact that the mark of ownership for the highest science has passed from the 
theology of the saints to the “science”57 achieved by Proclus:
Praeamb. A, p. 53, l. 29: in ista sapientia divinali seu theologia sapientiali
Praeamb. B, p. 62, l. 321: haec sapientialis scientia
 56 Dietrich of Freiberg, De habitibus, 9.1- 2, p. 14, l. 62- 72: veniemus ad aliquid magis intimum, 
et hoc eo intimius, ut ita loquamur, quo spiritualius, et est phantasticum nostrum exspolia-
tum idolis et corporalibus rerum similitudinibus retinens apud se rei intentionem. Et istud 
vocamus cogitativum nostrum. Et hic oritur aestimativa et per consequens ratio particu-
laris. Et operatio boni vel mali hinc surgit; consequenter autem ratio et proprietas virtutis 
operativae. Sine hac vi spirituali daemon numquam fuisset lapsus. Ruina enim sua fuit eo, 
quod inclinavit se in aestimatum bonum, quod non fuit verum. Intellectus autem semper 
verorum est.







Praeamb. C, p. 61, l. 308- 309: haec divinalis supersapientia
p. 65, l. 426- 429: habitus divinalis seu supersapientialis
p. 65, l. 444- 445: nostrae divinalis theologiae
p. 65, l. 454 – p. 66, l. 455: nostrae divinalis supersapientiae
p. 67, l. 514: nostrae supersapientialis et divinalis sapientiae
p. 68, l. 539: habitus supersapientialis scientiae Platonicae
p. 69, l. 566: nostram divinalem philosophiam
With Berthold, the disproportion no longer fell between the divine sciences 
of the saints and the philosophers, but between Platonic supersapientia and 
Aristotelian first philosophy: “above the mode common to it and the other 
sciences, [Proclus’ science] has something more in the reason and cause of its 
certitude and unshakeable assent in these principles”.58
Berthold made the comparison between Aristotelian metaphysics and 
Platonic supersapientia in two parts: (1) by an inspection of the cognitive prin-
ciple used in theology (p. 63, l. 375 – p. 65, l. 425), and (2) by a consideration 
of the supersapiential and divinising habit through which Platonic theology 
receives its principles (p. 65, l. 426 – p. 69, l. 569). While Berthold’s argument 
proceeds mostly by compiling citations from Proclus, Dionysius, and Boethius, 
and tacitly Sapientiale iii.23, its structure was clearly still indebted to theo-
logical discourse – these are the sort of distinctions one would expect to find 
relative to (2) faith, the habit perfecting (1) the intellect under the free move-
ment of the will, as we find for example in Thomas Aquinas.59 On these same 
lines, Ruedi Imbach has observed that Berthold’s procedure in this part of 
the Praeambulum recalls Aquinas’ discussion of sacred doctrine as a wisdom 
surpassing human wisdom.60 If Berthold indeed has been using Dietrich’s De 
theologia, then this structural parallel between sacred doctrine and supersapi-
entia should be interpreted in the maximal sense: Berthold has subordinated 
Aristotelian sapientia to Platonic supersapientia as Dietrich had subordinated 
pagan philosophy to Christian theology. This was possible because, as we have 
seen, notions like revelation and deification through grace have been extended 
 58 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 63, l. 371- 374: immo supra modum com-
munem sibi et aliis scientiis aliquid amplius habet in ratione et causa suae certitudinis et 
indeclinabilis assensus in ipsa talia principia.
 59 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, iia iiae, q. 4, a. 2.
 60 Imbach, “Au- delà de la métaphysique”, p. 389: “Ce modèle qui postule au- delà de la reine 
des sciences philosophiques une science supérieur rappelle d’une certain façon le rap-
port que Thomas d’Aquin envisage, notamment au seuil de la Summa theologiae, entre la 
sagesse philosophique et la science théologique, la sacra doctrina.” Cf. Thomas Aquinas, 








to Hermetic and Platonic theology and anthropology, in no small part under 
the inspiration of Romans 1:19: “What was known of God is manifest to them; 
for God revealed it [revelavit] to them”.61 Unlike Dietrich’s divine science of the 
philosophers, Berthold’s Platonism was soteriological.
Berthold was led to this remarkable conclusion by the texts. In Proclus he 
found parallels to passages from Dionysius that his predecessors had used to 
characterise the superiority of faith over natural philosophical reason. As with 
Prologus 17, here the crucial source was Proclus’ De providentia et fato on the 
modes of cognition. Berthold appealed to Proclus now to explain (1) the nature 
of the cognitive principle used in theology. Contrasting the certitude of the 
lower sciences with that of Platonic science, Berthold now shifted from speak-
ing of the cogitative power – the basis for belief in natural science – in the 
first- person (quam cogitativam dicimus), which (perhaps citing Dietrich) he 
had used when describing mechanism of belief in natural science, to the third- 
person (ratio particularis, quam quidam cogitativam vocant).62 As in 123D, he 
subdivided the ratio particularis into three functions (triplex officio): turning 
below to imagination (phantasia), it is “opinionative” and is occupied with the 
intentions of physical things; turning above itself, it is “scientific” and treats 
pure mathematicals; in its middle operation, it considers mathematicals 
applied to physical beings (harmonics, perspective, astronomy), which would 
be the domain of mixed demonstration mentioned already. The cognitive prin-
ciple of Platonic science, Berthold continued, also exceeds the universal reason 
(ratio universalis) or possible intellect that “apprehends the thing in its reason” 
that, turned below, concerns logical intentions, whether first or second inten-
tions; toward itself, “metaphysical” intentions;63 and above, “it reflects beings 
as such” (simpliciter entia speculatur). With the possible intellect we reach the 
level of metaphysics as the study of being and its properties.
In 123D, Berthold had expanded the description of the lower function of the 
cogitative by tacitly drawing from a passage in Albert’s Summa theologiae that 
 61 The same verse in the Vulgate reads: Quod notum est Dei, manifestum est illis: Deus enim 
illis manifestavit. As the editors of the Expositio indicate, Berthold’s source here at the 
beginning of the Prologus was Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, ed. I. Brady 
(Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971– 19813), lib. i, dist. 3, 
cap. 1, §35, on the knowledge of God from creatures.
 62 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 63, l. 378– 379. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De 
intellectu et intelligibili, iii.27.2, p. 200, l. 26: Ratio particularis, quam etiam aestimativam 
seu cogitativam vocant. Cf. 67C, p. 11, l. 100- 101, and 177H, p. 182, l. 297.
 63 Instead of mathematicas, as is found in the Vatican manuscript, here the reading in the 









distinguished between conviction (fides), that must be placed below scientia, 
from the theological faith (fides) that is above knowledge.64 Albert’s text, not 
cited by Berthold, continued as follows:
But faith in theological matters is not this kind of faith, which occurs 
through a medium, but is a light that, like a medium without a medium 
by which would be proved, locates the faithful in the first Truth through 
assent and certitude.65
Albert here echoed a phrase from Dionysius that he had just cited, which also 
featured prominently in the question concerning the scientific character of 
theology at the beginning of the Summa:
Dionysius in  chapter 7 of his book On the Divine Names says that faith is a 
light locating the faithful in the first Truth and the first Truth immutably 
in them. And likewise, under this light, things are received that cannot be 
received under the natural light.66
When Berthold moved beyond the possible intellect to establish the superi-
ority of the Platonic divine science over Aristotle’s metaphysics, we find him 
appealing to Dionysius for an account of (1) the unum animae and (2) the cog-
nitive habit belonging to it (supersapientia) that has a structurally identical 
role to fides in Albert:
Indeed, these cognitive principles relate only to beings, although accord-
ing to different reasons. However, many divine things are above being, as 
is evident in the case of things divine according to essence and what is 
divine according to cause, which is ‘above all beings’, as Dionysius attests 
in  chapter 4 of On the Divine Names B. For this reason, in  chapter 1 of the 
 64 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 123D, p. 128, l. 113- 117. For a similar notion of supra- 
intellectual faith among the pagan Platonists, see P. Hoffmann, “Erôs, Aletheia, Pistis … et 
Elpis. Tétrade chaldaïque, triade néoplatonicienne”, in M. Delgado, C. Méla, F. Möri (eds), 
Orient- Occident. Racines spirituelles de l’Europe (Paris: Cerf, 2014), p. 63– 136.
 65 Albert the Great, Summa theologiae, pars i, tr. 3, q. 15, c. 3, a. 1, p. 78, l. 69- 72: Fides autem in 
theologicis non est talis fides, quae per medium fit, sed est lumen, quod ut medium non habens 
medium, quo probetur, credentes locat in prima veritate per assensum et certitudinem.
 66 Albert the Great, Summa theologiae, pars i, tr. 1, q. 1, p. 7, l. 53– 57: Et Dionysius libro De 
divinis nominibus cap. VII dicit, quod fides est lumen locans credentes in primam veritatem 
et primam veritatem in ipsis immobiliter. Et ideo sub lumine illius accipitur, quod sub lumine 








Mystical Theology, he calls ‘unlearned’ those ‘who are sealed off in beings 
and believe that there is nothing supersubstantially beyond beings, but 
they presume to know, with that cognition that is according to them-
selves, him, who makes the shadows his hiding place’. Consequently, 
it is impossible that we should receive those things that are above us 
according to our ownness [iuxta proprietatem nostram] and thus com-
pare things divine with a reason that has been reared on the senses, with 
which we are deceived by appearances, as he says there in  chapter 7 of 
On the Divine Names. Dionysius adds an explanation for this, when he 
describes the cognitive principle in us of things divine, which we are 
seeking here: ‘one must see that our mind has a certain power for know-
ing, through which it examines things intelligible, but a union exceeding 
the nature of the mind (the other translation says: “a unity superexalted 
beyond the nature of the mind”), through which the mind is conjoined 
to those things that are above it. Therefore, it is necessary to think divine 
things according to this, not according to ourselves, but our whole selves 
placed outside our whole selves and deified wholly. For it is better to be 
God’s and not our own’.67
This is (1) “the cognitive principle with which the theologian is occupied con-
cerning divine things to be apprehended”.68 Here Berthold speaks only of the 
theologian (theologus) and posits no distinction between the pagan Proclus 
or the Christian Dionysius. The key doctrine that unites both theologians is 
the principle that divine things must be known in a divine mode, for like is 
only known by like, and that this knowledge is inherently dispossessive – it 
is not according to the creature’s ownness (proprietas).69 Indeed, the major 
attributes of the unum animae mentioned here by Berthold correspond to 
those used, for example, by Thomas Aquinas relative to the nature of faith, and 
the distinction between knowing divine things “according to our mode”, as the 
philosophers do, and knowing them “according to the mode of divine things” 
 67 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 64, l. 395- 415.
 68 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 63, l. 375- 377: Quod patet primo ex prin-
cipii cognitivi inspectione, quo theologus in divinis apprehendendis versatur, quod est emi-
nentius et sic perspicacius omni alio principio cognitivo, quo circa alia quaecumque scibilia 
occupamur.
 69 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 65, l. 419- 420: quomodo divina tract-









through infused faith.70 Similarly, Aquinas’ commentary on the De divinis 
nominibus implied that the “union above the nature of the mind” should be 
identified with knowledge of divine things by grace.71 The crucial passages 
from De divinis nominibus c. 7 on the unity exalted above the nature of the 
mind and faith locating the soul in the highest Truth find a direct correlate 
in Proclus’ statement in De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam, that “this 
unum is more divine than intellect”, and “locates” the soul in the divine life.72 
Berthold would entirely accept the way Albert and Aquinas had used Dionysius 
to describe this supra- intellectual perfection of the intellect they identified as 
faith. The only difference was that he realised that the same principle had to 
be extended to the pagan Proclus and, through him, to the Platonic tradition.
Finally, Berthold contrasted (2) the cognitive habits of Platonic supersapi-
entia and Aristotelian sapientia in terms of their (a) certainty, (b) complexity, 
and (c) nobility. Berthold’s source for the citations of Aristotle was Sapientiale 
iii.23, where Thomas of York had focused on the dignity of wisdom in rela-
tion to all the other intellectual habits discussed in Nicomachean Ethics vi.73 
Berthold’s arguments involved primarily a fortiori comparisons, which followed 
quite naturally from the name he invented for the habit of Platonic theology: if 
Aristotelian sapientia is so noble, how much nobler must Platonic supersapi-
entia be! (a) Wisdom, according to Aristotle, demonstrates not only from the 
principles of things, but is a “veridical science” of the principles themselves. 
The examples taken from Eustratius of “distances, length, breadth, depth” as 
the principles of geometry then accomplishes an important transition in the 
 70 Thomas Aquinas, Super Boetium De Trinitate, ed. P.- M.J. Gils (Roma: Commissio Leonina, 
1992), q. 2, a .2, p. 95, l. 65- 77: Et secundum hoc de divinis duplex scientia habetur: una secun-
dum modum nostrum, qui sensibilium principia accipit ad notificandum divina, et sic de 
divinis philosophi scientiam tradiderunt, philosophiam primam scientiam divinam dicentes; 
alia secundum modum ipsorum divinorum, ut ipsa divina secundum se ipsa capiantur, quae 
quidem perfecte in statu viae nobis est impossibilis, sed fit nobis in statu viae quaedam illius 
cognitionis participatio et assimilatio ad cognitionem divinam, in quantum per fidem nobis 
infusam inheremus ipsi primae veritati propter se ipsam.
 71 Thomas Aquinas, In librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio, c. vii, lect. 1, 
n. 705, p. 262: secundo vero, habet quamdam unitionem ad res divinas per gratiam, quae 
excedit naturam mentis nostrae, per quam unitionem, coniunguntur homines per fidem 
aut quamcumque cognitionem, ad ea quae sunt super naturalem mentis virtutem.
 72 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 16, p. 25, l. 650- 652: per unum, quod est intellectu 
divinius, ‘in quod consummans anima et locans se ad ipsam divina est et vivit divina vita, 
secundum quod huic est licitum’.
 73 Retucci, “Nuovi percorsi”, p. 91– 92. On Berthold’s ambiguous stance toward Aristotle 
here, see W. Goris, “Metaphysik und Einheitswissenschaft bei Berthold von Moosburg”, in 










Praeambulum from the earlier epistemological account of principles as propo-
sitions to an ontological conception of principles as objects.74 This shift made 
possible Berthold’s ensuing argument, citing Proclus, that the Platonic ascent 
through dialectic and the principles of the various sciences (the point in geom-
etry, the monad in arithmetic, etc.), rising to the unhypothetical first principle, 
reaches a domain beyond what Aristotle had considered. To this extent must 
the principles of Platonic wisdom surpass Aristotle’s in certitude.75 These are 
precisely not the arguments we would expect to find in Dietrich, for they imply 
that our knowledge of the separate substances can in fact be more certain than 
our knowledge of being and its properties.
(b) Whereas sapientia is a combination of intellectus and discursive scientia, 
the habit of “our super- sapiential wisdom” is, in the words of Boethius, “the 
simple inspection of the Form forming all things as such” (simplex inspectio 
formae simpliciter omnia formantis).76 In other words, supersapientia is the 
non- discursive apprehension of the entire universe as it is enfolded in the 
Form forming all things. This would correspond to the content of the intel-
lectus adeptus as Berthold inherited it from Dietrich of Freiberg, as implied in 
Dietrich’s citation of Gregory the Great on St. Benedict’s vision of the entire 
universe in a single ray of light. But, as we saw, the Boethian notion of intelli-
gentia for Berthold includes a deeper cognition prior to reflexivity. This funda-
mental dimension of intelligence emerges in Berthold’s subsequent citation 
of Dionysius on the capacity of rational souls who, “by enveloping the many 
into one” become “worthy of intellections equal to the angels”, insofar as this is 
possible for the soul. The angels, Dionysius continued, are capable of a unitive, 
uniform contemplation and are “figured [figurata] after divine supersapientia”. 
In other words, to know the simple, the soul itself must become simple. The 
“most divine cognition of God” for angels or for souls, Berthold concluded with 
Dionysius, is “through ignorance according to the union above mind, when the 
mind, having departed from everything else, and then also sending itself away, 
is united with the super- resplendent rays, and is illuminated hither and yon by 
 74 This elision was noted by S. Gersh, “Berthold of Moosburg and the Content and Method of 
Platonic Philosophy”, in J. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., A. Speer (eds), Nach der Verurteilung von 
1277, p. 493– 503, at p. 499– 500.
 75 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 66, l. 488: certissima et altissima cognitio 
hominis deificati.
 76 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 67, l. 521- 523: intelligentiae vero celsior 
oculus existit, supergressa namque universitatis ambitum illam simplicem formam pura 
mentis acie contuetur. This is a combination of syntagms from Boethius’ De Trinitate (c. 









the inscrutable depth of wisdom [inde et ibi non scrutabili profundo sapientiae 
illuminata]”.77 These are the same texts Berthold used later in the Expositio to 
describe the circular and the direct motions of the soul and the doctrine of 
contemplation. If we are to assume a coherent doctrine behind it all, we must 
again conclude that the habit of supersapientia, though it is first cultivated in 
the oblique motion, is only perfected in these two higher motions, which are 
given by God.
(c) The nobility of this science surpasses Aristotelian metaphysics in its sub-
ject and in its form. Whereas Aristotle’s metaphysics treats “being as being, its 
parts and properties”, Plato’s divine science concerns “the universe of divine 
things”: God, the primordial causes, and their orders. The latter science is com-
prised of “principles” through which the mind ascends to the contemplation 
of the existence (anitas), but not the essence (quiditas) of God. Berthold once 
again relies chiefly on the authority of Dionysius: the mind cannot know God 
simply from his nature, for God exceeds all reason, “but from the ordering of all 
things, placed out before him”.78 For Berthold, in a phrase redolent of Dietrich, 
this is a necessity recognised by the philosophers in the domain of natural prov-
idence that must be respected by theologians reasoning within the sphere of 
voluntary providence: “if none of the wise inquires generally after the essence 
[quid est] of the superessential principle of all […] what theologian presumes 
to inquire after the superunifical superessence of the primarily One?”79
Here yet again, the Platonic consensus, which united the best of the pagans 
with the doctors of the Church, has transcended the boundaries of natural and 
voluntary providence in the Praeambulum. Nevertheless, just as we saw with 
Berthold’s incorporation of the terminology of antarkia and hierarchia, this 
did not amount to a confusion of the two orders. Berthold had clearly asserted 
that the articles of faith are the first principles in the theology of voluntary 
providence. If questioned further about the difference between the two theol-
ogies, perhaps he would draw on the unused resources of the Praeambulum to 
 77 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 67, l. 523 – p. 68, l. 538.
 78 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 1, p. 5, l. 15- 16. Commenting on the same passage 
(De divinis nominibus, 7.3, 869C- D), Albert denied that even the blessed know the quid est 
of God, but only the quia est. Cf. Albert the Great, Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, 
ed. P. Simon (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1972), 7.25, p. 356, l. 32 – p. 357, l. 55, as well as 1.21, 
1.24, 1.62, 5.3, 6.9, 7.30, 13.27; id., Super Dionysium De mystica theologia, c. 1; Super Epistulas 
I and V. F. Ruello, Les “Noms divins” et leurs “raisons” selon saint Albert the Grand commen-
tateur du De divinis nominibus (Paris: Vrin, 1963), p. 98– 101, has argued convincingly that, 
for Albert, there are degrees of knowledge of the divine quia est in the beatific vision 
according to the various apprehensions of the rationes of the divine attributes.








explain that they are believed through the free assent to authority rather than 
through the spontaneous assent of the cogitative power. But whether he would 
follow this route or not, it is clear that the habit of Platonic theology has not 
replaced faith. Berthold has rather extended the dignity that had exclusively 
belonged to faith, as Albert and Aquinas had understood it through Dionysius, 
to the habit of supersapientia: the cognition of the unum animae is deifying 
and salvific, it is given by a divine gift, and the difference between contem-
plation, in the strict sense, in via and in patria is simply one of degree rather 
than kind.
There was for Berthold some doctrinal overlap between the articles of faith 
and supersapientia. Following Thomas of York, Berthold held that the Trinity 
was known to the philosophers reasoning to the invisibilia Dei; building on the 
Clavis physicae, he held that the general Resurrection accords with the laws 
of natural providence. This of course left out the doctrine of the Incarnation 
and the sacramental means by which the restoration achieved through Christ 
is communicated to individuals who are members of his body. As we will see 
in Chapter 5, Berthold’s Eriugenian conception of human nature and the Fall, 
as set out in his commentary on the final propositions of the Elementatio 
theologica, brings the reader as close to the Incarnation of the Word as the 
order of natural providence allowed. Sacred history and matters relating to 
the fate of individuals would fall within the study of the order of voluntary 
providence, which presupposes and consummates the order of natural prov-
idence.80 The precise character of this consummation can only be surmised 
in its barest outlines from the Expositio. What seems clear is that no propo-
nent of the methodology of gemina providentia held that an individual, as an 
individual, could somehow stand outside the order of voluntary providence. 
Even though, as we have seen, the ontological constitution of angels embeds 
them in the order of natural providence, we must assume for Berthold that 
the the study of the order of natural providence through the Elementatio the-
ologica is something a person undertakes who is always embedded within the 
voluntary order.
The astonishing thing about Berthold’s position is that the study of Platonic 
philosophy through a pagan text and the development of the habit of supersa-
pientia makes a person more receptive to divine grace. This is possible because, 
as we will see in further detail in Part Two, Berthold understood deification to 
consist in the restoration of the human individual to the dignity that belongs 
to human nature (the microcosm), which is itself a recapitulation of the 




macrocosm. This pushes the dialectical relation between natural and volun-
tary providence in Berthold’s doctrine of the unum animae even further: the 
highest freedom for the human individual consists in living in conformity with 
the human nature that always abides in the Word. In other words, it seems 
from the Expositio that the “consummation” of natural providence by volun-
tary providence is for the individual to become adequate to the hidden depth 
of its nature where God already dwells.
What difference remains between supersapientia and faith, then, must 
chiefly concern the means by which the perfecting habit dispossesses, unifies, 
and locates its subject in the first truth. Both would begin from the outside, both 
would begin with belief, and would both go beyond the mundane wisdom of 
the (Aristotelian) philosophers. One follows the arduous way of reasoning by 
the theorems of Platonic philosophy, which united knowledge and action, the 
study of nature and ascesis, to the apprehension of the primordial causes and 
the awareness of a more hidden depth in the soul. This enlarges the mind and 
prepares it to be elevated to a non- discursive but reflexive vision of those hid-
den mysteries through the acquired intellect (the sublevatio mentis that occurs 
through human industry and grace) and, within and beyond that, to an oper-
ative union with the plenitude of the Word (the exultatio mentis). As Tauler 
succinctly put it, to the extent that a person abandons themself and turns to 
the ground of the soul, grace is born within them.81 Thoroughly in agreement 
with the spirit of Berthold’s teaching, Tauler acknowledged that the pagans 
were familiar with this ground through their knowledge and ascesis, while we 
Christians, he lamented, are strangers to it.82 Tauler perfectly expressed the 
cultural ramifications of Berthold’s extension of the dignity of faith to Platonic 
supersapientia. For Berthold, this was nothing else but the consequence of his 
realisation that the De mystica theologia of Dionysius and the Tria opuscula 
 81 John Tauler, Predigt 60d (Trinity Sunday), p. 300, l. 25- 28: Also verre sich der mensche in den 
grunt liesse und kerte, do wúrt die genode geborn und anders nút eigenlich in der hoesten 
wisen. – Hievon sprach ein heidenscher meister Proculus […].
 82 Cf. John Tauler, Predigt 61 (Nativity of John the Baptist), p. 332, l. 16- 21: Der nu in sinen inni-
gen grunt dicke kerte und dem heimlich were, dem wúrde manig edel blik von dem inwen-
digen grunde, der im noch klorer und offenbarer were (das Got ist) denne sinen liplichen 
ougen die materieliche sunne. Disem grunde woren die heiden heimlich und versmochten ze 
mole zergengkliche ding und giengen disem grunde nach. (“Whoever turns often into his 
inner ground and becomes familiar with it, will receive many noble sightings of the inner 
ground, which will reveal to him that God exists in a clearer and more manifest way than 
the material sun is present to his bodily eyes. The pagans were familiar with this ground 
and they abstained from material things and pursued this ground.”) For the rest of the 






of Proclus transmitted the same doctrine of divinising wisdom (sapientia div-
inalis) that proceeds “not according to ourselves, but our whole selves placed 
outside our whole selves and deified wholly”.
As for the way of faith, if the sermons of Tauler can still serve as a guide, it 
would follow the more immediate but no less difficult path of reaching the 
divinity of the incarnate Word, whose lower and higher powers were con-
stantly tending to the Father,83 by a dispossessive conformity to his humanity, 
by humility, and by the recognition of one’s own nothingness.84 In both paths, 
we might say, the propensity of the old Adam for appropriation and familiarity 
is gradually curbed as one begins to live by God’s life (dispensat mundum cum 
dis; vivit divina vita), through whom the soul’s many works become a single 
work (so ein guot werk mag heissen alle die manigvaltikeit).
 83 John Tauler, Predigt 39 (Fifth Sunday after Trinity), ed. F. Vetter, p. 157, l. 13 – p. 158, l. 23: Die 
edele minnekliche sele, unser herre Jhesus Christus, die was nach iren obersten kreften ane 
alle underlos gekert fúrwúrflichen in die gotheit, […] und was denne aber als selig und 
gebruchlich als si ietzunt ist. […] Die im aller gelichest nu nachvolgent an den goetlichen 
fúrwúrfen, in dem wirken und gebruchen ein wirt, die súllent im aller glichest her nach sin 
in weselichem gebruchen eweklichen. […] Also tuot der inwendige verklerte mensche: der 
ist inwendig in sinem gebruchende, und mit dem liechte siner redelicheit so úbersicht er 
gehelingen die uswendige krefte und berichtet die zuo irem wúrklichem amte, und inwendig 
ist er versunken und versmolzen in sinem gebruchlichen anhangende an Gotte, und blibt in 
siner friheit ungehindert sins werkes. Doch disen inwendigen dienent alle die uswendigen 
werk, das enkein so klein werk enist, es diene alles her zuo. So ein guot werk mag heissen 
alle die manigvaltikeit. (“The noble and adorable soul, our Lord Jesus Christ, which was 
in its higher powers without interruption objectively turned toward the divinity, […] was 
then as blessed and joyful then as it is now. […] Those who now follow him in all things 
as closely as possible in their objective orientation to the divine, in whom to act and to 
enjoy are one – these people should be as close to him as possible in essential and eternal 
joy. […] This is what an inwardly illumined person does: he is inward in his enjoyment, 
and with the light of his discernment he thus surveys at once the outer powers and directs 
each of them to their task, and inwardly he is engulfed and melted away in his joyful 
dependency on God, and remains in his freedom unhindered by his works. Rather, all 
these outward works serve the inward joy, such that there is no work so small that it does 
not contribute to all. Thus, one may call all the multiplicity one good work.”).
 84 John Tauler, Predigt 45 (Thirteenth Sunday after Trinity), ed. F. Vetter, p. 197, l. 1- 2: Das eine 
das ist das du bekennest din nicht, das din eigen ist, was du bist und wer du bist von dir selber. 
(“The one thing necessary is that you recognise your nothing, which is proper to you, is 
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Wherever there is found a one in actuality, there providence is nec-
essarily found.1
∵
As was clear from Berthold’s sermon on Romans 1:20, the Hermetic concep-
tion of the macrocosm and microcosm, and their dynamic interrelation, was 
for him the framework within which the entirety of philosophical theology 
could be recapitulated. In what follows, this Hermetic motif will be used to 
frame a systematic overview of metaphysical and anthropological themes in 
Berthold’s commentary on the Elementatio theologica. As Berthold interpreted 
Proclus within a commentary tradition deeply informed by the Liber de causis, 
it was held as a basic principle that a higher or more primary cause has a wider 
amplitude of causal influence than a lower or secondary cause (Propositions 
56- 57). Diversity or multiplicity arises as lower causes restrict or limit the causal 
influence of the higher: each lower cause presupposes both the power of the 
immediately prior cause and the effect or substratum that this prior cause has 
produced or elaborated (Propositions 71- 72). In this way, complexity increases 
towards the centre of the cosmic order, where we find the human, who is “the 
horizon of simple and composite beings”.2 The particularity of the human’s 
place in the order, therefore, is not its status as an image of God (imago Dei), 
for the plethora of principles above it, and especially the primordial causes, are 
also imagines Dei.3 The human is set apart because it alone receives the gifts of 
all the gods.4 In this sense, one might call it an imago deorum, which amounts 
to saying that the human reflects within itself the totality of primordial causes 
in the divine Word. Because it concentrates within itself the diversity found 
in the cosmos, “composed from the primary parts of this greater world”, it is a 
minor mundus and, accordingly, is every creature (omnis creatura).5
 1 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 120H, p. 102, l. 372- 373: Necessario, ubicumque invenitur 
unum secundum actum, ibi et providere invenietur.
 2 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 72C, p. 39, l. 53- 67.
 3 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 32E, p. 211, l. 166 – p. 212, l. 201; 177C, p. 175, l. 81 – p. 176, l. 93. 
Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, ii.34.1- 3, p. 172, l. 31 – p. 173, l. 51. See also 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ia, q. 93, a. 3.
 4 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 162C, p. 18, l. 75- 79.













Following this order, then, we will begin with the macrocosm, descending 
gradually to the human, who is “the most composite”, and finally consider the 
dynamic relation between the two worlds – that is, how individuals are made 
adequate to the abiding dignity of the microcosm, and how the microcosm in 
its entirety is harmonised with the macrocosm.6
 6 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 59D, p. 168, l. 184- 185; 58F, p. 161, l. 159- 162. 
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Broadly speaking, following Propositions 20- 21, Berthold demarcated four 
internally ordered ranks (maneries) within Proclus’ cosmology of natural prov-
idence: (1) that of the One, which includes the gods or primordial causes; (2) of 
Intellect, which includes everything beneath the primordial causes down to 
and excluding heavenly souls; (3) of Soul, including both heavenly (“whole”) 
and human (“partial”) souls; (4) and of Body or Nature, embracing the world 
of generation or becoming.1 He largely but not exclusively interpreted the 
interactions within and between these levels through a theory of causality 
he adapted from Dietrich of Freiberg, who had distinguished between three 
kinds of causes (essential, substantial, and accidental).2 Directly in line with 
Dietrich, Berthold also maintained that, in any of these three kinds of causes, 
one finds that an “interior transfusion” is the principle of any activity directed 
to the outside – this is true of all four maneries, of bodies as much as of the 
Trinity.3 But in a significant departure from Dietrich, Berthold maintained that 
only a Platonic perspective on causality and universality, which places the One 
and the Good at the foundation of the cosmos, can adequately account for this 
interior dynamism and the order that flows from it. Therefore, we must first 
grasp the fundamental distinction in Berthold’s view between the Aristotelian 
and the Platonic understandings of first principles in metaphysics and the-
ology, with which he began his remarks on Proposition 1 of the Elementatio. 
Upon that basis we shall find that the philosophy of the Expositio can indeed 
be regarded, as Loris Sturlese remarked, as a “thinking through” of Dietrich’s 
metaphysics within the context of the Elementatio theologica and Berthold’s 
understanding of the revision of first principles it required.4 The result of this, 
as we glimpsed in Berthold’s subtle but decisive transformation of Dietrich’s 
 1 On the political and literary origins of the term maneries, see D. Calma, “Maneries”, in 
I. Atucha et al. (eds), Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach (Porto: Fédération Internationale 
des Instituts d’Études Médiévales, 2011), p. 433– 444.
 2 Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, 3.2.9.4, p. 90, l. 2 – p. 93, l. 104.
 3 Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, i.5.1 – i.9.2, p. 139, l. 59 – p. 142, l. 93.
 4 Sturlese, Homo divinus, p. 143: “Als Berthold die Entscheidung traf, die Philosophie Dietrichs 











methodology and theology in the Expositio tituli and the Praeambulum, was a 
philosophy that placed the ecstatic before the substantial and the non- reflexive 
prior to reflexivity both in the cosmos and in the human soul.
1 Plato and Aristotle on the One and the Good
By the end of the Praeambulum it became clear that Berthold was less inter-
ested in drawing a boundary between Christianity and pagan Platonism than 
between the Platonic divine science and Aristotelian metaphysics. This con-
trast between the two traditions is carried on as a leitmotif of the Expositio.5 
The problem, as we will now see, was not with Aristotle’s philosophy as a 
whole, but rather with its account of the immaterial world.6 Berthold largely 
accepted Aristotelian natural philosophy as it applies to the world of becom-
ing. But when the relationship of potency and act in that domain was extended 
to apply to the order of the separate substances, according to Berthold the 
consequences were dire: metaphysics became content to function as a sort of 
logical game that had jettisoned any attempt to reach the realities themselves 
or to make its practitioner disposed to receive them. For Berthold, realising 
Aristotle’s ambitions for a science of the separate substances, whose transi-
tory contemplation is the highest felicity in this life, required a revision in first 
principles.
At the outset of his commentary on Proposition 1 (“Every plurality in some 
way participates the One”),7 Berthold announced that Plato and Aristotle have 
opposed ways of accounting for the origin of distinction and plurality (ratio 
distinguendi).8 According to Berthold, Aristotle’s mistake was not that “act 
separates and distinguishes” (Metaphysics vii.13, 1039a7) but the belief that 
this was universally the case. As the Dominican presented it, Aristotle arrived 
at this position through a thoroughly physicalist orientation to the question 
of substance: “in the foundation of nature, namely prime matter, nothing is 
 5 Passages may be classified according to the following themes: on abstract metaphysics and 
real divine science (1A, 11A); on abstract and separate universals (16D, 67C, 135K, and 136D- E); 
on the soul as self- moving (17A- B); on the ideas (177H and 178B).
 6 For a similar criticism of Aristotle made by Proclus, unbeknownst to Berthold, see C. Steel, 
“Why Should We Prefer Plato’s Timaeus to Aristotle’s Physics? Proclus’ Critique of Aristotle’s 
Causal Explanation of the Physical World”, in Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. 
Supplement 78(2003), p. 175– 187.
 7 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 1, p. 3, l. 1: Omnis multitudo participat aliqualiter uno.
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distinct”. If act always determines potency, then prime matter must be “one by 
privation” of act.
In Berthold’s reconstruction of the Aristotelian approach, we move from 
this assumption about act and potency to a metaphysical reduction to being 
as the first principle. Since act is in some sense “opposed” to potency, Berthold 
presented what he described as a summary of Aristotle’s arguments in 
Metaphysics x about the most fundamental opposition or contradiction, from 
which arise the notions of act and potency as well as “one” and “many”.9 His 
tacit and direct source here was Dietrich of Freiberg’s De natura contrariorum, 
which used Aristotle’s text extensively to explain the nature of contraries that 
are the basis of physical change in the elements apprehended by our senses.10
According to Aristotle, the opposition of potency and act is logically depend-
ent on the more fundamental opposition of privation and positive possession 
(privatio et habitus). To understand what Berthold meant by this, we can look 
more closely at Dietrich’s analysis of Aristotle’s arguments.11 Contraries are 
what differ maximally within a genus, which is “the common nature” that the 
notion of contrariety presupposes as the basis for comparison. While a genus 
as a common nature implies some kind of formal content, it is also capable of 
further determination by differentiae that are more formal than it; the genus 
thus becomes “the subject”, broadly speaking, of affirmation and negation. The 
genus in this perspective is an aptitude for either affirmation or negation; or, in 
other words, it is what positively relates to the common term in question (hab-
itus) or what is remote from it (privatio). This is what Berthold assumed when 
he wrote that this “first contrariety” of privation and habitus has “originated 
from the first opposition as such” which (following Dietrich) he identified as 
contradiction (contradictio) or affirmation and negation in a given subject. 
“Contradiction” is more absolute than “contrariety” because the latter admits 
of degrees and intermediary states, and these presuppose contradiction as 
their measure. With contradiction, then, we arrive at the “first and original 
reason of every distinction”, namely, “the contradictory opposition of being to 
non- being as such”. Tellingly, Berthold did not include the portion of Dietrich’s 
argument emphasising that affirmation and negation must not be understood 
in a strictly propositional or logical sense, but as “real, simple intentions con-
cerning being” – for Dietrich, only in this way can they give rise to the real 
 9 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 1A, p. 73, l. 88– 89.
 10 Dietrich of Freiberg, De natura contrariorum, 1.1, p. 83, l. 2- 3: Considerandum de vocatis 
elementis, inquantum invenitur in eis principium transmutationis physicae […].








intentions of “one” and “many”.12 But this was not the Aristotle Berthold was 
resisting.
Berthold continued to rely on Dietrich to explain how, for Aristotle, the 
notions of “one” and “many” are “the primary modes of being” deduced from 
the absolute opposition (that is, the contradiction of affirmation and negation 
or of being and non- being). The notion of “one” (ratio unius) removes the dis-
tinction (removetur distinctio) that occurs between being and non- being as 
such, since what is one is simultaneously “indistinct in itself and distinct from 
anything else”.13 That is, what is indistinct in itself contains no division or dis-
tance (remotio). In this sense the distinction that is effected by the opposition 
of being and non- being is removed or negated. But when the ratio unius is pre-
supposed and the distinction of affirmation and negation is posited (ponitur 
distinctio), then we have the notion of “many” (ratio multi). For “many” implies 
that there is one thing and another thing, and that this one is not that one.
Again following Dietrich, Berthold clarified that the opposition of affir-
mation and negation is found in every intention of being. Therefore, it is not 
“exceeded by being itself” but is coterminous with it, for being is not a genus. 
So too the first modes that arise from the opposition of “one” and “many” do 
not divide any “common intention” but are “a simple enumeration of beings”. 
This implies that the amplitude of the ratio unius is coextensive to that of the 
ratio entis. However, in any determinate genus of being, the modes that arise 
from the opposition of privation and habitus are themselves determinate. 
Three examples of this are given by Berthold in 1A. (1) If the formal intention of 
the genus is something analogically common, as “healthy” is said of an animal 
and of urine, then we speak of the determinate modes of identity and diver-
sity (diversitas). Dietrich had argued that this term “diversity” is appropriate 
because, in the case of analogical commonality, the intention of being is not 
truly one (non tamen vere una), since the terms do not really and truly share 
the common nature.14 (2) If the formal intention of the genus is univocally 
common, then we have a clear case of the privation and habitus of a common 
nature, whose modes are identity and “difference” (differentia). For example, 
plants and animals univocally share the identical genus of “animated body” 
 12 Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De natura contrariorum, 13.1, p. 93, l. 47- 55. Cf. V. Decaix, “Les 
transcendentaux et l’un. Dietrich de Freiberg à l’école de Thomas d’Aquin”, in Bochumer 
philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 16(2013), p. 146– 162, at p. 154– 160, on 
the similarities of Dietrich’s derivation of the notion of “one” to the approach taken by 
Aquinas.
 13 Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De natura contrariorum, 16.2, p. 95, l. 30– 35.
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but “differ” in species.15 (3) Finally, if privation is somehow intrinsic to one pair 
of the opposition, as the colour black is inherently the privation of the colour 
white, then we speak of the determinate modes of “likeness” and “contrariety” 
(similitudo, contrarietas).16
Berthold included these examples of determinate genera and their modes 
because they provided a catalogue of the kinds of unity and plurality that pop-
ulate a world in which act or habitus always determines potency. Plato, how-
ever, followed another path (via) concerning the origin of plurality:
Although [Plato] conceded that distinction is the formal cause of plural-
ity, yet according to him act only distinguishes in material things, and not 
everywhere, that is, not in the entire universe of things.17
In material things, it is indeed the case that what is more common – either in 
reality (prime matter) or in reason, whether it be analogical (being as such) 
or univocal – is more potential and is distinguished or “determined” by act 
and specific differentiae. But it is otherwise in the immaterial order, where the 
more common or “more universal” is more actual (activius); here, we are in 
the domain of the universality of separation (universalitas separationis) or the 
theological universal (universale theologicum), while regarding material things 
we speak only of the universality of predication (universalitas praedicationis) 
or the logical universal (universale logicum).
This is the fulcrum around which the discord of Plato and Aristotle turns in 
the Expositio. Berthold explained that Aristotle, failing to observe this distinc-
tion of universality, understood being (ens) as a transcendental (transcendens) 
and “the first of all intentions”, which does not have existence outside the soul 
(non habens esse in rerum natura extra animam). He reached the priority of ens 
by a logical abstraction according to the dictates of the universality of predica-
tion. Now, a transcendental is an intention that is not confined to a particular 
genus or category.18 As we have seen, since the notions of “one” and “many” are 
not confined to any determinate genus, they too for Aristotle must be transcen-
dentals, which do not exist outside the soul (transcendentia, quarum esse etiam 
 15 Dietrich of Freiberg, De natura contrariorum, 21.1- 23.2, p. 98, l. 16 – p. 99, l. 42.
 16 Dietrich of Freiberg, De natura contrariorum, 24.1- 3, p. 99, l. 50 – p. 100, l. 71.
 17 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 1A, p. 73, l. 90- 94: Plato vero alia via incedit circa multitu-
dinis originem, qui, licet concedat distinctionem esse formalem causam multitudinis, tamen 
actus secundum eum non ubique, hoc est in tota rerum universitate, distinguit nisi in solis 
materialibus.










non est extra animam). The entire deduction of the modes of the opposition of 
affirmation and negation – metaphysics as the science of being and its proper-
ties – was thus regarded by Berthold as a purely logical exercise, which remains 
valid if its application is restricted to those boundaries. For Berthold, unlike for 
Dietrich, Aristotle’s deduction in Metaphysics x tells us nothing about the real 
origin of diversity. This is why it was necessary to follow Plato’s more counter- 
intuitive approach. As Eustratius reported, Plato posited the ineffable Good as 
the common cause of all things, prior to the difference of being and non- being 
(super ens et non ens). Distinction arises from the fact that what comes from 
the principle (principiatum) its less actual than its source, and to that extent it 
falls short (recessum) of the first principle as such.19
In Proposition 11 (“All beings proceed from one first cause”),20 we find a con-
vergent account of the Aristotelian approach to first principles. This time the 
transcendentals were more directly Berthold’s focus. According to Berthold, 
Aristotle held that being (ens) is “the first and most formal of all intentions” 
because it is the last in “resolution”.21 As Wouter Goris has shown, Berthold’s 
notion of the resolution to ens moved through two levels: the first followed the 
argument of the Posterior Analytics to reach the principle of non- contradiction, 
and another taken from Avicenna that led to the non- complex first principle of 
knowing.22 As in Proposition 1, Berthold aimed to prove that Aristotle arrived 
to the primacy of ens through a reflection on the first principles of logical anal-
ysis, always with the assumption that act determines potency. With this logical 
primacy of being, the other transcendentals, “one, good, true, thing, and some-
thing” are seen further determinations of or additions to the notion of ens. 
These additions, Berthold never tired of repeating, are purely rational and have 
their reality only in the understanding.
Berthold then drew the critical conclusion that haunts Aristotle through-
out the Expositio, turning against him the words of Averroes’ commentary on 
 19 A similar argument about act and potency, which used the language of accessus and 
recessus and appealed explicitly to the Elementatio theologica, was made by Godfrey of 
Fontaines in favour the real identity of essence and existence in the separate substances. 
See Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines, p. 90– 97.
 20 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 11, p. 8, l. 1: Omnia entia procedunt ab una causa prima.
 21 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 11A, p. 185, l. 28 – p. 186, l. 53. This terminology derived 
from Dietrich: De ente et essentia, ed. R. Imbach, in Opera omnia, vol. 2, i.2.2, p. 28, l. 78- 78; 
id., De natura contrariorum, 15.1, p. 94, l. 3- 4; id., De quiditatibus entium, 1.3, p. 99, l. 12- 13; 
id., De origine rerum praedicamentalium, 1.7, p. 139, l. 75- 76.
 22 W. Goris, “Das Gute als Ersterkanntes bei Berthold von Moosburg”, in W. Goris (ed.), 
Die Metaphysik und das Gute. Aufsätze zu ihrem Verhältnis in Antike und Mittelalter, Jan 
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Metaphysics x: “being” and “one” are “universal categories which do not have 
being outside the soul”.23 In the judgement of Jan Aertsen, this is the most 
remarkable aspect of Berthold’s account of Aristotle.24 When confronted with 
Aristotle’s explicit declaration that “good” and “bad” are in things (bonum et 
malum sunt in rebus), Berthold conceded that, while this is true of things sub-
jectively (subiective), the transcendental notions of “good” and “bad” them-
selves for Aristotle still exist only in the soul as concepts (conceptibiliter sunt in 
anima). What he likely meant was that “good” and “bad” are attributes that “sub-
jectively” presuppose something already constituted in actual being. Berthold 
perhaps had in mind Nicomachean Ethics i.6, where Aristotle rejected the 
existence of any ideal Good that would be distinct from its different meanings 
in the various genera of being; any universal Good apart from these instances 
could only be an abstraction. Indeed, Berthold immediately cited Eustratius’ 
criticism of this argument as “sophistic”, given that Aristotle himself affirmed 
at the beginning of the Ethics that “the Good is what all things desire”.25 For 
Dionysius, as Berthold noted, this universal desire is precisely one of the rea-
sons the Good should be placed beyond the difference of being and non- being, 
because it extends its causal power to both what is and what is not.26
Therefore, according to Berthold, when Proclus stated in Proposition 11 that 
being is the immediate effect of the first cause, he meant something very dif-
ferent from Aristotle, for Proclus has understood being as being (ens in eo, quod 
ens) in the “Platonic” way. In Berthold’s view, Aristotle worked with two mean-
ings of ens. It either referred to being in its generality, insofar as it abstracts 
both from motion and change (physical being) and from mathematical being 
(this is what Aristotle studied in the Metaphysics) or it referred to being as it 
is constituted from its intrinsic principles, that is, after one has removed the 
extrinsic principles of efficient and final causality from one’s consideration of 
being (this is what Aristotle studied in Metaphysics xii, where he focused only 
on the intrinsic principles of matter and form in substance).27 The Platonists, 
however, gave “being as being” three additional senses, each of which referred 
 23 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 1D, p. 77, l. 218- 19: Ens et unum praedicamenta universalia 
sunt, quae non habent esse extra animam.
 24 Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought, p. 548.
 25 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 11A, p. 187, l. 68- 80.
 26 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 11A, p. 187, l. 81- 86.
 27 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 11B, p. 188, l. 100- 117: […] Et secundum hanc generaliorem 
entis rationem Aristoteles prosequitur de ipso in sua Metaphysica. […] Et istum modum 
entis ponit Aristoteles XII Metaphysicae, ubi etiam dicit Commentator, quod res habet 













to the ordered series of real intentions that are found in the universe. In the 
broadest sense, it refers to the entire order of being and the higher principles 
that constitute it (goodness and infinity); more strictly, it refers to the pri-
mordial cause of being; finally, most strictly, it refers to anything contained 
within the order generated by that primordial cause.28 According to Berthold, 
Proposition 11 could be interpreted relative to all three Platonic senses of “being 
as being”, but more properly it should be understood to the final sense. Either 
way, Proclus was describing being as it really is in the nature of things, where 
what is more universal in its influence or more indeterminate is prior to what 
is more determinate or less universal. By indicating a more adequate interpre-
tation of the proposition, in which the phrase “from one first cause” (ab una 
prima causa) would refer to the order of beings descending from the primor-
dial cause of being, Berthold was signalling how thoroughly Proclus differed 
from the later standpoint of the Liber de causis and its unequivocal affirmation 
that the first of created things is being (Proposition 4: prima rerum creatarum 
est esse et non est ante ipsum creatum aliud).
For the remainder of the Expositio, whenever Berthold explicitly compared 
Plato and Aristotle, it was most frequently on the question of abstraction and 
separation or, in other words, on the logical universality of predication and 
the theological universality of separation (see, e.g., 16D, 67C, 135K, and 136D- 
E). Berthold’s source for this distinction once again was Dietrich of Freiberg, 
who maintained that “abstraction is the work of reason” but “separation is the 
work of nature”.29 But with Berthold, especially owing to his interpretation 
of Dionysius’ De mystica theologia through Proclus, this distinction took on a 
soteriological valence entirely absent in Dietrich. As Berthold has presented 
it, the metaphysics of being is founded on a physicalist approach to the rela-
tion of act and potency that ultimately accounts for the origin of diversity 
through a merely logical reflection: in the physical world, act determines 
potency; in metaphysics, the most formal intentions and the categories of 
our understanding are merely notional additions to being. The kinds of plu-
rality we are left with are catalogued only according to the different kinds of 
predication.
To reason only according to logical universals was, therefore, to remain in 
the familiar order of what is “according to us”. From this point of view, lurking 
behind the metaphysics of being is the spectre of solipsism. The assumption 
was never far from Berthold’s mind that Proclus and Dionysius were talking 
 28 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 11B- C, p. 188, l. 118 – p. 189, l. 166.
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about the same thing when Proclus subordinated Aristotle to Plato while out-
lining the hierarchy of modes of cognition in De providentia et fato, and when 
Dionysius introduced the mode of mystical theology:
Indeed, these cognitive principles relate only to beings, although accord-
ing to different reasons. However, many divine things are above being. 
For this reason, in  chapter 1 of the Mystical Theology, [Dionysius] calls 
‘unlearned’ those ‘who are sealed off in beings and believe that there is 
nothing supersubstantially beyond beings, but they presume to know, 
with that cognition that is according to themselves, him, who makes the 
shadows his hiding place’. Consequently, it is impossible that we should 
receive those things that are above us according to our ownness [iuxta 
proprietatem nostram] and thus compare things divine with a reason that 
has been reared on the senses.30
The Platonists attend to the things established in nature (res rata in natura) 
rather than logical categories (esse in anima).31 Their orientation to reality is, 
in other words, primarily an ecstatic one. The fundamental boundary between 
doing theology “according to ourselves” and “not according to ourselves” cor-
responded to the difference between logical and theological universals. To 
think the immaterial, the categories of thinking that are at home in the phys-
ical world must be reversed. But it is important to bear in mind that, for all of 
this, Berthold did not denigrate the material world or natural philosophy. The 
invisible things of God are always sought first of all through the creation of 
the world, whether the world is regarded as an obscure “vestige” of them or a 
more transparent “sign”. It would be better to say that, for Berthold, Aristotle’s 
natural philosophy would in fact be better served by grounding it in the divine 
science of the Good.
Here Berthold owed something further to Dionysius, and his notion 
that the divine light or “thearchic ray” reaches the human mind through 
 30 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 64, l. 395 – p. 65, l. 421: Verum quia ista 
principia cognitiva non sunt nisi entium, licet secundum diversas rationes, pleraque autem 
divinorum sunt superentia […] unde et in Mystica theologia cap. 1 indoctos vocat, ‘qui in 
existentibus sunt firmati nihil super existentia supersubstantialiter esse opinantes, sed 
putantes scire ea, quae secundum ipsos, cognitione eum, qui ponit tenebras latibulum suum’. 
Cum ergo hoc sit impossibile, scilicet quod iuxta proprietatem nostram ea, quae sunt super 
nos, accipiamus et hoc comparantes divina rationi connutritae sensibus. Cf. Expositio, 71D, 
p. 35, l. 123- 127, cited above in Introduction, section 3, n. 150.
 31 See, for example, Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 1A, p. 74, l. 106- 109; 11A, p. 186, l. 54- 55; 







the material world precisely to lure it outside itself. When commenting on 
what Dionysius meant when he says that the divine science proceeds “not 
according to ourselves”, Berthold cited this famous dictum from De caelesti 
hierarchia:
It is impossible for the thearchic ray to illumine us from above unless it 
envelops itself, in order to elevate us, with various sacred veils that are 
according to us [quae sunt secundum nos], arranged naturally and famil-
iarly by the paternal providence.32
These veils include the spectacles (theorias) spoken of by two commenta-
tors on Dionysius, John the Scot and John the Saracen. These are summoners 
(appellantes), beckoning to the created intellect through “lights” scattered 
in creatures in the mode of “vestiges, images, and signs” (as in the oblique 
and the direct motions) to draw it to God. The final ascent to God, however, 
as Berthold made clear by turning from this tacit citation of Albert’s Summa 
theologiae to the De mystica theologia itself, is only attained by those who 
go beyond these veils and theophanies into the divine darkness.33 This, for 
Berthold, is God’s way of drawing the soul out of the solipsism to which it 
so instinctively inclines, and that has expressed itself detrimentally in the 
metaphysics of being. Berthold’s interpretation of Proposition 1 thus was a 
first and decisive indicator of the path for the desirous soul to follow through 
the veils.
 32 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 16, p. 25, l. 660- 664: Et notandum, quod [Dionysius] 
dicit ‘non secundum nos’ etc. (hoc est inquantum humani), quia ‘neque possibile est aliter 
nobis supersplendere thearchicum radium nisi varietate sanctorum velaminum sursum 
active circumvelantum et his, quae sunt secundum nos, providentia paterna connaturaliter 
et familiariter apparantum’. Cf. Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia, 1.2, 121B- C.
 33 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 16, p. 25, l. 671- 674: ‘solum non velate et vere apparet’ 
omnia transcendentibus et introeuntibus caliginem. In this respect, Berthold anticipated 
the interpretation of Dionysius we find in authors like Denys the Carthusian (d. 1471), who 
criticised earlier commentators, including Aquinas, for holding too narrowly to the prin-
ciple that God only appears to the created intellect in veils and for passing over precisely 
these passages from De mystica theologia. See K. Emery, “Sapientissimus Aristoteles and 
Theologicissimus Dionysius. The Reading of Aristotle and the Understanding of Nature in 
Denys the Carthusian”, in A. Speer, A. Zimmermann (eds), Mensch und Natur im Mittelalter 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 1992), p. 572– 606, at p. 579– 590; id., “A Complete Reception of the 
Latin Corpus Dionysiacum. The Commentaries of Denys the Carthusian”, T. Boiadjiev, 
G. Kapriev, A. Speer (eds), Die Dionysius- Rezeption im Mittelalter (Turnhout: Brepols, 
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2 Creation
The former [existence] is for the sake of the latter [order], because 
an isolated essence does not properly have the notion of ‘good’ 
unless it is ordered.34
Therefore, goodness is the essential mode or intention of any given 
thing.35
Berthold often illustrated the most fundamental principles of Proclus’ philos-
ophy using analogies from the physical world. For him it seems that the funda-
mental metaphysical registers of unity and goodness could each be illustrated 
through a specific metaphor or image, and each image required the other to 
be properly understood. In the register of unity, we can see that Berthold pre-
ferred the analogies of the containment of all numbers in the monad or of all 
radii of a circle in its centre.36 In the register of goodness, he used the analogy 
of the spontaneous generative activity of the sun as the clearest example of 
the self- diffusivity of the Good, in its action that is prior to the finite division 
of choice and necessity.37 One image without the other would give the impres-
sion of either stasis (numerical relations without dynamism) or chaos (gener-
ative power without order). Therefore, it was fitting that in the commentary 
on Proposition 30 (“Everything that is produced immediately from another, 
remains in the producer and proceeds from it”),38 which in effect summarised 
the entire process of procession and return, the two analogies were combined 
in Berthold’s only explicit citation of Eriugena’s Homilia on the Prologue 
 34 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 25H, p. 148, l. 389- 394: Quod omne perfectum citra pri-
mum agat per intentionem diffundendi bonitatem suam et sic procedat in generationem 
secundum ultimum potentiae suae, patet ex eo, quod bonum in recipiente est duplex, scilicet 
absolutum, quod est esse, et respectivum sive bonum in ordine. Et primum est propter secun-
dum, quia absoluta essentia non habet rationem boni proprie, nisi prout est ordinata.
 35 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 7A, p. 141, l. 96: Bonitas igitur est uniuscuiusque rei essen-
tialis modus sive intentio.
 36 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 1F, p. 79, l. 296 – p. 80, l. 308; 2A, p. 82, l. 34 – p. 83, l. 35; 
2C, p. 86, l. 144- 145; 3A, p. 92, l. 27 – p. 93, l. 32; 9E, p. 173, l. 230- 232.
 37 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 5C, p. 119, l. 222- 224; 8E, p. 163, l. 224- 236; 18A, p. 44, l. 26- 
29; 18B, p. 47, l. 135 – p. 48, l. 152; 18D, p. 52, l. 297 – p. 53, l. 323; 22A, p. 102, l. 140- 145; 23E, 
p. 119, l. 250- 256; 25I, p. 149, l. 436 – p. 150, l. 440; 152C, p. 142, l. 70. On this conception of 
freedom in Berthold, as he extracted it and amplified it from Albert the Great and Ulrich 
of Strassburg, see W. Goris, “Metaphysical Freedom. From Albert the Great to Berthold of 
Moosburg”, forthcoming.
 38 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 30, p. 20, l. 1- 2: Omne quod ab aliquo producitur 













of John (which he attributed to Origen).39 When employing either image, 
Berthold would often introduce it as an “elegant”, “careful”, or “beautiful” illus-
tration of a metaphysical argument.40 He of course found the comparison of 
God to the sun in numerous sources including Dionysius, Proclus, Avicebron, 
Albert the Great, and Ulrich of Strassburg, and although he was not familiar 
with Plato’s famous analogies of the Sun, Line, and Cave in the Republic, he 
nevertheless recognised the principle that “the Good is diffusive of itself and 
being” had its origin in Plato, who wrote in the Timaeus that “jealousy is far 
removed from what is best” (ab optimo porro invidia longe relegata est) – this 
principle, he maintained, “must be pondered with diligence”.41
Berthold also found it necessary to use both images in his commentary to 
Proposition 125 on the spontaneous causal activity of the gods:
Every god, from wherever it begins to show itself in an order, proceeds 
through all secondaries, and indeed always multiplies and distrib-
utes its outflowings, but always retains the characteristic of its own 
hypostasis.42
Evidently the term that stood out to him here was emicare, “to appear sud-
denly” or “to break forth”, since he devoted the entire discussion of the supposi-
tum (the authoritative, doctrinal background presupposed by Proclus) to “the 
conditions of light” and how “these are found in the divinising nature”.43 He 
argued that the three conditions of light were described in the analogy of the 
sun from Dionysius. (1) Light acts through its essence: “our sun does not reason 
 39 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 30D, p. 196, l. 206- 215: ‘Conspice, quomodo omnium 
rerum, quas mundi huius sensibilis globositas comprehendit, causae simul et uniformiter 
in isto sole, qui est maximum mundi luminare, subsistunt, quomodo numerositas herbarum 
et fructuum in singulis seminibus simul continentur, quomodo multiplices rerum in arte 
artificis unum sunt et in animo disponentis vivunt, quomodo infinitus linearum numerus in 
uno puncto unum subsistit! Et huiusmodi naturalia perspice exempla, ex quibus velut phys-
icae theoriae pennis poteris arcana verbi mentis acie inspicere et, quantum datur humanis 
rationibus, videre, quomodo omnia, quae per verbum facta sunt, in ipso vivunt et facta sunt!’ 
This is a collection of phrases from  chapters 9 and 10 of the Homily.
 40 For example, beside the text of Proclus’ De decem dubitationibus cited at Expositio, 122F, 
p. 119, l. 175- 180 in ms Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.iv.31, f. 50rb, Berthold has written 
puta pulchrum exemplum.
 41 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 7A, p. 139, l. 17- 23; 13B, p. 212, l. 111- 112.
 42 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 125, p. 63, l. 1- 4: Omnis deus, a quocumque inceperit 
ordine emicare se ipsum, procedit per omnia secunda, semper quidem plurificans suas deri-
vationes et partiens, servans autem proprietatem proprie ypostaseos.
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or choose” but shines by virtue of its very being. (2) Light shines universally: “it 
illumines all things capable of participating its lights”, each according to their 
capacity. (3) Light shines unceasingly.44
These were not only metaphors for Berthold, who held that there was a 
deeper continuity between the laws describing the diffusion of physical light 
and the principles of the diffusion of the highest Good. As he noted here, since 
every essence flowing into another (influens in aliam) either is light or has 
the nature of light, and since the Good is self- diffusive, “the Good therefore is 
light or has the nature or characteristic of light”.45 We are then given several 
passages from Dionysius where the Good is likened to the sun, whose causal 
activity Berthold described as a exseritio, a “revealing” or a “stretching- forth”.46 
The light of the Good redounds through the primordial causes or gods, the rays 
of goodness (radii bonitatis), who imitate its causal activity within their own 
domains.
This account of divine diffusion and manifestation was then balanced in 
Proposition 125 by a discussion of the gods’ remaining.47 Here Berthold used 
metaphors from the Clavis physicae to illustrate his point: the first causes 
in themselves are one and are not separated from one another, but they are 
divided in their effects; “just as in the monad all numbers are one [and] simple”, 
so all the primordial causes are one individual in the divine Word.48 We should 
not marvel, the Clavis continued, that this escapes the finest point of our mind 
(mentis nostrae aciem fugiat) which is already overwhelmed by instances of 
this in the concentrated and generative power of seeds, which burst forth into 
variegated forms, colours, and fragrances.
Elsewhere, following the same lead from the Clavis, Berthold extended this 
principle about the ineffable abundance found among things in his comments 
to Proposition 121 (“Everything that is divine has an essence that is good-
ness, a unifical potency, and a cognition hidden and incomprehensible to all 
 44 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 125A, p. 147, l. 16 – p. 148, l. 31. Cf. Dionysius, De divinis 
nominibus, 4.1 and 4.4.
 45 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 125B- C, p. 148, l. 33 – p. 149, l. 78.
 46 The verbal form of this noun (exsero, exserere) was used in a similar context by Albert the 
Great. See, for example, Albert the Great, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, 
lib. i, tr. 2, c. 2, p. 27, l. 22- 58. It was taken up by Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. 
Liber 4, Tractatus 1- 2,7, ed. S. Pieperhoff (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987), lib. iv, tr. 1, c. 5 (5), p. 28, 
l. 42- 50.
 47 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 125D- F, p. 149, l. 83 – p. 152, l. 176.
 48 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 125F, p. 152, l. 164- 173, cited Dionysius, De divinis nomini-












secondaries altogether”),49 to declare that any essence (usia), creaturely or 
divine, is incomprehensible:
In all things that exist, usia is altogether incomprehensible in itself, not 
only to sense, but even to intellect. ‘For just as God, as he is in himself 
beyond every creature, is not comprehended by intellect, so likewise the 
creature in its hidden depths is known to be incomprehensible. Whatever 
is perceived by bodily sense or considered by intellect in any creature is 
nothing other than some accident of some incomprehensible essence. 
What is known through quality, or quantity, or form, or matter, or any 
accident is not what it is, but that it is’.50
Berthold did not explain precisely how he interpreted the Clavis on this point, 
though a comparison with other passages in the Expositio can offer some fur-
ther clarification. To be sure, he did not view it within the broadly Aristotelian 
perspective of the ten categories, even though these were integral to Eriugena’s 
original argument in Periphyseon i and remained central to the Clavis. Rather, 
it seems likely that Berthold would have understood this assertion within the 
context of his doctrine of participation, according to which the essences of 
creatures are constituted by different formal intentions.51 Of these intentions, 
he identified goodness or unity as the deepest or most essential mode.52 It is 
 49 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 121, p. 60, l. 1- 3: Omne divinum existentiam [Berthold: 
essentiam] quidem habet bonitatem, potentiam autem unialem et cognitionem occultam et 
incomprehensibilem omnibus simul secundis.
 50 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 121E, p. 107, l. 68- 75, citing Honorius Augustodunensis, 
Clavis physicae, c. 6, p. 5, l. 12 – p. 6, l. 19: Usia in omnibus, quae sunt, omnino per se ipsam 
incomprehensibilis est non solum sensu, sed etiam intellectu. ‘Quia sicut Deus ultra omnem 
creaturam in se ipso nullo intellectu comprehenditur, ita etiam in secretis suis creatura 
incomprehensibilis cognoscitur. Quidquid autem in omni creatura vel sensu corporeo per-
cipitur vel intellectu consideratur, nihil est aliud nisi quoddam accidens unicuique incom-
prehensibili essentiae, nam aut per qualitatem aut quantitatem aut formam aut materiam 
vel quodlibet accidens cognoscitur, non quid est, sed quia est’.
 51 See the centrality of goodness in the citations of the Clavis at Berthold of Moosburg, 
Expositio, 2A, p. 82, l. 12 – p. 83, l. 38. The notion that the essence of the first cause is dif-
fused intentionally (intentionaliter) through the universe likely came to Berthold through 
Dietrich of Freiberg, De cognitione entium separatorum, 79.3, p. 242, l. 36- 46. See 4.5, 
n. 268, below.
 52 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 3D, p. 97, l. 192- 198: ea, quae fiunt unum per crea-
tionem, sic fiunt unum, ita, quod ipsum fieri unum est eis esse unum, cum inquantum huius-
modi sint unum tantum, quod est uniuscuiusque eorum essentia; 5B, p. 118, l. 190- 192: licet, 
ut solum a primo procedunt, stent sub unitate intentionis (scilicet boni), quae etiam est cui-
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as good or one that a creature is related immediately to the creative activity 
of God.
To understand this point, we may begin by looking at his comments on 
Proposition 7 (“All that is productive of another is greater than the nature of 
that, which is produced”),53 which Berthold regarded as “almost the founda-
tion of the whole edifice of this science”.54 Its proof must establish that what is 
produced depends on the producer not only for its existence but also for what-
ever causal power it has. The celebrated maxim of Dionysius, which Berthold 
traced to the Timaeus, served that purpose well. The Good is not only diffusive 
of existence (esse) but also itself (sui) – in other words, the Good communi-
cates the very power of self- diffusivity. Explicating the notion of “good” (ratio 
boni) any further was, however, no straightforward matter. Since it cannot be 
defined through anything prior to itself, it must be known through its effects 
or proper modes.55 Even the name “the Good” does not capture its quiddity, if 
it even has one, but rather reflects how we bless (sanctificamus) the origin of 
all with the noblest name at our disposal. Berthold’s description, rather than 
definition, of the Good was this:
‘Good’ is the essence of any given thing according to the reason by which 
it primarily subsists formally from the universally first cause, [subsisting] 
either as such or according to some determinate mode participated from 
that, which subsists as such.56
Berthold glossed this description extensively.57 By “the essence of any given 
thing”, he had in mind the arguments made by Dionysius, that if you remove 
the good from something, you remove the thing altogether. According to the 
Areopagite, even privation and non- existence depend upon the Good. In this 
respect, “good” is the most formal or essential aspect of a thing because all other 
determinations presuppose it,58 just as “being” was regarded as fundamental 
 53 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 7, p. 6, l. 1- 2: Omne productivum alterius melius est 
quam natura eius quod producitur.
 54 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 7A, p. 139, l. 9- 10.
 55 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 7A, p. 140, l. 40 – p. 141, l. 69.
 56 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 7A, p. 141, l. 70- 73: bonum est uniuscuiusque rei essen-
tia secundum eam rationem, qua primo formaliter a causa universaliter prima subsistit vel 
simpliciter vel secundum aliquem determinatum modum participatum ex eo, quod subsistit 
simpliciter.
 57 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 7A, p. 141, l. 74 – p. 143, l. 167.
 58 A parallel argument at Expositio, 21D, p. 84, l. 295- 312, makes it clear that here he was 
extending Averroes’ critique of Avicenna, who held that a thing is one by an addition to 














from the standpoint of the universality of predication. This priority of “good” 
is not so clear if we take as our starting point a given object of everyday expe-
rience, in which the notions of “being”, “one”, and “good” indeed seem to coin-
cide. But if we consider these notions “absolutely” or in themselves, according 
to Berthold, then we see that “good”, in its orientation to the final cause or end 
as intended by the principle, can precede the subject in which it inheres.59 
Berthold at this stage would invoke the creative etymology of bonitas as a der-
ivation from the Greek boo- boas, meaning, “I call out, you call out” (clamo- 
clamas).60 The Good calls all things immediately into being. Where there are 
necessarily lower traces of this causality that are unable to subsist as good sim-
pliciter (as only the gods or primordial causes can), the Good determines or 
contracts its causal power through these gods or primordial causes, which are 
nearer to it, in order to strengthen the lower to realise its perfection.
Although we find ourselves at metaphysical bedrock of the Expositio and 
can only rely on descriptions and metaphors instead of precise definitions, it 
is important nevertheless to be as clear as possible about what Berthold was 
aiming for. It was not, as these statements from Dionysius initially could be 
taken to imply, that the creative activity of the Good was responsible for a 
thing’s potential for existence. According to Berthold, that very potentiality 
for existence is a function of the subsequent limitation of the causality of the 
Good through the primordial cause of power (virtus) or infinity (infinitas), 
which is the principle immediately subordinate to the Good.61 Even the ori-
entation toward existence presupposes a more spontaneous creative activity. 
One way to clarify this difficult notion is to consider that the effect of the pri-
mordial cause of power or infinity, for Berthold, is a determinate potentiality 
for subsistence. What this presupposes is the more holistic causality of the 
Good, which is perhaps better understood as providing the relational context 
or the dynamic universal structure within which the essence will exercise its 
function.62 A thing exists for the sake of its function, which is its perfection.63 
 59 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 7A, p. 141, l. 97 – p. 142, l. 133.
 60 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 7B, p. 146, l. 276- 282. On the use of this etymology in 
Eriugena, Albert the Great, and Ulrich of Strassburg, see De Libera, Métaphysique et noé-
tique, p. 186– 187.
 61 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 3B, p. 94, l. 77- 92. See 4.4, n. 193, below.
 62 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 7A, p. 144, l. 181- 182: boni determinatio non est aliud nisi 
boni diversa in diversis participatio.
 63 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 13F, p. 218, l. 307- 312. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu 
et intelligibili, i.1.1, p. 137, l. 3- 6: Sicut dicit Philosophus in II De caelo et mundo, unaquaeque 
res est propter suam propriam operationem. Cuius dicti ratio est, quia propria operatio est 
pertinens ad perfectionem rei et habet rationem boni et finis, propter quem res est, sine quo 
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But this perfection is not entirely self- serving. Berthold gave a strong inter-
pretation of Dietrich of Freiberg’s declaration that a separated and isolated 
essence (absoluta essentia) does not have the notion of the good (ratio boni), 
but only insofar as it is ordered to something outside itself.64 In this view, at 
the level of the singular or the individual, relationality precedes substantial-
ity; the totality is prior, and the parts have their function and possibility only 
with respect to the whole.
We have seen already how, in Berthold’s view, Plato’s theorems direct the 
soul outside itself to the things in nature (res rata in natura) and away from 
the abstractions that have their reality only in the soul (esse in anima) that the 
mind exclusively clings to so long as it is “sealed off in beings”. The progress of 
intellectual perfection culminates in the non- discursive and operative union 
with the One. We glimpse now, in Berthold’s commentaries on Propositions 1 
and 7, how the habit of supersapientia is already underway as one sets out along 
the oblique motion from rational starting points that are oriented toward the 
One and the Good. That is, the soul’s adjustment of its thinking to the realities 
outside it, even at these initial stages, anticipates that divinising end precisely 
because it mirrors the most fundamental disposition of the One or Good itself. 
In Proposition 1, when Berthold first explained the Platonic perspective on the 
origin of plurality, he stated that it must be sought ultimately with reference to 
“the disposition of the first cause” that led it to produce.65 For this he turned 
directly to Dionysius: the first cause is drawn out of itself by “the ecstasy of 
divine love” (exstasis divini amoris), which disposes the cause to communicate 
not just one but all possible modes of its goodness.66 This generative ecstasy 
at the ground of reality “necessarily” institutes a plurality, because only diverse 
gradations of unity and goodness are “the perfect demonstration of wisdom”. 
Similarly, in Proposition 7, Berthold argued that his description of goodness as 
the essential mode of any given thing was compatible with the Platonic under-
standing of creation as “the immediate procession of plurality from the first 
cause”.67
 64 See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 25H, p. 148, l. 389- 394, cited at n. 34, above. Cf. 
Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, i.10.3, p. 143, l. 22- 38.
 65 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 1C, p. 75, l. 151 – p. 77, l. 208.
 66 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 1C, p. 76, l. 197- 200: exstasis divini amoris est causa mul-
titudinis rerum creatarum, exstasis, inquam, quae non sinit ipsum esse sine germine, sed 
disponit ipsum ad communicandum se omnibus modis, quibus est possibile communicare 
bonitatem suam. This was a tacit citation of Albert the Great, Summa theologiae, ed. 
A. Borgnet, Opera omnia, vol. 32 (Paris: Vivès, 1895), pars ii, tr. 1, q. 3, m. 3, a. 1, p. 25a, which 
Berthold embellished with Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 4.13, 712A- B.










The Platonic account of creation is discussed at greatest length in 
Proposition 5 (“Every plurality is set beneath the One”).68 Berthold began 
there by outlining the Peripatetic doctrine of the procession of all things 
from the One.69 His major Peripatetic authority was Avicenna’s Liber de 
philosophia prima sive scientia divina ix.4. Avicenna was frequently cited in 
seminal works by William of Auvergne and Thomas Aquinas as an example 
of an erroneous doctrine of mediated creative causality, according to which 
God creates the highest separate intelligence, which then creates the second 
separate intelligence, the first heavenly soul, and the first heavenly body, and 
so on, until we reach the world of generation and corruption. In this view, 
since a simple one can only produce a simple effect, diversity must arise 
through the distinct, comparative activities of the first created intellect. 
Using Ulrich of Strassburg’s De summo bono, Berthold explained the logical 
ordering of these activities as follows. (1) The first created intellect contem-
plates the completely necessary existence (necesse esse) of God, from whom 
it proceeds. It then contemplates itself as having come from the necessary 
existent and thus understands itself as necesse esse, for it beholds itself in 
the light of God’s intellect. In so doing, the intellect constitutes another 
intellectual substance beneath itself as an intellectual light, which however 
is diminished because it does not possess the abundance of the first light. 
(2) The first created intellect then contemplates itself insofar as it is in act, 
and thus the light of God’s intellect falls (occumbit) within it. The intellect 
then extends its light to another being below it, and thereby constitutes 
the first heavenly soul and the immediate mover of the outermost sphere. 
(3) The first created intellect then contemplates itself according to the pos-
sibility that exists within it, which it receives from itself and not from the 
necessary existent. As it thinks itself as possible, it produces the heavenly 
body of the outermost sphere.
The Platonists, according to Berthold, with Dionysius as their chief repre-
sentative, would not be satisfied with this account.70 Although they hold even 
more strictly to the unicity of the first principle, which is not only “one per 
se” but is “the One as such and absolutely self- identical”, they are still able to 
 68 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 5, p. 4, l. 1: Omnis multitudo secunda [Berthold: sub-
missa] est ab uno.
 69 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 5A, p. 113, l. 13 – p. 115, l. 70. Berthold’s explanations of 
Avicenna’s position resemble passages from Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber 4, 
Tractatus 2, 8- 14, ed. A. Palazzo (Hamburg: Meiner, 2012), lib. iv, tr. 2, c. 9 (1), p. 27, l. 20 – 
p. 28, l. 49.
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maintain that plurality is an immediate effect of the One. Giving a catena of 
citations from Dionysius on the divine differentiation (discretio), Berthold 
had to concede that here he was relying principally on texts about God as the 
Good and not as the One, and he reminded the reader that they will ultimately 
find that these two designations of the first principle are brought together in 
Proposition 13. Now, the passages from Dionysius all assert that God remains 
one while acting within plurality, but they do not explain precisely how this 
is so. First, then, Berthold decided to confront an objection, which he seems 
to have invented, that called Dionysius’ authority on these matters into 
question: since Dionysius has spoken as “a theologian”, these texts should be 
reserved for matters pertaining to voluntary providence and God’s direct inter-
ventions in history. However, the objection continued, following “the theolo-
gising philosophers or philosophising theologians”, one must hold that in the 
order of natural providence things proceed from the One in a mediated and 
linear fashion, just as Avicenna has proposed. Berthold responded that, on 
this question of the origin of multiplicity from the One, it makes no difference 
which order of providence was being considered. The Platonists do not even 
have to abandon the principle that from a simple one only one can come.71 The 
purpose of this objection and response, it seems, was to show that Dionysius, a 
theologian, argued according to the same necessary and rational assumptions 
as the theologising philosophers and philosophising theologians. The greatest 
of the Platonists, therefore, did not abrogate from the laws of natural reason. 
This also means that the fuller explanation that follows in Berthold of how the 
divine differentiation (discretio) immediately produces a plurality can be read 
back into Dionysius’ texts. Berthold must show how the One can be an imme-
diate source of plurality without denying the principle that from a simple one 
only a one can come.
Although he does not use these terms, his response appealed to something 
like the notion of enfolding and unfolding.72 Berthold first established that 
for the Peripatetics (Aristotle, Avicenna) and the Platonists (Plato, Dionysius, 
Boethius), God is as an intellective and volitional principle. The “archetypical 
world” in God is one in form and in reality and, similarly, his will is “one and 
immutable”. According to the Peripatetics, since plurality is completely unlike 
the simple and immutable principle, what comes immediately from God must 
be a mediating principle or “singular one” (unum singulare), that is, the first 
 71 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 5B, p. 116, l. 108- 111: ab uno singulariter existenti non 
debeat procedere nisi unum, et idem eodem modo manens semper natum est facere idem.






created intellect.73 According to the Platonists, Berthold insisted, this conclu-
sion does not follow:
Notwithstanding these doctrines, the position of Platonic philosophy is 
that, from the One, which is One as such and absolutely, remaining self- 
identical in every way, plurality proceeds immediately, in such a way that 
it operates itself [agens se ipsum] in plurality and thus multiplies, as was 
put forward earlier by Dionysius. By ‘plurality’, I mean not only the partial 
[plurality] of the unities themselves, which is immediately related to the 
primarily One, but also the total [plurality] of the universe, insofar as the 
universe subsists in the intention of ‘one’ and ‘good’. This intention in the 
First as such is not only the exemplary reason but also the efficient and 
final reason.74
The divine wisdom or art, full of “living, unchangeable reasons”, is a principle of 
order. An order is both one and many. A “singular one”, therefore, cannot ade-
quately represent the archetypical world. In Albert’s Summa theologiae these 
arguments were meant to establish the agreement between Aristotle (with his 
metaphor of the general and the army in the Metaphysics xii.10) and Dionysius 
concerning the procession of creatures. Berthold, however, having framed a 
debate between the Platonists and Peripatetics, intervened in Albert’s text to 
reinforce the distinction of formal intentions, and emphasised the priority of 
“good” as the essential mode or intention of any given thing.75 Insofar as the 
universe, or anything in it, subsists in the intention of “one” or “good”, it has 
come immediately from the One, and does so according to an ordered series.
It is here that we observe how the register of unity complements and cor-
rects the one- sidedness of an exclusive focus on the Good. While the Good pro-
vides the dynamic and relational context within which an entity will receive 
 73 Here Berthold was summarising objections to the immediate procession of plurality pre-
sented in Albert the Great, Summa theologiae, pars ii, tr. 1, q. 3, m. 3, a. 1, p. 23a- b. This was 
the same article Berthold had used on the exstasis divini amoris.
 74 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 5B, p. 116, l. 130 – p. 117, l. 137: His autem non obstanti-
bus positio Platonicae philosophiae est, quod ab uno, quod est simpliciter unum et absolute 
et omnino eodem modo manens, procedit immediate multitudo ita, quod ipsum est agens 
se ipsum in multitudinem et sic multiplicans, ut supra positum est ex Dionysio; multitudi-
nem, inquam, non solum partialem ipsarum unitatum, quae est immediata ad ipsum prime 
unum, sed etiam totalem universi, inquantum ipsum universum solum subsistit in intentione 
unius et boni, quae intentio in simpliciter primo non solum est ratio exemplaris, sed effectiva 
et finalis.
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its possibility and its existence, the essential order of invisible and separate 
substances must be defined by the structure of number and proportion. This 
was a principle Berthold accepted from Book ii of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: “a 
causal order requires a first, a middle, and a last”.76 As we saw already in 7A and 
now in 5B, Berthold divided the ordered unities that arise immediately from 
the One into two groups, in accordance with Proposition 64 (“Every primor-
dial unity establishes a twofold number: some of hypostases that are perfect 
in themselves; others of illuminations having their hypostasis in others”).77 In 
his commentary on Proposition 64, Berthold began by repeating the contrast 
between the Aristotelian understanding of unity as a transcendental notion 
identical with being, which has only esse in anima, and the Platonic view of 
unity as a res extra animam.78 For the Platonists, unity as a principle contains 
all that comes from itself in potency or virtually (virtualiter). This potency is 
either (1) active or (2) passive. These in their extreme instances apply to the 
One and to prime matter, respectively. The active potency is in turn subdi-
vided, such that it can apply (1a) simpliciter to God, (1b) to a primordial cause, 
or (1c) to the trace of the One in any spiritual substance that requires further 
determination in order to subsist.79 This yields the distinction in Proposition 
64 between the “the primordial unities” that subsist through themselves (1b) 
and their “illuminations” that require further determination in order to subsist 
(1c and 2).
Berthold at this point referred the reader to Proposition 62 (“Every plu-
rality nearer to the One is fewer in quantity, but greater in power, than 
more remote pluralities”)80 for his account of the precise number of the 
 76 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 5B, p. 118, l. 178- 179; 62B, p. 182, l. 57- 61. For a passage 
known to Berthold that brought together both registers of proportional structure and 
causal dynamism, see Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, prooem. (1- 2), p. 13, l. 2- 27.
 77 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 64, p. 34, l. 1- 3: Omnis primordialis unitas duplicem 
substituit numerum, hunc quidem per se perfectarum ypostaseon, hunc autem illustratio-
num in aliis ypostasim habentium. In the Tria opuscula, he found this principle applied to 
the register of unity. See Proclus, De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam, q. 10, §63, 
p. 102, l. 3- 7: Duplicibus autem unitatibus entibus sive etiam bonitatibus, quas bonum illud 
produxit ens causa utrorumque et altero modo unum, et hiis quidem autotelon (id est per se 
perfectis), hiis autem dispersis in participantibus causis.
 78 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 64A- B, p. 193, l. 14 – p. 194, l. 54.
 79 The trace of the One (1c) should be subdivided again because it must include (1cα) the 
separate substances that are mentioned at 64F and (1cβ) human souls, which are not dis-
cussed there. On the illumination or vestige of the One in the human soul as an active 
potency, see Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 24B, p. 129, l. 162- 198, 162B, p. 17, l. 32- 58.
 80 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 62, p. 33, l. 1- 2: Omnis multitudo propinquius uni ens 












self- subsistent principles (1b and 1cα). Here, he produced what he regarded 
as a remarkable (miranda) table enumerating the principles populating the 
essential order of natural providence (from the One down to, and including, 
heavenly souls).81 The smallest possible essential order, he maintained, and 
therefore the order nearest to the One, is necessarily composed of the num-
bers 1 (first), 2 (middle), 3 (last). This corresponds to the six formal inten-
tions of the primordial causes of unity, infinity, being, life, intellect, and soul. 
Berthold then assigned each primordial cause a number from 1 through 6 as 
its root (radix). For example, the number 6 corresponds to the soul. The soul 
is comprised of six formal intentions (goodness, infinity, being, life, intellect, 
soul). This root is then increased by the same proportion found in the highest 
order – 6 (first), 12 (middle), 18 (last) – to reach the sum of 36. In other words, 
in the essential order of the cosmos, there must be 36 heavenly souls. So per-
suaded was Berthold by this deductive reasoning that he used it to resolve an 
ancient debate about the exact number of heavenly movers: 36 falls almost in 
the middle of the figures proposed by Eudoxus (26) and Calippus (47)!82 As 
amusing or naive as this approach must seem, we should bear in mind that 
Berthold was convinced that the ecstasy of divine love has expressed itself in 
a supremely orderly way, and that only a model like this can explain how a 
plurality immediately unfolds from the One and how that One enfolds within 
itself the archetypical world.
3 The Trinity and the Gods
In accordance with his views about the knowledge of God attained by the best 
of the pagan philosophers of antiquity, Berthold’s interpretation of Proclus 
was thoroughly Trinitarian. Berthold held that a Trinitarian theology could 
and should be extrapolated from the text of the Elementatio theologica, not 
because this would extrinsically grant it the Christian form its final and perfect 
truth required, but because its own coherence as a revival of Plato’s thought 
demanded it. For Berthold, the Platonists had harmonised the registers of 
unity and goodness, of order and fecundity, in a Trinitarian understanding of 
the first principle.
In one of the longest treatments of Trinitarian theology in the Expositio, 
Berthold argued that, since generation (the procession of the Son from the 
 81 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 62B- C, p. 181, l. 20 – p. 184, l. 138.
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Father) is “the communication of nature, it most of all befits that, which is 
most communicable”. And since the first Good is most communicable, this is 
what Dionysius meant when he said that “the ecstasy of the love of the highest 
Good does not leave it without seed” (sine germine) – for, Berthold explained, 
“to sprout forth [germinare] is to generate”.83 The spontaneous communication 
of the divine nature in the Trinity (bullitio or “boiling”) is thus the precondi-
tion for God’s spontaneous creative activity (ebullitio or “boiling- over”).84 Both 
dynamics are the result of what Berthold, commenting on the same passage 
from De divinis nominibus 4.10, called the amorous motion (motus amorosus) 
that moves the Good to communicate itself.85 For the principle to communi-
cate itself in an orderly way, it must already be order itself or, in other words, 
as Berthold wrote in the Prologus, it must be the primarily Beautiful (prime 
pulchrum).86 The Trinity is the Beautiful because it is “the cause of the agree-
ment and lucidity of universes, calling everything to itself, and gathering all in 
all into the same”.87 From “this Beautiful there comes to all beings their beauty 
according to their proper measure; on account of the Beautiful there arise the 
concords, friendships, and communions of all things”.88 The relational context 
created by the Good or Beautiful was thus understood by Berthold as the Holy 
Spirit unfolding the interrelations present implicitly in the archetypical world 
or divine Word that is coeternal with the Father.
 83 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 40C, p. 41, l. 203- 207: quia generatio communicatio natu-
rae est, illi maxime conveniet, quod est maxime communicabile; sed prime bonum est max-
ime communicabile seu communicativum sui; ergo sibi maxime conveniet generatio. Et hoc 
est quod dicit Dionysius 4 cap. De divinis nominibus, exstasis amoris summi boni non sinit 
ipsum sine germine esse; germinare autem generare est. Cf. Albert the Great, Summa theo-
logiae, pars i, tr. 7, q. 30, c. 1, p. 227, l. 21- 29.
 84 On the theme of ebullitio, see M.R. Pagnoni- Sturlese, “A propos du néoplatonisme d’Albert 
le Grand. Aventures et mésaventures de quelques textes d’Albert dans le Commentaire 
sur Proclus de Berthold de Moosburg”, in Archives de Philosophie 43(1980), p. 635– 654. 
For Albert see, for example, Albert the Great, De animalibus, lib. xx, tr. 2, c. 1, p. 1306, 
l. 34 – p. 1307, l. 8: Luminosum enim ita ebullit luces quod continue videtur moveri motu ebul-
litionis si ipsum est fons lucis sicut est sol […]. Et sic est in fontali universitatis causa, a qua 
ebullitione procedunt bonitatum ipsius luces et formae quae in rebus distantibus receptae 
diversum esse accipiunt secundum diversam recipientium potestatum.
 85 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 16A, p. 24, l. 23- 25: Haec Dionysius, ubi clare exprimit 
motum amorosum esse in prime bono, quo se movet in sui multiplicationem et ad intra pro-
priam naturam per emanationem originalem et ad extra per causalem.
 86 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 19, p. 29, l. 781: prime pulchrum, superbenedicta 
Trinitas.
 87 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 19, p. 29, l. 778- 779: causa consonantiae et claritatis 
universorum et ad se ipsum omnia vocans et tota in totis congregans ad idem.














This Trinitarian philosophy of creation was first outlined in Prologus 9 and 11. 
As Berthold stated there, the world is made by wisdom, who has built its house 
upon seven pillars (Proverbs 9:1).89 Following the Clavis physicae, he explained 
that the paternal intellect has fashioned or “hewn out” these pillars or primor-
dial causes in the Word, which is the divine art (ars), and these are divided 
and multiplied by the Holy Spirit in its effects.90 As we have seen, Berthold’s 
response to the Peripatetic arguments about the procession of the cosmos from 
the simple One in 5B was based on the assumption shared by Platonists and 
Peripatetics that the first principle acts through intellect and will. In Berthold’s 
view, these immanent operations of knowing and willing could be assimilated 
to the begetting of the Son and the mutual spiration of the Holy Spirit.91 Such 
a passage from the immanent operations to the distinction of persons in God 
was not something Thomas Aquinas, or many Dominicans who succeeded 
him in the 14th century, would accept; but it does find some precedent in the 
more emanationist Trinitarian theology of the Franciscan school that followed 
Bonaventure and, interestingly, in the theology of German Dominicans like 
Ulrich of Strassburg and Hugh Ripelin of Strassburg.92
 89 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 11, p. 18, l. 439 – p. 19, l. 471. The seven pillars 
are those mentioned in 62C, along with the lowest primordial cause of nature or body. 
Presumably, it was not included in 62 because its effects belong to the domain of becom-
ing or generation, and therefore cannot be enumerated according to the patterns of 
an immutable essential order. At Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 101B, p. 211, l. 26- 30, 
Berthold spoke of seven “formal perfections”. For other instances, see, e.g., 8D, 23D, 58A, 
71D, 99B, 133E, 140D, 155D.
 90 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 9, p. 14, l. 300 – p. 15, l. 320; 126B, p. 155, l. 44 – p. 157, 
l. 97. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 40C, p. 41, l. 177- 179: Plato ponit in prime bono 
paternum intellectum formantem ex se verbum, quod est ratio omnium faciendorum, imago, 
Filius et ars Patris et mundus archetypus, hoc est principalis mundi typus.
 91 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 28B, p. 173, l. 77- 81; 42F, p. 61, l. 201 – p. 63, l. 279.
 92 See R. Friedman, Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University. The Use of Philosophical 
Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans 1250- 1350, 
2 vols (Leiden: Brill, 2013), vol. 1, p. 171. According to the more emanationist approach, 
which Russell Friedman traces back to Richard of St. Victor, the persons of the Trinity 
are distinguished according to the ways in which they originate or receive divine being. 
Chapter 6 of Bonaventure’s Itinerarium mentis in Deum can be regarded as a locus classi-
cus for this approach, where Bonaventure read Dionysius through Richard, and used the 
principle that the Good diffuses itself as a way to establish the threeness of persons that 
must be conceived simultaneously with the divine unity as Being. Friedman distinguishes 
between the emanationist model and the more relational approach, which emphasised 
that the persons are defined by already fully formed relations of filiation and mutual spi-
ration. The relational model, favoured by many Dominicans after Aquinas, therefore pos-
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We have seen already that Berthold’s inspiration for his account of pagan 
knowledge of the Trinity came from a Franciscan, Thomas of York (Sapientiale i.6) 
in Proposition 131A- C (“Every god commences its proper operation from itself”). 
No less important was Dietrich of Freiberg’s thorough integration of Augustine’s 
psychological image of the Trinity into the Peripatetic cosmology of the separate 
intellects,93 which Berthold relied on in 131D- F. Accentuating Dietrich’s argument, 
Berthold identified the ratio boni as the basis of the active overflow of any intellec-
tual principle, whether in God or in intellects that are active through their essence 
(intellectus in actu per essentiam). Dietrich had already argued that the sponta-
neous diffusion or boiling- over (ebullitio) of a cause derives its fecundity from a 
hidden interior transfusion or boiling (bullitio).94 In God, this interior transfusion 
constitutes an “order of nature” of distinct persons. In all essentially active intel-
lectual principles below God (the primordial causes down to the highest portion 
of the human soul), it results only in a relational distinction within a single sup-
posit.95 Thus in a spontaneous and free act of Trinitarian overflow, the One pro-
duces within itself simple principles (imagines Trinitatis) that are able to carry on 
the further work of determining the “ones” or “goods” (“vestiges”) it has created.96
The continuity in this analogy between the creative and unbounded cau-
sality of the One or Good as Trinity and the bounded or determinate causality 
of the primordial causes was established through Berthold’s interpretation of 
Proclus’ notion of the self- constituted (τὸ αὐθυπόστατον; antipostaton).97 The 
origins of this notion went back at least to Iamblichus (d. c. 325), who used it 
the immanent operations of the human soul and its full reality in God, which is known 
only by revelation.
 93 A. Colli, Tracce agostiniane nell’opera di Teodorico di Freiberg (Genoa: Marietti, 2010).
 94 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 125D, p. 149, l. 83- 91.
 95 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 131E, p. 196, l. 176 – p. 197, l. 198.
 96 On the gods as images of God, see Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 32E, p. 210, l. 156- 158 
and p. 211, l. 183 – p. 212, l. 201; 28C, p. 175, l. 150- 151; 177E, p. 178, l. 165- 169. Berthold’s source 
was Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, 1.2.1.1.6- 7, p. 41, l. 2 – p. 44, l. 46. See also 
the studies by K. Flasch, “Procedere ut imago. Das Hervorgehen des Intellekts aus seinem 
göttlichen Grund bei Meister Dietrich, Meister Eckhart und Berthold von Moosburg”, 
in K. Ruh (ed.), Abendländische Mystik im Mittelalter. Symposion Kloster Engelberg 1984 
(Stuttgart: Metzler, 1986), p. 125– 134; id., “Converti ut imago – Rückkehr als Bild. Eine 
Studie zur Theorie des Intellekts bei Dietrich von Freiberg und Meister Eckhart”, in 
Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 45(1998), p. 130– 150.
 97 On self- constitution in Proclus, see S. Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena. An Investigation 
of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo- Dionysian Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 1978), 
p. 125– 137; C. Steel, “Proklos über Selbstreflexion und Selbstbegründung”, in M. Perkams, 
R.M. Piccione (eds), Proklos. Methode, Seelenlehre, Metaphysik (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 
p. 230– 255; D.G. MacIsaac, “The Origin of Determination in the Neoplatonism of 












to account for the freedom of the rational soul.98 Proclus generalised the idea 
of self- constitution by relating it to substantial self- reversion (Propositions 42 
and 43), which enabled him to apply it to almost all immaterial realities. In 
Proposition 40 (“Everything that proceeds from itself has a self- constituted 
essence and precedes those things that subsist from other causes”),99 the first 
passage in the Elementatio theologica devoted to the subject, Proclus con-
nected the notions of self- sufficiency and self- constitution, and definitively 
located both in principles beneath the Good, since its simplicity is beyond 
self- sufficiency.100
For Berthold, however, although the Good is above self- sufficiency because 
of its superabundant power, it is not above self- reversion or self- constitution.101 
On the contrary, according to Berthold’s interpretation of Proclus in the con-
text of Dietrich’s metaphysics, the Good is superabundant or “boils over” pre-
cisely because of its self- reversion or interior transfusion (bullitio), which is 
also true of the gods proportionately in their own domains. When Berthold 
finally confronted Proclus’ refusal of self- reversion in the One in the proof of 
Proposition 40, he did so carefully:
This [refusal] was disproved above in the declaration, unless perhaps the 
author wishes to say that, just as the primarily Good is better than self- 
sufficient principles, namely the antarkes, so also it is better than the per 
se subsistent, namely, the antipostaton.102
Medieval, and Early Modern Thought. Essays Presented to the Rev’d Dr Robert D. Crouse 
(Leiden: Brill, 2007), p. 141– 172, at p. 157– 166; E. Ludueña, La recepción de Eriúgena, 
p. 150– 154.
 98 Henry of Ghent used the theorems of the Elementatio on self- reversion for the same pur-
pose. See P. Porro, “The University of Paris in the Thirteenth Century. Proclus and the 
Liber de causis”, in S. Gersh (ed.), Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 264– 298, at p. 269– 275.
 99 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 40, p. 24, l. 1- 2: Omnia que ab alia causa procedunt 
precedent que a se ipsis subsistunt et habentia essentia authypostaton.
 100 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 40, p. 24, l. 17- 18: Si autem bonum authypostatum, 
ipsum se ipsum producens non unum erit. There was a lacuna Moerbeke’s translation after 
this line that omitted Proclus’ brief explanation of his assertion: what proceeds from the 
One is not one; but if the One were self- constituted it would proceed from itself; there-
fore, the One would be both one and not one.
 101 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 10F, p. 183, l. 229 – p. 184, l. 255. Cf. 9B, p. 169, l. 102- 105.
 102 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 40 commentum, p. 45, l. 341- 344: Istud est reprobatum 
supra in declaratione, nisi forte auctor velit dicere, quod, sicut prime bonum est melius 
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In other words, if Proclus only meant that the Good is above the self- sufficient 
goods or primordial causes (the antarkia described in Proposition 9) and in this 
sense is above “self- constituted principles”, then this more qualified statement is 
correct. Now, although Proclus posited a kind of self- sufficiency among the gods 
in texts unknown to Berthold (e.g., Platonic Theology i.19), modern interpreters 
of Proclus doubt whether self- constitution would apply at that level, given the 
doctrine’s intrinsic relation to self- reversion.103 So committed was Berthold, how-
ever, to Dietrich’s Augustinian and Peripatetic metaphysics that it was unthink-
able that self- reversion would not be at the root of all fecundity in the cosmos.
The Elementatio theologica provided several opportunities to address the 
theme of self- reversion (Propositions 15- 17, 42- 44, 82- 83). Beginning his com-
mentary on 15A, Berthold invoked Dietrich’s conception of the intrinsic for-
mal unity of the cosmos, which consists in “the redounding of one part into 
another”, and in whose dynamism each part acquires the ratio boni.104 It is nec-
essary to posit “essential relations” inherent in the nature of each part of this 
essential order, which preserve this dynamic hierarchy without compromising 
the simplicity of the parts.105 The essences that comprise such an order are 
completely identical with their operation.106 In other words, these essences 
are inconceivable apart from their intrinsic relation to the rest of the order;107 
their operation of self- reversion is simultaneously the return to their principle 
and is nothing else but the outward expression of the first principle within the 
cosmos.108
This basic background helps us to understand Berthold’s strategy for navigat-
ing Proposition 40. In 40A, he first described two kinds of procession that cor-
respond to the general division of all things into the absolute and the relational 
(respectivum).109 These correspond to the “causal” (absolute) and “original” 
 103 See MacIsaac, “The Origin of Determination”, p. 157– 159, and the literature cited there.
 104 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 15A, p. 15, l. 12- 24. Cf. 6C, p. 130, l. 103- 126.
 105 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 15A, p. 15, l. 39- 46. Cf. 16A, p. 24, l. 14- 31.
 106 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 15B, p. 17, l. 102- 103.
 107 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 32B, p. 207, l. 52- 57.
 108 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 15C, p. 18, l. 134 – p. 19, l. 139: Potest [se ipsum conver-
sivum] tamen habere partes ante totum, quae non ponunt in numerum, et sic motu amoroso, 
qui est virtus concretiva seu unitiva naturalis, festinat ad se ipsum ut ad principium formale 
suae propriae subsistentiae, et sic continet et figit se ipsum in esse transfundens se ipsum in 
se ipso se ipsum in alio esse respectivo generando.
 109 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 40A, p. 36, l. 11- 14. The relational (respectivum) is a more 
general term than the relative (relativum), since the latter is confined to the category of 
relation, whereas the former is found in things outside that category. By this Berthold 
seems to mean that an essence can be intrinsically defined by its tendency (habitudo) 
















(relational) orders described in 21A- B and 29A.110 A causal order proceeds to 
the outside (ad extra) and into a multiplicity of absolutely ordered, distinct 
natures, whereas the Trinitarian, originative “order of nature” proceeds to the 
inside (ad intra) and does not result in any inequality of natures. Following 
Dietrich’s interpretation of Augustine, Berthold maintained that this origina-
tive order is also found in intellectual creatures as images of God, where it 
results not in a distinction of persons but in three relationals (tria respectiva) 
within a single supposit.111 Berthold underscored that this original “order of 
nature” in God and in the images of God does not multiply their essences.112
In 40B, Berthold then provided definitions of generation and spiration as 
“emanations” that are general enough to apply to the Trinity or to its images in 
subordinate principles.113 From this general perspective, Berthold then moved 
to consider the specific differences in the proportion by rehearsing the grades 
of self- sufficiency he had outlined first in Proposition 9.114 The self- sufficient 
is defined as “that which has from itself and in itself the fullness of its proper 
goodness” as a formal cause. In this sense, God, and the gods in a secondary 
way, subsist by themselves whole and wholly (subsistunt se totis et totaliter), 
meaning that both are constituted only by one formal intention: “one” or 
 110 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 21B, p. 78, l. 84- 99; 29A, p. 182, l. 12 – p. 184, l. 76.
 111 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 21A- B, p. 77, l. 40- 41, p. 78, l. 89- 90, and p. 79, l. 122- 124.
 112 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 40A, p. 37, l. 43- 53. In 21B, Berthold gave a fuller account 
of what he meant by “order of nature” by relying on Albert the Great, Summa theologiae, 
pars i, tr. 9, q. 41, c. 2, a. 1, p. 317, l. 87- 97. In the background of Albert’s text was Dionysius’ 
statement (De divinis nominibus, 2.7, 645B), that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are 
“sproutings of the divine nature” (pullulationes divinae naturae). Here, Albert argued, 
“nature” must not be understood in the primary sense to mean “essence”, because then 
Dionysius would have asserted that the divine essence is multiple. “Nature” must rather 
be understood in a secondary sense, as defined by Aristotle: “the power, from which the 
coming- forth comes forth” (vis, ex qua pullulat pullulans). In this sense, in the Trinity, 
“nature” stands for “person” (supponit pro persona) with the added connotation of a spe-
cific notion of coming- forth (consignificando notionem determinantem modum pullula-
tionis), by which that nature is communicated from one person to another (e.g., paternity, 
generation, or spiration). In the self- constituted principles below the Trinity, Berthold 
added, “nature” stands for the relational (pro respectivo) and not for “person”, but with the 
same added connotation of a specific notion of coming- forth.
 113 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 40B, p. 37, l. 57 – p. 39, l. 125; 42F, p. 61, l. 201- 296. 
Berthold’s sources here are not indicated in the apparatus fontium. His general definitions 
are taken from Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, 1.3.2, p. 53, l. 2 – p. 56, l. 86. From 
John of Damascus, through Ulrich of Strassburg, Berthold also took a less general defini-
tion of generatio that clearly sets it apart from the mutable and temporal kind of genera-
tion found among creatures. See Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber 3, Tractatus 
1- 3, ed. S. Tuzzo (Hamburg: Meiner, 2004), lib. iii, tr. 1, c. 2 (3), p. 10, l. 50 – p. 12, l. 103.
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“good”. The gods are only “formally” self- subsistent since they receive their 
unity or goodness from the One, and therefore depend on the One as their 
efficient cause. Here Berthold would look to Proposition 65 to say that the One 
subsists as “one” according to cause, and the gods subsist as “ones” according 
to “essence”. In this sense, the gods are self- sufficient “not absolutely, but rel-
atively”.115 Invoking Proposition 64, Berthold described the gods as supremely 
self- sufficient as wholes and wholly (secundum se totum et totaliter) by virtue 
of their simplicity and their superabundant power to originate their unique 
formal determinations. In other words, as “essential” goods or ones the gods 
are “wholly” self- sufficient as formal causes, which allows them to act as prisms 
refracting the causality of the Good into their own orders. Next come entities 
constituted from at least two principles, which are self- sufficient “as a whole 
but not wholly”: they are self- sufficient as wholes (sufficiunt sibi se totis per se) 
because they are essentially and always active, but since they are constituted 
out of more than one formal intention, they cannot be called “one” or “good” 
in every way (totaliter). Such entities are also known as beings existing as a 
species (entia secundum speciem). They are composite but not in such a way 
that they could be called “individuals”; their composition comes only from 
their essential or formal parts. These comprise the greater population of the 
invisible world below the gods in Berthold’s Platonism: infinities, true beings, 
lives, and intellectual hypostases. Next, heavenly souls are independent or self- 
sufficient by their divine and intellectual operation, but their animating (ani-
mealis) operation is fulfilled only in a body. Rational or human souls, finally, 
have self- sufficiency only in virtue of their supreme part that is not conjoined 
to the body.116 This catalogue of self- sufficient principles may be summarised 
as follows:
 115 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 9B, p. 170, l. 108- 112; 40C, p. 39, l. 132- 137. For this crucial 
distinction between the primordial causes as subordinated to God (qua efficient cause) 
and as per se subsistent (qua formal causes), Berthold may have been inspired by Thomas 
Aquinas’ commentary on the Liber de causis. See E. Ludueña, “The Gods and Causality”.
 116 In Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 43A, p. 66, l. 21 – p. 67, l. 42, Berthold extended the 
self- constituted or self- conversive all the way from the One and to the possible intellect 
which, considered as a conceptional being (ens conceptionale) – that is, according to the 
mode of being that embraces the subject, object, and mode of its knowledge in act – exer-
cises its independence by constituting the quiddities of things. What all these principles 
share is that they are, at least in their activity, independent (per se standi). On the possible 
intellect as ens conceptionale, see Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, iii.8.1- 
9, p. 183, l. 3 – p. 184, l. 51, and B. Mojsisch, “Sein als Bewußt- Sein. Die Bedeutung des ens 
conceptionale bei Dietrich von Freiberg”, in K. Flasch (ed.), Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister 






God: per se subsistens absolute
Gods: sufficiunt sibi/ subsistunt et secundum se totas et totaliter
Entia secundum speciem: sufficiunt sibi/ subsistunt secundum se totas sed 
non totaliter
Heavenly and human souls: sufficiunt sibi/ subsistunt non se totis
Having recalled this order of principles, Berthold then proceeded to outline 
their dynamic interrelation in his comments on Proposition 40. He appealed 
to Augustine’s acknowledgement that the Platonic doctrine of the divine “art” 
or “archetypical world” was equivalent to the Christian understanding of the 
coeternal and only- begotten Word.117 Following Dietrich of Freiberg, Berthold 
pushed this agreement to the limit by extending the Platonic doctrine of the 
divine art to principles beneath God.118 Finally, he went beyond even the let-
ter of Dietrich’s text toward a more complete account of the Trinitarian activ-
ity of these principles by identifying the role of the spirit (spiritu producentis 
vehente) in the conveyance of the form within the principle into its effect.119 
Using a remarkable and singular epithet in the entire Expositio, Berthold then 
introduced two passages from Dionysius the Platonist (Dionysius Platonicus). 
One was the familiar passage we have seen several times already describing the 
Trinitarian emanations as “sproutings of the divine nature”. The second follows 
it in the De divinis nominibus:
Every divine paternity and filiation is given to us and to the supercelestial 
powers from the primary paternity and primary filiation separated from 
all things. From these the supercelestial powers become gods, and the 
sons of gods, and deiform fathers, and are named minds, being perfected 
ens naturae) an image of the Trinity because it is not essentially active. See Dietrich of 
Freiberg, De visione beatifica, 1.2.2, p. 46, l. 3 – p. 53, l. 41.
 117 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 131B, p. 191, l. 46 – p. 194, l. 117.
 118 Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, i.8.1- 3, p. 141, l. 46 – p. 142, l. 74.
 119 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 40C, p. 41, l. 193- 194. The phrase spiritu vehente was likely 
taken from Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. iv, tr. 1, c. 5 (6), p. 29, l. 64- 82, where 
Ulrich rejected the view of certain philosophers, like Hermes, who posited an intermedi-
ary spirit bearing the forms of the fluxus from the source to its recipients. Cf. Albert the 
Great, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, lib. i, tr. 4, c. 1- 2, p. 44, l. 50 and 
57, and p. 44, l. 33. Ulrich criticised Arius for identifying this intermediary with the Holy 
Spirit and argued that the role of such a spiritus should be restricted to corporeal forms. 
For Berthold, on the contrary, following Thomas of York, the Hermetic spiritus was among 
the several acceptable witnesses to the pagan knowledge of the Holy Spirit. See Berthold 
of Moosburg, Expositio, 6E, p. 132, l. 202 – p. 133, l. 208, and 131B, p. 193, l. 81 – p. 194, l. 117, 
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spiritually (that is, incorporeally, immaterially, and intelligibly) by this 
paternity and filiation.120
As Berthold presented it, then, Augustine and Dionysius Platonicus authorised 
this extension of Trinitarian theology to subordinate principles and “gods”. 
His singular use of the epithet Dionysius Platonicus in the entire Expositio dis-
plays the deeper assumptions that were at work here, which can be detected 
elsewhere in the commentary where we find these Trinitarian passages in 
the Areopagite cited almost in the same breath as phrases from the Hermetic 
Liber xxiv philosophorum.121 There was no opposition here between pagan 
and Christian Platonists on the question of first principles; in other words, for 
Berthold the Platonists held to a Trinitarian account of the divine as Platonists 
and only incidentally, in certain cases, as Christians.
This Platonism that Berthold held to be so profoundly in accordance with 
Christian doctrine evidently marked a significant departure from Proclus. 
Berthold, however, proceeded as if his interpretation conformed to the original 
Platonic doctrine. This is clearest when Berthold, perhaps anticipating Proclus’ 
refusal of self- reversion in the One, presented an anonymous objection: “if the 
Good is itself producing itself”, that is, if it is self- constituted, “it is not One”.122 
Berthold’s response was a brief and standard assertion of Trinitarian divine 
simplicity – relations do not multiply the divine essence – with little further 
explanation. More interestingly, he followed this with what he seems to regard 
as an undesirable consequence of that argument, which even the objector 
 120 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 40C, p. 42, l. 214- 223: Omnis paternitas divina et filiatio 
data est et nobis et supercaelestibus virtutibus ex patriarchia ab omnibus segregata et fil-
iarchia: ex qua, et di et deorum filii, patres et deiformes fiunt, et nominantur mentes, spirit-
ualiter videlicet tali paternitate et filiatione perfecta, hoc est incorporaliter, immaterialiter, 
intelligibiliter […]. Cf. Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 2.8, 645C.
 121 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 40C, p. 42, l. 214- 227: Hoc expresse vult Dionysius 
Platonicus 2 cap. De divinis nominibus, ubi dicit: ‘Pater quidem est fontana deitatis […].’ 
Hermes etiam Trismegistus in prima regula theologica idem videtur intendere […]. Cf. 
Expositio, 21F, p. 86, l. 374- 381: Ex praedictis verbis Dionysii manifestum est in thearchica 
processione divinarum personarum ordinem naturae sive naturalis originis incipere sive 
principiari, si ita licet dicere, in superaeterna emanatione a Patre, qui est fons supersub-
stantialis deitatis sive fontana deitas, qui etiam secundum Trismegistum et Alanum dicitur 
unitas in eo, quod Pater est principium, non de principio. Et sic ‘unitas (scilicet Pater) gignit 
monadem (id est Filium, qui est principium de principio) et in se suum reflectit ardorem (scil-
icet Spiritum sanctum, qui est amor et nexus Patris et Filii)’. Dionysius is also cited alongside 
the Hermetic Liber in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 64C, p. 194, l. 56- 59; 137A, p. 15, 
l. 24 – p. 16, l. 36; and 141D, p. 48, l. 122 – p. 49, l. 143.
 122 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 40C, p. 42, l. 235- 236: Nec valet instantia, qua posset dici, 








would want to avoid: if respective distinction removes unity in the Good, so 
must it also compromise the unity of the gods.123 Perhaps his imagined inter-
locutor was an interpreter of Proclus who, like Dietrich of Freiberg, had identi-
fied the gods with the separate intellects.124 Such an interpreter would indeed 
be unwilling to compromise the real simplicity of the separate intellects (even 
though they are constituted out of multiple formal intentions), for this would 
undermine the identity of their essence with their operation. Berthold and 
anonymous objector shared the assumption that the gods and/ or the separate 
intellects are simple and self- reflexive. Both sides of the dispute would agree 
that self- reflexivity is so intimately related to the fecundity of the separate 
principles that the objection must be ruled out.
Once it is granted that God and the primordial causes can be triune and 
yet simple, Berthold considered another objection arguing that, since he has 
affirmed a respective distinction in the gods but a distinction of persons in the 
Trinity, he has effectively made the gods simpler than the Trinity.125 This led 
Berthold to posit a basic but nevertheless crucial explanation of the difference 
between God and the gods that undergirds the entire metaphysics of first prin-
ciples in the Expositio. He replied by pointing out that this respective distinc-
tion in the gods is in fact a sign of each their limitation: each god has a nature 
that is “supposited” (suppositata) because it depends on the Good as an effi-
cient cause, and thus receives from outside itself its causal power to produce. 
It is in this sense, at the conclusion of 40F, that he will argue that the notion of 
the self- constituted “primarily” pertains to the self- sufficient gods, which are 
self- sufficient and limited as “good” but superabundant in their unique formal 
intentions, and not to God himself who is the superabundant Good.126 This 
was the basis for Berthold’s attempt in the commentum to offer an acceptable 
interpretation of the letter of Proposition 40 in the face of Proclus’ outright 
denial of self- constitution to the One.127
 123 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 40C, p. 42, l. 237- 239: Et praeterea, si distinctio respectiva 
adimeret unum in prime bono, ergo et in bonitatibus, quarum quaelibet est unum et bonum 
per essentiam secundum auctorem.
 124 See n. 170- 172, below.
 125 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 40C, p. 42, l. 239 – p. 43, l. 251. Cf. Expositio, 28B, p. 175, 
l. 136- 138: In prima [Trinitas], natura est ratio producendi, sed ipsum respectivum est pro-
ducens; in secunda productione natura absoluta suppositata est producens, sed bonum est 
ratio producendi.
 126 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 40F, p. 44, l. 283- 288.
 127 Berthold incorrectly attributed to Proclus the notion that the archetypes exist in the mind 
of the Good. See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 164D, p. 32, l. 58- 9: Huic etiam alludit 
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As much as Berthold relied on Thomas of York, Dietrich of Freiberg, and 
his Hermetic sources for his understanding of Platonic Trinitarian theology, 
he was equally indebted to his Eriugenian sources like the Clavis physicae, the 
glosses on Dionysius that he attributed to Maximus, the Liber de causis primis 
et secundis, and the Homilia on John’s Prologue for his explanation of how 
the gods arose within the Word and in what sense they are subordinate to the 
One. The doxographical outlook of the Expositio was thoroughly informed by 
Berthold’s assumption that the author of the Clavis, supposedly Theodorus the 
abbot of Constantinople, was heir to a tradition of Dionysian theology that 
included commentators like Maximus, who transmitted teachings handed 
down from the Apostles.128 This tradition, in Berthold’s view, had reconciled 
the divine names of Dionysius with Augustine’s doctrine of the divine ideas.129 
With this pedigree, Eriugena’s synthesis of the Greek Fathers with Augustine in 
his doctrine of the primordial causes, which both remain within and proceed 
from the Word, became the Platonism that would unite Dionysius, Augustine, 
Proclus, and Boethius in Berthold’s Expositio.130
esse omnes species et specierum numerum’. For Proclus, the conditor is the Demiurge, who 
belongs to the lowest triad of intellectual gods.
 128 Honorius Augustodunensis, Clavis physicae, c. 69, p. 48, l. 4- 5: Maximus philosophus tradit 
a successoribus apostolorum omnium que sunt quinquepertitam divisionem […].
 129 E.g., John Scotus Eriugena, Periphyseon, ed. É. Jeauneau (Turnhout: Brepols, 1996- 2002), 
lib. ii, 616C, p. 125, l. 3168- 3191: Sunt igitur primordiales causae, quas rerum omnium prin-
cipia diuini sapientes appellant, per se ipsam bonitas, per se ipsam essentia, per se ipsam 
uita […]. Sed ne quis aestimet quae de primordialibus causis diximus nullius auctoritatis 
munimine fulciri, quaedam ex libro sancti patris Dionysii De diuinis nominibus huic operi 
inserere non incongruum duximus. Cf. Gersh, “The Content and Method of Platonic 
Philosophy”, p. 497: “Clearly Berthold could not have worked out so successfully the rap-
prochement between Proclean noetic principles, Pseudo- Dionysian divine attributes, and 
Augustinian eternal reasons without recourse to the Eriugenian doctrine of primordial 
causes and their effects”. That Eriugenism was so instrumental in bridging the Platonisms 
of Dionysius and Proclus confirms the verdict of J. Trouillard, “Érigène et la théophanie 
créatrice”, in J.J. O’Meara, L. Bieler (eds), The Mind of Eriugena (Dublin: Irish University 
Press for the Royal Irish Academy, 1973), p. 98– 113, at p. 98: “Quand on a le bonheur de 
lire Jean Scot Érigène, on est surpris de découvrir […] une telle puissance de pensée et 
d’expression. Celle- ci lui de réinventer, à travers des documents mineurs, plusieurs des 
intuitions les plus originales du néoplatonisme”.
 130 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 176C, p. 163, l. 206 – p. 164, l. 213: Verum ut ista diver-
sitas [specierum] excludatur, sciendum, quod principale exemplar simplex est intra 
omnium causam, scilicet prime Deum sive eius mentem secundum Dionysium, Augustinum, 
Boethium et Platonem cum suis sequacibus, ut iam diffuse ostensum est, exemplaria vero sub 
primo principali exemplari, quae et ipsa dicuntur et sunt causae primordiales rerum sicut 
ipsi dii, non quod prime Deus ad extra respiciat in universum producendo, sed quia in eis et 








When Berthold read William of Moerbeke’s translation of the Elementatio 
theologica, he found a text inherently amenable to this doctrine of the primor-
dial causes. Moerbeke used the adjective primordialis eight times to translate 
ἀρχικός, ἀρχηγικός, and πρωτουργός.131 Of these eight cases, seven resulted in 
the syntagm primordialis causa or primordialis unitas. Berthold was attentive 
to these occurrences and sometimes cross- referenced the relevant proposi-
tions,132 and used Eriugenian sources for four of them (Propositions 64, 97, 
121, and 125). In seven of the eight propositions, Dionysius also featured prom-
inently in Berthold’s comments, even though the terms primordialis causa and 
primordialis unitas were completely absent from the Corpus Dionysiacum.133 
As Robert Crouse has shown, this terminology in Eriugena derived from 
Augustine’s De Genesi ad litteram (lib. vi, c. 10, §17) and from Bede’s De natura 
rerum.134 Augustine was likely the source for the syntagm primordialis causa 
in Hugh of St. Victor,135 Peter Abelard, and Peter Lombard’s Sentences (lib. ii, 
d. 18, c. 5), and, through them, in the works of Alexander of Hales, Albert the 
 131 Propositions 64, 70, 71, 97, 113 comm., 115 comm., 121 comm., 125 comm.
 132 For example, Expositio, 70D and 113F.
 133 In certain editions of the Corpus, these terms would have appeared through Thomas 
Gallus’ Extractio, in Dionysiaca, ed. P. Chevallier, 2 vols (Brugge: Desclée de Brouwer, 1937- 
1950), vol. 1, In De divinis nominibus, c. 5, p. 693, l. 340- 1: Et quod de his dixi, de aliis ideis 
sive archetypis (scilicet aeternis rationibus Verbi) sentiendum est: verbi gratia, per se bonitas, 
per se veritas, per se aeternitas, per se ipsa virtus, et similia quae simpliciter et aeternaliter 
consistunt in Verbo Dei et primordialiter causant omnia existentia. Inter antiquas autem 
causas primordialior est ipsum esse per se. […] Et invenies ipsas participationes primor-
dialius fundari in ipso esse. Cf. Thomas Gallus, Explanatio in libros Dionysii, ed. D. Lawell 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), p. 152, l. 953 – p. 153, l. 960: et vt nostris. Quia primordiales 
causalitates mentes nostras excedunt nec sufficimus effectus creatos ad illarum causarum 
infinalitatem digne conferre […]; p. 462, l. 115- 126: quia in Verbo Dei summe simplici conti-
nentur unitiue et simpliciter omnia exemplaria, et ita omnia exemplarium causata in eodem 
Verbo uniuntur […]. et illud vnvm, id est eterni Verbi unitas, est elementativvm, id est 
primordialiter causatiuum, omnivm.
 134 R. Crouse, “Primordiales Causae in Eriugena’s Interpretation of Genesis. Sources and 
Significance”, in G. Van Riel, C. Steel, J. McEvoy (eds), Iohannes Scottus Eriugena. The Bible 
and Hermeneutics. Proceedings of the Ninth International Colloquium of the Society for 
the Promotion of Eriugenian Studies Held at Leuven and Louvain- la- Neuve June 7- 10, 1995 
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), p. 209– 220.
 135 See Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis Christiane fidei, ed. R. Berndt (Münster i.W.: 
Aschendorff, 2008), lib. i, pars 2, c. 1- 3, 205B- 207D, p. 59, l. 2 – p. 62, l. 7, and Hugh’s earlier 
Sententiae de divinitate, translated in B.T. Coolman, D. Coulter (eds), Trinity and Creation. 
A Selection of Works of Hugh, Richard, and Adam of St Victor (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), p. 
140– 154. These texts are quite suggestive of an Eriugenian influence, and even criticise 
“some” who (wrongly interpreting Eriugena) would see the primordial causes as eternal 
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Great, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas. After Eriugena and Thomas Gallus, 
Albert, Aquinas, and Ulrich of Strassburg were among the few later authors to 
employ the terms explicitly in their treatments of Dionysius.136 With Berthold, 
this Eriugenian synthesis of Augustine and Dionysius reached a new degree of 
fruition.
Prologus 3- 5 set the tone for every subsequent discussion of the primordial 
causes in the Expositio. In these passages, Berthold first introduced his readers 
to the notion of primordial causes and went to great lengths to demonstrate 
how this terminology was faithful to Dionysius. According to Berthold, “the 
invisible things of God” can be taken in two ways, intransitively or transitively 
(intransitive vel transitive).137 Regarding their intransitive sense, Augustine and 
Dionysius were clearly in agreement. For Augustine, these invisible things are 
the eternal, unchangeable reasons in the Word (rationes aeternae et incommu-
tabiles in Verbo Dei Patris), which Dionysius called “exemplars pre- existing in 
God”.138
The situation for the invisibilia Dei understood transitively was more com-
plex. Berthold framed the discussion around De divinis nominibus 11.6, where 
Dionysius responded to a letter requesting clarification about what he meant 
when he sometimes said that God is life itself (per se vita) and, at other times, 
that God is the substantiator (substantificator) of life itself.139 Berthold will 
bring two more passages into play momentarily: De divinis nominibus 5.5 (read 
alongside the glosses of Maximus) and Epistula ii, which also treats the prob-
lem raised in the letter mentioned by Dionysius. Berthold began, however, by 
citing Thomas Gallus, the Eriugenian De causis primis et secundis (which he 
attributed to Al- Farabi), and finally Maximus. All three texts referred explicitly 
to Dionysius and, satisfying the demands of Berthold’s literal method, all three 
used the term invisibilia:
But if the invisible things of God are taken transitively, in this sense, 
according to Thomas Gallus commenting on  chapter 11 of On the 
 136 Albert the Great, Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, 5.24, p. 316, l. 64 – p. 317, l. 11; 
id., Summa theologiae, pars i, tr. 13, q. 55, m. 2, a. 1, p. 560a; Thomas Aquinas, In librum De 
divinis nominibus Expositio, c. 1, lect. 2, §72, p. 21; c. 2, lect. 1, §113, p. 39; c. 9, lect. 1, §807, 
p. 301.
 137 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 3, p. 7, l. 78.
 138 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 3, p. 8, l. 105 – p. 9, l. 120. Albert the Great presented 
the same dossier (Dionysius, Maximus, and Augustine): Summa theologiae, pars i, tr. 13, 
q. 55, m. 2, a. 1, p. 559b- 561b; id., Summa theologiae, pars ii, tr. 1, q. 4, m. 1, a. 2, p. 72a- 77a; 
id., In I Sententiarum, d. 35, a. 7, p. 189a- 191b.










Divine Names, ‘the divine Good is said to be the Substantiator’, namely, 
‘of his invisible things, which are the rays, so to speak, of superunified 
Goodness, such as per se being, per se life, and so on’. Al- Farabi discusses 
these invisible things in his treatise On the Cause of Causes, which begins, 
‘The Principle of principles’, and states the following: ‘Therefore, there 
are exemplars, the primary causes of things’. And below: ‘The first causes, 
because of their infinite diffusion over all things and the incomprehen-
sible height of the ineffable purity of their excellence, are not perceived 
by intellect, because they are not outside the First, who formed them in 
the principle.’ And below: ‘The invisible things are hidden away in the 
shadows of his excellence, but in their effects – brought forth, as it were, 
into a certain light of cognition – they ceaselessly appear’. Thus Al- Farabi. 
Concerning these primordial causes, which Dionysius calls ‘per se power’, 
‘per se being’ or ‘being- itself ’, etc., and ‘the principles of beings’, Dionysius 
himself says the following in  chapter 5 of On the Divine Names: ‘and 
being- itself is more ancient than per se life, and more ancient than per 
se wisdom’.140
Like Thomas Gallus, Berthold clearly stated that the Good is the cause of these 
principles or processions; we have already seen Berthold discuss this in terms 
of efficient causality. In On the Divine Names 5.5 he found the precedent for 
positing a rank among the primordial causes. But once again he will elaborate 
this beyond anything he would find explicitly in Dionysius.
Before this, however, Berthold cited the first Eriugenian text of the 
Expositio, the De causis primis et secundis. This text, in addition to explicitly 
harmonising Augustine and Dionysius (notwithstanding it attribution to Al- 
Farabi, which Berthold never questioned) offered the crucial description of 
 140 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 4, p. 9, l. 134- 149: Si vero accipiantur invisibilia Dei 
transitive, quorum secundum Vercellensem super 11 cap. Dionysii De divinis nominibus 
‘divina bonitas dicitur esse substantificatrix’, scilicet ‘suorum invisibilium quasi radiorum 
superunitae bonitatis, ut sunt per se esse, per se vita, etc.’ – de quibus invisibilibus prose-
quitur Alfarabius in libello De causa causarum, qui incipit: ‘Principium principiorum’, sic 
inquiens: ‘Sunt igitur exempla causae rerum primariae’; et infra: ‘Causae primae propter 
infinitatem super omnia diffusionem et incomprehensibilem altitudinem ineffabilis puritatis 
suae excellentiae nullo percipiuntur intellectu eo, quod non distant a primo, qui eas in princi-
pio formavit’; et infra: ‘Invisibiles res in tenebris excellentiae suae absconditae sunt, in effect-
ibus autem suis veluti in quandam lucem cognitionis prolatae non cessant comparere’: haec 
ille – , de istis causis primordialibus, quas Dionysius vocat ‘per se virtutem’, ‘per se esse’ seu 
‘secundum se esse’, et huiusmodi et ‘principia existentium’, sicit dicit ipse Dionysius 5 cap. De 
divinis nominibus: ‘Et est ipsum secundum se esse senius eo, quod est per se vitam esse, et eo, 
quod est per se sapientiam esse’.
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the two- sided and transitional nature of these exemplars.141 The passage he 
cited from the treatise derived ultimately from Periphyseon ii (550C- 551A and 
552A), which contained Eriugena’s commentary on the meaning of the “shad-
ows” and “abyss” in Genesis 1:2. A briefer version of this passage was taken 
over into the Clavis physicae, which Berthold marked with a marginal cross 
(ms Paris, BnF lat. 6734, f. 35v). Berthold’s text of the De causis primis et secun-
dis, however, as Ezequiel Ludueña observed, evidently included a phrase not 
found in the modern edition of Roland de Vaux or, for that matter, in the 
Clavis: the invisibilia are shadows and abysses diffusing through and above all 
things, and are unknowable “because they are not distant from the first” (eo, 
quod non distant a primo).142 This final clause allowed Berthold to account 
for the identity and distinction between the primordial causes and God, and 
to harmonise Dionysius with what he found, for example, in Propositions 123 
and 162 of the Elementatio theologica, which speak of the gods as hidden in 
their superior or unitive aspect but manifest in the character of the pluralities 
they produce. That is, as “good”, the primordial causes remain hidden in their 
source; as the cause of infinity, being, life, and so on, they are known from 
their effects.
Berthold gave a longer citation of the De causis primis et secundis in 
Proposition 56 (“Everything that is produced by secondary causes, is pro-
duced more eminently by prior and more efficacious causes, from which the 
 141 Al- Farabi must have been a complex figure in Berthold’s mind. As the supposed author 
of De causis primis et secundis, he deserves the highest praise for describing the rela-
tion of the primordial causes to God in precise terms. However, as the supposed author 
of the Liber de causis, which categorically affirms that the “first of created things is 
being”, he must belong with “unlearned” who are “sealed off in beings”. See the table of 
Philosophi famosi in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, p. 4, l. 40- 41: Alfarabius De causa 
causarum / item De causis; and 71D, p. 35, l. 123- 127, cited above in Introduction, section 
3, n. 150. Cf. Expositio, 57B, p. 150, l. 94- 96: Licet etiam ista sint subtilius dicta prius et 
secundum intentionem auctoris De causis, tamen non sunt de absoluta consideratione 
istius auctoris, qui non ponit causas primarias proprie nisi ipsas bonitates propter earum 
simplicitatem.
 142 Ludueña, La recepción de Eriúgena, p. 328– 338. Cf. Honorius Augustodunensis, Clavis 
physicae, c. 86, p. 61, l. 3- 6: que abyssus dicuntur propter incomprehensibilem altitudinem 
infinitamque sui per omnia diffusionem, que nullo percipitur sensu, nullo comprehenditur 
intellectu, tenebre autem propter ineffabilis sue puritatis excellentiam. See also De causis 
primis et secundis et de fluxu qui consequitur eas, ed. R. de Vaux, Notes et textes sur l’avicen-
nisme latin aux confins des XIIe- XIIIe siècles, c. 2, p. 92, l. 12- 16: cause rerum prime propter 
infinitam sui diffusionem et incomprehensibilem altitudinem et ineffabilis puritatis excellen-
tiam, nullo percipiuntur intellectu, excepto illo qui eas in principio formavit. Since Berthold 
could have modified the parallel passage in the Clavis to suit this purpose, one can assume 







secondary causes were produced”),143 which clarified his interpretation of this 
passage:
After Al- Farabi shows that [1] the exemplars of all things exist in the first 
wisdom, in which all things are known as in their first exemplars, just as 
things caused are known in their first causes, he immediately says what 
these are: [2] ‘The exemplars are, therefore, the first causes of things’. And 
below: [3] The first cause was never ‘without the first causes of things 
that were made in it’. And shortly thereafter: ‘The first causes, because of 
their infinite diffusion over all things and the incomprehensible height 
of the ineffable purity of their excellence, are not perceived by intellect, 
because they are not outside the First, who formed them in the principle’. 
[4] This is because in their effects or in their processions into intelligible 
forms, only their existence is known, not their essence, and [5] thus the 
primary causes come forth in those things, of which they are the causes, 
and they do not leave the first, namely, wisdom.144
This specifies [1] that the exemplars of all things exist in the divine mind, [2] 
that these exemplars are the first causes of things, and [3] that the first cause 
was never without these primordial causes made in it.145 All of this would apply 
to the intransitive sense of invisibilia that denotes the living, eternal reasons 
of things existing in the Word. Their transitive aspect came into view when 
Berthold wrote [4] that from the phenomenal world of intelligible forms, spe-
cies, and definitions, one can only infer that these causes exist without grasping 
their quiddity. [5] Therefore, the primary causes are manifest in their effects 
but do not depart from the wisdom or mind of God. The epistemological point 
 143 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 56, p. 30, l. 1- 3: Omne quod a secundis producitur et a 
prioribus et a causalioribus producitur eminentius, a quibus et secunda producebantur.
 144 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 56D, p. 144, l. 137 – p. 145, l. 148: Postquam ostendit 
[Alfarabius] [1] in prima sapientia esse omnium rerum exempla, in quibus sicut primis 
exemplis sciuntur omnia sicut causata in primis causis, statim subinfert, quid sint talia 
exempla dicens: [2] ‘Sunt igitur exempla causae rerum primariae’. Et infra: [3] Causa prima 
numquam fuit ‘sine prioribus rerum causis in se factis’. Et parum infra: ‘Causae primae 
propter infinitam super omnia diffusionem et incomprehensibilem altitudinem ineffabilis 
puritatis suae excellentiae nullo percipiuntur intellectu eo, quod non distant a primo, qui 
eas in principio formavit’. [4] Quod autem in effectibus, hoc est in processionibus earum in 
formas intelligibiles cognoscuntur solummodo, quia sunt, non autem, quid sunt, et [5] sic 
principales causae in ea, quorum sunt causae, proveniunt, et primum, id est sapientiam, non 
reliquunt.
 145 See also Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 99H, p. 202, l. 152- 159, where the primordial 
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at [4] brings us to the cusp of the transition from the intransitive, archetypi-
cal world and the transitive procession of creatures. In this way, the De causis 
primis et secundis has provided the basic insight about the primordial causes 
that Berthold will elaborate with principles derived from Propositions 64 and 
65.146 The Good (causaliter) is properly diffusive only of goods (bonitates per 
essentiam and bonitates per participationem) while these goods are in turn the 
causes that strengthen the irradiations of the Good that are too weak to subsist 
by themselves. Like the Good, the gods are only known imperfectly by their 
processions.147 But since each god generates its own more limited “universe” 
by a superabundance of a formal intention, it is in fact better known than the 
Good.148 According to Berthold’s theory of formal intentions, a primordial 
cause is one in re et intentione with what it essentially participates, namely, the 
Good itself.149 The notion of a unitas or bonitas per essentiam thus can serve 
the transitional function of being both a transcendent principle as a formal 
cause (identical with the One- Good as unum or bonum) but, insofar as it is an 
effect of the One- Good as an efficient cause (a god is not bonitas per causam 
but per essentiam), it has a limited or supposited nature. This duality explains 
how each god initiates its own characteristic intention from itself – the nearer 
a bonitas per essentiam is to the One, the greater the influence of its causal 
 146 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 13.3 was Berthold’s preferred text for showing that 
Dionysius held that intention of “one” or “good” subsists in three modes. See Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio, 113E, p. 37, l. 157 – p. 38, l. 160: Et attende diligenter, quod sic enucle-
ate distinguit [Dionysius] triplex unum, scilicet prime unum, quod vocat supersubstantiale 
unum et omnium causam, et existens unum, scilicet primo et per se unum, supra quod dicit 
esse prime unum sicut terminans ipsum, et quod est participans unum. See also, for exam-
ple, Expositio, 1D, p. 77, l. 226 – p. 78, l. 246; 5D, p. 120, l. 245 – p. 121, l. 282; 64F, p. 197, 
l. 149- 154.
 147 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 162I, p. 21, l. 183 – p. 22, l. 188.
 148 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 123L, p. 133, l. 295 – p. 135, l. 348.
 149 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 2B, p. 84, l. 97- 9: Quoddam enim participans et quo essen-
tialiter participat, id est participans et participatum, sunt unum re et intentione. Et est sum-
mus modus participandi conveniens solum primordialibus causis. See also Expositio, 125D, 
p. 149, l. 83- 120: omne activum prius natura transfunditur in se ipso, quam redundet ad extra 
[…], ideo interior emanatio in ipsis diis est ratio et causa emicationis sive processus causalis, 
qua de occulto supersubstantialis unionis quilibet deus emicat se ipsum. […] Sic ergo ‘omnis 
deus existens unitas per se perfecta’ per 114 et ‘primordialis causa’ per 97 tradendo ‘universo 
ordini’ suo propriam ‘proprietatem’ […]. Et hoc est, quod dicit Theodorus in Clave loquens 
de primordialibus causis: ‘Primae causae in se ipsis unum sunt et simplices nullique cognitio 
ordine definitae aut a se invicem segregatae: haec enim in effectibus suis partiuntur. […] 
primordiales causae in principio omnium, scilicet in Verbo Dei, unum simplex atque indi-
viduum sunt, dum vero in effectus suos in infinitum multiplicatos procedunt’; 117C, p. 69, 










efficacy.150 By distinguishing each primordial cause (e.g., per se esse, per se vir-
tus) as good from its intention as causal primordial principle, Berthold found 
an elegant account of the relation of God’s wisdom to its processions that did 
not reify one apart from the other but preserved their dynamic relationship.
After citing the De causis primis et secundis in Prologus 4, Berthold cited a 
lengthy Eriugenian gloss to De divinis nominibus 5.5, in which the primordial 
causes are identified with the divine ideas and the processions.151 This com-
ment, under the authority of Maximus, provided the crucial terminological 
equivalency between causae primordiales, ideae, formae aeternae, principalia 
exempla, situated these in the Word prior to the multiplying work of the Holy 
Spirit, and concluded by placing the entire doctrine under the shared author-
ity of Dionysius and Plato.152 Not only was the Triune nature of God known to 
Plato, but so was the view that there are primordial causes that arise within the 
Trinitarian processions that will refract its causality.
Berthold then turned to De divinis nominibus 11.6 and the question of God’s 
relation to these causes or per se principles.153 A feature of Dionysius’ text pru-
dently omitted by Berthold was the critique of the view that the cause of life, 
for example, is “a deity besides the super- divine life”. Dionysius had explicitly 
denied that these principles of beings are “creative substances and persons, 
which [some] called the gods of beings and per se active creators”.154 Berthold 
 150 The Clavis had not emphasised the internal division in each primordial cause into a crea-
tive and a created aspect. See S. Gersh, “Honorius Augustodunensis and Eriugena. Remarks 
on the Method and Content of the Clavis Physicae”, in W. Beierwaltes (ed.), Eriugena redi-
vivus. Zur Wirkungsgeschichte seines Denkens im Mittelalter und im Übergang zur Neuzeit. 
Vorträge des V. Internationalen Eriugena- Colloquiums, Werner- Reimers- Stiftung, Bad 
Homburg, 26.- 30. August 1985 (Heidelberg: Winter, 1987), p. 162– 173. Berthold’s interpre-
tation of the De causis primis et secundis and its phrase eo, quod non distant a primo thus 
brought him closer to Eriugena himself than the Clavis could.
 151 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 4, p. 10, l. 155- 174. Cf. Eriugena, Periphyseon, lib. ii, 
615D- 617A, p. 124, l. 3142- 3188, and Honorius Augustodunensis, Clavis physicae, c. 116, p. 85, 
l. 4 – p. 86, l. 39. Another portion of Clavis c. 116 was used concerning participation at 2A, 
but it is only cited in full at Expositio, 128A, p. 166, l. 12 – p. 167, l. 57, alongside De divinis 
nominibus, 5.8- 9 on the exemplars in God.
 152 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 4, p. 10, l. 165- 169: ‘Ideae a philosophis divinae vol-
untates appellari solent et praecipue a Platonicis, quoniam quaecumque voluit Deus facere, 
in ipsis principaliter et causaliter fecit’. Et infra: ‘Has formas sive ideas Dionysius ceterique 
sancti appellant per se ipsam bonitas, per se ipsam essentia […]’.
 153 Coincidentally, in Periphyseon, lib. ii, 617A- C, immediately following the passage that 
became the source for the scholium just mentioned, Eriugena also appealed to the 
authority of Dionysius and cited De divinis nominibus, 11.6 at length. This was not taken 
over into the Clavis.
 154 For this reason, Albert the Great, Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, 11.27, p. 424, l. 80 – 











Exstasis divini amoris 233
preferred to cite and slightly modify Dionysius’ positive statement that imme-
diately followed: being itself (per se esse) can be said divinely and causally 
(divine et causaliter) of God himself, and divinely and participably (divine 
participabiliter) of the providential powers of the unparticipable God.155 
This would correspond neatly to Berthold’s own distinction of intransitive 
and transitive invisibilia. The primordial causes as intransitive are the divine 
wisdom or the archetypical world and are one (unum in re) with the divine 
essence. But as causes, they are transitive, and are the Good as “divinely par-
ticipable”. In this passage, Dionysius had reported the teaching of some of his 
“divine, holy masters”:156 they called the substantificator of per se bonitas and 
per se deitas “the Beyond- good” (superbona) and “the Beyond- deity” (super-
dea), and called per se bonitas itself “the beneficent and deifying gift coming 
from God”.157 As Berthold interpreted him, Dionysius had thus posited some 
form of a subordination of these principles to God. Berthold presented this 
interpretation as consistent with Dionysius’ Epistula ii to Gaius, which out-
lined how God is above the “thearchy” – taken as a synonym for the primordial 
causes, deities, goodnesses and beneficent, deifying gifts of the unparticipable 
God.158
and the Platonists. Thomas Aquinas, In Librum De divinis nominibus Expositio, c. 11, lect. 4, 
§931- 933, p. 346, also interpreted this passage as a critique of the Platonists. See V. Boland, 
Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas Aquinas. Sources and Synthesis (Leiden: Brill, 
1996), p. 299– 303; Hankey, “The Concord”, p. 163– 169.
 155 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 4, p. 10, l. 179- 180. Ludueña, La recepción de 
Eriúgena, p. 343– 7, has noted a crucial variant: where Saracen’s translation reads par-
ticipaliter autem datas ex deo imparticipabili provisivas virtutes, Berthold has divine vero 
participabiliter datas. As Ludueña indicated, participabiliter appears in Albert the Great, 
Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, 11.27, p. 424, l. 74 and p. 425, l. 41. Berthold’s only 
other citations of De divinis nominibus, 11.6 – in Expositio, 63B, p. 187, l. 35 – p. 188, l. 52; and 
113A, p. 34, l. 35- 44 – both read particulariter, although this may be the result of a copyist’s 
error. Berthold’s passing reference to De divinis nominibus, 11.6 at Expositio, 23A, p. 113, 
l. 55- 57 suggests that he generally intended participabiliter as the correct reading.
 156 Albert the Great, Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, 11.29, p. 425, l. 66- 68, and Thomas 
Aquinas, In Librum De divinis nominibus Expositio, c. 11, lect. 4, §938, identified these indi-
viduals with Hierotheus and other disciples of the Apostles.
 157 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 4, p. 11, l. 186- 196.
 158 Albert’s comments on the Epistle focus on the problem of deification, and how deitas can 
be regarded as both created and uncreated. His solution distinguishes between the formal 
and efficient senses of “the principle of deification”. God is said to be above the formal 
principle which is “the [created] participation of deity assimilating to God through grace 
or glory”, while he is identical with the thearchy as the efficient cause of deity. See Albert 
the Great, Super Dionysii Epistulas, Epistula ii, p. 483, l. 49- 58. For Berthold, Epistula ii 
referred to the self- sufficient gods (deus per essentiam) as formal causes and to their 










Since Berthold was of course aware of Dionysius’ outright rejection of any 
deity besides (praeter) God, he knew he must tread lightly. He would explicitly 
invoke the Proclean term “gods” for the first time only after citing the Psalms 
95:3 and 97:9 that praise God as “far exalted above all gods”, and in Psalm 50:1 
as the Lord of gods (Deus deorum dominus), and after citing Paul, who subordi-
nated “the gods in heaven and earth” to “our one God and Father, from whom 
are all things and we in him, and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all 
things and we through him” (1 Cor. 8:5- 6).159 The same gods mentioned by Paul 
(isti di), Berthold declared, are for Proclus “beyond beings and the measures of 
being, for every being is in them as number is in the monads, though beings 
proceed from them”. Then there followed the pivotal text from De decem dubi-
tationibus 10.63, where Proclus used the same principle found in Proposition 
64 to establish that “one” and “good” exists in three ways: according to cause, 
existence, and participation.
Berthold anticipated that his readers would be uncomfortable with admit-
ting the existence of “gods by essence”. He invoked Boethius’ remarkable argu-
ment in the Consolatio philosophiae that everyone in bliss is god (omnis beatus 
deus) to illustrate how there can be one God “by nature” and many gods as you 
please “by participation”. “If you object”, Berthold remarked, “that therefore 
there are [still] no gods by essence, I say that this does not follow, since every 
god by essence participates deity because it does not have deity in its supera-
bundance”.160 The gods are subordinate to the immediate efficient causality of 
the Good – they participate or limit its superabundance – and do so in such 
a way that they are not distant from the first. That is, as formal causes consti-
tuted out of the single intention of “one” or “good” they refract the divine Light 
by proportionately exercising the same spontaneous and generative activity 
of the Good. In this way, Berthold’s original interpretation of his Eriugenian 
sources (especially the Liber de causis primis et secundis) in terms of the dis-
tinction of formal intentions (“good”, “infinite”, etc.) and the relation between 
formal and efficient causality established the accord of Proclus and Dionysius 
on one of the central themes for the Elementatio theologica that would be most 
difficult for his contemporaries to accept: the existence of primordial causes 
that are divine by their essence.
At the heart of Berthold’s determinedly Platonic approach to the separate 
substances was Proposition 65 (“Everything that subsists in any way, subsists 
principaliformiter according to cause, or according to essence, or according to 
 159 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 4, p. 12, l. 218- 226.
 160 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 4, p. 13, l. 248- 250. In 2A, p. 83, l. 48- 53, this limita-





Exstasis divini amoris 235
participation in an exemplary way”).161 The same idea appeared also in Proclus’ 
proof to Proposition 140, which Dietrich of Freiberg had cited as the exhaustive 
enumeration of the possible modes of any essential order.162 For Berthold, the 
principle is “so obvious that it is in no need of proof”.163 Berthold’s elaboration 
of Dietrich’s theory, after it has been subjected to the Platonic critique of the 
universality of abstraction and the metaphysics of being, would be impossi-
ble without this principle, which provided the law of proportionality that cap-
tured the way in which the separate substances must be truly ordered among 
themselves, independently of our thinking.
It was with these principles from Propositions 62- 66, having established 
for the first time in the Prologus that the primordial causes or gods were in 
fact posited by both Proclus and Dionysius, that Berthold schematised the 
array of separate substances.164 As the final link in his catena of citations from 
Gallus, the De causis primis et secundis, the glosses of Maximus, Dionysius, the 
Scriptures, and Proclus, Berthold gave a heavily glossed citation of De divinis 
nominibus 11.6 and interpolated the entire population of natural providence 
into the Areopagite’s text, from the six primordial causes, to their orders, to the 
self- subsistent members of those orders, and finally their participants. Despite 
his efforts to show that this simply was the common teaching of Proclus and 
Dionysius, Berthold’s proportional reasoning about the relationship between 
God’s unlimited causal influence and the limited influence of primordial 
causes in their partial universes was the teaching for which he himself will 
be cited in an anonymous commentary on the Sentences from 14th- century 
Regensburg.165
 161 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 65, p. 35, l. 1- 3: Omne quod qualitercumque subsistit 
aut secundum causam est principaliformiter aut secundum existentiam aut secundum par-
ticipationem exemplariter.
 162 Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, ii.1.2, p. 146, l. 14- 19: Plures modos non 
invenimus in essentialiter ordinatis; ii.7.4, p. 151, l. 66- 73. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 
65F, p. 204, l. 109- 114, concluded by finding this logical triad also in Dionysius, Epistula 
ix.2, 1108B.
 163 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 74C, p. 54, l. 137- 142: Ubi primo notandum et quasi pro 
fundamento ponendum, quod omne, quod qualitercumque subsistit, aut secundum causam 
principaliformiter aut secundum essentiam aut secundum participationem exemplariter 
per 65. Sed species, de qua agitur, subsistit tam in causa principaliformiter quam in par-
ticipantibus exemplariter, et hoc vere et secundum rem. Hoc enim ita manifestum est, quod 
etiam non indigent probatione.
 164 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 4- 5, p. 12, l. 227 – p. 13, l. 263. Proclus, De decem dubi-
tationibus circa providentiam, q. 10, §63 yields Propositions 64 and 65 (l. 231- 242); Berthold 
applied Proposition 65 to Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, lib. iii, prosa 10 (l. 243- 250), 
and Propositions 62 and 66 to Dionysius (l. 254- 263).












Just as Berthold used these Eriugenian sources to establish the subtle 
boundary between God and the highest of his works, so he also employed the 
Clavis to account for the dynamic presence of the Good as it moves through 
these causes or instruments of its causality:
Divine goodness and essence and life and wisdom and everything, which 
are in the font of all, first flow forth into the primordial causes and make 
them to be, then through the primordial causes into their effects in an 
ineffable way.166
That is, the same Good courses through all things providentially. Since these 
causes, insofar as they are unities or goodnesses, are not strictly other than 
God, “in a broad sense” God is said to become (fieri) through them in his prov-
idential and creative procession (processus seu exitus). The procession of a 
cause “from the secrets of its eminence into an effect” is said not only of the 
primordial causes, “which are said to be made [fieri], since they essentially 
multiply themselves in their effects,” but also of “God by his providence […] 
as Dionysius says in the Letter to Titus”.167 In this respect, Dionysius’ twofold 
usage of the term “procession” (effects proceed from a cause; a cause proceeds 
into its effects),168 was transmitted to Berthold through his Eriugenian sources. 
This is what undergirded his view about the ineffability at the depth of each 
thing (usia) by virtue of its immediate relation to the Good.169
 166 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 18B, p. 47, l. 112- 5 = Honorius Augustodunensis, Clavis 
physicae, c. 126, p. 94, l. 13- 6.
 167 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 3A, p. 92, l. 14- 19: tunc est processus seu exitus rei existen-
tis in actu ex secretis suae eminentiae in effectum, et sic non solum causae primordiales 
dicuntur fieri, cum se ipsas per essentiam multiplicant in effectus, sed etiam Deus ipse sua 
providentia, quae ‘perfecta est’, ut dicit Dionysius in Epistula ad Titum, quae est causa, ut 
sint omnia, et ad omnia procedit et in omni fit et continet omnia.
 168 S. Gersh, “Ideas and Energies in Pseudo- Dionysius the Areopagite”, in Studia Patristica 
15(1984), p. 297– 300.
 169 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 120D, p. 98, l. 255 – p. 99, l. 268: Non est autem alia prov-
identia omnium et alia causa omnium, sed unus atque idem Deus, qui in omnia procedit et 
in omni fit […]. Lux ineffabilis omnibus intellectualibus oculis semper praesens et a nullo 
intellectu cognoscitur, quid sit, per omnia diffusa in infinitum et fit in omnibus omnia; 120E, 
p. 100, l. 306- 8: Deus ex superessentialitate suae naturae, qua dicitur non esse primum 
descendens, in primordialibus causis a se ipso creatur et fit principium omnis essentiae; 
123M, p. 136, l. 367- 382: Dum ergo incomprehensibilis intelligitur, per excellentiam nihilum 
non immerito vocatur; atvero suis theophaniis incipiens apparere, veluti ex nihilo dicitur ali-
quid procedere, et quae proprie super omnem essentiam existimatur, proprie quoque in omni 
essentia cognoscitur. […] Ipse factor omnium in omnibus factus. On the ineffability of usia, 
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This Platonic consensus on the Trinity and the primordial causes was the 
standard Berthold used when he incorporated Dietrich of Freiberg’s notion of 
the essentially active intellect (intellectus in actu per essentiam) as an imago 
Trinitatis into his commentary. Dietrich had used this notion explicitly to 
interpret what Proclus meant by the gods in the Elementatio theologica.170 
According to Dietrich, when Proclus spoke of “gods” he simply appropriated 
the term to “inferior substances, namely the intelligences”, in order to indicate 
that the One was beyond the names “intellect” and “god”.171 Berthold departed 
from Dietrich by assimilating Proclus’ gods to the primordial causes or divine 
processions of Dionysius and not to the intelligences of the Liber de causis.172 
This coincided with Berthold’s extensive elaboration of one of Dietrich’s own 
conceptual inventions, the notion that a certain set of separate substances can 
be understood ontologically as beings existing as a species (entia secundum 
speciem). Adopting this notion, Berthold will argue for the subordination of 
the separate intellects to the gods considered in terms of their constitutive 
formal intentions: the gods are constituted by one formal intention (“one” or 
“good”), and the intelligences out of many (“good”, “power”, “being”, “life”, and 
“intellect”). But this clear subordination of intelligences to the gods accord-
ing to the dictates of Platonic reasoning came at the cost of a proliferation of 
separate principles that then must exist between the gods and intelligences 
(the orders of separately subsisting “infinities”, “beings”, and “lives”). These we 
found enumerated in the table at 62C, but now we will look more closely at 
Berthold’s justification for positing their existence.
 170 Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, i.7.1, p. 140, l. 21- 28: illae intellectuales sub-
stantiae, quas philosophi intelligentias vocabant, de quibus agitur in Libro de causis et in 
libro Procli, quas in pluribus locis illius libri deos nominat, quamvis secundum diminutam 
et imperfectam rationem deitatis, sicut etiam Philosophus in xii Metaphysicae approbat 
dictum illorum, qui vocabant principia moventia caelos, vocabant, inquam, deos secundum 
diminutam et imperfectam rationem deitatis.
 171 Dietrich of Freiberg, De cognitione entium separatorum, 9.2, p. 175, l. 70 – p. 176, l. 81: Unde 
attendendo hanc Dei immensitatem Proclus in libro suo superordinavit omnibus intellect-
ibus et secundum substantiam et secundum operationem quadam inexplicabili positiva 
nominis proprietate essentiam divinam dicens propositione 20: ‘[…] et omnibus intellec-
tualibus hypostasibus superius ipsum unum’. Ecce, caruit nomine positivo, quo exprimeret 
illam summam essentiam, quae Deus est, caruit, inquam, secundum intentionem suam, nec 
suffecit sibi nomen intellectus, immo nec nomen Dei, quae duo nomina appropriate infe-
rioribus substantiis, id est intelligentiis, in processu eiusdem libri sui propositione 121[125], 
130[134], 136[140], 141[145], et ibi in commento, ubi dicitur: ‘Plena autem sunt omnia diis, et 
quod unumquodque habet secundum naturam, inde habet’.
 172 E. Ludueña, “Creatio y determinatio en la Escuela Renana. De Alberto Magno a Bertoldo 








4 Limit and the Unlimited
Moving below the thearchy (God and the gods) to the numerous orders 
of entities that Berthold posited in the realm of being (from infinities to 
human nature) above the realm of becoming (nature and human individu-
als), we are immediately confronted with the question of the relationship 
between the creative causality of the One and the determinative causality 
exercised by the first of the primordial causes. Berthold identified this pri-
mordial cause – the prima unitas as distinct from the prime unitas or “the 
primarily God” – as “infinity” or the Unlimited. In so doing, he proposed a 
solution to a puzzle that has vexed Proclus’ medieval and modern interpret-
ers, namely, how to produce a coherent account of the relationship between 
the pair of Limit and the Unlimited (πέρας- ἄπειρον), discussed mostly in 
Propositions 89- 92, and the gods. Proclus’ most explicit statement about 
their relation in the Elementatio theologica at Proposition 159 (“Every order 
of gods is from the first principles, Limit and the Unlimited, but some relate 
more to the causes of Limit, others to the causes of the Unlimited”),173 has 
left his commentators from the time of Nicholas of Methone (d. 1160/ 1166) 
somewhat baffled, since it would seem to locate these two principles some-
where between the One and the gods, whose relation to the One was sup-
posedly immediate.174
As the situation has been recently described by Jonathan Greig, there are two 
problems that confront Proclus’ interpreters on this point.175 The first concerns 
the reconciliation of two apparently distinct causal models: one in which each 
supersubstantial god unites a series of entities that emerge from it and share 
its unique characteristic, and another in which Limit and the Unlimited are 
the immediate causes of the mixture of Being. The second problem is to avoid 
an undesirable consequence that could be drawn from in Proposition 159: if 
the orders arising from the gods are composed of Limit and the Unlimited, this 
would entail at least some composition in the gods themselves as principles of 
those orders. If so, this would mean that the gods are not in fact pure unities.176 
 173 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 159, p. 78, l. 1- 2: Omnis ordo deorum ex primis est 
principiis, fine et infinitate; sed hic quidem ad finis causas magis, hic autem ad infinitatis.
 174 See E.R. Dodds’ commentary to Proposition 159, in Proclus, The Elements of Theology, ed. 
E.R. Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19632), p. 281.
 175 See J. Greig, “Proclus on the Two Causal Models for the One’s Production of Being. 
Reconciling the Relation of the Henads and the Limit/ Unlimited”, in The International 
Journal of the Platonic Tradition 14(2020), p. 23– 48, at p. 23– 28.
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Let us call the first the “integration” problem, and the second the “simplicity” 
problem.
Although Berthold did not directly raise these questions, we will see that 
they nevertheless provide a helpful way of summarising the advantages and 
shortcomings in his interpretation of Proclus on the Limit and the Unlimited. 
Berthold’s proposal, in short, was that the One (prime unitas) should be iden-
tified as the Limit that produces a series of limits, which are the gods or pri-
mordial causes, and that the first primordial cause (prima unitas) should be 
identified as the Unlimited. This allowed him to avoid the integration problem 
altogether by maintaining that Proclus was in fact not outlining two different 
models of causality. There was one causal pattern derived from the principles 
of essential order and proportionality in Propositions 62- 66, and this applied 
as much to the gods as to all other members of the essential order of natural 
providence. Each primordial cause generates a series from its own characteris-
tic intention – in the case of the Good, this produces the intermediary princi-
ples (bonitates per essentiam) that, since they are substantial goods, refract its 
causal power. Each primordial cause also leaves a trace of its intention in every 
principle and order subordinate to it. This allowed Berthold to say that the pri-
mordial cause of being (prime entitas) and order arising from it, which follows 
immediately after the order of infinitas, is indeed constituted by Limit and the 
Unlimited (Proposition 89) precisely because Limit and the Unlimited leave a 
trace of their influence in every order of the gods (Proposition 159).
This proposal, however, led Berthold into some difficult territory relative to 
the “simplicity” problem. Berthold would want to maintain that his account 
of formal intentions did in fact preserve the unicity of each god as constituted 
from only the intention of “one” or “good”, even though each god is subordi-
nate to the One according to its own degree of “contraction”.177 We may again 
recall the table of six formal intentions in 62C, whose number at other times 
expanded to include the seven “pillars” or formal perfections of the house of 
God (unitas/ bonitas, virtus, entitas, vita, intellectualitas, animealitas, and nat-
uralitas). All that was required was to show that the first two intentions could 
be assimilated to the Limit and the Unlimited. But as soon as Berthold made 
this assimilation, he introduced a linear structure of subordination among the 
primordial causes. The One (prime unitas) or Limit was the immediate cause 
of the entire order of the gods as “ones” or “limits”. The highest member within 
that order (prima unitas), the primordial cause of infinity or power (virtus), as 
 177 Berthold received the terminology of “formal intentions” and “contraction” from Dietrich, 
who used it to interpret the Liber de causis. See Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intel-




both an essential unity (unitas secundum essentiam) and an originary formal 
cause (infinitas secundum causam), would fit Berthold’s desired model per-
fectly. However, every subordinate primordial cause within that order begin-
ning with prime ens must be, in Berthold’s words, “almost” (quasi) composite, 
insofar as it presupposes the activity of both the One and infinity, which he 
identified as an “auxiliary cause” (concausa) within the order of gods.
Readers of Proclus today would no doubt see this very linear model as a 
major departure from Proclus’ own more sophisticated henology, even though 
it was so advantageous for Berthold’s articulation of a coherent theory of cau-
sality in Proclus relative to the integration problem.178 Proclus in his commen-
tary on Plato’s Parmenides advanced an important but nevertheless obscure 
distinction between the way in which the gods arise from the One, “accord-
ing to union” (καθ’ ἕνωσιν), and the way entities arise from the gods, by same-
ness and difference.179 Furthermore, for Proclus, since the precise number of 
henadic principles can only be known to the gods,180 it would seem prepos-
terous to fix their number to six or seven. But this is exactly what Berthold 
was invited to do under the guidance of Proposition 135, which established a 
direct correlation between the number of gods and the number of the genera 
of being.181 In the spirit of Dietrich, Berthold would hold that the entire exer-
cise of the oblique motion would be undermined if one could not reason nec-
essarily about the invisible things of God beginning from the creation that was 
suffused with divine order and beauty.182 Ultimately, however, and perhaps 
 178 For the positions of C. D’Ancona, E. Butler, G. Van Riel, and an original solution to the 
problem in Proclus, see Greig, “Proclus on the Two Causal Models”, p. 31– 46.
 179 Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria, ed. C. Steel, 3 vols (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007- 2009), vol. 1, lib. i, p. 644, l. 9- 10; lib. ii, p. 745, l. 14- 23; vol. 3, lib. vi, 
p. 1049, l. 26- 27.
 180 Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, ed. E. Diehl (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903- 1906), vol. 
3, p. 12, l. 27- 30.
 181 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 135M, p. 230, l. 301- 303. At 139D, Berthold addressed the 
possible confusion arising from his interpretation, which places between the gods and 
the “genus of beings” an intermediate “order of infinities”, according to the order of formal 
perfections. With a citation from Clavis, c. 119, Berthold explains that the infinities can be 
spoken of as non- beings. This equivocation appeared to satisfy the commentator.
 182 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 109B, p. 13, l. 29 – p. 14, l. 37: qui cum constituatur ex sex 
unitatibus, ut per declarationem 62 demonstratum est, necessarium est, quod in ipso tali 
ordine partes ipsius distributae sint secundum partes senarii aliquotas ita, quod primum sit 
unum tantum, 2 secunda et 3 tertia; 126F, p. 158, l. 146- 147: ponatur sub exemplo descriptionis 
ordinis deorum, qui necessario constat ex sex diis; 139D, p. 35, l. 76- 81: Hanc enim negare non 
possumus secundum intentionem auctoris, quia ad hoc praeter alia supra praemissa enu-
merata motiva cogit nos natura ordinis essentialis, quem necessarium est, sicut et in aliis, 
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more in accordance with Proclus’ own intent, Berthold understood that the 
oblique motion was itself the means to a higher apprehension. The content 
of this apprehension Berthold found described, not in Proclus’ commentaries 
on Plato, but, as we will see, in the Clavis physicae, which taught him that rea-
son necessarily divided what was in itself the unified movement of God as the 
beginning, middle, and end of all things.183
Berthold’s interpretation of the propositions on the absolute Limit and 
Unlimited followed from his views about the six- fold order of the gods. His first 
lengthy discussion of the subject is found in Proposition 90 (“The first [prima] 
Limit and the first [prima] Unlimited exist prior to everything constituted out 
of limit and the unlimited”).184 Berthold’s first inclination would no doubt 
have been to use the well- established distinction in the Expositio between 
the adverb prime (πρώτως) and the adjective primus (πρωτός), as it was first 
occasioned by Proposition 8. In such a view, the prima finitas mentioned in 
Proposition 90 should refer to the first effect of the primordial cause (e.g., 
prime finitas). However, in a rare departure from the letter of the Elementatio, 
Berthold proceeded directly to identify the One as prime finitas which, he 
argued, was what Dionysius had in mind when he spoke of the One limiting all 
things, including infinity (omnem quidem infinitatem terminans).185 He further 
associated the causality of Limit with God’s orderly arrangement of all things 
according to measure, number and weight.186 Using the law of proportionality 
in Proposition 65, he argued that the order of gods is in fact an order of limits 
(finitates), who would exercise the same dispositive power within their own 
domains.187
sex unitates contineret; 149F, p. 116, l. 165- 172: Hoc igitur positio, cui non potest intellectus 
contradicere […].
 183 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 125D, p. 150, l. 103- 109: Primae causae in se ipsis unum 
sunt et simplices nullique cognito ordine definitae aut a se invicem segregatae: haec enim in 
effectibus suis partiuntur. See also n. 216, below.
 184 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 90, p. 46, l. 1- 2: Omnibus ex finitate et infinitate con-
stantibus preexistit secundum se prima finitas et prima infinitas.
 185 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 90A, p. 154, l. 16 – p. 155, l. 39: […] Praemissis diligenter 
perspectis apparet ex sententia Dionysii prime unum, quod simpliciter omnia finit et termi-
nat, esse prime finitatem. See also Expositio, 159H, p. 198, l. 291- 298, citing Dionysius, De 
divinis nominibus, 13.1 and 13.3.
 186 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 159H, p. 199, l. 308- 311; 123K, p. 133, l. 271- 287.
 187 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 90C, p. 156, l. 90 – p. 157, l. 91. Incidentally, we may note 
that Proclus sometimes wrote that the Limit is more like the One. See Proclus, Théologie 
platonicienne, eds H.D. Saffrey, L.G. Westerink, vol. 3 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1978), lib. iii, 
c. 8, p. 33, l. 1- 2; id., In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, vol. 1, p. 176, l. 11- 12; id., In Platonis 












According to Berthold, the first unity (prima unitas) among these gods 
or limits is power or infinity (prime virtus, infinitas). He presented this as 
the shared doctrine of Proclus, Dionysius, and the Clavis physicae.188 The 
Unlimited or “infinity” is the naturally consequent determination to arise after 
“limit” because, he argued, “it is necessary that every determining [principle] 
be of an opposed ratio to what it determines”.189 He does not explain how this 
rule would apply to lower formal intentions. For example, one might say that 
entitas determines infinity understood as non- entitas, and it may be that life 
would determine entitas as “not- life”, but this is not clear from the text.
The “extremes of the universe”, the gods and prime matter, share the com-
mon feature of being produced “by the primarily Good alone”.190 To explain 
the relation of prime matter to the subsequent determinative causality of 
prime infinitas, Berthold staged a confrontation between Plato and “others” 
(in this case, Dietrich of Freiberg) regarding the question of whether matter is 
“something one and simple through its essence”. Opposing this thesis, Dietrich 
argued that matter is “many and essentially multiple” because of the plurality 
of its inherent capacities to receive different forms.191 To present Plato’s alter-
native and correct position, Berthold took arguments from Ulrich of Strassburg 
stating that matter has a threefold being: (1) as simple in its substance, it is 
without composition and prior to “the first inchoation of form”; (2) as a “being 
of potency”, it is subject to motion and change, insofar as it has “the inchoa-
tions of form”, although it remains one by privation of any form in act, “and 
thus nothing yet is distinct in it”; (3) as “actual being”, it is “determined by the 
act of form”.192 This threefold distinction of matter, presented here as an exe-
gesis of the Timaeus (which was not clearly stated in Ulrich) would correspond 
for Berthold to a precise sequence of causal influence, from (1) the Good, (2) to 
 188 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 90B, p. 155, l. 41 – p. 156, l. 77; 60B, p. 172, l. 66 – p. 173, l. 75, 
followed immediately by De divinis nominibus, 5.5 on the priority of per se esse relative 
to the other processions; 60D, p. 173, l. 98- 107: Ubi notandum, quod hic [Dionysius] vocat 
‘totam’ et ‘per se ipsam virtutem’ primam bonitatem intra ordinem unialem; 3B, p. 94, l. 77- 
92. For the agreement of all three authorities, see Expositio, 139D, p. 34, l. 60 – p. 36, l. 117, 
where non ens in the Clavis is identified with the order of infinities.
 189 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 89B, p. 151, l. 58- 67.
 190 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 59C, p. 166, l. 106- 115.
 191 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 59C, p. 166, l. 124 – p. 167, l. 148. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, 
De miscibilibus in mixto, ed. W. Wallace, in Opera omnia, vol. 4, 3.1- 4, p. 32, l. 3 – p. 33, l. 28.
 192 Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. iv, tr. 2, c. 7 (2- 6), p. 120, l. 18 – p. 124, l. 153. 
Berthold identified the inchoation of forms with Augustine’s notion of the seminal rea-
sons. See Expositio, 138 commentum, p. 31, l. 246- 248: secunda illustratio est infinitas ipsius 
materiae per incohationes omnium formarum in ea, quas quidam vocant rationes semina-
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power (virtus),193 and finally (3) being, for “prime matter, although it is a one 
when considered by itself, is yet unable to stand in the things of nature without 
[something] determining it”.194
As for the troublesome Proposition 159, Berthold maintained that it must be 
read in light of the Propositions 151- 156, which concern “the properties of the 
gods, in comparison with one another and with their effects or orders”. From 
this standpoint, Proposition 159 should be understood with reference to “a gen-
eral property belonging to every order caused by the gods”.195 In other words, 
he read the phrase “order of the gods” (ordo deorum) in the text as a subjective 
genitive, “the order that comes from the gods”. In Berthold’s view, this connected 
Proposition 159 both to Proposition 89 (the first result of Limit and the Unlimited 
is true Being), in that the order of being is clearly subordinate to the order of the 
primordial causes, and to Proposition 102, which stated that prime ens (the pri-
mordial cause of Being) bestows the mixture of Limit and the Unlimited.196
Berthold’s commentary on Proposition 102 began by confronting an inter-
pretation which, considering Proposition 89, would restrict the communica-
tion of Limit and Unlimited to true beings (enter entia) that alone participate 
“extensive infinity”, either insofar as they are eternal in an atemporal sense 
or as perpetual through temporal succession.197 To avoid this result, Berthold 
introduced a distinction among the gods themselves. The primordial cause 
of being (prime ens) can be considered in two ways: as amethectum,198 it is 
 193 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 57G, p. 154, l. 224: materia prima, quae substantivatur per 
posse. Cf. Averroes, De substantia orbis, in Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis, vol. 
9 (Venezia: Junta, 1562- 1574), c. 1, f. 3vL.
 194 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 89B, p. 151, l. 53- 54. See also Expositio, 71D, p. 35, l. 128- 
138: Verbi gratia: prime (prime] primae ed.) virtus determinat essentiam materiae primae, 
quae procedit a solo primo, per commentum 59, ad esse in potentia, puta ad virtutem recep-
tivam formae, et sic essentia materiae subicitur virtuti; sed quia uterque effectus tam prime 
boni quam prime virtutis stat adhuc in quadam indeterminatione, ideo prime ens praesup-
ponens effectum utriusque determinat et informat ipsum entitate, scilicet essentia formae; 
formae, inquam, talis, quae tantum dat esse.
 195 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 159, p. 189, l. 5- 7: […] unam generalem proprietatem 
omnibus ordinibus a diis causatis convenientem. See also Expositio, 159D, p. 194, l. 172- 176.
 196 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 159F- G, p. 196, l. 229 – p. 197, l. 243.
 197 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 102A, p. 217, l. 14- 26.
 198 William of Moerbeke inexplicably transliterated ἀμέθεκτον in Propositions 99- 102, 123, 161, 
which he had translated elsewhere as imparticipatum (Propositions 23- 24, 63 comm., 69 
comm., 162 comm.). At Expositio, 99C, p. 200, l. 69- 81, Berthold inventively distinguished 
between imparticipatum and amethectum, arguing that the latter denotes a loftier kind 
of independent subsistence. That is, amethectum combines the senses of “the unpartici-
pated”, “the indivisible”, and “the not- participating” (imparticipans). It is not only exalted 














“unbegotten”;199 however, “as a unity included within the unifical order, it 
proceeds from two causes, namely, the primary cause and the auxiliary cause 
[concausa]”.200 Such a distinction within each primordial cause, as uncaused 
insofar as it is amethectum and yet dependent on the One, was a straightfor-
ward combination of Propositions 99 and 100. The gods are self- sufficient qua 
unities but are above self- sufficiency qua the super- plenitude of their distinc-
tive intention.201 In one sense, this aligned with Berthold’s characteristic dis-
tinction between the self- originating character of each god as a formal cause, 
coupled with its dependency on the Good as an efficient cause. However, we 
see here that Berthold has added another layer of complexity: the god of enti-
tas (prime ens) depends both on the One and on prime infinitas as an “auxil-
iary cause”. Berthold was careful to observe the difference between the more 
rarefied notion of the amethectum, which applies only to the gods, and the 
wider amplitude of the self- sufficient (antarkes).202 Yet this technical precision 
had to be abandoned to address the problem at hand, for Berthold finally con-
ceded that prime ens “is, as it were, composed” from Limit and the Unlimited, 
which both “act in prime ente itself and with it”.203 Only this can explain how 
all beings are recipients of the mixture of Limit and the Unlimited (according 
to Propositions 89 and 102). But the internal composition required to account 
for the serial order among the gods has compromised the pure simplicity of 
every god below prime infinitas.204
The conclusion drawn from Proposition 102 – that prime ens is “quasi- 
composite” because Limit and the Unlimited “act in prime ente itself and 
with it” – was used in Berthold’s commentary on Proposition 159 to address 
to the restricted senses of imparticipatum presented in Expositio, 23A, p. 112, l. 15 – p. 113, 
l. 54. However, at 161F, he was forced to admit that there is also a “less proper” sense of the 
term amethectum.
 199 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 23E, p. 117, l. 191- 201, where Berthold presented this 
notion as the teaching of Dionysius.
 200 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 102B, p. 218, l. 33- 38: licet prime ens inquantum amethec-
tum non sit ab alia causa, sed ingenitum per 99, tamen, inquantum est unitas quaedam 
intra ordinem unialem conclusa, procedit a duabus causis, scilicet principali et concausa. 
Principali, quod est prime unum, quod etiam directe est causa et totalis ipsius prime entis. 
Concausa, scilicet prima unitate intra ordinem, scilicet prime infinitate, quae est intermedia 
prime unius et prime entis per 92 in commento.
 201 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 99B, p. 199, l. 55- 67; 100G, p. 208, l. 145- 154.
 202 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 99A, p. 198, l. 13 – p. 199, l. 41.
 203 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 102B, p. 218, l. 43- 48.
 204 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 23C, p. 115, l. 126- 128: participatorum quaedam sunt 
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“a controversy among the wise” concerning the origin of plurality and, more 
specifically, whether the dyad proceeds immediately from the One. From 
Thomas of York, who accepted their arguments, Berthold cited Avicebron, 
Gundissalinus, and Hermes on the dyad as the immediate product of the One 
and the root of plurality, which Avicebron and Gundissalinus identified as 
first matter and first form.205 Opposing such views were Dionysius, “whose 
authority prevails, since it is supported by infallible reason”, and Boethius, who 
maintained that the angels and all things incorporeal are immaterial. Berthold 
resolved the controversy by distinguishing (or equivocating) between four dif-
ferent senses of the word “matter”.206 (1) In “the strict sense”, matter is what 
is “mixed with privation”; (2) in its “less proper sense”, matter as it is found 
in the celestial bodies is identical with “the subject” of place and extension; 
(3) in its “wide sense”, matter can mean anything that is subjected to act, such 
as rational souls and angels, which pass from intellection to non- intellection; 
(4) finally, in its “widest sense”, matter can mean “an actual determining 
potency”. The latter refers to the notion we have encountered already in sec-
tion 4.1 in Berthold’s account of “theological universality”, according to which a 
more actual formal intention is determined or contracted by a more potential 
formal intention. In this fourth sense, one could say that “matter” is found in 
all beings beneath the gods as far as heavenly souls, in which there is a gra-
dation of increasing formal determination and composition, but where the 
result nevertheless remains a single nature (unum in re). In this sense, then, 
everything proceeds from the dyad, which is “far better and more fittingly 
named the Limit and Unlimited”.207 Nevertheless, when Berthold treated “the 
origin of these two principles” in themselves, he sought no compromise and 
rejected the arguments of Gundissalinus and Avicebron outright, using the 
principle from 5B that idem manens idem semper natum est facere idem, and 
the principle of procession by similitude. Since “nothing is the cause of its 
contrary”,208 the One causes per se unities. Since two equally first principles 
 205 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 159B, p. 191, l. 75 – p. 193, l. 137. Cf. Thomas of York, 
Sapientiale, lib. ii, c. 11. On Thomas’ hylomorphism, see D.E. Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy 
at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 63– 64 
and 83- 85.
 206 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 159C, p. 193, l. 139- 167.
 207 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 159D- F, p. 194, l. 174 and p. 196, l. 229- 233.
 208 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 159G, p. 197, l. 249. This does not contradict his argument 
for the derivation of the Unlimited from the Limit in Expositio, 89B, p. 151, l. 58- 59: omne 
determinans esse oppositae rationis ad illud, quod determinat, which referred to the emer-
gence of new formal determinations that are unlike their cause owing to their distance or 










cannot emanate immediately and causally (causaliter) from the One, they are 
necessarily reduced to two principles or springs (scaturrigines): the prime uni-
tas and the prima unitas.209
With the notion that infinity or prima unitas is the auxiliary cause (con-
causa) of the order of the gods,210 Berthold maintained that the order of uni-
ties is subject to the same rational laws as the rest of the invisible world: the 
highest member of any order acts as an auxiliary cause of its subordinate 
members.211 This determination of the causality of the One by prime virtus 
affects not only prime matter and prepares it for subsequent determinations, 
but “in some sense leaves a trace of its intention in the goodnesses following 
it”.212 Nevertheless, Berthold did not overlook the more speculative interpreta-
tive possibility that his Eriugenian sources offered him: a model of the primor-
dial causes or gods in which they are not so easily defined by linear structures. 
Commenting on Proposition 140, where Proclus alluded to the sympathy (com-
patientia) that is found in everything owing to the total presence of the higher 
principles in the lower, Berthold explained how each god not only leaves a ves-
tige of its intention in the lower gods, as we would expect by now, but also that 
a lower god leaves a vestige of its intention in the order arising from a prior god. 
In other words, because prime intellectus leaves a vestige of its causal power in 
prime anima and prime natura, it “consequently” leaves a vestige “in the order 
 209 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 159G, p. 197, l. 263- 264. Berthold frequently referred to 
the primordial causes as “springs”, see 17A; 18B; 18C; 99B; 100D; 123H; 131E; 140D; 143D; 
153B; 177F.
 210 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 152B- C, p. 141, l. 57 – p. 142, l. 81. An auxiliary cause is the 
summit (summitas) within a particular order and is itself subordinated to a primordial 
cause. See, for example, Expositio, 22B, p. 103, l. 180- 186.
 211 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 159G, p. 198, l. 278- 286: immo [prime infinitas] relinquit 
vestigium suae principiationis etiam in ipsis diis. Sic ergo omnis ordo deorum, quem dii 
instituunt, est ex principiis primis fine et infinito formaliter et a primis principiis prime fini-
tate et prime infinitate causaliter et originaliter, quorum unum est simpliciter primum, puta 
prime unum, aliud autem est secundario primum, a quo etiam tamquam a summo sui totus 
ordo deorum dependet; non iam proprie causaliter, sicut a primo simpliciter principio, sed 
suo modo, inquantum intra unum et eundem ordinem superius est concausa inferioris stans 
sub ordine principalis principii, quod principale per ipsum et cum ipso et in ipso sequentia 
producit.
 212 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 57G, p. 153, l. 209- 214: Talis autem bonitas determinans 
et quasi informans causalitatem prime boni, ubi ipsa causalitas non valet in se ipsa sub-
sistere, hoc est secundum gradum determinatae distantiae a primario boni actu, transcenso 
videlicet ordine bonitatum, quae sunt effectus simpliciter prime boni, incipit suam actionem 
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of infinities, true beings, and lives”.213 This implies that the primordial causes 
in the Word act in concert.214 The enfolded order of the archetypical world is 
the basis for the unfolded sympathy of the cosmic order.
In one sense, of course, this example of prime intellectus was a conven-
ient choice for this kind of mutual implication of intentions, inasmuch as it 
allowed Berthold to extrapolate Dietrich’s notions of intellectus in actu per 
essentiam, essential causality, and the ontology of being according to species 
(ens secundum speciem) to higher principles that are not, strictly speaking, 
intellectual hypostases. But these passing acknowledgements of the relativity 
of a strictly linear model are consistent with Berthold’s Eriugenian interpreta-
tion of Dionysius that we have noted already, where the strict divisions of real-
ity according to the laws of proportion and analogy were resolved into a uni-
fied perspective that finds the first principle itself coursing through or being 
made in all things (ad omnia procedit et in omni fit).215 It was not by chance 
that, shortly after offering the example of prime intellectus leaving its vestige in 
the higher orders, Berthold cited the Clavis for the notion that God “descends 
from himself and creates himself in all things”, and that the division of this 
providential act into a beginning, a middle, and an end, “are one in him, but are 
 213 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 140D, p. 40, l. 95- 101: Sicut verbi gratia potentia prime 
intellectus non incipit ubi potentia prime boni vel prime infinitatis vel prime entis vel prime 
vitae, sed desursum, scilicet in ordine intellectuum, ubi primum manifeste apparet eius cau-
salitas, licet aliquale vestigium suae intentionis relinquat et in prime anima et in prime nat-
ura et per consequens in ordine infinitatum, enter entium et vitarum. Et sicut dixi de prime 
intellectus potentiae incohatione, ita intelligendum est de aliorum deorum potentiis suo 
modo. This follows a citation of the Clavis physicae, c. 167 and 170, on the descent of all 
things from the Father of lights, and how “all things are from God and God is in all things 
[…], since from him and through him and in him all things are made”.
 214 On occasion Berthold would speak about the unique causality that belongs to each 
god: prime ens (161A); prime vita (53B, 101E); prime intellectus (156E- F); prime anima 
(129D); prime natura (20A, 34D- F). Berthold’s notion of a primordial cause of nature 
(prime natura) signaled a modification of Proclus who, in Proposition 21, carefully used 
“first” for the monadic One, Intellect and Soul, but “whole” for Nature. See M. Martijn, 
Proclus on Nature. Philosophy of Nature and its Methods in Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s 
Timaeus (Leiden: Brill, 2010), p. 49. In 129D, Berthold identified the prime anima with 
the world soul (anima totius), which extends immaterially from the centre of the earth 
to the heights of heaven and directs particular souls to their proper places. He identified 
prime natura with Avicebron’s notion of natura universalis (Fons vitae, lib. iii, c. 45), the 
unified principle that brings together and sustains the composite parts of bodies because 
it acts upon “the universal body”. All things that proceed from prime natura, according to 
Berthold’s enigmatic statement, do so naturally (naturaliter). The world soul and natura 
universalis share the attributes of being unified principles whose activity is providential.








diverse in the minds of those contemplating”.216 The prayer at the end of the 
Prologus, we recall, was intended to lift the contemplator (theoricus) from the 
mode of dividedness to the unified vision of the divine light as the principle, 
the guide, and the goal of all things. For Berthold, then, the rational divisions of 
the order of natural providence according to the laws of proportionality, with 
the proliferation of separate substances they entailed, were meant to prepare 
the mind for this vision.
5 Determination, Generation, and Light
The intention of ‘good’ cannot subsist by itself.217
If Berthold relied on the distinction of efficient and formal causality to hold 
together the superabundant causality of the gods in the Word alongside their 
subordination to the One, he had to introduce a further level of differentiation 
to account for the constitution of principles in the essential order below “the 
thearchy”. To this end, he adapted two interrelated doctrines from Dietrich of 
Freiberg to the framework of the Elementatio theologica: the ontological the-
ory of beings existing according to species (entia secundum speciem), and the 
theory of the mode of causality that is constitutive of and exercised by them 
(“determination” or “information”).218
Berthold inherited directly from Dietrich of Freiberg the notion of “being 
according to species” or “being as such” (ens ut simpliciter).219 Dietrich had 
 216 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 140E, p. 42, l. 151- 158: super omnia Deus invisibilis et incor-
poralis et incorruptibilis potest a se ipso descendere et se ipsum in omnibus creare, ‘ut sit 
Deus omnia in omnibus’ et usque ad extrema rerum […]. Deus totius universitatis conditae 
principium sit et medium et finis: principium, quia ab ipso procedunt omnia, medium, quia 
in ipso et per ipsum currunt omnia, finis, quia ipsum appetunt omnia, in quo quiescunt, quia 
nihil ultra quaerunt. Et haec tria in ipso unum sunt, in animis contemplantium diversa. Cf. 
Honorius Augustodunensis, Clavis physicae, c. 167, p. 132, l. 7- 10 and c. 171, p. 135, l. 2- 7. See 
also Expositio, 125D, p. 150, l. 103- 109, cited above at n. 183, as well as the citation of the 
Clavis in n. 213, above.
 217 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 136E, p. 10, l. 208: Intentio boni non potest ipsa subsistere.
 218 On determinatio and informatio, see Albert the Great, De causis et processu universitatis 
a prima causa, lib. ii, tr. 1, c. 17, p. 81, l. 43- 44 and lib. ii, tr. 3, c. 13, p. 150, l. 44- 63; Ulrich of 
Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. iv, tr. 2, c. 1 (3- 4), p. 58, l. 28- 46; Thomas Aquinas, Super 
Librum de causis Expositio, lect. 18, p. 104, l. 1- 17; Dietrich of Freiberg, De animatione caeli, 
11.1- 5, p. 22, l. 2 – p. 23, l. 28; id., De quiditatibus entium, 1.4, p. 99, l. 21- 30.
 219 On the synonymy of ens secundum speciem and ens ut simpliciter, see Dietrich of Freiberg, 
De intellectu et intelligibili, ii.33.5, p. 172, l. 22- 28; id., Quaestio utrum substantia spiritua-
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invented this notion as a way of accounting for the hierarchical subordination 
of separate substances within an essential cosmic order, in which the essence 
of every separate principle is identical with its operation. But the range of enti-
ties to which Dietrich applied it was more limited (intelligences and heavenly 
souls) than what we find in Berthold. Following the lead of the Elementatio, 
Berthold extended the range of ens secundum speciem upwards, into the order 
of infinities, and downwards, past the order of heavenly souls, to human nature 
as a species.
For both Dominicans, some kind of composition was required to explain the 
derivation or creatureliness of these separate substances without compromis-
ing the essential activity that was predicated upon their simplicity. The basic 
intuition that Dietrich and Berthold would not abandon was the assumption 
that the universe is an intrinsic unity (unum per se), and therefore it must be 
constituted out of an essential order, in which entities proceed from and return 
to their principles according to stable and necessary patterns.220 This essen-
tial order unfolds between the cosmological genera (maneries) of the One, 
the separate intelligences, as far as the heavenly souls and their bodies, which 
use the sublunary elements as instruments in order to produce their effects 
in the realm of becoming. This intrinsic order of the whole can be ensured 
only by the intrinsic and essential constitution of its parts. As Berthold put 
it, everything intrinsically related to something else in the order of essential 
causes is “a certain whole”, but the relation of this whole to its own parts deter-
mines what place in the essential order it holds.221 The notion of ens secundum 
speciem was introduced to account for the intrinsic composition that distin-
guishes secondary causes from God without undermining the essential bonds 
of the order of natural providence.222
l. 181- 204. See also Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 2D, p. 87, l. 204- 208: Si autem est unum, 
in quo est numerus secundum rem, hoc est dupliciter, quia vel facientia numerum sunt unum 
in esse vel plura. Si unum, tunc vel taliter unitum est ens ut simpliciter et secundum speciem 
tantum absque proprietate individuali vel est ens hoc et particulare et individuum.
 220 Dietrich of Freiberg, De animatione caeli, 2.2- 5.3, p. 13, l. 25 – p. 17, l. 30; id., De substan-
tiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis, 1.1- 5.2, p. 303, l. 2 – p. 307, l. 17. For 
Berthold, see Expositio, 6B, p. 129, l. 75 – p. 130, l. 126, as well as 33A, p. 214, l. 12 – p. 215, 
l. 36. Cf. Flasch, “Einleitung” to Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem 
theologicam Procli. Prologus, Propositiones 1- 13, p. xxxiii- xxxiv.
 221 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 66E- F, p. 5, l. 100 – p. 6, l. 130.
 222 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 44A, p. 73, l. 15- 21: unaquaeque res est propter suam pro-
priam operationem, ideo sola rei substantia seu essentia, si secundum se et absolute accip-
iatur, scilicet quantum ad solum esse, non sufficit intentioni naturae, nisi ipsa essentia sit 
operatio. […] Absoluta enim essentia secundum se non habet rationem boni nec est de reali 








To explain this kind of composition, Dietrich looked to Aristotle (Metaphysics 
vii.10- 11) for the distinction between formal parts (partes ante totum), which 
are simultaneously the principles of a simple form in the order of being and 
the parts of a definition in the order of knowing, and quantitative or qualita-
tive parts (partes post totum), which are extraneous to the essential features of 
the thing.223 According to Aristotle, formal parts are “before the whole” insofar 
as they constitute the quiddity or definition of a thing and make it known in 
such a way that the whole can be said to depend on those parts. Parts “after the 
whole” have the nature of matter, meaning that they are the parts into which 
a thing is divided when it is viewed as a “this” and not in its universal defini-
tion. These material parts can be corporeal (flesh and bones, in the case of 
“this animal”) or intelligible (the semicircle is part of “this circle”).224 Dietrich 
used these arguments to characterise the created separate substances in the 
order of natural providence. In his view, separate substances exist more like a 
species, ens secundum speciem (=es), because they have only “parts before the 
whole”. An es is not an individual but a “singular”. For an “individual” in the 
proper sense is what has “parts after the whole” or is an ens hoc (=eh).225
For Dietrich and for Berthold, the parts of a singular es are principles. In an 
es, these principles “retain their nature as principles”, which explains why the 
essence, power, and operation of es are one.226 That is, insofar as an essence 
does not require these extrinsic, accidental relations to realise its activity, it is 
incorruptible, its activity has no contrary, and as such the es belongs to the 
ratione est, ut una res fluat in aliam aliqua virtute activa. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De intel-
lectu et intelligibili, i.1.1, p. 137, l. 3- 10, i.10.3, p. 143, l. 18- 28; id., De accidentibus, 18.8, p. 79, 
l. 121 – p. 80, l. 135.
 223 See especially Dietrich of Freiberg, De origine rerum praedicamentalium, 5.26, p. 187, l. 221- 
224, 5.62, p. 200, l. 650- 662; id., De luce et eius origine, ed. R. Rehn, in Opera omnia, vol. 4, 
10.1- 12.2, p. 17, l. 79 – p. 19, l. 46; id., Quaestio utrum in Deo sit aliqua vis cognitiva inferior 
intellectu, 1.1 (6- 7), p. 294, l. 36- 48; id., Quaestio utrum substantia spiritualis sit composita 
ex materia et forma, ii.25, p. 335, l. 252- 269. See also id., De dotibus corporum gloriosorum, 
2.3- 4, p. 270, l. 12- 23; id., De corporibus caelestibus quoad naturam eorum corporalem, ed. 
L. Sturlese, in Opera omnia, vol. 2, 3.2, p. 381, l. 98 – p. 382, l. 102; id., De accidentibus, 3.5, 
p. 57, l. 88- 95; id., De quiditatibus entium, 7.5, p. 110, l. 60- 71; id., De mensuris, 4.17, p. 231, 
l. 106- 125; id., De magis et minus, 11.4, p. 55, l. 64- 68.
 224 As Berthold explained at Expositio, 76K, p. 70, l. 209 – p. 71, l. 220, a substance, unlike an 
essence, has parts after the whole. These parts, when they are brought together by the 
form of the whole (forma totius), such as humanity (humanitas), have the mode of matter. 
Humanity considered in itself is an essence, but when it is determined in such and such 
parts (in has vel has partes), a substantial individual is constituted.
 225 Suarez- Nani, Les anges et la philosophie, p. 56– 73; Flasch, Dietrich von Freiberg, p. 314– 319.
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essential structure of the cosmos.227 At the lower range of the essential order 
are heavenly souls. These, however, are called substantial rather than essential 
causes. Each heavenly soul is an eh because its activity partially depends on 
the heavenly body to which it is united.228 Finally, in the realm of becoming, 
there is no essential order. This is the domain of individuality and accidental-
ity properly speaking, insofar as all spiritual or corporeal principles, whether 
angels, human individuals, or bodies, realise their activity in partial or total 
dependency upon accidental, extrinsic relations founded on quantity and 
quality.229
These ontological conditions are related to distinct kinds of causality. eh 
come forth by generation, whereas es come forth by “simple emanation”, 
“determination”, or “information”.230 What comes forth by generation passes 
from potency into act, and accordingly is first an eh before it is es (which 
is accomplished by the universalising activity of the possible intellect). For 
example, nature produces a succession of individual horses, but the species 
“horse” is only reached through abstraction. As for what comes forth by deter-
mination, its “formal principles” are first es by nature (prius natura). Certain 
entities, like heavenly souls or the agent intellects of human beings, are first es 
and then, by a logical ordering, they are individuated and are eh.231
In one of the lengthiest discussions of this topic in the Expositio, Berthold 
contrasted es and eh insofar as their principles are capable of union with 
one another (unibilia).232 That is, he proposed that we consider the opposing 
ways the constitutive principles of es and eh, insofar as they are principles, 
have simplicity, spirituality, and infinity. His argument proceeded from what 
is more known to us to what is unknown. “Imperfect” unitable principles, 
such as matter and form in a composite, are in “qualitative potentiality” and 
are, “so to speak, material” because their simplicity is inferior to the compos-
ite in which they must be united in order to exist in act. This union of mat-
ter and form in act has “spirituality” because they mutually conjoin in their 
 227 Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, ii.26.1- 4, p. 164, l. 29 – p. 165, l. 57; id., De 
cognitione entium separatorum, 21.1- 4, p. 185, l. 30- 60.
 228 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 25C, p. 142, l. 166- 172. Cf. Expositio, 44D; 50C; 51A; 76D.
 229 Dietrich of Freiberg, De animatione caeli, 8.2- 3, p. 19, l. 6 – p. 20, l. 30, 15.1- 2, p. 26, l. 38- 53; 
id., De intellectu et intelligibili, iii.21.2, p. 193, l. 103 – p. 194, l. 110.
 230 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 3A, p. 93, l. 37- 38: Et tale fieri dicitur determinatio vel 
informatio, ut quidam dicunt, vel compositio. See also n. 218, above.
 231 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 3B, p. 95, l. 116- 121. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De luce et eius 
origine, 10.1, p. 17, l. 79- 88.
 232 For what follows, see Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 4B, p. 105, l. 129 – p. 108, l. 242; 76D, 














essence (se mutuo penetrant penetratione essentiae), as is most evident in the 
“spirituality” of the simple and universal elements, which unite to form the 
four elements perceptible to the senses. Insofar as these individual principles, 
as principles, exist in potency, their “infinity” consists only in their indetermi-
nacy. Accordingly, they cannot bring themselves to union in act, but require 
a higher agent (e.g., an artificer, a heavenly mover). The activity of this agent, 
in turn, presupposes these potential principles that it brings into substantial 
being by a process of generation. Since generation is preceded by motion and 
alteration, the principles themselves must be mutable and, for this reason, 
must exist first as individuals both in time and by nature before they are a 
species. Therefore, unlike the particular (angels; the human agent intellect 
prior to individuation)233 or the singular (es),234 the individual constituted 
from such principles is measured by time; it comes to be and passes away 
due to the disproportion between its principles and the stable motion of the 
heavens.
As for the principles of unchangeable things or es, Berthold asserted that 
they have a “simplicity” that is greater than any composite, whereas the sim-
plicity of the principles of eh is subordinate to the composite they form. It 
follows from this that their “spirituality” is also greater, for what is simpler is 
capable of greater compenetration. Finally, unlike the principles of eh, the 
“infinity” of the principles of es consists in their actuality rather than potenti-
ality. This actuality, however, still stands in relation to a higher active “efficient” 
principle. But rather than being brought into act by that agent, these lower 
principles actively limit, contract, or “determine” the power of the immedi-
ately higher cause and act upon the “elaborated” substrate that the higher 
cause has produced. In this way, we have a process of “determination” that 
occurs by an order of nature and not by a temporal order (unlike “generation”); 
that is, determination unfolds by simple emanation into being (per simplicem 
emanationem in esse). Every principle that comes forth by determination, even 
 233 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 51C, p. 115, l. 98 – p. 116, l. 111.
 234 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 84B, p. 128, l. 20 – p. 129, l. 44. An individual is corporeal 
and has quantitative partes post totum. A “particular” has qualitative partes post totum, 
and through them it is determined within “the most specific species”, and yet it remains 
“one in being” and is not numbered by its parts. The “singular” subsists “singularly per se”, 
having partes ante totum that retain their nature as principles. In Expositio, 10B, p. 180, 
l. 122- 132, we read that the members of the order of antarkia (es), whose essence is iden-
tical with their power and operation, differ from one another specifically (specifice), until 
we reach heavenly souls, which are “individuated” by their operation. In a hierarchia com-
prised of angels, the substance, power, and operation of each member differ, and each 
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if it is limited or contracted, is nevertheless identical with its operation.235 As 
Berthold put it in a succinct and remarkable turn of phrase, their possibility is 
their existence (in eis sit idem posse et esse).236 We might say that, for Berthold, 
the domain of es, from the order of infinities to heavenly souls (prior to indi-
viduation) and to human nature as a species, corresponds to the contents of 
“the archetypical world” and is, in some sense, nothing else than its unfolding 
from the divine Word.237
For Berthold, this process of determination could only be understood if 
one adopted a Platonic rather than Aristotelian perspective on universality. 
This is most apparent in his commentary on Proposition 74 (“Every species is 
a certain whole, for it subsists from many [parts], each of which complete the 
species, but not every whole is a species”).238 Following Eustratius, he held 
that there are fundamentally only two kinds of species: one is the result of 
abstraction, the other is separate by nature.239 The first is constituted by the 
actualised possible intellect from the parts of the form.240 It is through this 
process that natural beings pass from the state of eh to es, since the pos-
sible intellect is what makes the universality in such things (intellectus agit 
universalitatem in rebus). The second kind of species exists in rerum natura 
apart from any activity of our intellect. Berthold argued that since the par-
ticipant (participans) exists in reality, so must the greater entity in which it 
participates (participatum): “many human beings are one human being by 
participation in the species”. Every species of the second kind, then, is an es 
belonging to essential order of the cosmos. Some things belong to the intrin-
sic order of the universe only as species (es), while others do firstly as species, 
and secondly as individuals, as is the case for angels and human souls. For the 
 235 See Berthold’s analysis of the seven regulae from Boethius’ De hebdomadibus in Expositio, 
2A, p. 83, l. 54 – p. 84, l. 93.
 236 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 4B, p. 108, l. 238.
 237 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 10, p. 16, l. 364 – p. 17, l. 385. A comparison can 
be made on this point with Henry of Ghent, who held that the number of creaturely 
essences and that of the divine ideas were equal and finite. See P. Porro, “Ponere statum. 
Idee divine, perfezioni creaturali e ordine del mondo in Enrico di Gand”, in Mediaevalia 
3(1993), p. 109– 159.
 238 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 74, p. 39, l. 1- 3: Omnis quidem species totum quoddam 
est: ex pluribus enim subsistit, quorum unumquodque complet speciem; non omne autem 
totum species.
 239 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 74A- C, p. 51, l. 44 – p. 55, l. 185. See also Expositio, 67C, 
p. 9, l. 60 – p. 12, l. 134; 176D, p. 165, l. 242- 253; 177I, p. 183, l. 335 – p. 184, l. 349.
 240 See Dietrich of Freiberg, De origine rerum praedicamentalium, 5.26- 33, p. 187, l. 209 – 
p. 190, l. 311. See also Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, 3.2.9.7 (3), p. 98, l. 11- 18; id., 














latter group, the species is “more truly and more really in the nature of things 
than its individuals”.241
Berthold corroborated this argument about the two kinds of species with 
Anselm’s famous denunciation of “the heretical dialecticians” who say that 
universals are only “vocal sounds”, and who therefore suppose that colour is 
nothing other than the body in which it inheres and that wisdom is nothing 
other than the soul of the person in whom it is found.242 According to Anselm, 
such confusions arise when reason is covered over with bodily imaginings 
(in imaginationibus corporalibus obvoluta), a judgement that Berthold shared 
based on his own interpretation of the De mystica theologia of Dionysius as a 
guide to the discord over universals. For Anselm, the heretical consequences 
of this contemplative failure are felt in the domains of Trinitarian theology 
and Christology. Without real universals, Anselm contended, one cannot even 
begin to understand how three persons in the Trinity are one God, or how it 
was that Christ assumed human nature and not a human person. Berthold’s 
only addition to these points was a lengthy citation from the Clavis physicae, 
that explained how humanity (humanitas) is both simple in its cause and 
“more than infinite” in individuals, as an example of a Platonic species.
This theory of the two kinds of species was closely related to Berthold’s the-
ory of form, which also assumed the ontology of es and eh, but proposed a 
greater continuity between the two domains. As Sylvain Roudaut has observed 
in a recent synthesis, Berthold’s doctrine of form and formal causality expanded 
the application of these terms far beyond their more limited place in Proclus’ 
Elementatio theologica, which in Proposition 74 located forms at the level of 
intellect and thus subordinated them to the levels of being and wholeness.243 
Berthold was more influenced in this regard by Albert the Great, who distin-
guished between separate or forming form (forma formans) and immanent 
or informing form (forma informans).244 At other times he followed Ulrich of 
Strassburg, who delineated the grades of form from God to accidental, inan-
imate form.245 With Albert, Berthold presented the ranks of animate forms 
in terms of their gradual approximation of the first mover and its capacity to 
 241 See Suarez- Nani, Les anges et la philosophie, p. 60, for an illustrative comparison of 
Thomas Aquinas and Dietrich of Freiberg on the subordination of individuals to species 
in the cosmic order.
 242 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 74C, p. 55, l. 186 – p. 56, l. 227.
 243 S. Roudaut, “Founding a Metaphysics of Light in Proclus’ Universe. Berthold of Moosburg’s 
Theory of Forms”, forthcoming.
 244 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 41C, p. 49, l. 73 – p. 51, l. 148.
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constitute and govern an articulated whole.246 Heavenly souls, followed by 
human souls, are the highest rank of forma informans, since they are partially 
related to the bodies they move. A forma formans, by contrast, subsists in itself 
and remains outside what it determines (foris manens). These include all es 
beneath the gods as far as intellectual hypostases, which are “formed” by deter-
minatio, in that the subject elaborated by the higher principle is “informed” or 
determined by lower, primordial “forms” or causes.
In his account of determinatio, Berthold combined Dietrich of Freiberg’s 
theory of causality with the doctrine of flux (fluxus) developed by Albert the 
Great (De causis et processu universitatis i.4) and Ulrich of Strassburg (De 
summo bono iv.1.5), who was his preferred source on the theory of fluxus.247 
Berthold discussed fluxus extensively in his commentary on Proposition 18 
(“Everything deriving being to others is primarily that, which communicates 
the derivation to the recipients”),248 where William of Moerbeke’s translation 
of χορηγοῦν as derivere brought Proclus’ text directly into the semantic field 
of the metaphysics of flow. Berthold’s definition of derivation (“derivation is 
both a simple and continuous causal emanation, preserving the identity of 
essence of the flowing form in the entire flow”) depended on Ulrich’s treat-
ment of fluxus.249 As Berthold explained it, “derivation” conserves the identity 
of form or intention between the cause and effect (unlike equivocal causal-
ity), while remaining unaffected by its action (unlike univocal causality) and, 
unlike causes that are principles (principatio), it does not enter the being (esse) 
of what is derived.
 246 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 205A- C, p. 209, l. 12 – p. 212, l. 121.
 247 De Libera, Métaphysique et noétique, p. 190– 191, has explained how Ulrich’s modifications 
of Albert’s doctrine of flux anticipated the doctrine of essential causality articulated by 
Dietrich and Berthold. With Albert, Ulrich affirmed (1) that form is what flows, because 
the origin of fluxus is the form of the light of the first universally active Intellect; (2) form 
is said to flow insofar as it goes out from the first principle, and not insofar as it comes 
from a material potency; (3) the origin of fluxus is the Giver of Form (dator formarum), 
since anything that bestows form on anything else does so by virtue of the abundance of 
this source. To these views, Ulrich added (4) what flows is essentially identical and differs 
only in being; (5) the differentiation of being comes from the diverse realities into which 
the form flows; (6) this differentiation is comparable to the multiplication of a genus in 
its species, which does not multiply the essence of the genus but only its being. Dietrich’s 
synthesis of these ideas with those of Proclus, according to De Libera (p. 204), allowed 
him to elaborate the doctrine of essential causality in its definitive form.
 248 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 18, p. 12, l. 1- 2: Omne derivans esse aliis ipsum prime 
est hoc quod tradit recipientibus derivationem.
 249 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 18C, p. 50, l. 245- 246: derivatio est emanatio causalis sim-










Following Albert and Ulrich, Berthold took one of his preferred examples 
of fluxus from the activity of an artificer. The art in the artificer’s mind “flows” 
through the body’s limbs and its tools, and through these the form is gradually 
determined until it is realised in the artefact.250 The same form is found in the 
art and in the artefact (idem essentia) and differs only in the mode of its exist-
ence (secundum aliud esse). To break through the materiality of the metaphor 
to a more adequate understanding of the process of determinatio, one should 
conceive the art itself as capable of producing artifacts by its simple intellec-
tual light, without the need of bodily limbs, instruments, and matter.251 To this 
effect, in Proposition 18, Berthold used the example of the sun. For the sake 
of argument, he noted, we might suppose that the sun is an essential cause 
(though in fact it is a heavenly body that acts as an instrument of an intellec-
tual principle). He then proposed we make a twofold comparison between the 
sun and its effects. (1) Compared with the sun’s essence as such, the effect is 
identical with the cause, for the sun not only contains the effect in its power, 
but precontains (praehabet) its effect in a nobler and more eminent mode 
than the effect exists in itself. Considered simply as essence, the sun is “iden-
tical with all its gifts”, indeed “is itself its gift”, but in a more eminent mode. 
However, (2) compared with “the essential modes or properties of the sun”, in 
which the substance of the sun is founded (fundatur), such as “incorruptibility, 
luminosity, moving in this particular way”, the effect is counted as something 
distinct from the sun in both being and essence.252 Only (1) where there is 
an identity of essence within a diversity of being or nature, can we speak of 
derivation. The second comparison (2) falls within the domain of causality in 
the strict sense, in which effects differ from causes in being and in essence.253 
Dietrich of Freiberg, who had inspired this distinction of derivation and cau-
sality, explained that the difference in being and in essence in the second 
comparison means that the efficient power of the heavens does not retain its 
“proper intelligibility” when it is found in its effect,254 because the stable dis-
position of celestial power is received only imperfectly in sublunary matter.
 250 Albert the Great, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, lib. i, tr. 4, c. 6, p. 49, 
l. 80 – p. 50, l. 11; Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. iv, tr. 1, c. 5 (2), p. 27, l. 16 – p. 28, 
l. 27. Albert also compared the ebullitio of the sun and of the first cause to the practical 
intellect in De animalibus, lib. xx, tr. 2, c. 1, p. 1307, l. 11 – p. 1308, l. 30.
 251 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 174A, p. 137, l. 39- 45.
 252 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 18D, p. 52, l. 300 – p. 53, l. 323.
 253 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 18D, p. 53, l. 324- 341. We should assume that Berthold 
took the second comparison as the statement of the fact.
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(1) The first comparison brings us directly into the domain of determination 
and the kind of causality that characterises es. According to Berthold, there are 
three kinds of determination.255 (1a) In a logical consideration, the potential 
genus is determined into act by the species through the differentia; (1b) among 
material beings, a potency for form is determined in the act of form; (1c) in der-
ivation, the more actual is determined by the more potential. In all three cases, 
the determinable, “existing in the determinate”, maintains its proper essence, 
intention, and property, and is numbered only according to being. While it is 
clear what the subject of determination is in (1a) and (1b), either the genus 
or the material potential for form, what is the subject of the (1c) third kind 
determination, which evidently was most important for Berthold? The answer 
to this is not forthcoming in Proposition 18 and requires us to look elsewhere 
in the Expositio.
According to Proposition 64, the One immediately produces two kinds of 
unities: those that subsist in themselves (the gods), and those that subsist in 
another. The members of the latter group are the subject of either determina-
tion or generation – determination in the case of es (immutable species, form-
ing forms, or true forms), and generation in the case of eh (informing forms, 
and the images of true forms). In a remarkable passage, Berthold explained 
how, in every es below the gods, we find “unities” that are unable to subsist by 
themselves (non valens subsistere) as they are in their immediate relation to 
the One, owing to their “distance” in the procession that unfolds necessarily 
according to an essential order.256 These unities are nothing else than the “uni-
ties exalted above the nature of the mind” described by Dionysius or, as Proclus 
called them, “vestiges of the One” (the expression unum animae would be inap-
propriate here for the numerous principles prior to souls). These unities are 
illuminated by principles subordinate to the One, which strengthens them to 
 255 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 18D, p. 53, l. 342- 354. See also Expositio, 3E, p. 97, l. 206 – 
p. 98, l. 247. At Expositio, 167E, p. 65, l. 210- 220, following Dietrich, Berthold distinguished 
between the principles of the essence of an intellectus in actu per essentiam, and the parts 
of the form that are gathered in the definition.
 256 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 12A, p. 198, l. 39- 67: In separatis […] similiter aliqua de 
praedictis causarum generibus, licet secundum aliam rationem a praefatis, inveniuntur. […] 
Causa autem subiectiva et quasi materialis accipitur penes intentionem causalioris prin-
cipii, quae, cum in se et per se non possit subsistere propter distantiam sui a prime sua causa, 
per aliam intentionem proximi subordinati producentis quasi informatur, determinatur et 
singularizatur. On the role of determination in strengthening these vestiges that cannot 
subsist on their own, see also Expositio, 3E, 30A, 41C, 59D, 64B, 65F, 90C, 137F, and 138B. 
The role of “proximity” and “distance” in any essential order was emphasised already in 






subsist – this is what occurs through determination.257 A lower god determines 
with its own irradiation the immaterial substrate already elaborated by one 
or more prior principles. At the root of all of these substrates among spiritual 
substances is the vestigium unius.258 But, Berthold stated clearly, at least in the 
case of the determination of an es, “the subjective cause” of determination is 
still more actual than the subsequent determination it receives.259 This is how 
the es enumerated in the table at 62C arise.
We may locate this account of the determinatio or derivatio of es within a 
larger framework of the modes of procession that Berthold systematised from 
Dietrich of Freiberg in his commentary on Proposition 29 (“Every procession is 
made through the likeness of the secondaries to the primaries”).260 Following 
Dietrich, Berthold made a distinction between what proceeds (1) from reason 
(a ratione) and (2) what proceeds according to reason (secundum rationem).261 
(1) When something proceeds “from reason”, the reason itself is the productive 
principle, such that no other power is required to bring about the procession; it 
would be as if the art of playing the lute were to play the lute by itself. Dietrich 
identified this as the mode according to which “the images of God”, that is, 
every intellectus in actu per essentiam from the separate substances to the 
human agent intellect, proceed insofar as they are imagines Dei. By contrast, 
(2) to proceed “according to reason” means that the reason is in the producer 
who has an additional power (virtus elicitiva) that brings about the production. 
 257 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 162B, p. 17, l. 33- 46: Et tales unitates sunt divinissima, quae 
sunt in essentiis entium, vitarum, intellectuum et ceterorum, et sunt supposita traditionibus 
aliorum deorum, quorum illustrationes pertingunt ad ipsa sicut a prime uno elaborata, et 
sunt susceptiva omnis processus, qui est ab ipsis diis, et praecedunt simpliciter omnes dona-
tiones ipsorum deorum per 71. Hae enim sunt illae unitates, de quibus aliqualiter dictum 
est super 135, et sunt in nobis excedentes secundum Dionysium 7 cap. De divinis nomini-
bus ‘mentis naturam’, et vocantur unitates superexaltatae. Sicut igitur in nobis sunt illud 
intimum et supremum, quod Deus in natura nostra plantavit, quod etiam est ‘vestigium’ et 
illustratio solius prime ‘unius’, quod determinatur ulterius aliis illustrationibus, puta virtutis, 
entitatis, vitae, intellectualitatis et ceteris, ita est proportionaliter in omnibus enter entibus 
supra hominem et citra deos, quod videlicet solius prime unius, super quam fundant aliae 
causae primordiales suas illustrationes secundum ordinem totalitatis earum.
 258 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 4B, p. 107, l. 231- 234.
 259 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 41E, p. 51, l. 169- 179; 71E- F, p. 36, l. 140- 153; 98B, p. 193, 
l. 85- 86.
 260 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 29, p. 19, l. 1- 2: Omnis processus per similitudinem 
secundorum ad prima efficitur.
 261 For what follows, see Expositio, 29B- C, p. 184, l. 78 – p. 185, l. 127, which relies on Dietrich 
of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, ii.32.1- ii.36.3, p. 170, l. 104 – p. 175, l. 115. For a fuller 
account of Dietrich’s position, see also De visione beatifica, 1.2.1.1.1- 1.2.1.1.5, p. 37, l. 10 – 
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What proceeds in this way are the determinate species of things (e.g., the spe-
cies “horse”) that have (2a) an exemplary form (forma exemplaris) in God. eh 
properly speaking also proceed (2) “according to reason”, but in addition to 
requiring (2a) the specific determination that comes from the exemplary form, 
they have a further determination that God knows in their (2b) ideal form 
(forma idealis). es, however, proceed both (1) as an image and (2a) according to 
an exemplary form. This accounts for their self- subsistent “singularity”, which 
is simpler than “individuality”, but which is nevertheless determinate because 
it corresponds to an exemplary form in the divine mind. According to Dietrich, 
their mode of procession as (1) images predominates over (2a) that determi-
nacy, since each intellectus in actu per essentiam is “a likeness of the totality of 
being” because it understands all being as such, and not just of some part of 
being. For Berthold, who was able to refine Dietrich’s position on this point, 
the true realisation of (1) is found in the gods, whereas every es below the 
gods as far as the separate intelligences proceed according to both (1) and (2a). 
Berthold also clarified that, in the case of heavenly souls and human beings, 
we must be dealing with some combination of (1), (2a), and (2b), since their 
relation to body makes them individuals, even though their highest part is an 
essentially active intellectual principle. Finally, Berthold noted, generable and 
corruptible things proceed only according to (2a) an exemplary form and (2b) 
an ideal form.
Berthold elsewhere made similar refinements of Dietrich’s order of essen-
tial causes or intellectus in actu per essentiam.262 Dietrich had elaborated a the-
ory of three kinds of causes: (i) essential, (ii) substantial, (iii) and accidental 
causes. In this model, God and es are essential causes. An essential cause is 
an essence that produces another essence through a simple outflowing (per 
simplicem defluxum), without motion or change. The only difference between 
God’s activity and that of the es from this point of view corresponds to the 
amplitude or determination of the causal activity – that is, how many formal 
intentions are presupposed by the es. Berthold was not satisfied with this 
generic description of essential causality and thus subdivided it into three lev-
els: (ia) the unbounded causality of the Good; (ib) the limited, but relatively 
unbounded causality of the gods; (ic) and the determinate and contracted cau-
sality of the es. Each god produces an entire cosmic series, whose intention is 
equally present to all, but this is contracted within the order by the auxiliary 
cause (concausa) at the order’s summit, which makes each member of that 
 262 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 7B, p. 146, l. 265 – p. 151, l. 447, supplemented with 




order a singular.263 From here, Berthold simply summarised Dietrich’s account 
of substantial and accidental causes. In a substance, the essence is contracted 
(contrahitur) to being either in potency or in act, and with this comes all the 
extraneous instruments and attributes that are needed for the substance to 
be realised in act. In this way, the substance is “contracted further to individu-
als” or eh possessing “parts after the whole”. A thing can vary in its substance, 
insofar as it passes from an imperfect to a perfect state, but it cannot vary in 
its essence. Heavenly souls with their bodies are the paradigm of substan-
tial causes. They presuppose the essences of generable things that have been 
constituted by es and draw them out of potency into actuality through their 
motions and with celestial heat and light, as far as the imperfection of sublu-
nary matter will allow.264 Finally, accidental causes presuppose substance, and 
act upon the extrinsic features of the thing.
As we descend from the realm of being (es) into becoming (eh) we see that 
the entire procession, from God to the material world, is related in Berthold’s 
understanding of formal perfections or “intentions”. The One existing accord-
ing to cause produces only “ones”, either according to essence or participation, 
which are immediately related to it. Each entity in its ground, insofar as it is 
one or good, is immediately dependent upon the creative causality of the One. 
Each of the six gods originates from itself a unique formal intention reflecting 
its rank within the order of primordial causes. We have seen how this model 
forced Berthold to admit both that a higher god leaves a vestige of its formal 
intention in the lower god and that a lower god leaves a vestige of its formal 
intention in the order arising from the higher gods. This reminds us that the 
gods, despite falling into a rank when viewed from their effects, remain ineffa-
bly in the divine Word insofar as they are substantial goods that are “made” and 
not “created”, and that creation proceeds from God according to the modalities 
latent in the archetypical world.265
A series arises from each primordial cause according to “a causal proces-
sion”, which Berthold defined as “an emanation of a nature from another 
nature that preserves the natural distinction within an intentional identity”.266 
This description of the intelligible unity of a causal order as “intentional” came 
from Dietrich of Freiberg, who had used it relative to Propositions 21 and 97 of 
 263 Compare Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 7B, p. 147, l. 306- 316, with Expositio, 38B, p. 28, 
l. 49- 51.
 264 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 25C, p. 142, l. 177- 186; 72C, p. 39, l. 53 – p. 40, l. 82.
 265 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 9, p. 14, l. 300 – p. 15, l. 320.
 266 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 29A, p. 183, l. 54- 55: emanatio naturae a natura salvans 
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the Elementatio theologica.267 Dietrich argued that the unity of the universe 
derives from the fact that “the essence of the first principle” is diffused “inten-
tionally” by its causal power.268 That is, the same essence is found in the effects 
of the first principle, but it exists in each according to the recipient’s mode 
of being.
Berthold included these passages from Dietrich in his commentaries on 
Propositions 21 and 97,269 but he only explained exactly what he understood 
by the term “intention” in Proposition 71.270 There Proclus had outlined the 
important principle that each lower cause presupposes the causal power of 
the higher cause as well as the substrate that the higher cause has elaborated. 
Berthold’s discussion of the meanings of intentio, it must be noted, was not 
prompted by the presence of the term in the Elementatio, but rather by Proclus’ 
use of the word “illuminations” (ἐλλάμψεις, illustrationes) to describe the cau-
sality exercised by the gods.271 In one sense, Berthold explained, “intention” 
can refer to what exists indifferently in the soul or outside the soul. Such inten-
tions are either “the six transcendentals according to Aristotle” (ens, res, aliq-
uid, unum, verum, bonum), which “are identical in reality, but distinct in rea-
son”, or are the parts of a definition (genus, differentia, and species). In another 
sense, “an intention is distinguished from the thing in the soul”, and this again 
has two senses. If it “implies an imperfection”, we say that “the existence colour 
in the [transparent] medium” is intentional (intentionale), which presumably 
means that the illuminative power of colour is weaker or imperfect compared 
to that of light. If “intention” denotes something that brings about a perfec-
tion, then it refers to the formal intentions of “good”, “infinite”, “being”, and so 
on, as they exist in the primordial causes or, in a more contracted way, in the 
 267 Dietrich of Freiberg, De cognitione entium separatorum, 74.2- 5, p. 237, l. 99- 118.
 268 Dietrich of Freiberg, De cognitione entium separatorum, 79.3, p. 242, l. 36- 41: De ista autem 
unitate seu una intentione, de qua tot et talia dicta sunt, ut apparet intuenti, potest expres-
sius dici sic, videlicet quod ipsa est essentia primi principii in se ipsa existens secundum pro-
prietatem substantiae suae, sed intentionaliter secundum virtutem suam diffusa per rerum 
universitatem, quo tota rerum universitas non solum ab ipso tamquam a causali primo prin-
cipio, verum etiam inter se secundum partes suas causaliter dependeat.
 269 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 21I, p. 91, l. 531- 539; 97B, p. 186, l. 42- 53.
 270 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 71, p. 38, l. 1- 9: Omnia que in primordialibus causis 
totaliorem et superiorem ordinem habentia in effectibus secundum eas que ab ipsis illustra-
tiones supposita aliqualiter fiunt partialiorum traditionibus; et que quidem a superioribus 
illustrationes suscipiunt eos qui a secundis processus, ille autem in hiis locantur; et ita prece-
dunt participationes alie alias, et illustrationes alie super alias desuper ad idem pertingunt 
subiectum, totalioribus preoperantibus, partialioribus autem super illorum operationes sui 
ipsorum traditiones elargientibus participantibus.












higher members of their orders and in their participants. Berthold then went 
on to contrast the Platonic and Aristotelian understandings of what it means 
to be a “common” intention. For Aristotle, it had to do with the universality of 
predication or signification. For Plato, intentions were understood to be com-
mon in reality (intentiones communes secundum rem), and it was of course this 
approach that Proclus adopted in Proposition 71.272 These contrasts are famil-
iar enough. What was new in Berthold’s account was the close association of 
the intentio extra animam, the irradiation or illumination of the primordial 
causes, with the natural phenomena of light and colour.
The top and bottom of Berthold’s cosmology are connected seamlessly in 
his theory of the diffusion of light. It is here that we come full circle and under-
stand why the metaphor of the sun served so well to illustrate the ecstatic cre-
ative activity of divine love. This went beyond a commonplace association. In 
Propositions 36, 37, 125, and 143, we find that Berthold not only used light as a 
metaphor to describe the procession and conversion of all things. He under-
stood the dynamics of these orders by extrapolating from specific principles 
concerning the nature and diffusion physical light that had been propounded 
by the perspectivists: Alhazen (De aspectibus, translated c. 1200), Roger Bacon 
(De multiplicatione specierum and Perspectiva, early and mid- 1260s), Witelo 
(Perspectiva, mid- 1270s), and John Peckham (Perspectiva communis, c. 1280).273 
Berthold may have known the works of all these 13th- century perspectivists. 
He was certainly familiar with Alhazen’s De aspectibus274 and Dietrich of 
Freiberg’s De iride et radialibus impressionibus (after 1304).275
 272 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 71D, p. 33, l. 51- 62.
 273 This natural scientific dimension of Berthold’s metaphysics been recognised since 
Barbara Faës de Mottoni’s analysis of Propositions 36 and 37; see B. Faës de Mottoni, “Il 
problema della luce nel Commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg all’Elementatio theologica 
di Proclo”, in Studi medievali 16(1975), p. 325– 352. Alain de Libera concluded his funda-
mental study of the German Dominicans with Berthold’s theory of light as a way of sum-
marising the characteristic motifs of that intellectual culture; see De Libera, La mystique 
rhénane, p. 410– 423. Most recently, Sylvain Roudaut has examined Berthold’s synthesis of 
Dietrich of Freiberg’s theory of perfectional form and his incorporation of other sources 
like Avicebron and Adam Pulchrae Mulieris, and has demonstrated that we can indeed 
speak of “a metaphysics of light” in the Expositio; see Roudaut, “Founding a Metaphysics 
of Light”, forthcoming.
 274 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 143O, p. 72, l. 435 – p. 73, l. 460.
 275 We may recall here the glosses on Aristotle’s Meteorology attributed to Berthold that appear 
in the margins of Dietrich’s De iride (in ms Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.iv.30, f. 56v- 
57r) and the fragment on optics (in ms Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.iv.31, f. 45r- v) that 
was copied by the same scribe responsible for Berthold’s text of Macrobius’ In Somnium 
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Berthold’s discussions of light in Propositions 125 and 143 were guided by 
his standard procedure of basing his comments on the precise terminology 
used by Proclus (125: emicare; 143: a divino lumine).276 These passages, however, 
should be read alongside his more systematic exposition of a theory of light in 
his commentaries on Proposition 36 (“Of all things that are multiplied through 
procession, the primaries are more perfect than the secondaries, and the sec-
ondaries are more perfect than those that come after them, and so on in the 
same way”) and Proposition 37 (“Of all things subsisting through conversion, 
the primaries are more imperfect than the secondaries, and the secondaries 
are more imperfect than those that follow them, but the last things are the 
most perfect”).277 These commentaries marked a flagrant departure from his 
exegetical method, since in Propositions 36 and 37 Proclus had made no ref-
erence to light or illumination. Berthold’s decision to give a summary of the 
entire metaphysics of the Elementatio theologica, as it can be recapitulated 
in the pattern of procession and return, through a theory of light allows us 
to glimpse some of the deepest assumptions he brought to the text. Perhaps 
the only comparable passage in this respect was Berthold’s presentation of 
the astrologer as a paradigmatic example of the human vocation to be a nexus 
Dei et mundi, mediating between the stable realm of being and the changea-
ble realm of becoming, according to the Proclean notion of “ruling the world 
with the gods”.278 Both passages not only clarify Berthold’s interpretation of 
the philosophical principles of the Elementatio as a representative text of the 
Platonic tradition, but also hint at his broader assumptions about how this 
divine science was continuous with the philosophy of nature.
Berthold’s approach to Propositions 36 and 37 moved across three levels of 
light (the physical, the intellectual, and the supersubstantial). For both com-
mentaries, even though Proposition 36 begins, so to speak, “from above” and 
Proposition 37 “from below”, Berthold started out from the laws of physical 
light, and from there moved to treat intellectual light and, finally, supersub-
stantial light. His preferred authorities for describing the level of intellectual 
glosses and the fragment on optics are edited in Sturlese, “Note su Bertoldo di Moosburg 
O.P.”, p. 249– 256.
 276 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 125, p. 63, l. 1- 4, cited in n. 42, above; prop. 143, p. 71, 
l. 1- 3: Omnia deteriora presentia deorum subsistunt; et si ydoneum sit participans, omne 
quidem quod alienum a divino lumine fit, illustratur autem omne subito a diis.
 277 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 36, p. 22, l. 1- 3: Omnium eorum que secundum proces-
sum multiplicantur prima sunt perfectiora secundis et secunda hiis que post ipsa, et conse-
quenter eodem modo; prop. 37, p. 23, l. 1- 3: Omnium secundum conversionem subsistentium 
prima sunt imperfectiora secundis et secunda hiis que deinceps; ultima autem perfectissima.








light were Aristotle, the Liber de intelligentiis of Adam Pulchrae Mulieris, and 
Avicenna; on supersubstantial light, Berthold turned to Dionysius and again 
to Adam. For the foundational analysis of physical light, Berthold appealed to 
“the perspectivists” in general (probably Alhazen and Dietrich), all of whom 
were indebted to Aristotle’s De anima ii.7 and  chapter 3 of his De sensu et 
sensato.279
Berthold’s analysis of physical light centered on radiant forms (formae 
radiosae) and the process of propagation or radiation (radiatio).280 Light and 
colour are radiant forms. Unlike a physical form such as heat, which exclu-
sively inheres in its subject, a radiant form is an inherent quality that informs 
its subject “in a certain order towards the outside”, by which it diffuses and 
multiplies itself. According to Berthold, three things coincide in the process 
of radiation: (1) the principle, (2) the medium, and (3) the mode of propaga-
tion. His account of (1) the principle was basically Aristotelian.281 The trans-
parency (diaphanum) as such is unbounded (interminatum). Light (lumen) 
is a quality received into the transparent as a form is received by its subject. 
Light in the transparency constitutes the transparency in act (perspicuum).282 
The perspicuum is either bounded (terminatum), and as such is colour, or is 
compressed (conculcatum), and as such is visible light (lux visibilis); in other 
words, colour exists at the boundary of the transparent, while light exists in 
the transparent.
Berthold devoted more attention to (2) the medium and (3) mode of radia-
tion. (2) The transparency is said to be “transmissive” of any form “because of a 
certain ejection of its parts from one another”, and thus it is ordered to the out-
side (ad extra). At this point, Berthold appealed to Dietrich’s notion of essen-
tial causality and stated repeatedly that a radiating form retains its nature but 
takes on a different mode of being (secundum aliud esse) outside its subject. 
Visible light thus “proceeds according to its essence outside itself, making itself 
 279 For an overview of perspectivist optics in Alhazen and its Western reception, see A.M. 
Smith, Alhacen’s Theory of Visual Perception. A Critical Edition, with English Translation 
and Commentary, of the First Three Books of Alhacen’s De aspectibus, the Medieval Latin 
Version of Ibn al- Haytham’s Kitāb al- Manāẓir, 2 vols (Philadelphia: American Philosophical 
Society, 2001), vol. 1, p. lii- cxii.
 280 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 36A, p. 15, l. 13 – p. 17, l. 80; 37A, p. 22, l. 11 – p. 24, l. 79.
 281 Aristotle, De anima, ii.7, 418a26- 419b2; id., De sensu et sensato, 3, 439a12- 440b25.
 282 Diaphanum and perspicuum were generally treated as synonyms, the latter being the 
Latin translation of the former, which was a transliteration from the Greek. Berthold, 
however, seems to have followed Dietrich (De iride ii.4) who used diaphanum for the 
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be outside itself according to its essence, but according to another mode of 
being”.283
As for (3) the mode of radiation, Berthold stated that visible light diffuses 
itself over a spatial distance. As such, he argued, it relates by nature first to 
what is more distant, and consequently only to what is proximate (per prius 
re ipsa et ordine naturae respiciat magis distans). From this principle we could 
infer, for example, that prime matter is an immediate effect of the Good, whose 
intention would pass immediately through the entire universe as “one” or 
“good” until it reached the term most distant from it. Berthold underscored 
the point that light diffuses itself in a linear fashion, because linear movement 
implies the pure extrapolation of part after part (per eiectionem in distantia ut 
distantia inquantum huiusmodi) without the connotation of return (reditus). 
Such an assertion might lead us to expect that Berthold will focus more on 
circularity in Proposition 37, which concerns the order of conversion. But that 
is not what we find. He reaffirmed that the linear radiation of light indeed cor-
responds to procession; but for Berthold the paradigmatic example of conver-
sion is the perpendicular incidence of a ray on a reflective surface, so that the 
ray is reflected directly back to its source.284
The Neoplatonic cosmological structure of procession and return is proba-
bly most frequently imagined in terms of nested circular patterns, where each 
moment of procession is extrinsic to each moment of conversion. According 
to Berthold’s proposal that it be likened to the linear diffusion of a ray reflected 
upon itself, every moment of procession is also a conversion. This defies our 
temporal imagination. It is, however, a perfect analogy for the dynamics of 
essential causality that Berthold developed from Dietrich of Freiberg.285 
Indeed, when Berthold discussed the “reflection” or conversion of “intellectual 
light” in 37B, he cited this crucial passage from Dietrich’s De visione beatifica:
In the order of things that is intrinsic with regard to the disposition of 
essential causes and effects, the posterior are not found without the prior, 
nor any of those that are last without the absolutely first. Likewise, these 
acts, which are concepts [conceptus] that are always essentially in act, 
 283 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 36A, p. 16, l. 46- 50: ut eadem lux secundum substantiam 
sit secundum esse nature in proprio subiecto, sit autem et alibi et extra se secundum aliud 
esse non solum secundum aliquem effectum, sed etiam secundum suam essentiam pro-
cedens ad extra se et faciens se extra se secundum suam essentiam, sed secundum aliud esse 
in concernendo per se distantiam localem eorum, in quae se diffundit.
 284 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 37A, p. 22, l. 30 – p. 23, l. 60.








and which, in each degree of their order, remain fixed by the conception 
[conceptione] which is their own essence, do not conceive anything with-
out this very conception by which they conceive their productive princi-
ple, and would have no existence without it. And thus, since such things 
both proceed and subsist by their conception, by which they conceive 
their principle (and this conception is nothing else but a certain essential 
reflection or conversion into their very principle), it is necessary that all 
such principles are subsistences according to conversion, even though 
procession and conversion are the same in reality, just as radiation is in 
its own way.286
As Berthold well understood, at the level of es, whose essence is identical 
with their operation, every moment of procession is equally a moment of 
conversion. The only difference between this mode of “radiation” and that of 
the Good relates to the medium. Whereas these intellectual radiant forms are 
diffused through a medium, which in the analogy is equivalent to the subject 
elaborated by the primordial causes above it, the superintellectual light of the 
Good presupposes no medium at all, but simply multiplies itself (multiplicans 
se suis processibus in omnia), and yet remains one in its multiplication (unum 
in multiplicatione et unum in processione). In this linear optical model, the self- 
communication of the Good in procession is timeless and identical with the 
conversion of intellectual creatures to the Good.
The linear diffusion and reflection of light was therefore the most adequate 
illustration of the exstasis divini amoris that is at the ground of the universe. 
As Berthold’s comments on Propositions 125 and 143 reaffirm, the name “light” 
befits God in several ways, but most of all God’s essence as Goodness.287 For 
just as light is the most formal and noblest of all sensible forms, and has the 
 286 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 37B, p. 24, l. 91- 97: Sicut in ordine rerum, qui est per se 
quantum ad dispositionem essentialium causarum et causatorum, posteriora non inveniun-
tur sine prioribus nec aliquid eorum, quae sunt post, sine simpliciter primo, ita isti actus, qui 
sunt quidam conceptus per essentiam semper in actu, quorum quilibet in aliquo gradu sui 
ordinis figitur sua conceptione, quae est eius essentia, nihil concipiunt sine ea conceptione, 
quae concipiunt suum principium productivum, sicut et nullam entitatem haberent sine eo. 
Et sic, cum huiusmodi res ex sua conceptione, qua concipiunt suum principium, et proce-
dant et subsistant, ipsa autem conceptio non est nisi quaedam in ipsum suum principium 
essentialis reflexio sive conversio, necessarium est omnia talia principia esse subsistentia 
secundum conversionem, licet conversio et processio sint idem secundum rem, sicut etiam 
suo modo in radiatione.
 287 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 143L, p. 69, l. 312- 314: Et ideo Dionysius in idem ponit haec 
duo, scilicet bonum et lumen. Pulchrum autem mediante lumen reducitur ad rationem boni, 
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perfections of all visible qualities in itself in a unified and simpler way than they 
are in themselves, so “the Goodness of the gods” embraces all of their formal 
perfections or colours within itself.288 For this reason, the primordial causes 
can be likened to prisms refracting the Good into their respective orders.289
It may be that the image of the linearity of the diffusion of Goodness in 
Berthold’s thought ran even deeper. We have already seen that, for Berthold, 
of the soul’s three motions, the direct or “linear” was the highest. For the soul 
that moves in this way, the creatures of the world have become transparent to 
their divine ideas, allowing the mind to ascend rapidly through the modes of 
cognition until it reaches a transitory enjoyment of the intellectus adeptus and, 
within that reflexivity, apprehends God through non- reflexive ignorance above 
the mind. This ignorance, as Berthold read in Dionysius (De divinis nominibus 
7.3), occurs “when the mind, having departed from everything else, and then 
also sending itself away, is united with the super- resplendent rays, and is illu-
minated hither and yon [inde et ibi] by the inscrutable depth of wisdom”.290 
This is how the minds of those “who sit in darkness and the shadow of death” 
are illumined and filled by the rays of truth.291 When the soul is raised to the 
cognition of the unum animae, it becomes united to this same linear progres-
sion of the Good to and from itself by non- reflexively mirroring (inde et ibi) the 
paternal and providential light. In this way the microcosm will be harmonised 
with the macrocosm.
 288 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 143L, p. 68, l. 301- 308: Sicut enim lux est maxime forma-
lis et nobilis inter omnes formas sensibiles et habet in se unite et simpliciter et excellenter 
perfectiones omnium qualitatum visibilium adeo, quod etiam sit hypostasis, id est formalis 
subsistentia, omnium colorum, ita bonitas deorum consistit in hoc, quod ipsa sola ratione 
suae supersubstantialitatis est pura et immixta et sic omnino formalis nihil habens vel de 
materia vel materiae condicionibus sibi permixtum, immo nec de aliis intentionibus formal-
ibus essentialiter.
 289 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 125B, p. 149, l. 61- 64: ita dii, qui sunt per se bonitates, 
radios bonitatis, quos copiosissime sicut supremae et provectissimae essentiae suscipiunt 
ad instar prime boni omnibus suis intentionibus subiectis, copiosius largiuntur essentialiter, 
universaliter et impausabiliter infundendo.
 290 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 123D, p. 129, l. 152- 155. The only other citation of this text 
is in Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 68, l. 533- 538.
 291 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 143L, p. 70, l. 352- 357: Prime enim Deus est simpliciter 
prima, purissima, simplicissima et superperfectissima veritas et ratio incommutabilis omni-
quaque diffundens radios suos in omne verum, licet per prius superimpleat ipsos deos super-
intellectuali lumine et consequenter omnes supercaelestes mentes, et sic descendat usque 
ad illuminationem nostri, ‘qui’ etiam quasi ‘in tenebris et umbra mortis sedemus’. Cf. Luke 














Here there resounds to the mind the wondrous sweetness of the 
shouts of those who feast, of the banqueters calling out.1
∵
Berthold of Moosburg’s commentary on the final proposition of the Elementatio 
theologica (“Every partial soul, descending into becoming, descends entire; it 
is not the case that one part of it remains above while another part descends”) 
recapitulated the central themes of his reconstruction of Platonic philoso-
phy and related them directly to the life of human individuals in the realm of 
becoming.2 As the concluding words of his propositum indicate, he regarded 
Proclus’ doctrine of the soul’s descent as the logical culmination of the entire 
argument of the Elementatio:
For although something of [the human soul] always stands in the light of 
actual intelligence, thinking itself and its principle from which it intellec-
tually and cognitively emanates, yet this cognition belongs to the whole 
soul only accidentally. Therefore, nothing of the soul is said to remain 
above, insofar as it is soul, but the whole descends into becoming accord-
ing to the Platonists. And, thus, the intention of the element and of the 
entire book is manifest.3
 1 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 20, p. 34, l. 966- 967: Unde sonat ei mira suavitas sonus 
epulantium, id est sonantium epulantium. Cf. Peter Lombard, Commentaria in Psalmos, In Ps. 
41:4, pl 191, 418A.
 2 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 211, p. 103, l. 1- 3: Omnis partialis anima descendens in 
generationem tota descendit et non hoc quidem ipsius sursum manet, hoc autem descendit.
 3 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 211F, p. 264, l. 246- 251: Quamvis enim aliquid eius semper stet 
in lumine actualis intelligentiae intelligendo se ipsum et suum principium, a quo intellectual-
iter et cognitive emanat, tamen ista cognitio non est totius animae nisi per accidens. Ideo nihil 
animae dicitur sursum remanere, inquantum est anima, sed apud generationem secundum 









The entire mechanism of invisible principles, from the thearchy through the 
manifold orders of entia secundum speciem, finds its end in the descent of the 
human (“partial”) soul into becoming.4 Compressed into this brief passage 
were several conclusions that Berthold has reached through a reflection on the 
final propositions of the Elementatio. These were devoted to the nature and 
ranks of “total” and “partial” souls (Propositions 184- 205) and, finally, to the ori-
gin and properties of the incorruptible “vehicle” or body (susceptaculum) that 
is always united to total and partial souls (Proposition 196) and accompanies 
a partial soul in its descent from being into the material body (Propositions 
206- 210). As Berthold saw it, once Proclus had established the properties and 
endurance of that spiritual body and described its descent with the partial soul 
into the world of becoming, he had traversed the entire order of natural prov-
idence, in which each member is identical with its operation. What is left for 
theology would presuppose and consummate that essential order.
For Berthold, this meant that the human soul and its incorruptible body 
belong to the subject matter of the Elementatio theologica, the invisible things 
of God within the order of natural providence. The coherence of his decision 
to centralise the Hermetic motif of the macrocosm and microcosm, both of 
which contain the four maneries of One, Intellect, Soul, and Body, depended 
 4 Adopting the terminology of Proclus, Berthold distinguished between three kinds of soul: (1) 
“whole” or heavenly souls, (2) “partial” or human souls, and (3) the images of souls (indal-
mata seu idola animarum; cf. Proposition 64), which are the souls of animals and plants. 
Their names correspond to their degree of separation from the body. According to 111E: (1) 
are participated separably (separabiliter); (2) separably and inseparably; (3) inseparably. 
Separability denotes the extent to which a soul has the principle of its vital motion inde-
pendently of the body and, therefore, is immortal. According to 183E: (1) are intellectual as a 
whole but not wholly (non totaliter); (2) are not intellectual as a whole nor wholly (nec se totis 
nec totaliter); (3) have only a trace of reason. Furthermore (1) have two parts, the intellective 
and vegetative, and their name reflects the fact that they are at once conjoined and sepa-
rated from their bodies as a whole (se totis coniunctae et separatae); (2) have three parts, the 
intellective, sensitive, and vegetative, and their name reflects how they are partly conjoined 
and partly separated (partim coniunctae et partim separatae). The status of (1) “whole” souls 
is clarified at 201B: as intellectual, they receive intelligible species directly from the separate 
intelligences and, as vegetative, they relate directly to “universal nature” insofar as they pre-
pare a heavenly body, through exercising their operation (per potestativam expansionem), 
to receive this intellectual influence seamlessly through circular motion. This completes 
the flow (fluxus) of form that began with the Good and proceeded through its instruments 
that determine its causality. In 184E, Berthold subdivided the second group: after (1) “divine” 
heavenly souls, which participate a divine unity through their divine intellect, come (2a) 
“intellectual” souls, which are partial souls that exist in being (in ente) and (2b) souls that 
are “receptive of change” (transmutationis susceptivae), which are partial souls that exist in 




on this. According to Berthold, as was noted already, the human’s unique place 
in the cosmos derives not from its status as an imago Dei but rather, as it were, 
as an imago deorum: only the human, the most composite creature, focalises 
all the gifts of the gods found in the macrocosm. In one sense, this is a function 
of the human’s weakness; the active vestige of the One in the human soul is 
so feeble that it needs all the assistance the gods can offer. Yet this weakness 
becomes its glory, for as an image of all the gods, human nature mirrors the 
totality of the archetypical world. In this sense, the rival to human nature is 
not any one of the principles above it but instead the entire macrocosm as 
the most adequate image of God. The plenitude of the Word is unfolded in 
both. This is how the microcosm as the “most composite” creature is also the 
nexus Dei et mundi – it is at once “every creature” and the centre- point of the 
creation.
This vision of human nature receiving all the gifts of the gods is precisely 
what we find detailed in Berthold’s commentary on Proposition 211,5 where 
he forged an extraordinary synthesis of some of his most important sources 
(Proclus, Macrobius, the Clavis physicae, and Dietrich of Freiberg) to outline a 
theory of the human soul’s “double descent” from God into the world of becom-
ing. The soul’s first descent is from God into its substantial union with human 
nature as a species, the second is from human nature to the soul’s individual 
existence in becoming. Both, Berthold insisted, occur atemporally – their divi-
sions are a reflection of our understanding.
In his account of the first descent, which corresponds to the constitution 
of human nature as a species and as the microcosm, Berthold presupposed 
his earlier arguments about the priority of the Good over being, the doctrine 
of the gods as an ordered series of primordial causes, and the ontology of ens 
secundum speciem. This synthesis went beyond anything we find in Dietrich, 
whose notion of ens secundum speciem was never applied to human nature or 
to a narrative of “descent”.6 Here Berthold’s interpretation of the exemplarist 
anthropology of the Clavis physicae through Dietrich’s ontology will provide 
the decisive means for navigating these passages in the Elementatio theolog-
ica. Through his synthesis of these sources, Berthold maintained that, even 
now, human nature in its singularity “imitates the presiding gods” because it 
is constituted in being as almost (quasi) an ens secundum speciem.7 Human 
 5 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 211C, p. 260, l. 90 – p. 261, l. 124.
 6 The major source for this narrative structure in Berthold was Macrobius, Commentarii in 
Somnium Scipionis, i.11.10- i.12.18, p. 47, l. 9 – p. 51, l. 17.
 7 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 211C, p. 261, l. 113- 116: ubi [anima partialis] perfecte stat in 








nature itself, in other words, must be a member of the “world” that includes 
every separate being standing in the eternal enjoyment of God (in aeterna Dei 
fruitione).8
Yet Berthold was careful to avoid the autotheistic implications such a posi-
tion might entail. Regarding the second descent, which relates directly to the 
passage cited above, Berthold again followed Dietrich. Both Dominicans main-
tained that there is a principle (intellectus agens) within the human soul that 
“always stands in the light of actual intelligence”.9 But as Berthold clarified, 
and Dietrich would concur, this does not save the soul from having to begin 
its return to God from the senses and with phantasms – in Proclus’ terms, no 
part of the soul “remains above” (sursum manet). Nevertheless, as both authors 
recognised, their arguments about the ongoing operation of the agent intel-
lect in the soul’s ground entailed a doctrine of recollection, at least relative to 
the immutable reasons that cannot be derived from experience. Once again, 
Berthold made this more explicit than Dietrich’s passing reference to the 
Platonic doctrine.10
Berthold’s narratives of the first and second descents placed the unum ani-
mae prior to the agent intellect both in the constitution of human nature and 
in the individual. As we have seen, the vestigium unius is presupposed by the 
gods in the determination of any ens secundum speciem. In the individual, the 
unum animae grounds the individuated agent intellect’s essential activity and 
ecstatically relates the person to that nature and, thus, to its perpetual imita-
tion of “the presiding gods”. The final matter for us to consider, then, will be 
the significance of this modification of Dietrich’s anthropology for Berthold’s 
theory of deification. In accordance with the atemporal, exemplarist view of 
human nature Berthold inherited from the Clavis physicae, which he advanced 
in his rejection of Proclus on the soul’s temporal pre- existence, Berthold under-
stood deification in terms of the return of the human individual to the state 
that belongs to it insofar as it is a species, and from which it is never entirely 
alienated (sic in ente supra loca et tempora collocatur, ubi etiam deos praesides 
imitatur). Ultimately, we will see that Berthold, partly inspired by Bernard of 
Clairvaux, understood the transitory enjoyment of such a state (intelligentia or, 
in other words, intellectus adeptus and the unum animae) as, so to speak, “the 
intellect in love” or as an operative union with the divine will.
ad imaginem et similitudinem prime boni. Et sic in ente supra loca et tempora collocatur, ubi 
etiam deos praesides imitatur. See also Expositio, 208E, p. 237, l. 181- 187.
 8 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 164D, p. 33, l. 76- 80.
 9 Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, 1.1.1.3.6 (2) – 1.1.2.3 (3), p. 22, l. 110 – p. 25, l. 76.








Berthold’s notion that the individual is related to the human species 
through the unum animae can also provide the necessary groundwork to 
begin drawing comparisons with his contemporaries like Meister Eckhart, 
Henry of Ekkewint, and John Tauler.11 All four Dominicans share the view 
that an individual participates in the same human nature that has been enno-
bled by the Word to the extent that a person leaves off what makes them 
a “this” or a “that”. As they understood it, this dispossession is nothing else 
than the exercise of charity. All of this was entailed in Berthold’s theory of 
the soul’s double descent into becoming. If such a doctrine was “the intention 
of the entire book”, then we can infer that, for Berthold, the purpose of the 
Elementatio theologica was to recall the soul to its intrinsic and vital connec-
tion to the divine providence, exercising its oblique motion by providing the 
rational means for the soul in the realm of becoming to make itself aware of 
that abiding dignity and receptive to the ecstatic operation for which it is 
already inherently worthy.
1 Human Nature and the Spiritual Body
Observe: what Proclus calls the vehicle, the Apostle calls the house 
or habitation.12
The doctrine of the incorruptible vehicle (susceptaculum) of the soul appears 
for the first time explicitly in Proposition 196 (“Every participable soul uses a 
first, perpetual body that has an ingenerable and incorruptible hypostasis”).13 
The term “participable soul”, as Berthold saw, applied generically to total and 
partial souls. However, at this stage of the Expositio, he applied Proclus’ argu-
ment to heavenly and human souls separately, at 196D- E and 196F, respectively. 
When treating heavenly souls, his main sources were Dietrich of Freiberg and 
Averroes’ De substantia orbis, and for human souls, the Clavis physicae. But 
Proposition 196 had clearly required that a unified account of the incorrupti-
ble vehicle be given for both kinds of soul. We will see that the disparate ten-
dencies in Berthold’s sources for Proposition 196 gave rise to ambiguities and 
 11 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 211C, p. 261, l. 119- 120: in quo descensu determinatur intra 
ipsam humanam naturam ad hanc singularem unitatem. See 5.3, below.
 12 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 210C, p. 249, l. 102- 103: Et attende: Quod auctor vocat sus-
ceptaculum, Apostolus vocat domum seu habitaculum.
 13 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 196, p. 95, l. 1- 2: Omnis anima participabilis corpore 









tensions in his commentary, which were not addressed before Propositions 
206- 210 on the incorruptible vehicle of the partial soul.
It is a principle for Proclus that from a transcendent, unparticipated monad 
there arises a group of immanent, participated terms (Proposition 23). The 
multiplicity of that participated group is in turn a function of the diversity of 
participants. In the case of souls proceeding from the monadic and unpartic-
ipated Soul, the differentiation of “participable souls” must occur simultane-
ously with bodies to participate them.14 These participants or bodies, there-
fore, are required to account for a soul’s distinction from the unparticipated 
Soul. If participable souls depend on a body for their individuation, that body 
must be imperishable if the participated soul’s identity and immortality is to 
be preserved. For this reason, Proclus posited a permanent “astral” body that 
would guarantee the immortal soul’s identity throughout the great cycle of 
death and rebirth, as well as a semi- permanent “pneumatic” body that is sub-
ject to divine reprobation or reward between reincarnations.15 This pneumatic 
vehicle, in turn, is what pervades the third body, which is entirely corruptible. 
For both metaphysical and theological reasons, then, Proclus held that each 
participable soul is eternally individuated by its own spiritual body.
Berthold’s main guides while navigating Proclus’ more simplified account 
of the single incorruptible body in Proposition 196 were Dietrich of Freiberg 
and the Clavis physicae. In 196F, Berthold drew upon twelve chapters in the 
Clavis, citing 115 lines of the text, to offer a concise presentation of Eriugenian 
anthropology. As Berthold presented it, the question of the nature of spiritual 
body in the Clavis arose from a reflection on the status of the human as 
imago Dei. The imago, as he read in the Clavis, includes everything in human 
nature that is substantial and abiding in the eternal present of God’s creative 
Word.16 Accordingly, the imago does not include the corruptible body that is 
 14 This argument was made explicitly in Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria, vol. 
1, lib. i, p. 707, l. 8- 26. See also R. Chulp, Proclus. An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), p. 99– 105.
 15 The difference between astral and pneumatic bodies is only implied in Proposition 209, 
and was not detected by Berthold, who read this text in terms of the accretion of materi-
ality to a single incorruptible body. For a fuller account of the doctrine in light of Proclus’ 
other works, see E.R. Dodds, in Proclus, The Elements of Theology, p. 313– 321; J. Finamore, 
Iamblichus and the Theory of the Vehicle of the Soul (Chico: Scholars Press, 1985), p. 85– 88; 
J. Opsomer, “Was sind irrationale Seelen?”, in M. Perkams, R.M. Piccione (eds), Proklos. 
Methode, Seelenlehre, Metaphysik, p. 136– 166, at p. 148– 151.
 16 On time and eternity in Eriugena, see R. Crouse, “Predestination, Human Freedom and the 
Augustinian Theology of History in Eriugena’s De divina praedestinatione”, in J. McEvoy, M. 
Dunne (eds), History and Eschatology in John Scottus Eriugena and His Time. Proceedings 








extraneous to the intelligible essence of the human, but rather the spiritual 
body that was created in Paradise, which abides even now and will exist after 
the Resurrection:17
That essential body was established in Paradise; but it was yet only in rea-
son that it and the soul were created in that general and universal human, 
who was made after the image of God, in whom all humans in body and 
soul were altogether and at once established only in possibility, and in 
whom they all sinned before they might have proceeded into their own 
substances – that is, before any could have appeared in discrete diversity 
in their rational soul or spiritual body. This body would have adhered to 
the incorruptible soul, had it not sinned. And in this body all humans will 
be resurrected.18
A single spiritual body belongs to “the general and universal human” in 
Paradise, prior to any divisions of time or place, prior even to human history 
and the division of the sexes, both of which are the result of the Fall. In this 
universal human, individuals were present only in possibility and did not yet 
go forth into their proper substances, into distinct souls and spiritual bodies 
by angelic reproduction.19 Since Adam turned towards himself rather than to 
Maynooth and Dublin, August 16- 20, 2000 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), p. 303– 
311, at p. 307– 309.
 17 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 196F, p. 127, l. 148- 152: Corpus autem dico hoc corruptibile 
carnalis adhuc animae merito suae inoboedientiae superbiaeque diversisque calamitatibus 
involutae hospitium, non illud caeleste et spirituale, quod in paradiso cum animae creatum 
est, quale et post resurrectionem futurum erit. Cf. Expositio, 210M, p. 255, l. 321- 324: Ibi 
enim intellectus, ibi ratio, ibi sensus, ibi seminalis vita, ibi corpus, non hoc corruptibile mer-
ito peccati superadditum, sed spirituale et caeleste ante delictum datum et in resurrectione 
futurum.
 18 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 196F, p. 128, l. 171- 178: Primum illud essentiale corpus in 
paradiso est conditum; sola tamen ratione et anima in ipso generali et universali homine ad 
imaginem Dei facto creata est, in quo omnes homines secundum corpus et animam simul et 
semel in sola possibilitate conditi sunt et in ipso omnes peccaverunt, priusquam in proprias 
substantias prodirent, id est antequam quisquam in discreta differentia in anima ration-
ali et spirituali corpore appareret, quod corpus incorruptibili (incorruptibili] incorruptibile 
Clavis) animae aeternaliter adhaereret, si non peccaret; et in hoc omnes homines resurrec-
turi sunt.
 19 The Clavis omitted the more precise designation of this unrealised multiplication as a 
form of angelic reproduction. Cf. Eriugena, Periphyseon, lib. ii, c. 582B, p. 362, l. 3975- 
3985: […] priusquam in proprias substantias prodirent, hoc est, antequam unusquisque 









God, humanity in its fall simultaneously constitutes for itself corruptible bod-
ies appropriate to that lower life and receives them as the tunics of skin fash-
ioned by God (Genesis 3:21).20
Berthold undoubtedly discerned some similarities between Proclus and the 
Clavis on these points: the spiritual body is caused by an immobile substance 
(Proposition 207), while the lower body is superadded to accompany the soul’s 
fall from being into becoming (Propositions 209- 210).21 But the differences 
between the two authorities are even more striking. One problem concerns 
the numerical status of the spiritual body. In the Eriugenian perspective of 
the Clavis, the spiritual body as one and universal because it belongs to the 
“universal human”.22 Individual corporeal bodies arise as bundles of properties 
or accidents in the realm of temporal and spatial division.23 These particular 
bodies are not, properly speaking, the natural bodies of their souls but rather 
are garments “superadded” to common humanity.24 In this sense, as John 
Marenbon has noted, for Eriugena there was really no question about the indi-
viduation of substance as such, since individuals are nothing but “concourses 
of accidents”.25
Eriugena followed the consequences of this reasoning about the Fall in his 
account of the general Resurrection, when the diversity of fallen humanity will 
be restored to itself as it has always existed substantially in the divine Word.26 
Material differentiation falls away entirely. In the Resurrection, souls who in 
Paradise existed in possibility in the universal human will be differentiated 
 20 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 196F, p. 127, l. 154: ostendit animam sibi ipsi causare cor-
pus materiale. See also Expositio, 207E, p. 229, l. 151 – p. 230, l. 190, where Berthold cited 
Macrobius (In Somnium Scipionis, i.14.3).
 21 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 207E- F, p. 229, l. 151 – p. 231, l. 213.
 22 Eriugena also called the universal human “the plenitude of humanity” (plenitudo human-
itatis), following Gregory of Nyssa: Periphyseon, lib. iv, 759A- B; lib. v, 922A- C, 942B- C, 
953A- B, and 957C. On Eriugena’s ontology of human nature, see C. Erismann, L’Homme 
commun. La genèse du réalisme ontologique durant le haut Moyen Âge (Paris: Vrin, 2011), 
p. 149– 292.
 23 See the citations of the Clavis at Expositio, 74C, p. 55, l. 206 – p. 56, l. 227, as well as 
Eriugena, Periphyseon, lib. v, 941D- 944B.
 24 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 196F, p. 129, l. 202- 214, citing Clavis, c. 272. Cf. Eriugena, 
Periphyseon, lib. iv, 801C.
 25 J. Marenbon, “Eriugena, Aristotelian Logic and the Creation”, in W. Otten, M. Allen (eds), 
Eriugena and Creation. Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference on Eriugenian 
Studies, held in honor of Edouard Jeauneau, Chicago, 9- 12 November 2011 (Turnhout: Brepols, 
2014), p. 349– 368, at p. 362– 363.
 26 C. Steel, “The Return of the Body into Soul. Philosophical Musings on the Resurrection”, in 

















only by their merits and virtues, but not by any vices or by any individual 
body.27 As Tullio Gregory observed, Eriugena was less concerned with the sta-
tus of individual souls than with the unity and future integrity of humanity,28 
and with situating this general return within the rhythm of nature’s return to 
the primordial causes.29
Berthold’s comments on Proposition 196 indicate that he was aware that 
further clarification was going to be needed on this subject, both to elucidate 
the doctrine of the Clavis and to show that the Elementatio theologica agrees 
with it. His lengthy series of citations of the Clavis in 196F was bookended with 
two cautionary remarks:
To be sure, concerning this body that the rational soul is said to use first 
and that it always animates by its being, I will define nothing rashly, for 
it should follow that it is perpetual, since it has an ingenerable, incor-
ruptible, and unchangeable subsistence; for just like the heavenly bod-
ies, it does not receive any outside ‘impressions’, if these are thought to 
be ‘wandering’. Let us hear, however, what Theodorus judged about this 
body in the Clavis. […]
These things may be brought forward without prejudice only to be 
clear about what the doctors of the Church judged regarding the matter 
at hand.30
Berthold concluded his catena of citations by reassuring his readers that the 
Clavis conveyed “the most sound and catholic faith of the divine theologians, 
Gregory and Maximus,” which itself was based on “unshakeable arguments”.31 
 27 Eriugena, Periphyseon, lib. v, 983B and 987A- D.
 28 T. Gregory, “L’eschatologie de Jean Scot”, in R. Roques (ed.), Jean Scot Érigène et l’histoire de 
la philosophie. Laon 7- 12 juillet 1975 (Paris: cnrs Éditions, 1977), p. 377– 392.
 29 Eriugena, Periphyseon, lib. v, 978D.
 30 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 196F, p. 126, l. 128 – p. 127, l. 31 and p. 130, l. 252- 3: Sane de 
corpore, quo anima rationalis primo uti dicitur et quod semper animat esse suo, nihil habeo 
temere definire, cum oporteret esse perpetuum sicut habens subsistentiam ingenerabilem et 
incorruptibilem et inalterabilem, cum ad instar corporis caelestis impressiones non recipiat, 
si esse ponitur peregrinas. Audiamus tamen, quid Theodorus in Clave sentiat de hoc corpore 
[…]. Haec sine praeiudicio sint adducta ad hoc solum, ut clarescat, quid circa praesentem 
intentionem doctores ecclesiastici senserint.
 31 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 196F, p. 130, l. 228- 231: Sanissima namque et catholica 
fide credimus divinorum virorum theologi, videlicet Gregorii et Maximi, de talibus incon-
cussas rationes reddentium dogmate imbuti, quod Conditor humanae naturae totam simul 
eam creavit nec animum ante corpus nec corpus ante animam condidit. Cf. Eriugena, 












The tone of Berthold’s cautionary remarks should be understood less as a note 
of disapproval than an acknowledgment that he has introduced views from 
reliable authorities that would be unfamiliar or possibly scandalous. He would 
also have realised that he had not yet explained how to relate the account of 
the bodies of heavenly souls in 196D- E with the incorruptible susceptaculum of 
human nature of 196F. Thus far, he has only given hints to the unified account 
that we find, for example, in his interpretation of Proposition 210 (“Every vehi-
cle connatural to the soul always has the same shape and size, but it appears 
greater or smaller and in dissimilar shapes because of the additions or remov-
als of other bodies”).32 But it would fall to Propositions 207- 210 to clarify the 
ontology of the spiritual body of the partial soul, where, as we will now see, 
Berthold adapted the metaphysics of Dietrich of Freiberg that he had used rel-
ative to the incorruptible bodies of heavenly souls at 196D- E.
According to Dietrich, heavenly and earthly bodies are constituted in 
inverse ways.33 In the case of corruptible bodies, privation and “the indetermi-
nate dimensions” in matter precede the form, so that the intrinsic principles 
of a body are not principles as such (as Berthold will say, they do not retain 
their nature as principles, with the properties of simplicity, spirituality, and 
infinity),34 but are first “individual natures” rather than “beings existing as spe-
cies”. The situation is otherwise for incorruptible bodies: a heavenly body is 
by nature intrinsically and fully ordered to its act without any privation. It is 
by nature first an ens secundum speciem – it is a heaven as such (caelum) – 
before it is this heaven (hoc caelum) and an individual. As we have seen, for 
Dietrich, an ens secundum speciem is a being which proceeds from God “from 
reason” (that is, as an image) and “according to reason” (from a forma exem-
plaris or ratio specifica) in the divine mind. This latter ratio is a determining 
formal cause, giving it its definitional content, and situating it as a singular 
 32 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 210, p. 102, l. 1- 4: Omne anime susceptaculum con-
naturale et scema idem semper et magnitudinem habet, maius autem et minus videtur et 
dissimilis scematis propter aliorum corporum appositiones et ablationes. See the citations 
of the Clavis physicae, c. 272- 273 at Expositio, 196F, p. 129, l. 212- 214: Universaliter autem in 
omnibus corporibus humanis una eademque forma communis omnium intelligitur et sem-
per in omnibus incommutabiliter constat; and 210C, p. 250, l. 104- 113: nec me existimes duo 
corpora naturalia in uno homine docere. Unum corpus est, quo connaturaliter et consub-
stantialiter animae compacto homo conficitur; illud autem materiale superadditum rectius 
vestimentum quoddam mutabile et corruptibile veri ac naturalis magis accipitur, quam 
verum corpus […].
 33 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 196D, p. 125, l. 89 – p. 126, l. 103. See Dietrich of Freiberg, 
De corporibus caelestibus quoad naturam eorum corporalem, 8.1- 2, p. 384, l. 66- 80, which 
drew on the De substantia orbis of Averroes.








entity within the universe as a per se element of its order.35 For something to 
be an individual ens hoc before it is an ens secundum speciem means that the 
universality inherent to the species is achieved only through the succession 
of individuals in becoming and through intellectual abstraction. However, an 
entity like a separate intelligence is an ens secundum speciem as such, with-
out ever becoming an ens hoc, and serves a necessary function in the order of 
nature by its singular existence alone.36 The heavenly bodies are located at the 
boundary of these two orders: by a natural, not a temporal order, a heavenly 
body belongs first to the per se order of things before it is an individual or ens 
hoc. The heaven only becomes “this” heaven when it acquires parts posterior to 
the whole (partes posteriores toto) such as quantitative dimensions.37
Berthold juxtaposed the essential outlines of this argument with the human 
spiritual body at the beginning of 196F (ad instar corporis caelestis) and went 
no further. By Proposition 207 (“Every vehicle of a partial soul is established 
from an immobile cause”),38 he began establishing the analogy directly.39 This 
coincided with a greater reliance on Dietrich’s treatises on spiritual bodies 
and the Resurrection (De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resur-
rectionis and De dotibus corporum gloriosorum). Finally, in Proposition 208 
(“Every vehicle of a partial soul is immaterial, indivisible in its substance, and 
impassible”),40 he placed the human spiritual body together with the heavenly 
bodies as a quasi ens secundum speciem:
The vehicle itself is first the essence of body as such before it is a qual-
ified body, and its form (that is, the partial soul) is first united to the 
 35 Dietrich of Freiberg, De origine rerum praedicamentalium, 5.17, p. 184, l. 117 – p. 185, l. 131; 
id., De visione beatifica, 1.2.1.1.3, p. 38, l. 42- 80; id., De intellectu et intelligibili, ii.33.5, p. 172, 
l. 22- 28; id., Quaestio utrum substantia spiritualis sit composita ex materia et forma, ii.20, 
p. 333, l. 181- 203. See also 4.5, above.
 36 Dietrich of Freiberg, De origine rerum praedicamentalium, 3.24, p. 164, l. 182- 186: […] ens 
ordinabile in genere simpliciter et per se est ens completum secundum speciem; cuius com-
plementi ratio consistit in eo, ut sit ens per se in habendo suam suam formam substantialem 
ab agente per se in ordine ad finem per se intentum a natura.
 37 Dietrich of Freiberg, De luce et eius origine, 10.1- 13.3, p. 17, l. 79 – p. 20, l. 89. Cf. Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio, 209B, p. 248, l. 49- 65.
 38 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 207, p. 101, l. 1- 2: Omnis partialis anime susceptacu-
lum a causa immobili conditum est.
 39 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 207F, p. 231, l. 207- 213: […] susceptaculum partialis ani-
mae, cum hanc habeat rationem ad susceptaculum divinae animae, quam habet anima par-
tialis ad divinam, sub qua ordinata est secundum substantiam […].
 40 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 208, p. 101, l. 1- 2: Omnis partialis anime susceptacu-













essence of its vehicle, such that it is the essence of body as such before it 
is this body. Consequently, the union of the partial soul with its vehicle 
precedes whatever dimensions might be supposed to exist in it. From this 
it follows that not only the partial soul, but even its vehicle is indivisible 
in its substance. […]
Since, therefore, the vehicle of the partial soul, which it first animates 
by its being, is immaterial […] and since its union with its soul precedes 
dimensions – whether they are called ‘indeterminate’ or ‘determinate’ – 
it is necessarily indivisible in its substance after the manner of the celes-
tial bodies. In these cases, the soul is first united by nature to its sub-
ject, insofar as they are principles or beings as such, and the heaven is 
by nature first constituted as a being as such and is, so to speak, a being 
according to species; then it is determined into an individual, so that it 
is this heaven.41
With this notion of the spiritual body and the partial soul forming a quasi ens 
secundum speciem, after the manner of the heavenly bodies, Berthold has found 
a way of accounting for the unicity of the incorruptible susceptaculum, and 
thus of reconciling the Elementatio theologica with the teaching of the Fathers 
as interpreted in the Clavis physicae. Given his rejection of the doctrine of 
cyclical re- embodiment (see 5.3, below), Berthold did not see the need to posit 
a plurality of spiritual bodies to ensure a soul’s identity over time; as we will 
see, the creation of individual souls occurs according to the divine will within 
the order of voluntary providence. In Berthold’s Eriugenian modification of 
Proclus, the spiritual body belongs to human nature as a species. Having inter-
preted the Clavis itself through the ontology of Dietrich of Freiberg, Berthold 
could agree with the Eriugenian doctrine that, in the case of human nature, 
 41 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 208E, p. 236, l. 161- 172 and p. 237, l. 181- 187: Ipsum sus-
ceptaculum prius est essentia corporis simpliciter quam corporis huiusmodi, et eius forma 
(scilicet partialis anima) prius unitur essentiae sui susceptibili, ut est essentia corporis sim-
pliciter quam huius corporis. Et per consequens unio animae partialis cum suo susceptaculo 
praecedit dimensiones, quaecumque sibi fingerentur inexistere, et ex hoc non solum anima 
partialis, sed etiam ipsius susceptaculum est indivisibile secundum substantiam. […] Cum 
igitur susceptaculum animae partialis, quod primitus animat suo esse et sit immateriale […] 
et unio eius cum sua anima praecedat dimensiones – sive dicantur interminatae vel termina-
tae – , ipsum necessario erit indivisibile secundum substantiam ad instar corporum caeles-
tium, in quibus prius natura unitur anima suo subiecto, inquantum sunt principia seu entia 
ut simpliciter et constituitur caelum prius natura ut ens simpliciter et quasi ens secundum 




“neither the substances or essences or the reasons of things descend into gen-
eration, but only their passions or accidents”.42
The complete synthesis of these doctrines was achieved in Berthold’s 
commentary on Proposition 211. Here, as was mentioned, Berthold fused the 
accounts of the creation of humanity in Genesis 1:26 (Faciamus hominem 
ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram) and in the Timaeus 41a- 42b (on the 
cooperation of the younger gods with the Demiurge in fashioning the human 
being). Berthold began by noting that the partial soul, because it subsists in 
nature, can be considered in three ways (tripliciter considerari):43 (1) in the 
nobler mode according to which it pre- exists in its cause, (2) in itself according 
to existence or “essentially”, or (3) according to participation, in that the cause 
is considered in the effect.44 The consideration of the human soul secundum 
causam looks to its subsistence in the hierarchy of primordial causes in light 
of the plurality of its intrinsic formal principles; in this perspective, the human 
soul is present especially secundum causam in the primordial causes of soul, 
intellect, and in the One. But before indicating how one ought to understand 
this mode of subsistence, Berthold introduces several passages from the Clavis, 
which alludes (alludit) to this Proclean mode: “the human is a certain intellec-
tual notion eternally made in the divine mind”. Since all that is made by God 
is “primordial and causal” in him, but “proceeding and caused” in time, the 
human substance is one, but is seen under two aspects (una dupliciter intel-
lecta; duplex speculatio): as established in the intellectual causes and in the 
effects of generation.45 This dual conception was clearly at some variance with 
the tripartite model (cause, essence, participation), but Berthold reconciled 
them with the twofold descent of the soul: the first passes from the primordial 
causes into being, from (1) cause to (2) essence, and the second from (2) being 
 42 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 211D, p. 262, l. 175- 7: Ex quibus aperte colligitur nec sub-
stantias seu essentias nec rationes rerum descendere in generationem, sed solum earum 
passiones seu accidentia. Quid autem veritatis in hoc sit circa animam partialem, plenius 
elucescet.
 43 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 211A, p. 258, l. 13- 18: omne, quod qualitercumque subsistit 
aut secundum causam est principaliformiter aut secundum existentiam aut secundum 
participationem exemplariter per 65, necessarium est ipsam partialem animam tripliciter 
considerari: aut ut videtur in producente praeexistens ut in causa propterea, quod omnis 
essentialis causa nobiliori modo praehabet in se ipsa causatum suum existens prime, quod 
ipsum causatum est secundario […].
 44 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 211A, p. 258, l. 13- 31.
 45 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 211A, p. 259, l. 32 – p. 260, l. 74. Cf. Honorius 
Augustodunensis, Clavis physicae, c. 251- 252, p. 200, l. 17- 22 and 2- 3; c. 254, p. 202, l. 6 – 
p. 203, l. 32. On the duplex speculatio on human nature, see W. Beierwaltes, Eriugena. 










into (3) becoming.46 In this sense, the first descent corresponds to the eternal 
perspective on human nature in the Clavis, and the second to its manifesta-
tions in time.
This was the Platonic doctrine that, in Berthold’s view, was common to 
Proclus and the Clavis. The first descent of the human soul is “into being by 
nature and condition”, and the second is “into the particular mode of being 
related to generation”.47 We should repeat with Berthold that this dual model 
and the sequences of divine gifts within each descent do not imply the tempo-
ral pre- existence of the soul, but were only reflections of our mode of thinking 
(secundum modum nostrum intelligendi). In its first descent, the soul emanates 
from the Good through the primordial causes into its proper existence. The 
Good, through the primordial causes, “strengthens the irradiation of itself”, 
so that the first primordial cause, power (prime virtus), bestows by its illu-
mination “the possibility to be”, and so on through being, life, intellect, and 
soul, until finally, “through primarily nature, [the human soul] joins to itself 
a spiritual and connatural body”.48 This is described as the human’s “singular 
existence” and condition, before it has gone forth into individuals. Unified with 
its “concreated natural vehicle”, the soul in this mode “stands perfectly in the 
totality and integrity of human nature, in which all humans exist – one human 
formed after the image and likeness of the primal Good”. Thus the human soul 
is established not “in generation”, but “in being”, “beyond place and time, where 
even now it imitates the presiding gods”,49 and the spiritual body is located at 
the end of the partial soul’s atemporal passage from its state secundum causam 
in the primordial causes to its existence secundum propriam existentiam or 
as an ens secundum speciem. Dietrich’s influence can be detected clearly in 
 46 For a tripartite reading of the Clavis, see Expositio, 211D- E, p. 262, l. 175 – p. 263, l. 191.
 47 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 211C, p. 260, l. 91- 93.
 48 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 211C, p. 260, l. 101 – p. 261, l. 106: Deinde secundum 
modum nostrum intelligendi ipsum prime bonum per donationem primordialium causarum 
fortificat sui ipsius irradiationem […], per prime naturam coaptat sibi corpus spirituale et 
connaturale.
 49 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 211C, p. 260, l. 109 – p. 261, l. 115: Sic ergo descendens 
anima per primordiales causas procedit per omnes per se perfectos ordines ipsarum primor-
dialium causarum, ubi semper, plus et plus praemissis donationibus, contrahitur ad anime-
alitatis existentiam singularem et ad unionem sui cum sibi concreato susceptaculo naturali, 
ubi perfecte stat in humanae naturae totalitate et integritate, in qua sunt omnes homines, 
unus homo formatus ad imaginem et similitudinem prime boni. Et sic in ente supra loca 
et tempora collocatur, ubi etiam deos praesides imitatur. The final phrase, deos praesides 











Berthold’s description of the human nature constituted in the Word as a “sin-
gular existence” prior to individuation.
We find the same strategy (adjusting Proclus to the Clavis using Dietrich’s 
ontology) at work when we turn from Berthold’s understanding of the unic-
ity of the spiritual body to his account of its incorruptibility. A key feature 
of Eriugena’s doctrine, as Berthold inherited it from the Clavis, was that the 
substantial spiritual body is a present condition that is “hidden” until the 
Resurrection.50 The Eriugenian duplex speculatio entails that the universal 
depth of every person corresponds to an eternal exemplar in the divine mind. 
Berthold evidently endorsed this theory.51 His reliance on Dietrich to explain it 
is clear in the following passage, where he described the nature of the spiritual 
body constituted spiritually in being (in ente), as distinct from its material state 
in becoming (in generatione):
Such spirituality is contracted by nature, that is, from the essential origin 
of this substance. Thus, the vehicle that the partial soul first uses and ani-
mates with its being, although it is essentially a body, is spiritual, and is so 
by the spirituality that abstracts from all bodily place and position, which 
is contracted by nature from its essential origin, according to which it 
depends on an immobile cause.52
For Dietrich, “spirituality contracted by nature” (when taken in its essential 
rather than accidental signification) applies primarily to intrinsically spiritual 
living substances (angels, souls) and equivocally to non- living spiritual things 
 50 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 196F, p. 128, l. 190- 194: Cum incorruptibile perire non pos-
sit, ubi est nunc corpus incorruptibile, quod animae adhaereret, si non peccaret? Magister: In 
secretis naturae sinibus adhuc latet; in futuro autem saeculo apparebit, quando mortale 
hoc in illud mutabitur et corruptibile hoc induet incorruptionem. See also Expositio, 210M, 
p. 255, l. 316- 320: Humana enim natura […] non est secundum hoc consideranda, quod 
corporeis sensibus apparet irrationalibus animantibus similis, sed secundum hoc, quod ad 
imaginem Dei condita est, priusquam peccaret. In hac omne, quod Conditor primordialiter 
creavit, totum integrum manet. Adhuc tamen latet revelationem filiorum Dei expectans. 
And, similarly, Expositio, 210C, p. 250, l. 110- 114; 210D, p. 243, l. 116- 120.
 51 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 211A, p. 259, l. 66 – p. 260, l. 74.
 52 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 208A, p. 232, l. 21- 25: Spiritualitas enim talis aut est con-
tracta per naturam, ex origine scilicet essentiali talis substantiae, et sic susceptaculum, quo 
primitus utitur anima partialis et quod ipso esse animat, licet sit corpus per essentiam, est 
spirituale, et hoc spiritualitate, secundum quam abstrahit ab omni loco et situ corporali, 









(spiritual places such as heaven and limbo).53 In the passage used by Berthold, 
Dietrich did not refer to any innate spirituality belonging to the original human 
body in Paradise. For Dietrich, in the case of the resurrected body, that spiritual 
quality is only, as it were, accidental or imbued from without (quasi ab extrin-
secus indita) and is not present by nature. In other words, the spirituality of 
souls and resurrected bodies differ “equivocally”.54 Furthermore, while certain 
spiritual substances are in their proper “place” essentially (such as God, the 
intelligences posited by the philosophers and, perhaps, Dietrich adds, heavenly 
souls, since these are all essential causes), others (such as angels and human 
souls) are in their proper place only inchoatively (inchoative) by essence and 
consummately (completive) or destitutely (destitutive) in their places, depend-
ing on their merits.55 Thus, in this passage at 208A, Berthold innovated from 
Dietrich, firstly, by extending the concept of innate spirituality to the soul’s 
incorruptible body in accordance with the Elementatio and the Clavis, and, 
secondly, by adding an allusion to Proposition 207 (ab immobili causa), so that 
the susceptaculum itself can now be said to possesses spiritual properties by 
nature as an ens secundum speciem, by virtue of its origin from an immobile 
cause in the order of being.56
Berthold had to go further to explain the relation between the spiritual 
and corporeal bodies when commenting on Propositions 209 and 210, 
where Proclus stated that the imperishable body acquires increasingly more 
materiality in its descent, even while it remains self- identical. According to 
 53 Dietrich of Freiberg, De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis, 36.4, 
p. 339, l. 15- 22.
 54 Dietrich of Freiberg, De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis, 36.8, 
p. 339, l. 34- 40.
 55 Dietrich of Freiberg, De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis, 23.1- 7, 
p. 320, l. 41 – p. 321, l. 94.
 56 This did not, however, force Berthold to understand the Resurrection simply as the return 
to a primordial state before the Fall. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 209A, p. 240, 
l. 21- 31: Est et alius ordo, scilicet supernaturalis, quo gubernatur specialiter rationalis et intel-
lectualis natura per providentiam Dei voluntariam secundum rationem meriti et praemii, et 
pertinet ad statum vitae felicis, quo anima cum suo susceptaculo, quod primitus animat, est 
in ente, ad quem statum pertinet non solum gloria animae in fruendo per contemplationem 
et dilectionem fonte boni, ex cuius superplenitudine ipsa anima partialis utpote supercae-
lestis existens illuminatur, immo superimpletur divini luminis claritate, verum etiam glo-
ria ipsius susceptaculi, ut non solum sit spirituale spiritualitate contracta per naturam, ex 
origine scilicet essentiali talis substantiae, sed etiam sit et dicatur spirituale ex perfectioni-
bus talem spiritualitatem naturaliter consequentibus, quibus ipsum susceptaculum etiam 
dicitur gloriosum. Although Berthold did not mention it directly, he may have endorsed 
the Eriugenian theory of a twofold return. See, for example, Eriugena, Periphyseon, lib. v, 










Berthold, following Dietrich, since spirituality and corporeality are not of 
the same genus, a spiritual substance can “assume” or “be clothed” with cor-
poreality without leaving off its inherent spirituality.57 In an earlier passage, 
Berthold had already incorporated arguments from Dietrich explaining how 
two spiritual bodies (for Dietrich, “glorified” bodies) can be in the same place, 
since they do not have an intrinsic relation to that place, and to account for the 
way that spiritual bodies can be in the same place as corporeal bodies.58 Here 
in Proposition 209, however, Berthold has adapted texts in Dietrich that orig-
inally had been used relative to Christ’s appearance to Thomas and the other 
disciples after the Resurrection in order to explain Proclus.59 The Elementatio 
and the Clavis led him to adapt these arguments to the present condition of 
the Proclean spiritual body.
So influenced was he by the Apostolic authority of the Clavis that Berthold 
did not regard this as a scandalous conclusion. In fact, in a most characteris-
tic gesture, he freely drew a direct connection between Proclus’ abiding and 
incorruptible susceptaculum and the Eriugenian reading of Paul’s proclama-
tion that we have, in the present (habemus), “an eternal house in heaven not 
made by hands”.60 The eternal habitation is both a present fact and a promise. 
We can conjecture (coniecturam capere possumus) what the quality and state 
of that spiritual body must be, if we compare it with the corruptible body of 
our everyday experience: this body is visible and is temporal, that body is not 
seen and is eternal, and it exceeds in perfection every visible body that we 
can find. Berthold followed the Clavis in search of traces or intimations of the 
spiritual body at the level of the invisible elements, whose subtlety and omni-
presence underlie and constitute the elements of sense- experience.61 Rather 
than criticising Proclus’ notion of an enduring and incorruptible spiritual 
body, he sought to bring out its agreement with the Apostle’s teaching, author-
ised by the Clavis and understood through Dietrich’s ontology.
Although Berthold would not summarise things this way, what we have 
witnessed so far is an undeniable subordination of Proclus’ theories of the 
 57 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 209C, p. 242, l. 91 – p. 243, l. 110.
 58 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 208B, p. 233, l. 59 – p. 234, l. 101.
 59 See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 209A- B, p. 241, l. 37, 44, 60- 69, and compare with 
Dietrich of Freiberg, De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis, 31.3- 4, 
36.9, and 37.7.
 60 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 210C, p. 249, l. 83- 103. Cf. 2 Corinthians 5:1: quod aedifica-
tionem ex Deo habemus, domum non manufactam, aeternam in caelis.
 61 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 210A, p. 247, l. 25 – p. 248, l. 47. Cf. Expositio, 129A, p. 173, 














spiritual body and re- embodiment to the Christian standpoint of the Clavis 
physicae. For the anthropological implications of the Expositio, however, it 
is perhaps even more important that we note how the balance in Berthold’s 
synthesis shifted in the opposite direction, from the Clavis to Proclus. As we 
saw in his comments on Proposition 211, Berthold described the enduring 
condition of human nature in Proclean terms: the singular human nature 
constituted in the first descent “imitates the presiding gods”.62 This was a ref-
erence to one of the most important passages for Berthold’s interpretation of 
Proclus:
For each soul, when it exists above, journeys through the heavens (that is, 
travels the high places) and governs the entire world, beholding beings, 
and ascending with the presiding gods to the blissful and most perfect 
banquet of being, and filling those which look upon it with nectar from 
that place.63
Berthold alluded to this passage in his account of the astrologer as the exem-
plar of the nexus Dei et mundi in the Prologus, who “governs the world with 
the gods”.64 His echo of the same text in his description of the soul’s first 
descent (in Proposition 211) alerts us to two things. The first is that it shows 
how Berthold, notwithstanding his criticism of Proclus on reincarnation (see 
below), sought to give the doctrine an acceptable interpretation in conformity 
with his view of the Elementatio theologica as the consummate restoration of 
Plato’s theorematic philosophy. Secondly, and in line with the same passage in 
the Prologus, the phrase “imitates the presiding gods” suggests that this abiding 
condition of human nature is somehow related to the highest realisation of 
human contemplation in this life. That is, what individuals achieve through 
intellectual effort and divine assistance is what human nature as a singular ens 
secundum speciem always does. For Berthold, this doctrine of providential co- 
operation with the divine, which somehow belongs always to human nature 
with its spiritual body, and which souls partake of only in a transitory way, was 
a common teaching of the greatest Platonists (Proclus, Dionysius, Macrobius, 
 62 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 211C, p. 261, l. 115- 116.
 63 Proclus, De malorum subsistentia, c. 7, §23, p. 201, l. 7 – p. 202, l. 10: sursum quidem enim 
ens anima omnis meteoropori (id est alta petit) et omnem mundum dispensat, entia specu-
lans et cum diis presidibus ad felicem et perfectissimam entis epulationem ascendens, et que 
in ipsam respicientia replens eo quod ibi nectare.








Boethius).65 If human nature is an ens secundum speciem, then it must play an 
integral role within the essential order of natural providence. Its providential 
action, like that of the heavenly souls that always exercise the highest intellec-
tual operation and the non- reflexive operative activity of the unum animae, 
cannot be intermittent.66 The difference is simply whether the soul is in gener-
ation or in being (in ente), and the latter is equivalent to the essential order of 
natural providence, where essence is identical to operation. In Berthold’s inter-
pretation of this passage from Proclus’ De malorum subsistentia in atemporal 
terms, what happens when the soul ascends “to the blissful and most perfect 
banquet of being” is that it temporarily regains the knowledge that is always 
underway in its ground, which connects it with the providential operation that 
belongs to human nature as such. The human individual, in being harmonised 
with its own nature as microcosm, is harmonised with the macrocosm and the 
providence that is inherent to it.
The first descent of the soul arrives to the cusp of the transition from nat-
ural providence to voluntary providence, from the human species in ente to 
the human individual in generatione. Berthold clearly evoked the terminology 
of voluntary providence when he wrote that the second descent of the soul 
occurs when it is well- pleasing to the primarily Good with the advice of its 
council (ad beneplacitum prime boni de consilio sui senatus):
Within human nature [the partial soul] is determined to this singular 
unity, which deiform unity is specified in intellectuality, and this intel-
lectuality is singularised to the existence of this soul, which finally is par-
ticularised by the sensible and vegetative [powers].67
 65 See the way he echoes the phrase “imitates the presiding gods” when introducing cita-
tions from these authorities at Expositio, 206C- D, l. 81- 82, 92, 117, and 141; 207A, p. 225, 
l. 18- 21; 207B, p. 226, l. 63 – p. 227, l. 70.
 66 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 197I, p. 139, l. 220- 223: In statu enim generationis potest 
enumeratas quinque cognitionum species exercere [opinion, science, wisdom, intellect or 
intelligence, the unifical], prout minus vel plus se ab his corporalibus separaverit; in statu 
autem entis, ubi nullus rationis discursus est, ultimae duae cognitionis species ab anima 
exercentur. The five modes are enumerated in Expositio, 197G, p. 136, l. 108 – p. 138, l. 186.
 67 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 211C, p. 261, l. 117- 124: Existens vero in ente et totalitate 
naturae humanae, ut dictum est, ad beneplacitum prime boni de consilio sui senatus per 
descensum secundum (scilicet in generationem) in hunc mundum destinatur, in quo 
descensu determinatur intra ipsam humanam naturam ad hanc singularem unitatem, quae 
unitas deiformis specificatur in intellectualitatem et hoc intellectualitas singularizatur in 
hanc existentiam huius animae, quae etiam ultimo particulatur per sensuale et germinale. 
Et sic induit corpus materiale, quo etiam utitur secundum talis modi essendi exigentiam 








Unlike the first descent, where each primordial cause bestowed its own effect, 
the action here is undertaken exclusively by God, who produces the individual 
soul immediately. Then soul puts on (induit) a material body, which it uses 
according to the natural necessities of this mode of being. The last phrase is 
consistent with Berthold’s view of Platonic doctrine, according to which the 
soul is the “mover” rather than the “act” or “form” of the body.68
That God would be the immediate and exclusive agent in this process is 
consistent with Berthold’s understanding of the relation between natural and 
voluntary providence. In the perspective of natural providence, the thearchy is 
unfolded into its necessary formal order; but from the standpoint of voluntary 
providence, the thearchy simply is God. The first stages of the soul’s second 
descent as described here are somewhat mysterious, and we are left to make 
inferences based on passages discussed earlier in relation to the doctrine of 
determination in the Expositio.69 This second descent must be understood as 
another logical and non- temporal narrative. The movement is evidently from 
the more universal to the more limited. First, he began with three kinds of 
determinacy (determination, specification, singularisation) that correspond 
precisely to the terminology that defined the condition of entia secundum spe-
ciem. Such beings come forth by determination or “information”, they are con-
stituted in specific being (in esse specifico) and are “singulars”. We have encoun-
tered the notion of particularisation already passing relative to the ontological 
status of angels and separate souls.70
Individuation, therefore, must be inchoate in the unum animae and fully 
realised only when the material body is finally “put on”. What this seems to 
entail is that the soul’s means of being made adequate to the condition of 
human nature in its abiding integrity are already latent within it, especially 
in its higher powers. These correspond to higher modes of life or cognition 
that are realised only to the extent that the soul has separated from the body.71 
The goal of human life is to join itself to the higher world (applicatio eius cum 
mundo altiore) or to return to its higher world (redit anima ad suum saeculum 
 68 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 207C, p. 227, l. 78 – p. 228, l. 129. Against the Peripatetics, 
according to Berthold, the Platonists held that the soul descends by the will of God (nutu 
Dei) into “an arranged body”, that it does not “beg” for its intelligible species, but knows by 
recollecting its vision during its “natural state”.
 69 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 201A, p. 173, l. 36- 39: colligitur omnem divinam ani-
mam habere tres partes formales intrinsecas et essentiales animae substantiam integrantes, 
scilicet unum, quod est divinum, et intellectum, quo specificatur, et animealitatem, qua quasi 
individuatur.
 70 See 4.5, n. 234, above.










altius).72 In the following section, we will look closely into the second descent 
of the soul by following Berthold’s adaptation of Dietrich’s doctrine of the 
agent intellect as the essential principle of the soul, as well as his understand-
ing of how this principle relates to the essential order of natural providence 
and the soul’s beatitude.
2 Between Being and Becoming
Berthold’s account of the dynamic relation between the soul and its ground, 
in both movements of procession and return, was heavily indebted to Part ii 
of Dietrich of Freiberg’s De intellectu et intelligibili. After setting out the cos-
mological principles of his argument in Part i of his treatise, Dietrich then 
turned to describe the relationship between the agent and possible intellects 
(=ai, pi). Each intellect is essentially a likeness of the totality of being for, as 
Aristotle stated (De anima iii.5, 430a14- 15), the ai makes all things, while the 
pi becomes all things.73 Since there is an essential identity between both – the 
totality of being, either made or received – Dietrich described their interrela-
tion using the all- important principle from Proposition 65 (but Dietrich cited 
Proposition 140 commentum) that, within an essential order, each thing shares 
the same essence while existing either according the mode of a cause, of the 
essence itself, or of participation. Thus, the pi is all things “by participation”, 
while the ai is all things “by cause”. On this point Dietrich acknowledged that 
he was venturing beyond the Scriptures and the articles of the faith, since the 
argument was compelling him to admit that a cause below God could be said 
to bring about the essence of a given effect. Nevertheless, he noted, having 
in mind Proposition 56 of the Elementatio theologica and Proposition 1 of the 
Liber de causis, even the philosophers agree that whatever a secondary cause 
produces, the first cause does so in a more eminent way. It was safe to proceed 
on this assumption since the primacy of God’s creative causality was not being 
undermined. The remainder of Part ii of the treatise was devoted to deducing 
(deducitur) from these premises that the ai is the causal principle (principium 
causale) of the essence of the soul itself (ii.2- ii.12). Once this is established, 
Dietrich addressed the problems of the unicity and individuation of the intel-
lect (ii.13- ii.31) before discussing the object and mode of the ai’s intellection 
(ii.32- 42).
 72 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. L, p. 50, l. 463- 468.







According to Dietrich, the ai is a substance that belongs to the same class of 
beings that includes the separate intelligences of the Peripatetic philosophers or 
the “gods” of Proclus, and is identical to the hidden recess of the mind (abditum 
mentis) of Augustine’s De Trinitate.74 These intellects are in need of no ontologi-
cal supplement or accident to be what they are, that is, the ceaseless exercise of 
active memory, active understanding, and active will. The pi, by contrast, is noth-
ing before it thinks, as Aristotle argued (De anima iii.4, 429b30- 430a2). When 
it is actualised, it is identical to the intelligible form or species it receives from 
the ai.75 Dietrich understood this identity in the strongest sense: there is no pi 
“there” as a substance or subject before it thinks. Considered as a conceptional 
being (ens conceptionale inquantum huiusmodi) – a term Dietrich invented to 
describe the mode of being of intellectual substances when viewed in terms of 
their essential activities – there is something substantial about the pi’s opera-
tion, because it constitutes the quiddities of things by its universal act or con-
ception (universalis conceptio). However, in the concrete order of conceptional 
beings (ordo entium conceptionalium), which regards intellectual entities from 
the perspective of their natural being (ens naturae), the pi’s actualisation by an 
intelligible form is accidental to it.76 With this distinction, Dietrich intended to 
secure the individuation of the possible intellect alongside the universality of 
its content. Now, since the pi is nothing before it thinks, the ai must presuppose 
something else that is together with it (simul) by nature before it can produce 
the accidental disposition that is the intelligible species.77 This something is the 
substance of the soul, which will receive the accidental disposition. The soul’s 
substance is therefore in an immediate, mutual contact with the ai. Dietrich 
clarified that this does not mean that the ai is simply the essence of the soul, as 
if it were a form and the soul were its matter. Rather, they must be found together 
(simul) in such a way that the ai is “the essential cause” of the soul.
Dietrich held that the argument about the ai as the essential cause of the 
soul becomes much clearer once we accept, following Augustine, that the 
soul is not affected by anything beneath itself.78 In other words, the soul- body 
 74 See especially Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, 1.1, p. 15, l. 10 – p. 36, l. 104; id., De 
intellectu et intelligibili, i.7.1- 4, p. 140, l. 16 – p. 141, l. 43.
 75 Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, iii.13.3, p. 187, l. 12- 17; id., De visione beat-
ifica, 3.2.3 (4), p. 73, l. 52- 64.
 76 Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, ii.3.2, p. 148, l. 80- 87. On these kinds of ens 
conceptionale, see De intellectu et intelligibili, iii.8.1- iii.9.2, p. 151, l. 79 – p. 153, l. 14.
 77 Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, ii.2.1- 3, p. 147, l. 50 – p. 148, l. 76.
 78 Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, ii.3.3- ii.5.4, p. 148, l. 88 – p. 150, l. 34. 
On this doctrine in Augustine, see E. Bermon, Le cogito dans la pensée de saint Augustin 












composite is not the subject of exterior sense- perception and the interior 
senses like common sense and imagination; instead, the soul alone produces 
(facit) and performs (exercet) both external and internal functions, while the 
body is only the instrument of these operations. For Augustine, this meant that 
the soul has a certain interiority (intraneitas) that is not conjoined to the body. 
Dietrich explained this as follows:
Although the soul, according to its whole essence, is conjoined to the 
body (because it is simple), it is not however conjoined according to 
every qualitative mode of its substance. For it has many diverse qualita-
tive, substantial modes in itself, any of which imply the whole essence 
of the soul which, nevertheless, is one and all of them simultaneously, 
whether it be conjoined according to some of its modes or not con-
joined according to others. Neither do these diverse modes multiply the 
essence, but according to each there is one simple, undivided essence 
beneath each.79
To explain this relation between a simple essence and its diverse qualitative 
substantial modes (=qsm s), Dietrich gave three examples. The first came from 
Augustine’s argument in De Trinitate that the mind is totally present in each of 
its acts of memory, intellect, and will, which are distinguished only by relation. 
These are the qsm s of the mind. Among natural beings, we find the qsm s 
of genus, differentia, and species. This recalls Dietrich’s theory of determina-
tion: each of these are formal intentions, which imply the entire essence of a 
thing while remaining distinct. As a better example, however, Dietrich pur-
posed that we consider how the vegetative, sensitive, and rational powers of a 
soul are its qsm s. As Aristotle explained, each implies the total rational soul, 
such that the vegetative exists in the sensitive, and the sensitive exists in the 
rational, like the triangle exists in the quadrilateral.80 All these examples imply 
that qsm s are related according to a determinate order, either of coequals, in 
the case of imago Trinitatis (memory, intellect, will), or of prior and posterior 
 79 Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, ii.5.1, p. 149, l. 3- 10: Quamvis enim anima 
secundum totam essentiam suam coniungatur corpori, quia simplex est, non tamen est coni-
uncta secundum omnem modum qualitativum substantiae suae. Habet enim in se plures et 
diversos modos qualitativos substantiales, quorum quilibet importat totam essentiam ani-
mae, quae nihilominus una est, et tota simul est sive coniuncta secundum aliquem illorum 
modorum sive non coniuncta secundum alium. Nec illi diversi modi numerant essentiam, 
sed secundum quemlibet illorum est una simplex indivisa essentia sub quolibet illorum.






(the soul’s powers). Each qsm implies the total essence of that of which it is 
a mode.
Having determined that there is such an inwardness in the soul, in which 
the soul is entirely and essentially present, Dietrich returned to the main argu-
ment. Just as an animate thing has within itself the principle of its motion, so 
too the rational soul has within itself a principle of its highest mode of life, that 
is, to live intellectually according to the possible intellect.81 The principle of 
intellectual life is the ai, which necessarily is inward (intraneus) to the rational 
soul. This inwardness (ista intraneitas), Dietrich argued, is a “substantial iden-
tity”, and implies the mutual and essential relation (respectus) of two terms. 
There is, then, a dynamic relationship between the ai and the substance of the 
soul. This, however, does not make them totally identical. Burkhard Mojsisch 
has rightly argued that we must interpret the preceding discussion of qsm s 
only relative to the soul’s rational and vital operations, and not to say that 
the ai is a qsm of the soul.82 Rather, we might say that this inwardness cor-
responds to the soul’s qsm that is the subject for the accidental disposition of 
the intelligible species.83 The two related terms in “this inwardness” are in one 
another (intra invicem) essentially (unum in alio essentialiter), and only in this 
way are they the same in essence (idem per essentiam). That is, the ai and the 
soul are two essentially related substances. In such cases, for Dietrich, Proclus’ 
threefold modes of existence apply. The soul and the ai cannot be essentially 
identical in a univocal way, such that they would be one essence (una essentia), 
nor does the ai participate its essence from the soul. The only option remain-
ing is that the ai relates to the soul according to cause (per causam). From this 
it follows that the soul is in the ai “by a more eminent and noble mode than it 
is in itself”.84
 81 Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, ii.7.2- 4, p. 150, l. 46 – p. 151, l. 75.
 82 B. Mojsisch, Die Theorie des Intellekts bei Dietrich von Freiberg (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977), 
p. 52– 53.
 83 Dietrich clarified (at De intellectu et intelligibili, ii.6.1- 2) that it does not follow from this 
inwardness that the soul, conjoined to the body, exercises its vital operations intellectu-
ally (intellectualiter) for, even when separated from the body, it is not essentially intel-
lectual or an intellect. This amounts to saying that the rational soul is not an intellectual 
substance, because otherwise it would be an essential cause. See also De intellectu et intel-
ligibili, ii.17.1- 4, p. 157, l. 38 – p. 158, l. 67. Dietrich did not mention whether the soul or, 
more specifically, this intraneitas, would occupy the mode secundum essentiam between 
the ai (secundum causam) and the pi (secundum participationem), but it would follow 
from his argument.
 84 See also Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, ii.8.1- ii.9.4, p. 151, l. 79 – p. 153, 
l. 27; id., De cognitione entium separatorum, 23.1- 6, p. 186, l. 93 – p. 187, l. 110, where Dietrich 










Although Dietrich spoke of the ai as the lowest of the order of essentially 
active intellects, in an important sense it is different in kind from the intelli-
gences above it. Some essential causes (separate intelligences and heavenly 
souls), contain their effects in a simpler, nobler mode, but remain separate 
from their effects (sublunary substantial form) and share no univocal defini-
tion with them. Other essential causes “claim for themselves the conditions 
of their effects”. This applies to human and angelic ai s.85 Such ai s have the 
individuating conditions of their essential effects “inchoatively”, which the 
effects have as a “disposition”. For example, a temperament exists in the soul 
inchoatively, in the body dispositively, and fully in the composite. According 
to Dietrich, the necessary and sufficient condition for individuation is the pos-
session of parts that are after the whole (posteriores toto), which fall outside 
the consideration of the essence as such, but which the essence depends upon 
for its actuality. These parts can be quantitative, corporeal parts, such as a 
body’s limbs and members, or qualitative parts.86 Since, at this point, Dietrich 
recalled his earlier discussion of qsm s, we can assume that these qualitative 
parts individuating the ai are something like “the sensible”, “the rational”, and 
so on. These would be inchoate in the ai by “real natural relations”, which have 
an ambiguous status: they are really from and in the nature of a thing (realiter a 
natura et in natura rei), like the inclination (inclinatio) of a stone to fall or of fire 
to rise; they exist in any ai according to its nature (in quolibet intellectu agente 
secundum naturam suam); and yet they are also “after the whole”.87 Unlike cor-
poreal “parts after the whole”, these relations are not added to the essence but 
perfectly hold the place of such parts (perfecte gerunt vicem partium), for they 
determine or incline the essence of the ai to a spiritual substance disposed to 
receive it according to its qualitative parts. Again, Dietrich insisted, the result-
ing individualised ai in the soul is not a form- matter composite, for this only 
occurs in the case of the intellectus adeptus once the possible intellect has been 
elevated by grace. An analogy can, however, be made with the heart’s efficient 
essential causality of the rest of the body or the way a form contains the entire 
substance of a thing in itself.88 Therefore, although the ai is an essential cause, 
 85 Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, ii.19.2- 3, p. 159, l. 83- 105.
 86 Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, ii.27.4, p. 166, l. 95- 101, and ii.18.1- 3, p. 158, 
l. 70 – p. 159, l. 78.
 87 Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, ii.27.3, p. 166, l. 90- 93: Et sicut in alia man-
erie individuorum dictum est, quod sunt individua in habendo partes, quae sunt post totum, 
ita etiam suo modo se habet circa intellectum quantum ad dictos respectus, qui sunt posteri-
ores toto, qui similiter est individuus in habendo eosdem.










by virtue of these relations and its essential dependency on the soul’s sub-
stance, it has only accidental natural being and does not belong as such to the 
per se order of the universe.89 Presumably, then, the individual ai belongs to 
the order of voluntary providence, but through its intellectual activity, the soul 
is related to the essential, natural order.
Berthold presupposed these arguments when he summarised the various 
grades of limitation comprising the second descent of the partial soul. These 
passages from Dietrich’s treatise clarify that the partial soul’s individuality 
must be inchoate in the unum animae and the intellectus agens in the form of 
qsm s.90 This would have implications for the soul’s return to God, as we see 
in Berthold’s use of Dietrich’s arguments in his commentaries on Propositions 
188 (“Every soul is both life and living”) and 193 (“Every soul subsists proxi-
mately from an intellect”).91 We have already addressed an initial perplexity 
that could arise from a reading of 188E and 193E in isolation, where it would 
seem that the Aristotelian (intellectus agens), Augustinian (abditum mentis 
or facies), Proclean (unum animae; vestigium unius), and Dionysian (unitas 
superexaltata mentis) candidates for the soul’s highest principle were placed 
on equal footing. Berthold’s consistent position throughout the Expositio was 
that the unum is “the supreme portion of the rational soul” and, more precisely, 
the supreme “part of intellectual substance”.92 His apparent equivocation in 
these passages can be explained simply by pointing out that the unum animae 
is, ultimately, the essential cause of the soul in a primary sense, “with mind or 
intellect mediating”.93
The reason why Berthold introduced them side- by- side in Proposition 188 
was that he was concerned to explain the different kinds of “life” that heavenly 
and human souls may live. A principle of life can be numerically distinct from 
what it informs, as is the case of matter and form in a composite substance. 
Inspired, however, by Dietrich’s De intellectu et intelligibili, Berthold proposed 
that other kinds of intrinsic principles of motion or life are essentially one with 
the substance in which they are found, and differ only intentionally or modally 
(intentionaliter seu modaliter).94 Such is the case for separate substances that 
have in themselves the principles of rational, intellectual, and divine lives. 
 89 Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, ii.21.2, p. 161, l. 43- 49.
 90 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 191E, p. 92, l. 110- 122.
 91 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 188, p. 91, l. 1: Omnis anima et vita est et vivens; 
prop. 193, p. 94, l. 1: Omnis anima proxime ab intellectu subsistit.
 92 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 13D, p. 217, l. 270- 284; 20H- i, p. 71, l. 235 – p. 72, l. 275.
 93 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 164B, p. 31, l. 26 – p. 32, l. 34.














Heavenly souls always live according to the intellectual and divine modes of 
life, although the way in which they exercise the latter is more hidden from us 
(magis nos ibidem lateat).95
As for the human soul, Berthold’s consistent position was stated succinctly 
in the final subsections of the Expositio: because of its “partial” conjunction 
with the body and its passage from intellection to non- intellection, these 
higher forms of life are available to it only by a rapture or a kind of crossing- 
over (raptim et secundum quendam transitum fiat aliquibus).96 The partial soul 
descends whole (tota) into becoming because it cannot access this perfect 
intellectual life spontaneously, although it always presupposes its active oper-
ation. Therefore, the soul’s formal union with the operation – the state of the 
intellectus adeptus – that would link it to the essential order belongs to the 
whole soul (totius animae) only accidentally.97 Nevertheless, Berthold’s inter-
pretation of the anthropological exemplarism of the Clavis through Dietrich 
of Freiberg led him to add one important qualification to Proclus, which was 
signalled in his application of Proposition 65 to the case of the partial soul in 
211A: because of its inwardness (intraneitas) that is not joined with the body, 
the partial soul does not descend totally (totaliter) into becoming.98 According 
to Berthold, even though the human soul’s alienation from its own ground 
cannot be fully overcome in this life, it can be mitigated through the process 
of recollection. Since true philosophy embraces logic, natural philosophy, and 
ethics,99 the spiritual exercise of the soul’s oblique motion through the study 
of the Elementatio theologica, with its logical rigour and attention to natures 
outside the soul, must coincide with ethical practice. As the soul gradually sep-
arates itself from bodily affections, it recollects (recordetur) the knowledge that 
 95 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 188E, p. 65, l. 230; 193E, p. 103, l. 126 – p. 104, l. 134.
 96 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 211F, p. 263, l. 216.
 97 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 211F, p. 264, l. 246- 248: Quamvis enim aliquid eius sem-
per stet in lumine actualis intelligentiae intelligendo se ipsum et suum principium, a quo 
intellectualiter et cognitive emanat, tamen ista cognitio non est totius animae nisi per 
accidens.
 98 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 211E, p. 263, l. 192- 8: Et sic omnis anima partialis per essen-
tiam et se tota manet in suis primordialibus causis et tota procedit seu descendit non solum 
in suam propriam existentiam, sed etiam in generationem. Sed non totaliter, quia non secun-
dum omnem modum, quo est in suis primordialibus causis quoad primum descensum, nec 
secundum omnem modem, quo est in ente, quamvis nihil pertinens ad ipsius talis animae 
substantiam, prout descendit in generationem, maneat in ente quoad secundum descensum 
sive in esse intellectuali.













belongs to that principle of intellectual life.100 Insofar as it quiets even these 
interior movements, the soul lives the divine life.101 The theory of recollection 
provided the means of mediating the soul’s alienation from the ongoing activ-
ity in its ground and the gradual approximation of it through the discipline of 
the oblique motion.
The place of the theory of recollection in Berthold’s account of the soul’s 
double descent is most clearly defined in Proposition 207. Here Berthold used 
the doctrine of recollection to interpret Proclus’ statement that the first body 
of the partial soul is incorruptible because “it is established from an immobile 
cause”. The soul’s mode of knowing requires an appropriate kind of body. Since 
the soul’s modes of knowing in being and in becoming are so unlike, so too are 
the kinds of body the soul uses: it requires a spiritual body when it is in being 
(in ente) and is conformed to the presiding gods (conformis diis praesidibus) 
or contemplating them (contemplatrix deorum), as “divine” and “intellectual” 
souls always are; but when it is in becoming (in generatione) and has fallen 
into “forgetfulness”, it uses a material body.102 For the Platonists, if the soul had 
remained in its natural order (in ordine naturali), it would know things out-
side itself through the intelligible species with which the creator endowed it 
and would not have to beg for intelligibility (mendicare species intelligibiles ab 
 100 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 211E, p. 264, l. 222- 228: Sed pro tunc solvitur secundum 
Platonicos unio superioris partis, quod supra dixi principium intellectualis, a residua por-
tione substantiae ipsius animae, ne sit forma eius, licet ista solutio fiat plus et minus. Et per 
consequens ipsa anima in unione sui ad corpus materiale secundum proportionem talis 
solutionis obliviscitur eorum, quae prius existens in ente scivit, licet recordetur postea seda-
tis humoribus doctrina ventilante ad publicum semen veri, quod intus erat, sed in abdito 
latitabat. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De cognitione entium separatorum, 94.6, p. 258, l. 35- 
42: Ut enim attrahamus ad huius rei restitutionem sententiam Platonicorum, videbimus eos 
concordare nobiscum in hac re. Dicunt enim, quod anima rationalis separata portat secum 
omnes artes, sed ex coniunctione sui ad corpus cadit in oblivionem earum. Sed istam sen-
tentiam Platonicorum quantum ad hoc, quod videtur sonare, quod anima fuerit informata 
omnibus artibus ante infusionem suam in corpus, et per consequens, quod dicit de causa 
oblivionis, non recipimus, cum teneamus et fateamur animam in sui infusione creari et in sua 
creatione infundi. Berthold’s phrase ad publicum semen veri echoes Boethius, Consolatio 
philosophiae, lib. iii, metrum 11. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 194F, p. 114, l. 209- 231; 
207A, p. 225, l. 13 – p. 226, l. 58; 207D, p. 228, l. 111- 124.
 101 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 202C, p. 186, l. 167- 171. Cf. Proclus, De providentia et fato, 
c. 8, §31, p. 140, l. 11- 12: quo adiaciens le unum quietem amat, clausa cognitionibus, muta 
facta et silens intrinseco silentio.
 102 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 207A, p. 225, l. 18- 21: Secundum Platonicos vero anima 
partialis – secundum duplicem sui statum, quem alternare potest in infinitum, per praemis-
sam – alio indiget susceptaculo, prout est in ente conformis diis praesidibus (quando videli-








extra).103 One might say that it would always know itself, according to the cir-
cular motion, and the world, according to the direct motion. To exercise these 
motions perfectly, as the higher souls always do, the partial soul would need 
a body like theirs, which Berthold described using the attributes Paul applied 
the resurrected body (impassibility, clarity, subtlety, and agility).104 Looking 
at the soul’s present embodied condition, however, Aristotle was right to say 
that it must begin knowing by abstracting species from material things. In this 
sense, the material body is appropriate to initiate the process of recollection. 
Plato “did not deny this path”, but held that such a view must always be bal-
anced by the doctrine of recollection, which Berthold found authoritatively 
expressed by Boethius: “Now, the body bringing forgetful weight / does not 
expel all light from the mind; / within, there assuredly abides the seed of truth, 
/ which is aroused by instruction fanning the ember”.105 For the Platonists, the 
soul’s proper and vivid cognition has been obscured by the passions (confundi-
tur passionibus). This is why Berthold can argue at the end of Proposition 211 
that, even though a part of the soul always stands in the light of actual intelli-
gence – always recollecting its content through the universality that belongs to 
the human species – the whole soul is far removed from that light.
As Berthold put it before the concluding prayer of the Prologus, the wayfarer 
is so remote from the font of paternal light because it is so distracted by cares, 
occluded by imaginings, and bound up in lust.106 This light, whose “splendour 
is the Word”, illuminates all people “coming into this world” (cf. John 1:9). It is 
very important to note that Berthold, playing on the phrase in hunc mundum 
(“into this world” or “into this pure [state]”), then reverses the more familiar 
interpretation of the verse. That is, the true light does not illumine all peo-
ple equally who are born into the world of becoming – or, at least, it is not 
received equally by all. Rather, as Berthold made clear, it illumines only those 
who “come into intellectual purity” (illuminat omnem hominem venientem in 
 103 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 207C, p. 227, l. 94- 100.
 104 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 207A, p. 226, l. 40- 58. Cf. 1 Corinthians 15:39- 54.
 105 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 207C, p. 227, l. 100 – p. 228, l. 110; 207A, p. 225, l. 31 – 
p. 226, l. 34. Cf. Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, lib. iii, metrum 11, p. 91, l. 9- 12.
 106 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 21, p. 34, l. 968- 973: Ex praemissis patere potest, cum 
quanta difficultate anima etiam deiformis effecta in hac vita ascendat ad conspectum fontis 
paternae lucis, cuius splendor gloriae est Verbum, ‘lux vera, quae illuminat omnem homi-
nem venientem in hunc mundum’, scilicet puritatem intellectualem, a qua longe est mens 
hominis sollicitudinibus distracta, phantasmatibus obnubilata, taceo autem de carnali-
bus voluptatibus implicata. The final phrases (sollicitudinibus distracta, etc.) come from 
Bonaventure, Itinerarium mentis in Deum, in PP Collegii S. Bonaventurae (eds), Opera 










hunc mundum, scilicet puritatem intellectualem).107 Again we are confronted 
with the paradox that the cognition that belongs to the soul by nature as an 
ens secundum speciem is by nature inaccessible to it as an individual ens hoc. 
The exemplarist turn Berthold gave to the doctrine of recollection meant that 
the fullness sought by recollection somehow must belong to human nature 
as it subsists in the mind of God – in effect a combination of the Eriugenian 
anthropology of the duplex speculatio with the Proclean notion of imitating 
the divine providence. Just as the ceaseless cognition of the ground of the soul 
remains hidden to us, so does the spiritual body abide still “in the hidden folds 
of nature”.108 According to the doctrine of the double descent, as Berthold 
interpreted it through Dietrich of Freiberg’s De intellectu et intelligibili, individ-
ual souls created de novo are related to this plenitude through the unum ani-
mae and intellectus agens, which are simultaneously individuated and univer-
salising powers. We can turn now to consider the content of what for Berthold 
was the highest approximation of that state a soul could reach in this life: the 
transitory enjoyment of the state he understood to be the goal of the study of 
the Elementatio theologica, namely, puritas intellectualis.
3 The Goodness of Silence: Deification and Providential Cognition
Berthold’s Eriugenian interpretation of the Proclean spiritual body (suscep-
taculum) coincided with the single most direct criticism of Proclus in the 
Expositio. Berthold insisted three times, each time using the Clavis physicae, 
that souls who fully enjoy blessedness after death can never fall. This criticism 
was made at the conclusion of Proposition 196, again in 206, and finally in 209, 
as Berthold cited the Clavis on the beatitude “promised to the saints” and the 
macrocosmic reversion of all temporal things into their primordial causes, 
when “God alone shall appear in them”.109 This return of creatures to their 
 107 Cf. Meister Eckhart, Sermo vi/ 2 (First Sunday after Trinity), eds E. Benz, B. Decker, J. Koch, 
Die lateinischen Werke, vol. 4 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1956), §57- 58, p. 57, l. 3 – p. 58, 
l. 3: Ubi nota primo, quod deus verissime mittit, gignit unigenitum suum in anima munda 
et ‘in ipso et per ipsum omnia’, se ipsum, Ioh. 14: ‘ad eum veniemus’ etc. […] <Tertio> dic: in 
mundum. Non dicit: ‘in hunc mundum’ [1 John 4:9], sed in mundum simpliciter. Igitur in 
mundum intellectualem, secundum Platonem. See also Albert the Great, De intellectu et 
intelligibili, lib. ii, tr. unicus, c. 10, p. 518a- b, cited at 1.2, n. 79, above, and the citation of 
Dionysius at Expositio, Prol. 17, p. 26, l. 685- 689.
 108 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 196F, p. 128, l. 190- 2; 195D, p. 119, l. 99- 118.
 109 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 196F, p. 170, l. 64- 5: Non autem video quomodo homo beat-
itudinem perderet si eam re ipsa plene perfecteque gustaret; 206F, p. 223, l. 261- 266: Istius 









causes transpires only when creatures doff the finitude of time and place and 
revert to their infinite eternal principles while their nature remains intact; for 
the microcosm, the full enjoyment of that vision, understood in this sense of 
being “filled” with the plenitude of divinity by grace just as the humanity of the 
Son was filled with divinity by nature, precludes the possibility of any temporal 
pre- existence in such a state or a subsequent lapse from the beatific vision.
The central refutation of Proclus on re- embodiment is found in Proposition 
206 (“Every partial soul can descend into generation and ascend from genera-
tion into being an infinite number of times”).110 Rather than rejecting the view 
outright by merely contrasting it with the authoritative doctrine of the faith, 
Berthold was more interested in giving it an acceptable metaphorical meaning. 
We should remember that, for Berthold, Proclus belonged alongside Plotinus 
as a philosopher who lifted the coverings (integumenta) with which the earli-
est Platonists had enshrouded Plato’s theorems (theoremata). Although he did 
not recall this history of Platonism at this stage of the Expositio, it seems likely 
that Berthold regarded the literal interpretation of reincarnation he found in 
Macrobius and Proclus as either a further act of concealment or, more plau-
sibly, a failure to pierce all the way through those mythical coverings. His lan-
guage of refutation in 209F (refellitur) would suggest the latter view. In either 
case, the search for an acceptable metaphorical meaning of reincarnation was 
required if Berthold was to demonstrate the thorough compatibility of the 
best of the pagan philosophers with the greatest theologian Paul (summus div-
inalis sapientiae theologus Paulus), his disciple Dionysius, and his commen-
tators. To this end, he was assisted by Albert the Great’s De natura et origine 
animae, where the mythical soteriology of the Platonists is presented chiefly 
as an account of the soul’s origin, its immortality, and its natural yearning for 
knowledge.111
videtur intelligibile; anima enim fruens fonte omnium bonorum utpote beata et felicis vitae 
nec timore torqueri potuerit nec falsa securitate decipi nec commutabili bono allici ut, 
volens, a bono incommutabili se avertat nec ad aversionem ab aliquo violentari; 209F, p. 245, 
l. 201: per hoc iterum refellitur descensus animarum.
 110 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 206, p. 101, l. 1- 2: Omnis anima partialis descendere in 
generationem in infinitum et ascendere potest a generatione in ens.
 111 Albert the Great, De natura et origine animae, ed. B. Geyer (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 
1955), tr. 2, c. 7, p. 30, l. 30 – p. 31, l. 67. See also Albert the Great, Summa theologiae, ed. 
A. Borgnet, vol. 33 (Paris: Vivès, 1895), pars ii, tr. 12, q. 72, m. 4, a. 3, p. 51a- b: Ad dicta 
Marcobii dicendum, quod fabulosa sunt, et integumenta eorum quae dixerunt Gentiles 
idolotrae […]. Ad aliud dicendum, quod non intellexit Macrobius, nec etiam Plato, quod 







Berthold began Proposition 206 by noting that the word “place” (locus) in 
the strict sense applies only to the corporeal realm of becoming. It also has a 
“metaphorical” meaning for spiritual realities, where the higher is “located” by 
the lower as what is “more exterior”, and the lower is “located” by the higher 
as what is “more interior”.112 Here we may think of the hierarchy of cognition 
outlined in 123D, where the ascent to higher modes of knowing coincides with 
the apprehension of more fundamental aspects of the object. With this caveat 
about metaphor, Berthold was preparing for the argument that the notion of 
companion stars (stellae compares) in the Timaeus 42b, the “place” whence 
souls arise and whither they return, must be understood in the metaphorical 
sense.113 Platonists speak this way, he explained, because of their account of 
the origin of the partial soul, which holds that the constellations exercise a 
determinative operation through the influence of intellectual light, through 
which a celestial mover scatters intellectual seeds proportionate to itself 
within the soul.114 Berthold went so far as to claim that this accords with those 
(e.g., Augustine) who say that souls “are poured in by being created and are 
created by being poured in” (creando infundi et infundendo creari).115 With this 
simple manoeuvre, Berthold stripped Platonic doctrine of its association with 
the doctrine of the pre- existence of souls, such that it becomes an account of 
the soul’s intellectual origins and its natural desire to return to the interiority 
where it can live the life most appropriate to it.116
 112 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 206A, p. 216, l. 14 – p. 217, l. 37. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De 
substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis, 14.2- 3 and 14.4- 6, p. 313, l. 16- 21 
and 30- 38.
 113 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 206B, p. 217, l. 39 – p. 218, l. 75.
 114 Here Berthold also looked to Macrobius (In Somnium Scipionis i.14), whom he cited on 
the “fiery” intellect which the souls receive from the higher stars of the Milky Way (207E), 
along with Boethius’ poetic images of recollection as glowing embers kindled by teaching 
(207A- C). This account of the human soul’s origin would be compatible with what he 
found in Albert the Great, De natura et origine animae, tr. i, c. 5, p. 14, l. 14- 27.
 115 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 206B, p. 217, l. 51- 54: Et in talem sententiam concordant 
etiam isti, qui dicunt animas creando infundi et infundendo creari ita, quod usque hodie 
in circulis nativitatem ponitur ab eis una stella, quam Hyleg et Alkocoden vocant, quod 
Latine sonat vita et intellectus, eo, quod nato vitam et intellectum conferre dicitur. See also 
Expositio, 207C, p. 227, l. 78- 82.
 116 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 206B, p. 218, l. 62- 69: Videtur autem haec positio accipi ex 
quattuor motivis praecipuis: tum quia animarum partialium cum intellectualibus et divinis 
est eadem natura, cum sint eiusdem seyrae, ergo et idem locus; tum quia anima partialis non 
debetur corpori terrestri nisi propter similitudinem eius ad caelum, igitur caelum est magis 
proprius eius locus; tum quia anima partialis est quasi semen motorum caelestium secun-
dum expositionem Calcidii super Timaeo: ergo eorum erit ad eundem locum comparitas; 












More important still was Berthold’s account of the soul’s proper work in 
its native “place” at 206C (quid autem animae partialis in comparibus stellis 
existentis opus sit), where he forged a synthesis of Proclus and Dionysius on 
the question of beatitude and embodiment.117 This comparative approach has 
been followed unwittingly in more recent times by Jean Trouillard, who has 
contrasted Eriugena, whom he judged to follow Dionysius, and Proclus on pre-
cisely this question. Drawing on the Tria opuscula and Proclus’ commentary on 
the Republic (unknown to Berthold), Trouillard saw differences between the 
two Platonists where Berthold found similarities.118 Trouillard was emphatic 
that, for Proclus, separated souls rejoice at the prospect of being reunited with 
a body. Virtuous and vicious souls alike find in their return to body the opportu-
nity for action, although they descend for different reasons – some out of gen-
erosity and self- sacrifice, and others out of forgetfulness. Berthold was in fact 
aware of this view and cited the key passage from the De malorum subsistentia: 
souls descend either because of “the inability to imitate the presiding [gods], 
the desire for noble birth, purity, virtue, [or] divine intellect”.119 Berthold’s 
first citation of De malorum subsistentia in 206C, regarding the soul’s work in 
heaven, is also one that Trouillard would regard as characteristically Proclean:
For the primary good is not contemplation, intellective life, and knowl-
edge, as someone has said somewhere. No, it is life in accordance with 
the divine intellect which consists, on the one hand, in comprehending 
the intelligibles through its own intellect, and, on the other, in encom-
passing the sensibles with the powers of [the circle of] difference and in 
giving even to these sensibles a portion of the goods from above. For that 
which is perfectly good possesses plenitude, not by the mere preserva-
tion of itself, but because it also desires, by its gift to others and through 
the ungrudging abundance of its activity, to benefit all things and make 
them similar to itself.120
 117 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 206C, p. 218, l. 77 – p. 219, l. 110.
 118 J. Trouillard, “Métensomatose proclienne et eschatologie érigénienne”, in J. Sojcher, 
G. Hottois (eds), Philosophies non- chrétiennes et christianisme. Annales de l’Institut de 
Philosophie et de Sciences morales (Bruxelles: Université libre de Bruxelles, 1984), p. 87– 99.
 119 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 206D, p. 220, l. 140- 2.
 120 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 206C, p. 218, l. 83- 89, citing Proclus, De malorum sub-
sistentia, c. 7, §23, p. 202, l. 10- 18: Non enim erat prime bonum thea, id est speculatio, vel 
intellectualis vita et prudentia, ut alicubi ait aliquis, sed quod secundum divinum intellec-
tum detinens quidem intellectualia sui ipsius intellectu. Ambiens autem sensibilia his quae 
alterius potentiis et eorum quae inde bonorum partem etiam ipsius his exhibens, quia, quod 










Rather than addressing the theme of the soul’s desire for embodiment, how-
ever, Berthold focused on the term plenum, and connected this passage with 
one immediately preceding it, where Proclus stated that blessed souls in the 
realm of being “feast” with the gods: “with the presiding gods the soul ascends 
[…] to the fruition of divine things and especially of the primarily Good”.121 
According to Berthold, on this point Proclus in fact agreed with Dionysius, 
who wrote:
This, therefore, according to my knowledge, is the first rank of heav-
enly beings standing immediately in the circuit of God [in circuitu] and 
around God, simply and unceasingly encircling his eternal cognition 
in the highest arrangement beyond motion. This is what we find in the 
angels, who view many blessed contemplations purely, and who are illu-
mined by simple and immediate splendours, and filled with divine nour-
ishment [divino nutrimento adimpletus] – many, indeed, [are filled] by 
the first effusion that is bestowed, but one [rank] by the invariable and 
life- giving unity of the thearchic banquet [invariabili et vivifica thearchi-
cae epulationis unitate].122
According to Berthold, who did not mention that this passage referred to the 
seraphim at the summit of the angelic hierarchy, both texts describe the sta-
ble contemplation enjoyed by “divine souls” (the movers of the heavens) and 
“intellectual souls” (human souls in being). The language of feasting and plen-
itude, he argued, suggests that we are dealing with an activity that is connat-
ural to the soul, and if it is given fully without impediment, then it does not 
have a contrary (si est non impedita, non habet contrarium). This simple point 
alia datione et non invidiosae operationis omnia bonifacere desiderat et sibi similia facere. 
English translation: Proclus, On the Existence of Evils, trans. J. Opsomer, C. Steel (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 73– 4.
 121 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 206C, p. 218, l. 91- 93: Ex quibus verbis aperte colligitur 
animam partialem, ut est in ente, esse beatam, sicut quae cum diis praesidibus ascendit ad 
felicem et perfectissimam entis epulationem, id est ad fruitionem divinorum et specialiter 
prime boni.
 122 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 206C, p. 218, l. 95 – p. 219, l. 101, citing Dionysius, De 
caelesti hiearchia, 7.4, 212A: Igitur hic quidem est secundum meam scientiam primus cae-
lestium substantiarum ornatus in circuitu Dei et circa Deum sine medio stans et simpliciter 
et indesinenter ambiens aeternam ipsius cognitionem secundum supremam, ut in angelis, 
supermobilem collocationem; multis quidem et beatis videns pure contemplationibus, sim-
plicibus autem et immediatis splendoribus illuminatus: et divino nutrimento adimpletus, 







was meant to establish that Proclus was mistaken to assert that souls would 
ever descend from their homes among their “companion stars”, but the Clavis 
had it right: if ever souls delight in the immutable fount of all goods, nothing 
could draw them away.123 Thus Berthold read Proclus through Eriugena (and 
Dionysius) for whom, as Trouillard observed, the perfection of the soul is pre-
cisely to be “saturated by contemplation”.
The soul naturally longs for the kind of incorruptible body that “whole” 
heavenly souls have already, and which will serve it in the greater realisation 
of contemplative felicity.124 What a spiritual body enables, with the qualities 
of agility, subtlety, and so on, is the further transmission of the goods that the 
souls receive from intellects above them. For Berthold, souls do in a sense 
ascend and descend from being into becoming in rare moments of contem-
plative raptus, but to say that a soul would descend from the permanent pos-
session of its own intellect (intellectus adeptus), is unthinkable. The Dionysian 
correction of Proclus, which for Berthold truly grasped the doctrine behind 
the Timaeus, which Proclus should have understood by the light of his own 
principles, was that the soul does not turn directly back to the world of gen-
eration and corruption, but exercises a divine care for what is below because 
of a kind of excess or overflow. As Proclus himself wrote, the soul raised to 
“govern the world with the gods” by “ascending to the blissful and most perfect 
banquet of being”, fills those who follow upon it with that same abundance.125 
This idea immediately preceded Proclus’ remark, cited above, that “the pri-
mary good is not contemplation” or “intellective life”. So too for Dionysius, 
hierarchy is intended to connect the higher and lower through such a dynamic 
exchange.126 If contemplation does not result in some providential action, if it 
does not abound, then it is not yet divine.
 123 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 206F, p. 223, l. 263- 6: anima enim fruens fonte omnium 
bonorum utpote beata et felicis vitae nec timore torqueri potuerit nec falsa securitate decipi 
nec commutabili bono allici ut, volens, a bono incommutabili se avertat nec ad aversionem 
ab aliquo violentari.
 124 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 185H, p. 24, l. 334 – p. 25, l. 365; 202C, p. 185, l.127- 
136: quando incorruptibiles et immortales erimus et christiformem et beatissimum conse-
quemur finem, visibili ipsius Dei apparitione in castissimis contemplationibus adimpleti, 
manifestissimis circa nos splendoribus refulgente, sicut circa discipulos in illa divinissima 
transformatione; intelligibili autem luminis datione ipsius, impassibili et immateriali mente 
participantes et super mentem unitione, in ignotis et beatis immissionibus superclarorum 
radiorum, in diviniore imitatione supercaelestium mentium. Nam aequales erimus angelis, 
ut veritas dicit Eloquiorum, et filii Dei, resurrectionis filii existentes.
 125 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 206C, p. 218, l. 80- 83, cited above at 5.1, n. 63.










In this respect, we see that Berthold attempted to be faithful to Proclus’ 
own doctrine set out in Proposition 129 (“Every divine body is divine through 
a deified soul; but every soul is divine because of a divine intellect; but every 
intellect is divine through participation in a divine unity: and if the One is 
antotheon, that is, God from itself, intellect is most divine, soul is divine, and 
body is deiform”).127 Proclus’ terminology prompted Berthold to discuss the 
meaning of deification (deificatio). If the body is to be deified, this must occur 
“through assimilation and union” with God, as Dionysius wrote. This can only 
happen through the intermediary terms, such that “the body would be, as it 
were, changed into soul, soul into intellect, and intellect into God”.128
Here, once again, Berthold’s guide to interpreting Proclus on deification was 
the Clavis physicae.129 Berthold first included the famous images of light- filled 
air and red- hot iron, which Eriugena elaborated from Maximus the Confessor, 
and which subsequently were included in the Clavis.130 These metaphors orig-
inally were intended to illustrate how the divine and the human can be united 
without confusion or, in the more universal scope of Eriugena and Berthold, 
how a lower nature can be infused and transformed by the higher without los-
ing its identity: the corporeal is changed into the soul, “not so that it would be 
lost”, but “to preserve it in a better essence”.
To get a clearer sense of how this will occur in the macrocosm, Berthold 
continued, let us take as an example the deified person (ponamus hominem 
deificatum pro exemplo), in whom the four cosmological genera are present. 
He then cited the two familiar texts from Dionysius and Proclus – Dionysius on 
“the unity exceeding the nature of mind”, according to which it is necessary to 
think divine things, “not according to ourselves”, and so on; and Proclus, who 
made this point more clearly (istam intentionem clarius ponit Proclus), when he 
disclosed the frenzy or cognition above mind, in which the soul “sees” the One 
by “not seeing”, having brought all exterior and interior motions to stillness. 
 127 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 129, p. 65, l. 1- 5: Omne corpus divinum per animam 
est divinum exdeatam, omnis autem anima divina propter divinum intellectum, omnis 
autem intellectus divinus secundum participationem divine unitatis; et si quidem unum 
autotheon [Berthold: antotheon] (id est ex se) deus, intellectus autem divinissimum, anima 
autem divina, corpus autem deiforme. On this commentary, see E. Massa, “La deificazione 
nel commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg a Proclo, Elementatio theologica, 129. Edizione del 
testo e prime analisi”, in R. Lievens, E. van Mingroot, W. Verbeke (eds), Pascua Mediaevalia. 
Studies voor Prof. Dr. J.M. de Smet (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1983), p. 545– 604.
 128 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 129B, p. 177, l. 140- 141: quod corpus quasi mutetur in ani-
mam, anima in intellectum, intellectus in Deum.
 129 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 129B, p. 177, l. 142 – p. 179, l. 196.










According to Berthold, this shows that, although the preparation or purifica-
tion of the soul begins from below, deification begins from above, when God 
is participated separably (separabiliter) through the unum animae, which is 
the inseparable potency (per inseparabilem potentiam) or vestige God has left 
in the soul. Then the intellect is transformed and made most divine (divinis-
simum), and so on for the soul and for the body. In this way the participation 
in divinity passes through all intermediaries to the deification of the body (sic 
participatio divinitatis transit per omnia media usque ad deificationem corporis).
Among these more familiar sources, it is most striking to find Berthold cit-
ing Bernard of Clairvaux, as a confirmation of the consensus of the Clavis and 
Proclus about the deification of the microcosm (intended, we will recall, as an 
illustration of what will transpire in the macrocosm):
And so, as Bernard says, ‘the whole person will proceed into God and, 
adhering to him, from thenceforth will be one spirit with him’. ‘Just as 
a tiny drop of water infused in a large quantity of wine seems to leave 
itself, and now is imbued with the taste and colour of wine’, ‘so also, at 
that time, in the saints’ (that is, ‘when they are drunk, so to speak, with 
the abundance of the house of God, and in some way will have become 
oblivious of themselves’), ‘all human affection will necessarily, in some 
ineffable way, liquify and be poured out deeply into the will of God. 
Otherwise, how will God be all in all, if in man something of man will 
remain? Indeed, the substance will remain, but in another form, another 
glory, and another power’.131
This citation brought together and reordered numerous phrases from 
Bernard’s De diligendo Deo. This reordering, and the reference to Ephesians 
3:19 that immediately follows it in the Expositio, indicate that Berthold’s source 
was a popular florilegium, the so- called Flores Bernardi.132 This chapter of the 
 131 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 129B, p. 179, l. 188- 196: Et sic, ut dicit Bernardus, ‘totus 
homo perget in Deum et deinceps adhaerens ei unus cum eo spiritus erit’. ‘Quomodo stilla 
aquae modica multo infusa vino deficere a se tota videtur, dum et saporem vini induit et 
colorem’, ‘sic omnem tunc in sanctis’ (scilicet ‘quando quasi ebrii ab ubertate domus Domini 
quodammodo obliti sui ipsorum fuerint’) ‘humanam affectionem quodam ineffabili modo 
necesse erit a semet ipsa liquescere atque in Dei penitus transfundi voluntatem. Alioquin, 
quomodo erit Deus omnia in omnibus, si in homine de homine quidquam supererit? Manebit 
quidem substantia, sed in alia forma, alia gloria, aliaque potentia’.
 132 Bernard of Clairvaux, De diligendo Deo, eds J. Leclercq, H. Rochais, Sancti Bernardi Opera, 
vol. 3 (Roma: Editiones Cistercienses, 1963): totus … erit (c. 15, §39, p. 153, l. 9- 10); quo-
modo … colorem (c. 10, §28, p. 143, l. 15- 17); sic … sanctis (c. 10, §28 p. 143, l. 20); quando 






Flores embellished Bernard’s own summary of the argument in De diligendo 
Deo about of the four ascending modes of love, according to which a person 
(1) loves oneself for one’s own sake, (2) loves God for one’s own sake, (3) loves 
God for God’s sake, and (4) loves oneself for God’s sake.133 In the lengthier dis-
cussion of the fourth mode in  chapter 10 of De diligendo Deo, Bernard spoke of 
the rare possibility of attaining such love in this life, if only for an instant.134 In 
the summary at  chapter 15, however, which was retained by the Flores, the glass 
was half empty, and Bernard hesitated to affirm that the fourth mode could be 
attained “perfectly” in this life.135 This would not have had a significant bearing 
on Berthold’s analysis of Proposition 129, where the perspective was clearly 
that of the Resurrection and the total deification of the microcosm, but it will 
be worth keeping in mind when we return to consider Berthold’s conception 
of the transitory cognition of the unum animae.
In one sense, Bernard only confirmed what Berthold already took from 
the Clavis, with the metaphors of mixture illustrating how the substance of 
I have not been able to consult a manuscript of the florilegium written before the 15th 
century. Of the modern editions, the text used by Berthold was closer to Flores sancti 
Bernardi (Venezia: Junta, 1503), lib. ix, c. 42, p. 162vb, than what is found in Flores operum 
D. Bernardi abbatis Clarevallensis (Lyons: G. Rouillius, 1570), lib. ix, c. 36, p. 698, as the 
latter makes no reference to the domus Domini. In both editions, the next and final 
chapter of book ix is De longitudine, latitudine, sublimitate et profundo – a clear echo of 
Eph. 3:19, discussed below – which summarised Bernard of Clairvaux, De consideratione, 
lib. v, c. 13, §27. On the origins and medieval transmission of the Flores Bernardi, see 
M. Bernards, “Flores Sancti Bernardi”, in J. Lortz (ed.), Bernhard von Clairvaux. Mönch 
und Mystiker. Internationaler Bernhard- Kongress Mainz 1953 (Mainz: Veröffentlichungen 
des Instituts für europäische Geschichte Mainz, 1955), p. 176– 191, and U. Köpf, “Die 
Rezeptions- und Wirkungsgeschichte Bernhards von Clairvaux. Forschungsstand und 
Forschungsaufgaben”, in K. Elm (ed.), Bernhard von Clairvaux. Rezeption und Wirkung 
im Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1994), p. 5- 65, at p. 12– 17. 
The same passage from the Flores used by Berthold featured prominently in Henry 
Suso’s account of releasement (gelazsenheit) in The Little Book of Truth. See Henry Suso, 
Daz buechli der warheit, c. 4, p. 336, l. 7- 24. On Bernard’s influence among Berthold’s 
Dominican contemporaries, see G. Steer, “Bernhard von Clairvaux als theologische 
Autorität für Meister Eckhart, Johannes Tauler und Heinrich Seuse”, in K. Elm (ed.), 
Bernhard von Clairvaux, p. 233– 259.
 133 Bernard of Clairvaux, De diligendo Deo, c. 15, §39, p. 152, l. 18 – p. 153, l. 14.
 134 Bernard of Clairvaux, De diligendo Deo, c. 10, §27, p. 142, l. 13- 15: Beatum dixerim et sanc-
tum, cui tale aliquid in hac mortali vita raro interdum, aut vel semel, et hoc ipsum raptim 
atque unius vix momenti spatio, experiri donatum est.
 135 Bernard of Clairvaux, De diligendo Deo, c. 15, §39, p. 153, l. 3- 6: Sane in hoc gradu diu statur, 
et nescio si a quoquam hominum quartus in hac vita perfecte apprehenditur, ut se scilicet 









beatified human nature remains while it is imbued by grace with another glory 
and another power, so that God may be “all in all”.136 Just as water takes on the 
properties of wine, or iron the properties of fire, so human nature is enno-
bled by the divine nature. But the imagery used by Bernard (the banquet in 
the house of God, drunkenness, and self- forgetfulness) went further than this, 
and struck a deeper resonance with more characteristic motifs of the doctrine 
of contemplation in the Expositio, which have more in common with Proclus 
and Dionysius than with the Clavis. The banquet, with the semantic register of 
abundance and plenitude, was central to Berthold’s understanding of how dei-
fication occurs as an overflow from the top, so to speak, of the macrocosm and 
microcosm. Such metaphors appeared at the culmination of his gloss on Psalm 
42 at the conclusion of the Prologus, with the famished soul’s arrival to the 
house of God (the vision of the divine ideas) and the heavenly banquet (usque 
ad domum Dei, in voce exultationis et confessionis sonus epulantis). Similarly, 
the correction of Proclus’ literalist reading of Plato’s myths of embodiment 
with the Dionysian theology of the Clavis hinged on the idea that the soul’s 
proper activity in the realm of being is a feast (epulatio), whose overabun-
dance redounds providentially to its body and all who follow after the soul.137 
Bernard’s association of the banquet – with “the house of the Lord” surely sig-
nifying for Berthold the primordial causes in the Word – with the drunkenness 
of the saints (quasi ebrii) and their self- forgetfulness (obliti sui ipsorum) would 
have aligned with Berthold’s own understanding of the unum animae as a non- 
reflexive ignorance of self that exceeds and grounds the self- reflexivity of the 
acquired intellect (123D). These themes are found in the immediate context of 
129B with Dionysius (totos nos ipsos extra totos nos ipsos statutos / melius est 
enim esse Dei et non nostri ipsorum) and with Proclus’ metaphor of the divine 
frenzy of stillness (divina mania / quietens se ipsum).
The citation of Bernard also sheds new light on Berthold’s understanding of 
the unum animae. In a work as vast and methodical as the Expositio, which so 
 136 The same description of unitive cognition by “the flower of the intellect” used at 129B was 
cited at 114B, when Berthold maintained that Proclus was describing deification by grace 
(per gratiam). See also Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 120C, p. 93, l. 97- 107.
 137 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 206C, p. 218, l. 82- 83: et quae in ipsam respicientia replens 
eo, quod ibi nectare; 209A, p. 240, l. 21- 31: Est et alius ordo, scilicet supernaturalis […] et per-
tinet ad statum vitae felicis, quo anima cum suo susceptaculo, quod primitus animat, est in 
ente, ad quem statum pertinet non solum gloria animae in fruendo per contemplationem et 
dilectionem fonte boni, ex cuius superplenitudine ipsa anima partialis utpote supercaelestis 
existens illuminatur, immo superimpletur divini luminis claritate, verum etiam gloria ipsius 
susceptaculi; 209E, p. 244, l. 158- 171: ubi degustat et copiosam alimentorum divinorum afflu-






rarely departs from the parameters set by Proclus’ philosophical vocabulary, the 
value of a passing reference or citation for understanding Berthold’s unspoken 
assumptions can be inversely proportional to its quantitative presence. This 
has been the case with the intellectus adeptus in 123D, which was crucial for 
grasping Berthold’s modifications of Dietrich’s views about the roles of grace 
and reflexivity in the vision of God, and with the Prologus’ astrologer who “gov-
erns the world with the gods”, which enabled us to see how Berthold adapted 
Albert’s notions of the acquired and assimilative intellects and prophecy to a 
Platonic register. If there is one thing that these phrases from Bernard intro-
duce that was altogether absent from the recurring citations of Proclus and 
Dionysius on the unum animae, it was not the notion that the transformation 
of human nature occurs by grace, in which there is no confusion of humanity 
and divinity, but the idea that this occurs through a union of wills (unus cum 
eo spiritus erit / humanam affectionem in Dei penitus transfundi voluntatem).
The echo of Ephesians 3:19 that immediately followed the citation of Bernard 
in 129B (“thus a person will be filled unto all the fullness of God”) further rein-
forces the sense that affect, love, or will, is somehow operative at this highest 
level of supra- intellectual cognition. For this verse speaks of “comprehending” 
Christ’s love (caritas), which exceeds every determinate mode of being (lati-
tudo, et longitudo, et sublimitas, et profundum) and every kind of knowledge, 
precisely by being filled with that love.138 This imagery of plenitude evidently 
agrees with the overall theory of deification in 129B. But by concluding on this 
note, Berthold leaves the reader with the impression that the deification above 
mind is in some sense a transformation of the human will into the divine will 
or charity. The soul is so filled with God that it can love itself, a creature, for 
God’s sake. It does not require much extrapolation to construe this as the soul’s 
participation in the divine providence. If this is so, then it is through a kind 
of intellect in love that the soul exercises providence with the presiding gods.
In an entry on Berthold of Moosburg in the Lexikon des Mittelalters, Willehad 
Eckert clearly had this passage in mind when he concluded his brief summary 
of the Expositio in three sentences: “[Berthold’s] interest in Proclus is above all 
motivated by the thematic of the soul’s union with God which he, according 
 138 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 129B, p. 179, l. 197. Cf. Ephesians 3:17- 19: in caritate radi-
cati, et fundati, ut possitis comprehendere cum omnibus sanctis, quae sit latitudo, et longi-
tudo, et sublimitas, et profundum: scire etiam supereminentem scientiae caritatem Christi, 
ut impleamini in omnem plenitudinem Dei (“being rooted and grounded in charity, you 
might comprehend with all the saints what is the breadth, length, height, and depth: to 
know also the charity of Christ, which exceeds all knowledge, so that you may be filled 




to the model of Bernard of Clairvaux, sees as given through love”.139 This is a 
remarkable judgement from the first scholar in the 20th century to devote sub-
stantial attention to Berthold of Moosburg. Eckert rightly marked the anthro-
pological inspiration for Berthold’s commentary, and hinted at centrality of 
grace to Berthold’s conception of divine union (durch die Liebe gegeben sieht).
While I would agree with Loris Sturlese that a label like “affective mysti-
cism” for Berthold’s thought, which one might take Eckert’s summary to imply, 
would be a very inadequate description of the Expositio (since, as Sturlese has 
put it, for Berthold “the leap into mystical experience could not be a solution” 
to the restrictions of the metaphysics of being), I would not go so far as to say 
that Berthold therefore kept Bernard’s mysticism at a distance.140 It is true that 
Berthold only cited Bernard in two, albeit important, passages, for the doctrines 
of deification (129B) and contemplation (202A), and, moreover, likely relied on 
a florilegium.141 It is also undeniable that for Berthold the Platonic alternative 
to the Aristotelian metaphysics of being has to be made available, in principle, 
to everyone who desires to follow the laborious path of reasoning according 
to the oblique motion of the soul, until they arrive at the unhypothetical and 
simple first principle that grounds all thought. So while it would be misleading 
to suggest, though Eckert has not, that Berthold’s principal motive was to be 
faithful to Bernard of Clairvaux – it was to elucidate the soteriological wisdom 
of the Platonists – we should remain sensitive to the nuance this citation of 
Bernard brought to the Platonic consensus of the Expositio. When Berthold 
added that the unitive cognition of Proclus and Dionysius can be conceived as 
a transformative union of wills, we should pay attention, for it is only in such 
details that Berthold’s understanding of the unum animae can be allowed to 
come into view.
It would be unsurprising if a commentator had understood providential, 
non- reflexive cognition through ignorance (Dionysius) or seeing the One 
 139 W. Eckert, “Berthold von Moosburg”, in Lexikon des Mittelalters, vol. 1 (München / 
Zürich: Artemis, 1980), col. 2034: “Das Proklos- Interesse ist v. a. motiviert durch die 
Thematik der Gotteseinigung der Seele, die er nach dem Modell des Bernhard v. Clairvaux 
als durch die Liebe gegeben sieht”.
 140 Sturlese, Homo divinus, p. 152: “Daß der Sprung ins mystische Erleben für Berthold keine 
Lösung sein konnte, zeigt die Distanz, mit er die Mystik Bernhards in der Expositio betra-
chtet wird. Bernhard wird nur zweilmal erwähnt.”
 141 The two definitions of contemplation taken from Bernard’s De consideratione in 202A 
have the appearance of deriving on a florilegium, but in the printed editions of the Flores 
Bernardi they are quite far apart: Flores sancti Bernardi, lib. v, c. 64, p. 68vb and lib. viii, 
c. 90, p. 144rb; Flores operum D. Bernardi abbatis Clarevallensis, lib. v, c. 46, p. 318 and lib. 








through not seeing (Proclus), in terms of love. This reading of the De mystica 
theologia and De divinis nominibus 7.1 had been well established since the time 
of Hugh of St. Victor (d. 1141) and especially Thomas Gallus (d. 1226).142 Although 
Berthold’s citation of Bernard gestured in this direction, it is equally important 
to note that he nowhere made an outright identification of the activity of the 
soul’s supra- intellectual principle with amor. Some parallels between the two 
notions, however, do appear elsewhere in the Expositio, where Berthold more 
closely associated the banquet, divine plenitude, and love. We find this con-
nection stated most clearly in Proposition 177 (“Every intellect is a plenitude 
[plenitudo] of species”, etc.).143 Explaining how an intellect is productive by 
being “subject to the superessential will” (subicitur voluntati superessentiali), 
Berthold linked its generative power to the presence of unity or goodness 
within it:
Intellect is not only receptive of species but is even profusive of itself in 
the specifying determination of all that is below. In this way, it makes the 
goodness of silence to shine forth clearly in itself – I mean the goodness 
which is diffusive of itself, not by reasoning or choice, which here can 
even be called the silence which is in the hidden places, that is, in the 
holies of holies.144
The fecundity of an intellect is identical with the generative “goodness of 
silence”. The vocabulary of this passage recalls what we read in Berthold’s 
citations of Proclus and Dionysius on the angels as “revealers of the divine 
silence”.145 According to the exegetical possibilities made available to Berthold 
once he had integrated the methodology of natural and voluntary providence 
into Platonism, these passages about the angels can be applied proportionately 
 142 See D. Lawell, “Ecstasy and the Intellectual Dionysianism of Thomas Aquinas and Albert 
the Great”, in J. McEvoy, M. Dunne, J. Hynes (eds), Thomas Aquinas. Teacher and Scholar 
(Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2012), p. 155– 183; B.T. Coolman, Knowledge, Love, and Ecstasy 
in the Theology of Thomas Gallus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 1- 27.
 143 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 177, p. 87, l. 1- 5: Omnis intellectus plenitudo ens speci-
erum, hic quidem universaliorum, hic autem particulariorum est contentivus specierum; et 
superiores quidem intellectus universaliorem habent quanto particulariorem qui post ipsos, 
inferiores autem particulariorem quanto totaliorem qui ante ipsos.
 144 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 177C, p. 176, l. 116- 120: Non solum autem intellectus est sic 
specierum receptivus, sed etiam est sui ipsius in omnium inferiorum specificationem profusi-
vus, et sic est faciens munde resplendere in se ipso bonitatem silentii, bonitatem, inquam, sui 
ipsius diffusivam non ratiocinando nec praeeligendo, quod etiam potest hic vocari silentium, 
quod est in abditis, scilicet secretis secretorum.










to the activity of the gods in the domain of natural providence.146 In light of 
the distinction of hierarchy and antarkia in 10A, we can surmise that the dif-
ference in the proportion would be as follows: in a hierarchy ruled by will, “the 
goodness of silence” generates only providential operations and graces, but 
no substances, whereas in the order of natural providence, it is productive of 
entia secundum speciem by “specifying determination”. Here in 177C, Berthold 
connected that silence with the notions of overflow and plenitude. Although 
the unum is not mentioned explicitly, the language of “the hidden places” and 
“the holy of holies” was clearly meant to evoke the idea, found already in 162B, 
that a unitas superexaltata is at the root of each separate intellect as an ens 
secundum speciem. But what is most striking here was Berthold’s decision to 
explain the word “silence”, which characterised Proclus’ “clearer” account of 
deification through the unum animae cited at 129B, in terms of a spontaneous 
and generative activity prior to reasoning or choice.
Berthold’s commentary on Proposition 175 (“Every intellect is primarily 
participated by principles that are intellectual in both their substance and 
operation”) had already explored the role of the will or love in the essential 
activity of the intelligences.147 Here, Berthold began with an argument about 
what belongs to the perfection of every intellectual nature in general.148 The 
first text he offered was Dionysius, De divinis nominibus 4.13, on “the supera-
bundance of loving goodness” that draws God outside himself (extra se ipsum) 
in ecstasy (secundum extasim). Berthold maintained that this applies propor-
tionately to every essential cause, stating that “love is an act of will, which 
according to its proper notion denotes what belongs to the perfection of every 
 intellectual nature”. In these intellectual substances, he explained, love does 
not belong to the genus of an accident because it is not related to a potency 
that follows the essence of the intellect or to an appetite triggered by some 
object outside the intellect. This was an important clarification, for it might 
 146 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 156A, p. 169, l. 12- 21: sicut se habent superiores angeli in 
ordine providentiae voluntariae, ita se habent proportionaliter dii in ordine providentiae 
naturalis. ‘Si enim’, ut dicit Dionysius 4 cap. De divinis nominibus, ‘enunciat bonitatem div-
inam boniformis’ deiformis ‘angelus, illud existens secundum participationem’ secundo post 
Deum, quod quidem est secundum eam ‘primo enuntiatum, imago Dei est angelus, mani-
festatio occulti luminis, speculum purum, clarissimum, incontaminatum, incoinquinatum, 
immaculatum, suscipiens totam, si est conveniens dicere, pulchritudinem boniformis dei-
formitatis et munde resplendere faciens in se ipso, quemadmodum possibile est, bonitatem 
silentii, quod est in abditis’, eodem modo proportionaliter est de diis.
 147 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 175, p. 85, l. 1- 2: Omnis intellectus a secundum sub-
stantiam simul et operationem intellectualibus participatur primitus.








account for Berthold’s reluctance to identify the unum animae with amor, as 
this could imply that it is a power somehow separate from the intellect. Rather, 
love is “the inclination following the apprehended form”. This “will” desires its 
own good and communion with what is apprehended. In the case of an intel-
lect essentially in act, this desired good is God, who is more inward to the intel-
lect than its innermost part. In its communion with the overflowing Good, the 
intellect does not act by the necessity of compulsion or the necessity of nature, 
but by the freedom of the will, which for Berthold is entirely consistent with 
the immutability of necessity:149
Thus, every intellectual nature is elevated above its own nature, prop-
erly speaking, and attains to the likeness of the primarily Good. And 
because the will of an intellect essentially in act is not a power, but its 
very essence, it follows that the will does not belong to it such that the 
will would move once it has been moved by an external desirable object. 
Rather, it is said to be moved in goodness and love to cause all things that 
come after itself, just as Dionysius says about the primarily Good, as we 
saw above, that ‘divine love’ ‘does not leave it without seed’; so too, intel-
lectual love does not leave such an intellect barren. In this way, after the 
example of the primarily Good, the goodness of the will of the intellect 
itself cannot be without benevolence, nor can it be without the benefi-
cence through which it communicates its goodness in every way that it 
can be communicated and participated by whatever things are capable of 
participating in whatever way. For otherwise there would be jealousy in 
it, since it would not diffuse or communicate the good that it can bestow 
without any detriment to itself – but it is known that such ‘jealousy is far 
removed from’ everything divine.150
 149 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 175A, p. 147, l. 33- 37: Et hoc enim duo consequuntur ipsam 
voluntatem, unum in se, scilicet quod bonum proprium et eius communionem desiderat et 
amat amore intellectuali, secundum, quod in talis boni redundantis communione non agit 
necessitate coactionis, sed nec proprie necessitate naturae, sed voluntatis libertate, quae 
bene stat cum immutabilitatis necessitate.
 150 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 175A, p. 147, l. 38- 50: Et sic omnis intellectualis natura ele-
vatur supra naturam proprie dictam et accedit ad similitudinem prime boni, et quia voluntas 
intellectus in actu per essentiam non est potentia, sed sua essentia, patet, quod non competit 
ei, quod moveat mota ab appetibili extra, sed dicitur moveri in bonitate et amore ad cau-
sandum omnia, quae sunt post, sicut etiam de prime bono dicit Dionysius, ubi supra, quod 
‘divinus amor’ ‘non dimisit ipsum sine germine’; ita etiam amor intellectualis non sinit intel-
lectum talem esse infecundum, et sic etiam ad instar prime boni bonitas voluntatis ipsius 
intellectus non potest esse sine benevolentia, quae etiam non potest esse sine beneficentia, 






This is nothing if not a concise statement of Berthold’s rationale for elevat-
ing “good” over “being” as the primary name of God in Propositions 1 and 7, 
and his understanding of “goodness” as the essential mode of any given thing, 
according to which an essence is intrinsically related to an order outside itself. 
The additional clarification here is that this communication of the good is not 
only an ecstasy in God and the separate substances, but that it amounts to an 
elevation “beyond nature” (elevatur super naturam) in all creatures below God. 
Through the will, an intellect that is always essentially in act goes above itself 
in love and beyond itself in fecundity. Similarities with the passage from 177C, 
considered above, are undeniable: through willing or love, the separate intel-
lects “mirror” or “make present” the causality of the Good; this will is intrinsic 
to the essentially active intellect (in abditis) and yet transcends it (in secretis 
secretorum). Its activity is freedom itself, beyond reasoning or the necessity of 
nature, and is equivalent to “the goodness of silence” and the activity of the 
vestige of the One or Good in the intellect.
The echo of the Timaeus 29e in the final line of the text from 175A (invidia 
longe ab omni divino noscitur relegata) was followed up explicitly in 175B, 
where Berthold noted that Plato and Avicebron agreed when they stated that 
separate intellects “institute those things that exist by willing”: Plato, when he 
said that “the will of God is the most certain origin of things”, and Avicebron, in 
more precise terms, when he wrote that “Plato considered that the forms come 
to be in the intelligence from an intuition of the Will (ex intuitu voluntatis), and 
they come to be in the universal soul from an intuition of the universal intel-
ligence”.151 Berthold would have interpreted this passage from Fons vitae v.17 
with reference to the highest three cosmological genera of the Elementatio the-
ologica, but with the crucial difference that the domain of the Good has been 
identified with the Will. We find Berthold citing the same text whenever he 
wanted to explain how the separate intelligences receive the species of which 
they are the plenitude.152 The overall picture here suggests that the one beyond 
intellect, “the holy of holies” in the separate intellects wherein “the goodness 
of silence” reigns and is revealed in their fecundity that mirrors the Good, is 
quibuscumque et qualitercumque participare valentibus. Aliter enim esset in eo invidia, cum 
non diffunderet et communicaret bonum, quod posset sine sui detrimento communicare, 
quae tamen ‘invidia longe’ ‘ab’ omni divino noscitur ‘relegata’. Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 29e.
 151 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 175B, p. 149, l. 109- 114. On Berthold’s use of Avicebron, see 
A. Beccarisi, “Avicebron (Solomon Ibn Gabirol) and Berthold of Moosburg on Essential 
Causality”, forthcoming.
 152 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 145F, p. 86, l. 142 – p. 87, l. 178; 170C, p. 97, l. 103- 105; 174B, 






the “summit” of an intellectual substance that is immediately receptive to 
the divine will. Far from an isolated capitulation to authority, then, Berthold’s 
citation of Bernard was an acknowledgement of how profoundly the abbot’s 
notion of deification – a transformative plenitude arising from union with the 
divine will – agreed with what Berthold found in the Timaeus (the divine will, 
free from jealousy, as the origin of all things), the Phaedrus (on the feast in 
the heavenly circuit, reported by Proclus), Dionysius (the ecstatic love of the 
Good), and Proclus (the silent “frenzy” and union with the divine providence).
For Berthold, the simplicity of an intellectual substance was primary, and 
the notion of will or love could not compromise it.153 The idea that the vestig-
ium unius in all spiritual substances could be realised through a kind of love is, 
however, consistent with our earlier analysis of the unum animae and acquired 
intellect, where we concluded that the former should be seen as the higher 
phase of the latter, the kernel of non- reflexivity that grounds all intellectual 
activity. To the extent he has identified love with this higher phase, Berthold 
seems to have reached for the same doctrine expressed succinctly by Plotinus 
(d. 270):
So, Intellect has one power to think insofar as it regards what is in itself, 
and another insofar as it regards what transcends itself, with a kind of 
apprehension and receptivity. It is in accordance with the second power 
that it first sees, and then later while still seeing both comes to be intel-
lect and a unity. And the former is the contemplation of a wise intellect, 
whereas the latter is intellect loving, when it becomes senseless, ‘drunk 
with nectar’; then it falls in love, simplified into happiness by having its 
fill. And it is better for it to be drunk with this drunkenness than to be 
sober.154
For Plotinus as for Berthold, it would be inappropriate to speak of love as 
something separate from intellect. The drunkenness of intellect is rather one 
mode or “power” of its seeing that is always concomitant with the “sober” and 
reflexive knowing that it grounds: “intellect always has its thinking and always 
its non- thinking”, as Plotinus went on to explain. So too for Berthold, not only 
is the agent intellect of the soul always active, as Dietrich had argued, but the 
unum animae must be even more active than it. Even if their operations belong 
to the whole soul only accidentally, it is clear for Berthold that both are given to 
 153 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 175B, p. 150, l. 120- 129.
 154 Plotinus, Enneades, vi.7[38].35. English translation: Plotinus, The Enneads, ed. L. Gerson 






the soul as a pair. But what Plotinus made explicit, and which Berthold, with-
out knowing the Enneads, assumed in his endorsement of Avicebron’s sum-
mary of Plato’s explanation of how forms come to be in the intellect (ex intuitu 
voluntatis; subicitur voluntati superessentiali), was that the ecstatic activity of 
intellect in love, its “reaching out” (ἐπιβολή), is simultaneously a “receptivity” 
(παραδοχή).155 Berthold would have encountered the transliteration of the 
first term in Moerbeke’s translation of the De providentia et fato (epibolis, id 
est adiectionibus, simplicibus), but for him this passage in Proclus referred to 
the higher phase of the possible intellect as it intuits and receives simple for-
mal intentions from the agent intellect.156 Be that as it may, we have now seen 
that the same dynamic of higher and lower modalities is found at the next 
and highest level, where the agent intellect, having been united to the possible 
intellect in its lower phase, intuits, receives, and constitutes forms immedi-
ately from the divine will in its higher phase.
Far from undermining the philosophical coherence of the Expositio, the 
notion of the unum animae as a kind of affective intellect can bring some 
much- needed clarity to Berthold’s occasionally faltering attempts to define the 
proper activity of the unum apart from the intellectus agens.157 This struggle is 
nowhere more apparent than in the commentary on Proposition 124 (“Every 
god knows the divisible indivisibly, the temporal atemporally, the contingent 
necessarily, the changeable unchangeably, and in general all things more emi-
nently than they are in their own order”).158 After explicitly referring back 
to the degrees of cognition outlined in 123D, Berthold declared that it would 
suffice to collapse the highest two modes (the fifth: intellectus adeptus and 
unum animae; the sixth: the cognition of the separate intelligences) into one, 
called “the intellective”.159 Following Dietrich of Freiberg, he maintained that 
the intellective embraces the lower forms of sensitive and rational cognition 
 155 On the influence of this doctrine on Dionysius, see M. Harrington, “The Drunken Epibole 
of Plotinus and its Reappearance in the Work of Dionysius the Areopagite”, in Dionysius 
23(2005), p. 117– 138.
 156 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 123D, p. 129, l. 144- 147.
 157 Proclus, De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam, q. 1, §5, p. 8, l. 4- 6: necesse et providen-
tialem cognitionem super intellectualem esse, et sic utique omnia providentiam cognoscere 
uno quod sui ipsius, secundum quod et bonificat omnia […].
 158 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 124, p. 62, l. 1- 4: Omnis deus impartibiliter quidem 
partibilia cognoscit, intemporaliter autem temporalia, non necessaria autem necessarie 
et transmutabilia intransmutabiliter, et universaliter omnia eminentius quam secundum 
ipsorum ordinem.
 159 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 124A, p. 139, l. 15 – p. 140, 64. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, 
Quaestio utrum in Deo sit aliqua vis cognitiva inferior intellectu, 1.1.5- 10, p. 294, l. 34 – 












within itself in a simple mode (in ipso uniuntur modo simplici). This is because 
the intellective knows an object in the simple essence (simplex essentia) that 
is intrinsic to the intellect itself: unlike the sensitive power, which is occupied 
with the particular, and reason, which abstracts the universal, the cognition 
of the simple essence is neither universal nor particular (nec est universalis 
nec particularis / nec est individua nec universalis proprie loquendo). That is, 
the agent intellect contains the essence it knows and produces within itself, 
and does so in a simpler and nobler way than the essence exists in its effect or 
in the possible intellect, which apprehends it only through its divided formal 
parts. Such a cognition beyond the universal and particular was precisely what 
Proclus intended to convey with his notion of divine providence as what is prior 
to intellect.160 Berthold explicitly acknowledged this in 124B, but was confined 
to making a fortiori arguments about the unum animae as a cognitive princi-
ple based on Dietrich’s descriptions of the intellectus in actu per essentiam.161 
Compared with these rather awkward and ambiguous passages, the clarity of 
Berthold’s proposal that the separate intellects are “elevated above nature” by 
their will that is identical with their essence (175A- B) is more informative. Not 
the cognition of the separate intellects but their fecundity is related to the ves-
tige of the One within them, in which they are always located (illocantur) and, 
for that reason, always “imitate the gods”.162
Providence is found wherever there is an active vestige of the One.163 This 
providence is operative in the human soul, even when a person is not aware 
of it, through the unum animae, which is the principle of order and harmony 
among the parts. As such, the unum animae (or, perhaps better here, the bonum 
animae) is nothing else than the origin of divine love in the soul.164 In this 
 160 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 120, p. 60, l. 10- 11: Et enim ubi que pronoy (id est 
intellectus provisoris) operatio nisi in supersubstantialibus? See also the parallel text to 
Proposition 124 in Proclus, De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam, q. 1, §5, and espe-
cially at p. 8, l. 8- 11: Non enim est le unum ipsius velut le individuum unum: hoc enim ulti-
mum entium et universali deterius, quo participans est quod est, illud autem et universali 
melius […].
 161 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 124B, p. 141, l. 78- 85; 124C, p. 141, l. 99- 100; 124D, p. 143, 
l. 152- 154 and 170- 172. See also Expositio, 83B, p. 125, l. 88 – p. 126, l. 108 on the higher “certi-
tude” of the superintellective.
 162 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 134F, p. 217, l. 106- 132.
 163 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 120H, p. 102, l. 382- 383: ubicumque invenitur unum secun-
dum actum, ibi et providere invenietur.
 164 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 141F, p. 50, l. 194 – p. 51, l. 197: immo etiam supremum 
intra eandem essentiam sive substantiam respectu residuae portionis, sicut apparebit in 
anima, habet providentiam coordinatam propter alternam habitudinem eorum ad invicem, 
quam efficit divinus amor in eis. At Expositio, 141D, p. 48, l. 122 – p. 49, l. 143, this is directly 












sense, the unum as the highest term within its own “order” must be placed prior 
by nature to the agent intellect as the essential principle or auxiliary cause of 
the soul for exactly the same reason Berthold placed the Good prior to being: it 
provides the holistic field of possibility in which the intellect will operate. On 
this question Berthold had invoked Avicebron’s notion of the divine will in the 
Fons vitae as the power that creates and sustains the union of matter and form 
by ordering the parts in relation to one another and to their source.165 By “intu-
iting” this will, an intellect becomes a plenitude. Like the caritas of Ephesians 
3:19, this providential will is only “comprehended” when one is filled with it.166 
In this way it surpasses the determinate knowledge of the intellect. When the 
soul is “located” in its ground, even if only for a moment, it shares in the unitive 
knowledge of the higher principles – but there is also something more:
Their providence consists not in conjectural reasonings about the future, 
as in the case in political affairs among us; but by taking their station in 
the animative one, and through this being illumined all about with the 
unifical light of the gods, they see things in time atemporally, and divided 
things indivisibly, and those things in place without any place, and they 
do not belong to themselves, but to those illuminating them.167
Passages like this indicate why Berthold would interpolate Proclus into the 
description of the astronomer’s knowledge and activity in the Prologue, for this 
 165 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 13D, p. 215, l. 201- 218, citing Avicebron, Fons vitae, lib. v, 
c. 31, p. 315, l. 5- 21 and lib. v, c. 36, p. 323, l. 17- 20: ‘Fac me scire, quod est ligans materiam et 
formam, et quid est uniens et retinens earum unitionem, et quid est’, respondetur ex persona 
magistri: ‘Haec est voluntas, quae est suprior illis, quia unitio formae et materiae non est nisi 
ex impressione unitatis in illis. Et postquam inter unum et duo non est medium, scias per hoc, 
quod inter unitatem et materiam et formam non est medium. Discipulus: Quod est signum, 
quia unitas ordinatrix est materiae et formae? Magister: Signum ad hoc est omnimoda uni-
tio materiae et formae firma et stabilis et perpetua in earum creatione, id est principio uni-
tionis […].’ Et hoc est, quod dicit ibidem 36 cap.: ‘Verbum, scilicet voluntas, postquam creavit 
materiam et formam, ligavit se cum illis, sicut est ligatio animae cum corpore, et effudit se in 
illis et non discessit ab eis et penetravit a summo usque ad infimum’. Shortly before this, at 
13C, p. 214, l. 169- 197, Berthold had cited passages from Dionysius on the Good as the cause 
of friendship (amicitia) among the orders of beings.
 166 See n. 138, above.
 167 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 134F, p. 217, l. 127- 132, citing Proclus, De decem dubita-
tionibus circa providentiam, q. 10, §64, p. 106, l. 13- 18: et ipsorum providentia non in ration-
alibus coniecturativis futurorum, sicut politicorum, qui hic, sed in uno animeali stationem 
sumens; et per hoc circumlustrare uniali lumine deorum vident akhronos, scilicet intempo-
raliter, quae in tempore, et indivisibiliter divisa, et quae in loco omnia sine loco, et sunt non 








is nothing else than a description of a prophetic knowledge whose certainty 
exceeds any prediction confined to the realm of becoming.168 Everything in 
this description could apply to the cognition of an intellectus in actu per essen-
tiam or, on the human level, the acquired intellect (i.e., the “intellective” of 
124A) – except for the final clause stating that the soul no longer belongs to 
itself, as it would in reflexive, essential cognition, but to the higher causes. This 
we may connect with the love that elevates intellect beyond its nature to imi-
tate the divine generative providence, by which it manifests “the goodness of 
silence”, which has for its spontaneous result the perfect communication of 
illumination to those that are below.169
Berthold’s synthesis of the Clavis physicae, Proclus, and Dietrich of Freiberg 
in his exemplarist anthropology, and his views about its perpetual providential 
activity to which the individual is related through the unum animae, bear strik-
ing similarities to Meister Eckhart’s speculations about the relation of the indi-
vidual to human nature and what this relation entails for the ethical life and 
the exercise of charity. Eckhart’s understanding of the patristic adage that the 
purpose or “fruit” of the Incarnation was “that man may become by the grace 
of adoption what the Son is by nature” was closely related to his interpretation 
of 2 Corinthians 3:18: the adopted sons of God will be changed into the “same” 
image (in eandem imaginem transformamur) as the only- begotten Son.170 
Shortly after the passage discussed earlier, where Eckhart denied that beati-
tude would consist primarily in a reflexive act of the intellect, he stressed that 
the Word is received only by those who are “empty of every form impressed or 
begotten by creatures”.171 Eckhart applied this principle again when comment-
ing on the wedding at Cana and “the marriage” of human and divine natures, 
and went further to unfold the ethical demand this natural philosophical 
principle places on the individual.172 Since the Word assumed human nature, 
not a human person – and since human nature is univocally common to all, 
including Christ, and is more interior to every person than they are to them-
selves – it follows that whoever “wishes to become son of God […] must love 
 168 See 1.2, n. 66, above.
 169 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 153F, p. 155, l. 231- 242.
 170 Meister Eckhart, Expositio sancti evangelii secundum Iohannem, §106 (John 1:12- 13), p. 90, 
l. 11 – p. 91, l. 2. Cf. 2 Corinthians 3:18: Nos vero omnes, revelata facie gloriam Domini specu-
lantes, in eamdem imaginem transformamur a claritate in claritatem, tamquam a Domini 
Spiritu.
 171 Meister Eckhart, Expositio sancti evangelii secundum Iohannem, §110 (John 1:12- 13), p. 94, 
l. 13- 14.
 172 Meister Eckhart, Expositio sancti evangelii secundum Iohannem, §289- 291 (John 2:1), p. 241, 












their neighbour as himself” and must deny whatever is personal and one’s own 
(abnegare personale, abnegare proprium). This, Eckhart stated, is charity: to 
love one God in all things and all things in him (diligit siquidem unum deum in 
omnibus et omnia in ipso).
He advanced this metaphysical and ethical teaching even more strongly in 
his sermons. Here are two especially clear examples:
The masters say that human nature has nothing to do with time, that it 
is entirely untouchable and much more intimate and closer to man than 
man to himself. And, therefore, God took on Himself human nature and 
united it with His persons. There, human nature became God, because He 
took the naked human nature itself on and not a man himself. Therefore, 
if you wish to be the same Christ and be God, so abandon everything 
that the eternal Word did not assume. The eternal Word did not take on 
Himself a human being, hence, abandon what is a human being in you 
and what you are, and take yourself according to naked human nature, 
then you are the same with the eternal Word which human nature is with 
Him. As there is no difference between your human nature and His own, 
it is one, because what it is in Christ, this it is in you.173
The eternal Word did not take this person or that person to itself, but 
it took a free and undivided human nature to itself, which was naked 
without image; because the simple form of humanity is without image. 
And, therefore, as in this assumption human nature was assumed by the 
eternal Word as a simple one without image, the image of the Father, 
who is the eternal Son, became the image of human nature. Because as 
sure as God became man, so true it is that man has become God. And 
so human nature has been overformed by having become the image of 
God, who is the image of the Father. And so, if you shall be one Son, you 
need to detach yourself and leave everything that makes a distinction 
in you. Because man is an accident of nature; and, therefore, leave aside 
all that is an accident in you, and take yourself according to the free and 
undivided human nature. And since the same nature, according to which 
 173 Meister Eckhart, Predigt 24 (First Sunday in Advent), ed. J. Quint, Die deutschen Werke, vol. 
1 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1958- 1986), p. 420, l. 2- 11. English translation: Meister Eckhart, 
The German Works. 64 Homilies for the Liturgical Year. 1. De tempore, eds L. Sturlese, 
M. Vinzent (Leuven: Peeters, 2019), p. 89. See also the Latin sermon on the same per-
icope: Meister Eckhart, Sermo lii (First Sunday in Advent), §523, p. 437, l. 7 – p. 438, l. 5. 
Cf. Meister Eckhart, Predigt 25 (Tuesday after Fourth Sunday in Lent), ed. J. Quint, Die 




you will take yourself, has become the Son of the eternal Father by the 
assumption of the eternal Word, so you will become with Christ the Son 
of the eternal Father, because you take yourself according to the same 
nature that there has become God.174
Eckhart would later defend these ideas in the proceedings of his trial in 
Cologne, appealing to the same arguments we find in his commentary on 
John about the purpose of the Incarnation, the distinction between the only- 
begotten Son by nature and the sons by adoption through grace, and its impli-
cations for the correct understanding of charity as leaving off “this” or “that”.175 
While these portions from the proceedings did not ultimately factor into the 
papal bull In agro dominico (1329), two articles deriving from passages closely 
related to them were censured, which taken on their own might imply a kind 
of naturalistic autotheism (article 11: whatever the only- begotten Son has in his 
human nature, “he gave all this to me”) or the loss of any distinction between 
the only- begotten Son and the sons of God by adoption (article 12: whatever 
the Scriptures say of Christ, all of this is true of every divine person).176
While the Incarnation was of course methodologically excluded from 
Berthold’s consideration of the Elementatio theologica, it is nevertheless quite 
conceivable that his view of the relation of an individual within the order of vol-
untary providence (Eckhart: “leave aside all that is accidental in you”) to human 
nature as an ens secundum speciem (Eckhart: “human nature has nothing to do 
with time”) which exercises providence with the gods (Eckhart: “assumed by 
the eternal Word”) through the unum animae (Eckhart: “it is entirely untouch-
able and much more intimate and closer to man than man to himself”), would 
have direct consequences for any treatment of the subject. Berthold’s theory 
of the double descent of the soul, preserved a subtle but clear distinction 
between the individual and human nature. The theory of deification he out-
lined in Proposition 129 affirmed that the individual “lives by the divine life” 
through the unum animae, but also made it explicit that this transformation 
 174 Meister Eckhart, Predigt 46 (Eve of the Ascension), ed. J. Quint, p. 379, l. 6 – p. 382, l. 3. 
English translation: Meister Eckhart, The German Works. De tempore, p. 591– 593.
 175 Meister Eckhart, Magistri Echardi Responsio ad articulos sibi impositos II, ed. L. Sturlese, 
Acta Echardiana, Die lateinischen Werke, vol. 5 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2006), §65- 72, 
p. 333, l. 8 – p. 336, l. 14.
 176 In agro dominico, ed. L. Sturlese, Acta Echardiana, p. 598, l. 47- 51: Undecimus artic-
ulus: Quicquid deus pater dedit filio suo unigenito in humana natura, hoc totum dedit 
michi. Hic nichil excipio, nec unionem nec sanctitatem. Sed totum dedit michi sicut sibi. 
Duodecimus articulus: Quicquid dicit sacra scriptura de Christo, hoc etiam totum verificatur 








was not the annihilation of individuality (the Clavis physicae) or the individual 
will (Bernard of Clairvaux). It is rather the harmonisation of the individual to 
their own nature and, through that nature, to the divine. The union, as the cita-
tion of Bernard especially affirmed, is to be “one in spirit” with God through 
the union of wills. Nevertheless, Berthold’s attempt to offer a metaphysics of 
deification through a theory of human nature clearly moved along the trail 
that Eckhart had opened.
Berthold was not alone among his contemporaries in developing these 
Eckhartian themes. In his defence of Eckhart’s orthodoxy in the Little Book of 
Truth (c. 1330), Henry Suso took great care to nuance the master’s thought on 
these questions of the Incarnation, human nature, and individuality or per-
sonhood, with arguments from the Summa theologiae of Thomas Aquinas.177 
In one of the few sermons preserved from Berthold’s confrere in Bavaria, Henry 
of Ekkewint, we find the Dominican preaching about the spark or tiny flame in 
the soul (der funke oder der glanster der sêle). This spark has a perpetual appre-
hension of the divine reasons and guides a person with ethical council. Its con-
stant advice is that “you should let go of all man, so that you may be free of 
him, as if all of human nature was enclosed within you and your nature was the 
essence of all people, and as if you could see yourself in every man and every 
man in you”.178 Berthold could be seen as combining the Eckhartian specula-
tion about the ontological status of human nature with the approach we find 
in Henry of Ekkewint that focuses on a principle in the soul that mediates the 
relation of an individual to human nature, and guides a person in charity.
Of all Berthold’s contemporaries, however, John Tauler came the closest to 
what we find in the Expositio. In a sermon preached on the Nativity of John the 
Baptist, Tauler surveyed the various ways the faculties and powers in the soul 
“bear witness to the light” (John 1:7- 8).179 The lower faculties, the concupiscible 
and irascible, give one kind of testimony, by turning away from appetites and 
through perseverance. The higher powers of reason, will, and love, bear wit-
ness by apprehending the mysteries of God from afar, as John the Baptist had 
insofar as he was a prophet. But even this apprehension is separated from the 
light by a veil; the higher powers cannot attain to the ground (grunt). Here – 
which, Tauler stressed, is in fact no “here” at all, because it is prior to “this” or 
“that” – no image, determinacy, or created light can enter. Perhaps because the 
language of “ground” could imply a kind of stasis or sterility, Tauler switched 
 177 See F. Retucci, “On a Dangerous Trail. Henry Suso and the Condemnations of Meister 
Eckhart”, in J. Hackett (ed.), A Companion to Meister Eckhart, p. 587– 605, at p. 595– 599.
 178 See Introduction, section 1, n. 29, above.








to the semantic register of the abyss (abgrúnt) and to imagery of the churning 
ebb and flow of the sea. Here we may recall for Berthold how the unum animae 
is both silence and frenzy and is a more active principle than anything encoun-
tered in the world of experience. When the soul is engulfed in this abyss, 
Tauler continued, it finds God’s eternal dwelling- place, which God has never 
left. Here, eternity is experienced and tasted, where there is no past and no 
future. Tauler’s preference for the term “abyss” also allowed him to establish a 
dynamic relation of difference and identity between the soul and God through 
the image of one abyss calling out to another (Psalm 41:8: abyssus abyssum 
invocat) – just as, for Berthold, the Good summons all of its vestiges back to 
itself.180 Whoever becomes aware (war neme) of this calling finds that a light 
projects out from the ground and directs all the faculties of the soul toward 
their principle and origin: this is the voice, like John the Baptist, calling the 
soul out into the desert. When the soul enters this wilderness, which is beyond 
all thought, speculation, space, and time, it “is simple and without distinction”. 
The “experience” of God here is, one might say, the experience of remaining, 
where a person finds human nature as it always was:
And to the one who truly enters here, it seems as though he has been 
here eternally and as if he were one with him, even though this endures 
for only a blink of an eye, and these blinks feel and appear as though they 
last an eternity. And this radiates a light to the outside, and testifies that 
the human was eternally in God in his uncreatedness. When he was in 
him, then the human was God in God.181
Just as with Berthold, the soul’s entry into its ground coincides with an encoun-
ter with the exemplar of human nature in God, outside of the realm of becom-
ing and change. And so, Tauler concluded, unless a person returns to that state 
of purity that was theirs when they passed from their uncreated to their cre-
ated state, they will never return to God.182 This not only requires forsaking 
 180 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 7B, p. 146, l. 270- 282.
 181 John Tauler, Predigt 61 (Nativity of John the Baptist), p. 331, l. 26- 31: Es ist einvaltig und 
sunder underscheit, und wer her in geratet recht, dem ist als er alhie eweklich gewesen si und 
als er ein mit dem selben si, noch denne das es nút enist denne ougenblike, und die selben 
blicke die vindent sich und zoeigent sich ein ewigkeit; dis lúchtet es us und git ein gezúg das 
das der mensche was eweklichen in Gotte in siner ungeschaffenheit. Do er in im was, do was 
der mensche Got in Gotte.
 182 Cf. Meister Eckhart, Predigt 52 (Martyr), ed. J. Quint, Die deutschen Werke, vol. 2, p. 491, l. 9 – 
p. 494, l. 3. English translation: Meister Eckhart, The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, 








attachment and possessiveness. The spirit must also be transformed with the 
light of grace and must make itself habitually acquainted with its own inward-
ness. Given this background, it is all the more remarkable that Tauler imme-
diately introduced Proclus alongside Plato and other unnamed pagans who 
“were familiar with this ground”.183 Proclus had also featured at the conclusion 
of Tauler’s sermon on Holy Cross Day after a similar exemplarist account of 
the soul’s ground.184 As in his sermon for Trinity Sunday, Tauler was not inter-
ested in disabusing his audience of the impression that Proclus and Plato were 
therefore familiar with the state of simplicity he has just described.185 He was 
more concerned with making the point that these pagans were more familiar 
with the hidden dignity of human nature, made known to them through a kind 
of grace of which they were fully aware, than the Christians of his own day. If 
we want to imagine the ethical implications and cultural context of Berthold’s 
investigation of the invisible things of God in the order of natural providence, 
and his conclusions about the activity of the unum animae as a kind of provi-
dential love that never deviates from its non- reflexive directedness toward its 
source, we need look no further.186
 183 On this passage, see Part 1, n. 6 and 3.2, n. 82, above.
 184 John Tauler, Predigt 65 (Holy Cross), ed. F. Vetter, p. 358, l. 10- 16: In der verborgenheit wirt 
der geschaffen geist wider getragen in sin ungeschaffenheit, do er eweklichen gewesen ist e er 
geschaffen wúrde, und bekent sich Got in Gotte und doch an im selber creatur und geschaf-
fen. Aber in Gotte sint alle ding Got, do sich diser grunt inne vindet. ‘Als der mensche her in 
kumt’, spricht Proculus, ‘was denne uf den usseren menschen gevallen mag: armuete, liden 
oder gebreste, das si weler kúnne es si, des enachtet der mensche nút’. (“In this hiddenness, 
the created spirit is drawn back into its uncreatedness, where it is existing eternally before 
it was created, and it knows itself God in God, but acknowledges itself to be a creature 
and created. But in God all things are God, where this ground finds them within. ‘When 
a person enters here,’ says Proclus, ‘whatever then happens to the outer person – poverty, 
suffering, failure, whatever these kind these might be – the person does not notice it’ ”.).
 185 See 3.2, n. 81, above.
 186 See also John Tauler on “essential prayer”, in Predigt 24 (Sunday after the Ascension), ed. 
F. Vetter, p. 101, l. 22 – p. 102, l. 29, and on the mystical body, in Predigt 39 (Fifth Sunday 
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Conclusion
1 Legacy
The earliest traces of the influence of the Expositio appear in the sermons of 
John Tauler, whose astonishing endorsements of Proclus in his preaching have 
been our most important guide and witness to the cultural and anthropolog-
ical implications of Berthold’s valorisation of the pagan philosopher within 
his Christian milieu. Tauler not only cited some of the most important pas-
sages from the Tria opuscula used by Berthold to establish the concord of 
Proclus and Dionysius in their doctrines of the one of the soul: he compared 
them with contemporary notions of the imago Dei (Thomas Aquinas, Albert 
the Great, Meister Eckhart) and, sometimes only ambiguously separated 
them from the best of these positions (Dietrich of Freiberg). He also shared 
Berthold’s judgement about the pagan knowledge of the Trinity, which was 
the basis for Berthold’s synthesis of Dietrich’s metaphysics with the theory of 
primordial causes from the Clavis physicae. Most importantly, Tauler’s judge-
ments about Proclus in Predigt 60d (Trinity Sunday) and Predigt 61 (Nativity of 
John the Baptist) explicitly drew the conclusion that these achievements of 
a pagan philosopher, who had such “familiarity” with the ground of the soul 
(Berthold would say, who had perfected “the habit of our divinising supersa-
pientia”) ought to be received as a reminder, and even as a cause of shame, for 
Christians. This is the strongest direct witness to the argument in this study that 
Berthold’s Expositio should be understood as a project of reform that looked to 
antiquity for a divine science of God, the universe, and human nature that had 
been forgotten or even deliberately rejected by his contemporaries.1 Tauler’s 
use of Proclus in Predigt 61 and Predigt 65 (Holy Cross) also coincided with his 
elaboration of an exemplarist anthropology. In this view, an individual is medi-
ated to human nature in the divine mind through the ground, abyss, or the 
one of the soul. Such an anthropology was precisely what Berthold articulated 
in his commentary on Proposition 211. This is not to say that Tauler relied on 
Berthold for such a view of human nature – Meister Eckhart would be a more 
likely source – but that he would think of Proclus in such a context suggests 
 1 Cf. L. Sturlese, Philosophie im Mittelalter. Von Boethius bis Cusanus (München: Beck, 2013), 
p. 102: “Berthold projizierte das Reformprojekt Eckharts züruck in ein mythisches ‘goldenes 






that even on this matter he was familiar with his confrere’s interpretation of 
the Tria opuscula.2
After this case of a decisive but implicit influence, there are three instances 
of Berthold’s explicit influence in the 14th and 15th centuries: there are explicit 
references to the Expositio from an anonymous author from 14th- century 
Regensburg, in the Mariological works of the Viennese Dominican theologian, 
Franz of Retz (c. 1343 – 1427), and in the Apologia doctae ignorantiae (Defense 
of Learned Ignorance) by Nicholas of Cusa (1401 – 1464).3
The earliest explicit mention of the Expositio is found in an anonymous 
commentary on the Sentences written by a Dominican author in Regensburg in 
the mid- late 14th century.4 The citation of Berthold appears in the commentary 
 2 These speculations were not confined to the German Dominicans. One may also mention a 
contemporary development in Jan van Ruusbroec, whose doctrine of the soul’s three “uni-
ties” and exemplarist anthropology was first outlined in his Spiritual Espousals (Die geeste-
like brulocht), completed in Brussels around 1335- 1343. See Jan van Ruusbroec, Die geestelike 
Brulocht, ed. J. Alaerts (Turnhout: Brepols, 1988), b41- b68, p. 286– 289; b1625- 1669, p. 470– 475; 
and c125- 141, p. 586– 589. Incidentally, Tauler may have visited Ruusbroec around 1346, after 
Ruusbroec established the community of Groenendaal, and transmitted some of his works 
up the Rhine. A German translation of the Espousals was in circulation around 1350. See 
G. Warnar, Ruusbroec. Literature and Mysticism in the Fourteenth Century, trans. D. Webb 
(Leiden: Brill, 2007), p. 130– 134.
 3 There was possibly a tacit influence of Berthold on the incomplete commentary on the 
Elementatio theologica transmitted anonymously but now attributed to John Krosbein, who 
would have written the text before 1400. See F. Retucci, “Sententia Procli alti philosophi. 
Notes on an Anonymous Commentary on Proclus’ Elementatio theologica”, in D. Calma (ed.), 
Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages, II. New Commentaries on Liber de causis and Elementatio 
theologica (ca. 1350- 1500) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), p. 99– 180, at p. 110– 113. On John Krosbein, 
see D. Calma, “A Medieval Companion to Aristotle. John Krosbein’s Paraphrase on Liber de 
causis”, in D. Calma (ed.), Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages, II, p. 11– 98, at p. 20. Commenting 
on Proposition 115, Krosbein identified the gods as primordial causes (Retucci, “Sententia 
Procli”, p. 156, l. 26- 30): Quod vero velit in hoc loco dicere deos ordinum singulorum, me fateor 
ignorare, nisi forte velit hos esse primordiales causas et ydeas ordinum singulorum, que in sapi-
entia Dei supersubstantialiter et supervitaliter et superintellectualiter sunt unite, per quas pro-
ducuntur singula et formantur. Given the presence of this syntagm (primordialis causa) in 
the Latin text of the Elementatio and its use among more mainstream authors influenced by 
Augustine and Peter Lombard (see 4.3, n. 134- 136, above), its passing appearance in this com-
mentary on its own cannot, however, be taken as decisive evidence of Berthold’s influence.
 4 ms München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 26897. The citation of Berthold was noted 
first by F. Pelster, “Die Ehrentitel der scholastischen Lehrer des Mittelalters. Ein Beitrag und 
eine Ergänzung”, in Theologische Quartalschrift 103(1922), p. 41– 42. The two citations of the 
De causa Dei by Thomas Bradwardine (the doctor profundus), identified by Pelster at f. 33vb 
and f. 43ra, establish a terminus post quem of 1344. Boese, Wilhelm von Moerbeke, p. 75, has 









on distinction 1 of book ii of the Sentences, in response to the following ques-
tion: “whether the primarily first and unique principle, just as it can create all 
things from nothing and conserve them, can annihilate anything that has been 
created”.5 The commentator subdivides the question into several presupposi-
tions that must first be addressed, which concern the unicity of the first prin-
ciple and its status as the cause of all things. After setting out these problems, 
with various arguments for and against each thesis, the author then advances 
three principal arguments. Only the first is relevant here, which responds to 
the question, “Whether, of the whole cause of being, it is possible that there is 
a first effect prior to the first principle” (Numquid totius causae entis et possibilis 
sit ante unum principium primum effectum).6 Here, the anonymous elaborated 
an original interpretation of the distinction between prime primum and prima 
primum, which, as he indicated, was inspired by (illud notabile similiter) “the 
venerable father Berthold of Moosburg”. It is intriguing that this accurate refer-
ence, which was certainly to Expositio 8D, did not employ the alphanumerical 
system that we find in the extant manuscripts of the commentary, but referred 
instead to “the second principal article in theorem 8”. This could imply that 
the Expositio, or portions of it, circulated before the index and the system of 
alphabetical subdivisions were added.7
The passage in question from 8D outlined one of the characteristic termi-
nological distinctions in the Expositio, where Berthold explained for the first 
time what he understood by the difference between two adverbs, prime and 
 5 ms München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 26897, f. 42rb: Utrum sicut principium prime 
primum et unicum potest omnia de nichilo creare, possit sic aliquod creatum anichilare.
 6 ms München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 26897, f. 42va: Notandum est quod differentia 
est inter prima primum et prime primum. Nam primum vel prima primum est aliquod primum 
in ordine aliorum, quod primum alia omnia eiusdem ordinis participant quodammodo, ut pri-
mus homo participatur quodammodo ab omnibus hominibus participatione naturae humanae. 
Prime autem primum significat absolutissimum cuiuslibet ordinis rerum, cuius dicitur primum, 
non quod participetur essentialiter ab aliis cuiuscumque ordinis. Ex quo [corpore add. sed exp.] 
sequitur secunda differentia, quod primum cuiuslibet ordinis invenitur in multis eiusdem ordi-
nis, quoniam unumquodque respectu posterioris se dicit primum. Ex quo sequitur [sequitur in 
marg.] secundus quod primum competit multis, quia competit tot sicut possunt esse individua 
eiusdem ordinis, videlicet competit tot quot possunt esse ordines, non solum partiales sed etiam 
universales. Prime autem primum non competit alicui, nisi quod omnibus quorumcumque ordi-
num est superpositum et nulli citra se formaliter aut essentialiter aut quomodolibet absoluto 
immixtum aut commixtum, sed ab omnibus per universalem participationem penitus absolu-
tum et separatum. Et sic utor illo termino prime primum in titulo quaestionis. Et illud notabile 
similiter est venerabilis patris Bertholdi de Mospurch ordinis nostri [ordinis nostri in marg.] in 
suo commento super propositiones seu elementationes Procli, theoremate 8, articulo secundo 
principali.








primo, found in Moerbeke’s translation.8 According to Berthold, prime mod-
ifies its term to indicate what is “the most absolute and most eminent of an 
intention” (e.g., prime intellectus or intellectus secundum causam), while primo 
indicates what is “perfect in this intention” and thus has that intention per 
essentiam. What exists prime stands outside its order, while all things in the 
order participate it analogically. What exists primo (for example, a separate 
intelligence), although it is highest within a given order, is nevertheless limited 
because participates the prime intellectus and, thus, has a determinate place 
within the order.
The anonymous commentator developed from this passage his own termi-
nology of prime primum and prima primum and used it for a slightly differ-
ent purpose. For both Dominicans, the prime primum denoted a term that is 
absolute and separate from the order it causes and is not “essentially” or “for-
mally” dependent on anything beneath it. Berthold’s own position was even 
stronger than this, in that he argued that the gods as formal causes are also 
not dependent on anything higher insofar as they are superabundant causes 
that originate their characteristic intentions.9 For the anonymous author, 
prima primum could apply to any member of an order, provided there are 
terms beneath it, whereas primo for Berthold denoted only the highest mem-
ber within an order. Hence, the anonymous’ prima had a wider scope than 
Berthold’s primo.
This reference suggests that the anonymous commentator knew the 
Expositio quite well, for he has chosen a brief but important technical passage 
where Berthold defined the central logical principle of essential order that he 
found in Proposition 65 of the Elementatio, the De decem dubitationibus circa 
providentiam 10.63, and Dionysius’ Epistula ix.2, 1108D. Berthold had found this 
principle used extensively by Dietrich of Freiberg, who looked to Proposition 
140 to reason about the order of separate substances according to the laws of 
symmetry and proportion. With Proposition 8, Berthold had brought further 
terminological clarity to that logical pattern. Without this principle, Berthold’s 
harmonisation of Proclus with Dionysius through the Clavis, and his complex 
elaboration of Dietrich’s ontology, in which the primordial causes are under-
stood as goodnesses or unities according to essence (bonitates per essentiam), 
would have lacked a good deal of precision.
The next explicit reference to the Expositio comes from another Dominican, 
Franz of Retz, in his Comestorium beatae Mariae virginis (Digest on the Blessed 
 8 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 8D, p. 162, l. 178- 209.






Virgin Mary).10 In his discussion of the Virgin’s purity and her deification, 
Franz used the citation from Bernard of Clairvaux that Berthold reports (alle-
gat) in Proposition 129B.11 Although this is the only known explicit citation of 
the Expositio in Franz’s writings that has been mentioned by scholars, it is clear 
that the Viennese master’s familiarity with Berthold’s commentary went well 
beyond this. His preface to the citation of Bernard (homo tota mente vino deit-
atis adiunctus) echoed a passage from the Clavis physicae (sic humana natura 
Deo adiuncta), which was cited earlier in the Comestorium with the attribu-
tion to Theodorus. In this earlier passage, Franz in fact combined two cita-
tions of the Clavis on deification that he would have found in Berthold, one 
from 129B (the lower is absorbed into the higher but retains its nature, giving 
the examples of air filled with sunlight and red- hot iron) and then another 
from 120C (just as air is filled with sunlight, human nature when joined to God 
appears filled with divinity, yet retains its own nature).12 Earlier still in the 
Comestorium, while ruminating on the Virgin’s proximity to the fount of wis-
dom (fons sapientiae) above all the angelic hierarchies, Franz explicitly cited 
another passage from the Clavis of “Theodorus”, on the highest fount flow-
ing through the primordial causes and thence into creatures, until its waters 
 10 On Franz of Retz, whose works remain unedited, see G. Häfele, Franz von Retz. Ein Beitrag 
zur Gelehrtengeschichte des Dominikanerordens und der Wiener Universität am Ausgange 
des Mittelalters (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 1918); Kaeppeli, Scriptores, vol. 1, p. 397– 398; I. Frank, 
“Retz (François de)”, in Dictionnaire de spiritualité, vol. 13 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1988), 
p. 434– 436. The centre of Franz’s intellectual activity was the newly established Faculty 
of Theology in the University of Vienna. The citation of Berthold was identified in Häfele, 
Franz von Retz, p. 192, and was noted by M.R. Pagnoni- Sturlese and L. Sturlese in the 
“Prolegomena” to the critical edition of Propositions 1- 13 of the Expositio, p. xl, n. 5.
 11 ms Klosterneuburg, Augustiner- Chorherrenstift, Cod. 43, f. 107ra- b: Tertio principaliter est 
purissima et deificata, quia immutata vino abyssalis dulcoris. Nam sicut modicum aquae 
multo vino immissum totaliter convertitur in vinum, sic homo tota mente vino deitatis 
adiunctus deificatur et in Deum deiformiter transmutatur. Unde Bernardus, sicut allegat 
Pertholdus de Mosburg super Proclum […]. What follows is a verbatim citation of Bernard 
from Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 129B, p. 179, l. 188- 196. See 5.3, n. 131, above.
 12 ms Klosterneuburg, Augustiner- Chorherrenstift, Cod. 43, f. 104vb. Cf. Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio, 129B, p. 177, l. 142 – p. 178, l. 149, and 120C, p. 93, l. 101- 107. Bernard was 
one of the authorities, alongside the Scriptures, Albert the Great, and Richard of St. Victor, 
whom Franz cited most in the Comestorium, and it seems he knew the De diligendo Deo 
independently from Berthold (see the citations at f. 293rb- va and 294va). His echo of the 
Clavis when introducing the citation of Bernard suggests that he began with Theodorus 
and then recognised the connection Berthold had drawn between the two passages in 
terms of their argument and imagery; perhaps he chose to cite Berthold explicitly at this 









return through the most hidden recesses of nature. Franz then followed this 
an explicit citation of Proclus’ De providentia et fato, on the first cause as the 
fount of all goods. Both citations clearly derive from 18B of the Expositio, where 
Berthold discussed the different kinds of “fontal principles”.13 In total, then, we 
find seven explicit citations of the Clavis physicae in the Comestorium beatae 
Mariae virginis that were mediated by Berthold.14
Elsewhere in the same text, while discussing how the Virgin’s knowledge of 
God increased from her contemplation of nature, Franz borrowed extensively 
from the beginning of Berthold’s Prologus, but rearranged the authorities he 
found there into the philosophers (Al- Ghazali, Maimonides) and theologians 
(Paul, Ambrose [=Ambrosiaster], the Wisdom of Solomon 13:1- 4, Hugh of St. 
Victor, Gundissalinus, John of Damascus).15 Later in the Comestorium, while 
discussing the necessary service imagination offers to reason in the contem-
plative ascent to God, Franz seems to have relied on these opening pages of 
the Prologus again for the citation of Ambrose (=Ambrosiaster) and also for 
the Wisdom of Solomon 13:1- 4.16
Evidently Franz had direct access to a copy of the Expositio and was famil-
iar with its contents, using it at least eleven times in the Comestorium bea-
tae Mariae virginis alone (seven times for the Clavis, twice for the authorities 
from Prologus 1, once for Proclus, once for Bernard).17 Additionally, there is at 
 13 ms Klosterneuburg, Augustiner- Chorherrenstift, Cod. 43, f. 78rb- 78va. Cf. Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio, 18B, p. 47, l. 109 – p. 48, l. 156.
 14 In addition to the three mentioned in the previous notes, we find the same passage from 
120C cited by Franz at f. 69rb (where it is followed by the 129B passage at f. 69vb) and later, 
in an abbreviated form, at f. 129rb. The passage from 129B was also cited in an abbreviated 
form at f. 164va- b.
 15 ms Klosterneuburg, Augustiner- Chorherrenstift, Cod. 43, f. 110vb- 111ra. Cf. Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 1, p. 5, l. 5 – p. 6, l. 47. Perhaps this rearrangement was influ-
enced by the presence of the two tabulae auctorum (Philosophi famosi, Doctores ecclesiae) 
in the Expositio. Interestingly, Franz omitted the Bertholdian phrase divinalis sapientia 
from his description of Paul as “the greatest theologian” as well as Berthold’s citations of 
Dionysius. This was not out of any aversion to Dionysius’ authority, whom Franz freely 
cited elsewhere, but a hesitation about Berthold’s Dionysian argument that God is invisi-
ble even to “the eye of the mind” (oculus mentalis).
 16 ms Klosterneuburg, Augustiner- Chorherrenstift, Cod. 43, f. 202vb- 203ra.
 17 The link between Cologne and Vienna was likely Jodocus of Gorizia, who identified him-
self as a son of the Viennese convent in his explicit to the copy of Dietrich of Freiberg’s 
De origine rerum praedicamentalium that he made in Cologne in 1363. Jodocus brought it, 
along with four of the autographs of Albert the Great’s works that bear Berthold’s ex libris 
and a nearly complete copy of Proclus’ De decem dubitationibus he made from Berthold’s 
library, from Cologne either to Vienna or to Krems. These works were eventually bound 












least one other citation of the Clavis in Franz’s later Lectura supra antiphonam 
Salve Regina that was taken from Berthold.18 A study of Franz’s other works, 
which I have not undertaken, would undoubtedly reveal further borrowings.19 
This would allow us to establish how much of the Expositio Franz knew and 
whether, as it seems from the Comestorium beatae Mariae virginis, he used it 
primarily as a reference work, or whether he was influenced positively or neg-
atively by its philosophical content and aims.
Whereas the Regensburg commentator used Berthold as a philosophi-
cal authority for the distinction of prime- primo, with the elaborate theory of 
essential causality and proportionality this implied, Franz appears to have 
regarded the Expositio as a source for older authorities on the doctrine of dei-
fication and on the possibility of knowing God from creation. It is interesting 
to observe that Franz of Retz had a particular interest in the theory of deifica-
tion he found in the Clavis physicae of Theodorus, perhaps because it accorded 
with what he read in Bernard of Clairvaux, but more likely as a rare and fas-
cinating authority in its own right (see his use of Expositio 18B on the primor-
dial causes). While the doctrine of primordial causes was unacknowledged but 
implicit in the technical terminology used by the Regensburg commentator, 
we see with Franz of Retz that the legacy of the Expositio had become more 
closely associated with the rare Eriugenian contents it transmitted with the 
authoritative attribution to Theodorus.
The Expositio was likely receiving increased attention in Cologne at the 
time the two extant manuscripts were copied there, in 1437 (by the Dominican 
Conrad Keller of Rottweil) and in 1444 (by the order of William Gray). 
Berthold’s commentary was motivated and defined by the strict boundary he 
posited between abstraction and separation, logical and theological universal-
ity, doing theology “according to ourselves” or “not according to ourselves”, and 
who foliated the manuscript and added a table of contents. See Sturlese, Dokumente und 
Forschungen, p. 125– 126, summarising Frank, “Zum Albertus- Autograph”.
 18 See ms Klosterneuburg, Augustiner- Chorherrenstift, Cod. 52, f. 219rb, where Franz cited 
the Clavis for this same passage from 120C on the light- filled air as an image for the pres-
ervation of human nature even when it is infused by divinity.
 19 Häfele, Franz von Retz, p. 197, has stated that Franz knew Proclus’ treatises De providentia 
and De malorum subsistentia well. In the Comestorium, apart from the citation of the De 
providentia et fato from Expositio 18B (at f. 78rb- 78va), Franz cited one passage of the Tria 
opuscula independently of Berthold. At f. 218va, we find an explicit citation of De decem 
dubitationibus circa providentiam q. 8, §54 (that divine justice does not immediately exact 
punishment on wrongdoers but waits for the right moment), where Proclus gave the 
three examples of the virtue of Plato, Archytas, and Theano, whose zeal for justice curbed 
their anger. Coincidentally, the same passages from Proclus were cited by the Dominican 







the discordant forms of divine science they entail (the theology of being in the 
Liber de causis or the Platonic theology of the Good of the Elementatio theo-
logica). One can imagine that such arguments could have resonated, at least 
in part, with the debates between the schools of thought (known to scholars 
as the Wegestreit) that were defined by their distinct approaches to Aristotle 
and that had become institutionally enshrined in the colleges (bursae) of the 
University of Cologne in the 15th century.20 The debate concerning the status 
of universals was one among the many factors that led to the consolidation 
of these schools. Each school defined their reading of Aristotle through the 
approach taken by earlier masters, whether Albertists, Thomists, Aegidians, 
Scotists, or nominalists (moderni). At the turn of the 15th century, a resolutely 
“modern” reading of Aristotle prevailed in Cologne and, with it, a question-
ing of the “old” attempts at harmonising Aristotle with Christian doctrine 
made by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. By 1425, however, the realists 
and antiqui began to have the upper hand, largely thanks to the efforts of the 
Albertist, Heymericus de Campo, who was in Cologne from 1420/ 1422– 1432 and 
supported his Thomist colleagues even though he was critical of their views.21 
For the remainder of the 15th century, Cologne flourished as a stronghold of 
realism.
Berthold of course would agree entirely that a realist theory of univer-
sals was necessary to elucidate and defend the faith, but he would reject the 
claim made by Albertists like Heymericus that an Aristotelian metaphysics 
of being could adequately explain the doctrine of the flowing (fluxus) of uni-
versals from the divine mind. Berthold’s reading of Dietrich of Freiberg and 
Eustratius through the lens of the De mystica theologia of Dionysius and the 
De providentia et fato of Proclus meant that the Albertist notion of a continual 
fluxus of universals from God, into creatures, and back again through intellec-
tual abstraction, had to be severed along the divide of logical and theological 
universality. An author like Heymericus, if he ever read the Expositio, might 
have been very sympathetic to Berthold’s valorisation of Proclus’ philosoph-
ical method, but he likely would have classified Berthold’s Platonism as an 
instance of “the divine and superhuman philosophy of the Stoics”, who strove 
 20 For what follows, see M.J.F.M. Hoenen, “Via Antiqua and Via Moderna in the Fifteenth 
Century. Doctrinal, Institutional, and Church Political Factors in the Wegestreit”, in 
R. Friedman, L. Nielsen (eds), The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and 
Modal Theory (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), p. 9- 36.
 21 On Heymericus’ use of Albert the Great and his conception of metaphysics as a spiritual 
discipline, see D. Calma, “Metaphysics as a Way of Life. Heymericus de Campo on 






for a comprehension beyond their human station, and perhaps even as a devi-
ation from the thought of Albert the Great.22 So while it is conceivable that 
some thinkers in Cologne at that time would have been aware of the Expositio, 
its positive influence on them seems less probable. Berthold’s uncompromis-
ing Platonic metaphysics of separation or detachment would have made an 
uneasy bedfellow even for the most sympathetic Albertist, who would have 
been willing to entertain the possibility of the knowledge of the separate sub-
stances without recourse to phantasms.23 His denigration of the Liber de causis 
and relegation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics to the status of a logical reflection on 
being and the transcendentals would have pleased neither the antiqui nor the 
moderni in these 15th- century debates.
The final explicit reference to consider, which is more of a reference to the 
Expositio than to Berthold himself, is found in Nicholas of Cusa’s Apologia doc-
tae ignorantiae (1449). The question of the extent to which Cusanus knew the 
text directly has frequently raised by scholars but never resolved. The strongest 
arguments that Nicholas knew the Expositio first- hand have been advanced 
by Ezequiel Ludueña.24 Following the direction of Ludueña’s study and tak-
ing into consideration the larger context of the mention of the Expositio and 
the pantheistic controversies alluded to by Nicholas, I will argue further that 
Cusanus either spoke on the basis of an earlier and direct acquaintance with 
the Expositio or had a reliable and accurate report about its contents.
Cusanus’ mention of the Expositio comes near the conclusion of the 
Apologia:
 22 See, for example, Heymericus’ Colliget principiorum, which was likely written in 1434, long 
after Heymericus’ polemic against the nominalists began with his Tractatus problemat-
icus in 1424. On his Albertist classification of the history of philosophy, see D. Calma, 
R. Imbach, “Heymeric de Campo, auteur d’un traité de métaphysique. Étude et édition 
partielle du Colliget principiorum”, in Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen 
Âge 80(2013), p. 277– 423, at tr. 1, d. 1, c. 6, p. 297, l. 105. At Colliget, tr. 1, d. 1, c. 12, p. 301, 
l. 182- 189, Heymericus indicated he was primarily interested in the Elementatio theologica 
insofar as it agreed with the unanimous doctrine of Aristotle and the Liber de causis. His 
preference for the theorematic method was signalled at Colliget, tr. 1, d. 1, c. 13, p. 303, 
l. 222- 242.
 23 On this aspect of 15th- century Albertism, see A. Saccon, “Die natürliche Gotteserkenntnis 
in den Schriften der Kölner Albertisten des 15. Jahrhunderts”, in Quaestio 15(2015), 
p. 751– 760.
 24 This question has been considered recently in A. Fiamma, “Nicholas of Cusa and the So- 
Called Cologne School of the 13th and 14th Centuries”, in Archives d’histoire doctrinale 
et littéraire du Moyen Âge 84(2017), p. 91– 128, at p. 109– 113, and in detail in E. Ludueña, 
“Nicolás de Cusa. Una contribución a la historia del eriugenismo”, in J.M. Machetta, 
C. D’Amico (eds), Nicolás de Cusa, identidad y alteridad. Pensamiento y diálogo (Buenos 








It befalls [1] men of little intellect that they fall into errors when they 
seek higher things without learned ignorance. They are blinded in their 
mind’s eye by the infinity of the supreme intelligible light. And, unaware 
of their blindness, they believe that they see, and, in their half- sight, they 
are made rigid in their assertions (just as, without the spirit, the Jews 
were made moribund by the letter). There are [2] others who suppose the 
[3] wise who see are ignorant and erroneous when [2] they read things 
to which they are unaccustomed in [3] their texts and, above all, when 
they then find these authors believing themselves to be wise when [2] 
they think that [3] they are ignorant. Wherefore all the saints rightly warn 
us that the intellectual light should be withdrawn from [1, 2] those with 
feeble mental eyes. The works of the holy Dionysius, Marius Victorinus’ 
Ad Candidum, the Clavis physicae of Theodorus, the Periphyseon of John 
Scotigena, the Quaternuli of David of Dinant, and the Commentaries of 
brother John of Mossbach on the Propositions of Proclus, and other books 
like these, should never be shown to such people.25
At this stage of the Apologia, Cusanus was responding explicitly to the 
charges of pantheism levelled against him seven years earlier by John Wenck 
in his De ignota litteratura (On Unknown Learning, 1442– 1443).26 Several of 
Wenck’s accusations were directed against theses quoted from Nicholas’ 
De docta ignorantia (On Learned Ignorance, 1440). The “third thesis”, which 
prompted the passage in question, came from De docta ignorantia I.3- 4, 
where Cusanus claimed that the quiddity of things, or the truth of beings, 
 25 Nicholas of Cusa, Apologia doctae ignorantiae, ed. R. Klibansky, Opera omnia, vol. 2, §43, 
p. 29, l. 1 – p. 30, l. 3: Accidit autem hoc viris parvi intellectus, ut in errores incidant, quando 
altiora sine docta ignorantia perquirunt; et fiunt ab infinitate lucis summe intelligibilis 
in oculo mentis caeci et suae caecitatis scientiam non habentes credunt se videre et quasi 
videntes indurantur in assertionibus, sicut Iudaei per litteram non habentes spiritum ducun-
tur in mortem. Sunt alii, qui illos videntes sapientes putant ignorantes et errantes, quando 
in eis legunt eis insolita, et maxime, quando reperiunt eos tunc se credere, quando cognos-
cunt se ignorantes. Unde recte admonent omnes sancti, quod illis debilibus mentis oculis lux 
intellectualis subtrahatur. Sunt autem illis nequaquam libri sancti Dionysii, Marii Victorini 
ad Candidum Arrianum, Clavis physicae Theodori, Iohannis Scotigenae Περὶ φύσεως, 
Tomi David de Dynanto, Commentaria fratris Iohannis de Mossbach in Propositiones 
Proculi et consimiles libri ostendendi. All references are to the Heidelberg Academy edi-
tion of Cusanus’ works: Nicholas of Cusa, Opera omnia, iussu et auctoritate Academiae 
Litterarum Heidelbergensis (Leipzig / Hamburg: Meiner, 1932- ).
 26 For an informative contextualisation of the dispute, see K.M. Ziebart, Nicolaus Cusanus 
on Faith and Intellect. A Case Study in 15th- Century Fides- Ratio Controversy (Leiden: Brill, 






is unattainable in its purity (Quidditas rerum, quae est entium veritas in sua 
puritate est inattingibilis), and therefore that the understanding of a quid-
dity can always be further improved or purified without end.27 While Wenck 
agreed that truth of a thing in its purity cannot be attained in this life, he 
took issue with Cusanus’ denial that a finite understanding can grasp the 
quiddity of things at all and his related proposal that the purity of quid-
dity can instead be grasped immediately by learned ignorance.28 From this 
argument Wenck deduced two unacceptable corollaries: the first charged 
Nicholas with “the poison of error and falsehood”, the destruction of all 
science, since the coincidence of opposites suspends the principle of non- 
contradiction. For Nicholas, indeed, it was a primary rule of learned igno-
rance that no proportion exists between the finite and the infinite, so that 
no matter where one would begin among entities that exhibit degrees of 
greater and lesser finitude, one cannot arrive to the absolute Maximum. 
The absolute Maximum, for its part, can only be apprehended when it is 
intuitively or “incomprehensibly” understood to coincide with the absolute 
Minimum, because neither can be greater or lesser than itself.29 Cusanus 
replied to Wenck’s charge about the destruction of scientific knowledge by 
maintaining that the principle of non- contradiction holds necessarily in the 
domain of discursive reason, but that it must be recognised that this domain 
is subordinate to the standpoint of intellect, which grasps the coincidence 
of opposites non- discursively. Wenck’s second corollary, derived from the 
third thesis about the quiddity of things, shifted from epistemology to ontol-
ogy: “the absolute Maximum is a given thing in such a way that it is all things; 
and it is also no thing” (cf. De docta ignorantia i.4). Wenck immediately asso-
ciated this idea with the beghards, who were condemned for maintaining 
that they were “by nature indistinct from God”.30
Nicholas’ response, which immediately preceded the classification of the 
three kinds of ignorance cited above, began by specifying Wenck’s generic 
reference to the beghards by associating their thought with the heretical 
 27 John Wenck, De ignota litteratura, ed. E. Vansteenberghe, Le De ignota litteratura de Jean 
Wenck de Herrenberg contre Nicolas de Cues (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1910), p. 28– 29.
 28 John Wenck, De ignota litteratura, p. 23– 24.
 29 Nicholas of Cusa, De docta ignorantia, eds E. Hoffmann, R. Klibansky, Opera omnia, vol. 1, 
lib. i, c. 3, §9, p. 8, l. 20- 21.
 30 John Wenck, De ignota litteratura, p. 28– 29. He attributed six heretical views to the 
beghards: (1) that they are God and not distinct from him by nature; (2) that all divine 
perfections are in them; (3) that they are eternal and in eternity; (4) that they created all 










doctrines attributed to Amalric of Bene.31 Now on the familiar ground of canon 
law, Nicholas began to turn the tables on his opponent:
And if there were beghards who said, as Wenck writes, that they are God 
by nature, they were rightly condemned, just as Innocent iii condemned 
Amalric in a general council (on this, see the chapter Damnamus de 
summa Trinitate), who did not have a sound understanding of how God 
is all things by enfolding [Deus est omnia complicite]. John Andrea in his 
Novella reports Amalric’s errors.32
This reference to Amalric, as Ludueña has argued, is decisive for understand-
ing the rationale for behind Nicholas’ list of dangerous books that includes the 
Expositio.33 At the source of Amalric’s errors, which persisted all the way up to 
the anonymous beghards (and now, by implication, to Wenck himself), was for 
Nicholas the misunderstanding of the notion of enfolding (complicatio) and 
unfolding (explicatio).34 Without this distinction, Amalric would have had no 
way of avoiding the false interpretation of the statement that God is “the form 
of everything” (forma omnium), which would identify God with all things as 
they are unfolded in their particularity. Cusanus was implying that if Wenck, 
having read the De docta ignorantia, has now made such an accusation against 
its author, then he must unfortunately have suffered from the same blindness 
as Amalric – and in some sense was even worse off because he condemned it 
in another without recognising it in himself. Looking to the Nicholas’ classifi-
cation of the kinds of ignorance, we see that Amalric and the beghards would 
belong in group (1), who were simply mistaken, with Wenck in group (2) who, 
 31 On Amalric and his followers, see the studies collected in Lucentini, Platonismo, 
ermetismo, eresia nel medioevo, p. 363– 469.
 32 Nicholas of Cusa, Apologia doctae ignorantiae, §43, p. 28, l. 24 – p. 29, l. 5: Et si fuerunt 
Begardi, qui sic dicebant, ut scribit, scilicet se esse Deum per naturam, merito fuerunt con-
dempnati, prout etiam Almericus fuit per Innocentium Tertium condempnatus in concilio 
generali, de quo in capitulo ‘Dampnamus de summa Trinitate’; qui non habuit sanum intel-
lectum, quomodo Deus est omnia complicite; de cuius erroribus Iohannes Andreas aliqua 
recitat in Novella.
 33 Ludueña, “Nicolás de Cusa”.
 34 On Nicholas’ early formulation of this doctrine and his reception of 12th- century 
Chartrian sources, see D. Albertson, Mathematical Theologies. Nicholas of Cusa and the 
Legacy of Thierry of Chartres (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 184– 186 and 230- 
232. A comparison between Nicholas and Eriugena on his point has been undertaken in 
C. Riccati, Processio et explicatio. La doctrine de la création chez Jean Scot et Nicolas de 
Cues (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1983), p. 110– 122, and W. Beierwaltes, “Cusanus and Eriugena”, in 










given his unjust criticisms of Nicholas (and, elsewhere in De ignota litteratura, 
Meister Eckhart), succumbed to a kind of double ignorance. The (3) wise who 
see are, therefore, wise through learned ignorance, and they would presuma-
bly include Nicholas himself.35
As for the list of authors and texts Nicholas went on to mention, it is impor-
tant to note that Cusanus was not claiming that the writers themselves belonged 
to group (3) – he referred to books, not authors. Rather, the wise in group (3) 
are those whose clear mental eyesight gives them the authority to interpret 
such works. Earlier in the Apologia, Cusanus made it clear that, if a person 
wishes to join the ranks of the wise, they should read the De mystica theologia 
with the commentaries of Maximus, Hugh of St. Victor, Robert Grosseteste, 
John the Scot, Thomas Gallus, “and other more recent commentators”.36 Now, 
of these writings, only the glosses attributed to Maximus, the commentary of 
Grosseteste, and the Explanatio and Extractio of Thomas Gallus were actually 
devoted to the De mystica theologia, while Hugh and Eriugena wrote commen-
taries only on the De caelesti hierarchia. What Cusanus must mean is that these 
are all reliable guides to follow as one grapples with the Dionysian corpus, and 
eventually learns to approach the De mystica theologia with the proper intel-
lectual disposition. Once learned ignorance, or the intuitive understanding of 
the nature of enfolding and unfolding and the coincidence of opposites, has 
been gained, one can then begin the ascent into mystical theology,37 and, pre-
sumably, correctly interpret the more dangerous and esoteric texts listed in his 
response to Wenck.
Nicholas’ reference to the Novella super Decretalibus of John Andrea (d. 
1348) gives us some clues about the criteria he had in mind when compiling 
this list. In the Novella, we read that three errors of Amalric were condemned 
at the general council: (1) all things are God (omnia sunt Deus); (2) there are 
primordial causes that create and are created (primordiales causae, quae 
creant et creantur); (3) there will be a unification of the sexes at the end of 
time, or there will be no sexual differentiation at all (adunatio sexuum post 
 35 Wenck’s criticisms of Eckhart were addressed by Cusanus almost immediately before 
the passage in question. See Nicholas of Cusa, Apologia doctae ignorantiae, §32- 38, p. 22, 
l. 10 – p. 26, l. 25.
 36 Nicholas of Cusa, Apologia doctae ignorantiae, §30, p. 20, l. 16 – p. 21, l. 4. For an argument 
that Cusanus intended to disseminate the Apologia widely, see Ziebart, Nicolaus Cusanus 
on Faith and Intellect, p. 91.
 37 Nicholas of Cusa, Apologia doctae ignorantiae, §7, p. 6, l. 7- 9: Unde, cum nunc Aristotelica 
secta praevaleat, quae haeresim putat esse oppositorum coincidentiam, in cuius admissione 








consummationem, seu non erit distinctio sexus).38 In his report, John Andrea 
cited the Chronicon of Martin of Opava who, like his contemporary Henry of 
Segusia in 1271, had glossed Innocent iii’s decretals and established direct links 
between each error and passages from Eriugena’s Periphyseon. Martin in fact 
classified the Periphyseon as a liber Amalerici, while Henry identified Amalric 
as a follower of John Scotus (secutus est iste Amalricus).39
Although it cannot be excluded that Cusanus had all three theses in mind, 
as well as their association with Eriugena, when compiling his list of danger-
ous books, an examination of Nicholas’ views of each text, case by case, in his 
other works tells a simpler story. In the Apologia, indeed, the only thesis men-
tioned from Andrea’s Novella was (1) that God is all things, which, Cusanus has 
argued, must be qualified to mean that God as all things “by enfolding”. Indeed, 
Nicholas himself had used expressions very similar to the notion of God as the 
forma omnium in De docta ignorantia i.23 and ii.2 (forma formarum, forma 
essendi).40 This is the thesis the wise could interpret fruitfully in the esoteric 
works, thanks to learned ignorance, and it is a sufficient criterion to explain the 
presence of each dangerous text listed here in the Apologia. Again, however, 
we cannot rule out that Nicholas had the other theses in mind as well. We 
will see that Nicholas never affirmed any version of errors (2) and (3), on the 
primordial causes as created and creative principles or on the loss of sexual 
differentiation, but his reasons for avoiding them can only be inferred from 
other aspects of his thought.
Turning now to the list of dangerous books, we of course find an abun-
dance of material in Nicholas’ works relating to Dionysius, whose authority 
he held in the highest esteem.41 Restricting ourselves to the Apologia, we have 
already noted that for Nicholas learned ignorance must be presupposed as a 
 38 John Andrea, Novella super Decretalibus cum apostillis noviter editis (Venezia: De Tortis, 
1505), f. 8rb.
 39 For the texts, see Lucentini, Platonismo, ermetismo, eresia nel medioevo, p. 362– 365. 
Martin’s list included two additional errors: (a) that ideas in the divine mind create and 
are created (=2), and that all things will return to God and find rest in these ideas, and will 
remain one individual (unum individuum); (b) just as Abraham and Isaac are one nature, 
so all are one and all are God (omnia esse unum et omnia esse Deum) (=1); (c) no sin can be 
imputed to those acting out of charity; (d) God is seen only in creatures, never in himself; 
(e) had man not sinned, there would be no division of the sexes, but only angelic multi-
plication, and that after the Resurrection the sexes will be united (=3).
 40 On the influence of Thierry of Chartres on these notions in particular, see J.- M. Counet, 
Mathématique et dialectique chez Nicolas de Cues (Paris: Vrin, 2000), p. 140– 150.
 41 L. Baur (ed.), Cusanus- Texte III, Marginalien, I. Nicolaus Cusanus und Ps.- Dionysius im 










hermeneutical key for reading Dionysius correctly. He framed this point dra-
matically when he recalled that he received the vision of learned ignorance 
as a gift from God before he had examined Dionysius or any of the other 
“true theologians”.42 Whether or not this accurately described the historical 
sequence of events is irrelevant. What Nicholas was implying is that the per-
spective of intellectus cannot be reached by the arduous effort of reason but is 
always there, grounding reason in its discursive operation; intellectus can only 
be received, it cannot be won. In other words, for Nicholas, one cannot even 
begin to seek God except by learned ignorance, that is to say, without the recog-
nition that God withdraws precisely to the extent that discursive reason draws 
nearer to him.43 In this sense, the De mystica theologia, properly understood, 
would be the antidote to Amalric’s error: for Dionysius, God is beyond the coin-
cidence of opposites and the interplay of affirmative and negative theology or, 
in other words, God is “the opposite of opposites”. Since God utterly transcends 
the finite realm of distinction, division, and opposition, he can indeed be said 
to be all things by enfolding, for he is “the being of all things in such a way that 
he is not any of these things”.44
As for Marius Victorinus (d. c. 363), mentioned next in the Apologia, we 
unfortunately do not have any further clues about how Nicholas interpreted 
his letter to Candidus (Ad Candidum), with its arguments that the Word is the 
“being” that proceeds from transcendent “non- being”, and is the manifestation 
of the existence that is “hidden” in the Father.45 It is conceivable, nevertheless, 
that Cusanus would have tried to extract the doctrine of folding and unfolding 
from these utterances, perhaps while clarifying that Victorinus’ words do not 
necessarily entail the subordination of the Son to the Father that they might 
seem to imply.
In the case of David of Dinant, whose works were censured at the same 
council that condemned Amalric in 1210, we find Nicholas advancing a positive 
 42 Nicholas of Cusa, Apologia doctae ignorantiae, §16- 17, p. 12, l. 4- 22.
 43 Nicholas of Cusa, Apologia doctae ignorantiae, §18, p. 13, l. 21- 26: Reperies enim ibi, quod, 
licet ubique sit et non absit a nobis – ut ait Paulus Atheniensibus, quando Dionysium con-
vertit – , tamen tunc proprius ad ipsum acceditur, quando plus fugisse reperitur; quanto 
enim ipsius inaccessibilis maior elongatio melius capitur, tanto propinquius inaccessibilitas 
attingitur.
 44 Nicholas of Cusa, Apologia doctae ignorantiae, §21, p. 15, l. 14- 16, and §24- 25, p. 17, l. 16- 20.
 45 Marius Victorinus, Ad Candidum, eds P. Henry, P. Hadot, Traités théologiques sur la Trinité, 
vol. 1 (Paris: Cerf, 1960), §2- 14, p. 132, l. 10 – p. 151, l. 27. On the influence of Victorinus 
on Eriugena’s notion of theophany, see G. Piemonte, Vita in omnia pervenit. El vital-
ismo eriugeniano y la influencia de Mario Victorino (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Patristica et 










interpretation of his thought in his later work De li non- aliud (1462).46 David 
was introduced there relative to a problem raised by Ferdinand, representing 
the Aristotelians, who wondered how Dionysius’ statement that “the One is in 
a sense the element of all” could be reconciled with the De mystica theologia, 
where he denied the God is “one”.47 Ferdinand was instructed by Nicholas that 
“element” here means that God is the cause of unity, since he is the immanent 
and sustaining root of each thing. If this “element” were to be removed, all 
things would cease to exist. If this is so, observed Ferdinand, this means that 
David of Dinant and his followers erred minimally (minime errarunt) when they 
called matter (hyle), intellect (nous), and nature (physis), “God” and declared 
that the world is “the visible God”.48 Nicholas seemed to concur, and explained 
that David identified hyle as the principle of bodies, nous as the principle of 
minds, and physis as the principle of motions, but “he did not see that they dif-
fer among themselves insofar as they are principles, which is why he spoke as 
he did”.49 That is (if I understand correctly), David called hyle, nous, and physis 
“God” because he regarded them all under their aspect as “elemental” roots or 
principles of bodies, minds, and motions, but he did not recognise that, since 
each of these principles is an other, each is necessarily posterior to the Not- 
other. But you, Ferdinand, Nicholas continued, having received a correct inter-
pretation of Dionysius, see more clearly that God as the Not- other defines all 
things and is in all things, even though he is not mixed with any of them. What 
the text implies here is that David of Dinant and his followers nearly reached 
 46 Due to a confusion of a later chronicler from Laon, it was believed in the 13th century that 
David was directly influenced by Amalric. See E. Maccagnolo, “David of Dinant and the 
Beginnings of Aristotelianism in Paris”, in P. Dronke (ed.), A History of Twelfth- Century 
Western Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 429– 442.
 47 Nicholas of Cusa, De li non- aliud, eds L. Baur, P. Wilpert, Opera omnia, vol. 13, c. 17, §81, 
p. 42, l. 25 – p. 43, l. 15; citing Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 13.3, 980B.
 48 This refers to the well- known fragment edited in David of Dinant, Quaternulorum frag-
menta, ed. M. Kurdziałek, in Studia Mediewistyczne 3(1963), p. 69– 71. For the last state-
ment, Nicholas likely had in mind the passage where David expressed his agreement with 
Plato: the world is the sensible God (mundum esse Deum sensibilem).
 49 Nicholas of Cusa, De li non- aliud, c. 17, §81, p. 43, l. 3: et illa non vidit differre inter se ut in 
principio, quocirca sic dixit. The sense of the Latin is unclear and has led translators either 
to change the word order to et illa vidit non differre (Dupré: “und lenkt seinen Blick darauf, 
daß sich jene, sofern sie im Ursprung sind, nicht voneinander unterscheiden”) or to ren-
der ut in principio more freely (Hopkins: “but he did not see that they differ among them-
selves as beginnings”). It does not seem possible to translate the latter phrase literally as, 
presumably, Nicholas would hold that all these principles are indeed one insofar as they 
exist complicite in the principle itself. Therefore, I follow Hopkins because I understand 
the statement as a judgement of a shortcoming in David of Dinant’s philosophy, which is 










the truth of the doctrine of enfolding and unfolding (minime errarunt) but 
emphasised one side of the relation (God’s immanence) at the expense of the 
other (God’s transcendence). Indeed, David’s own Platonic formulations about 
the world as the “visible” or “sensible” God come close to Cusanus’ own decla-
ration in the De li non- aliud that “the creature is the appearance [ostensio] of 
the creator defining himself, or the light, which God is, manifesting itself”.50
As for the Clavis physicae, named next in the Apologia, we have no direct 
evidence of Cusanus’ reading of the text. This has not always been the view of 
scholars. On the basis of Marie- Thérèse d’Alverny’s judgement in her influen-
tial study of 1953 (“Le cosmos symbolique”), Paolo Lucentini ascribed the 15th- 
century marginalia in ms Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 6734 
(the same manuscript used by Berthold), to Cusanus, whose attribution of the 
Clavis to Theodorus, coupled with the verdict of d’Alverny, seemed to put the 
matter beyond dispute.51 In her review of Lucentini’s Platonismo medievale in 
1982, however, d’Alverny revised her earlier hypothesis, having consulted two 
experts of Cusanus and after further comparison with the cardinal’s authentic 
glosses.52 To my knowledge, d’Alverny’s doubts have remained unaddressed, 
even though they are indeed substantial enough to revise the attribution to 
Nicholas.53 This raises the question of how Cusanus came to attribute the text 
to Theodorus. The copy of the Clavis physicae preserved in his personal library 
(ms Bernkastel- Kues, Bibliothek des St. Nikolaus- Hospitals, Cod. Cus. 202) is 
anonymous and contains no annotations. In the absence of any evidence for 
the circulation of another manuscript of the Clavis ascribed to Theodorus, it 
 50 Nicholas of Cusa, De li non- aliud, prop. 12, §118, p. 63, l. 4- 6: Creatura igitur est ipsius crea-
toris sese definientis seu lucis, quae deus est, se ipsam manifestantis ostensio.
 51 On the Clavis marginalia, see Lucentini, Platonismo medievale, p. 77– 109, reprinted in 
Lucentini, Platonismo, ermetismo, eresia, p. 19– 48, citing d’Alverny from 1953 at p. 23, 
n. 11: “Le cardinal Nicolas de Cues, grand amateur, on le sait, de textes platoniciens et 
néo- platoniciens, a sans doute eu quelque temps notre manuscrit entre les mains, car les 
annotations marginales du XVe siècle que porte celui- ci ressemblent fort à son écriture.”
 52 D’Alverny, “Platonismo medievale”, p. 349.
 53 After consultation with Dragos Calma, who with Ruedi Imbach has published a study of 
Cusanus’ marginalia on Heymericus de Campo (ms Bernkastel- Kues, Bibliothek des St. 
Nikolaus- Hospitals, Cod. Cus. 106) – see Calma, D., Imbach, R., “Les notes marginales de 
Nicolas de Cues au traité Colliget principiorum d’Heymeric de Campo”, in K. Reinhardt et 
al. (eds), Heymericus de Campo. Philosophie und Theologie im 15. Jahrhundert (Regensburg: 
Roderer- Verlag, 2009), p. 15– 51 – I note that there are indeed significant discrepancies 
between the two hands: the hand annotating the Clavis is more cursive, and there are 
clear differences between, for instance, the letters “x”, “y”, the final superscript “m”, and 
the abbreviation “con- / com- ”. D’Alverny already signalled a difference in their formation 










seems most likely that, like Franz of Retz, Nicholas relied on the Expositio for 
the attribution.
Nicholas’ views about the Periphyseon can be gleaned from his marginalia 
to Book i of the dialogue, which fortunately are preserved.54 We see in these 
marginalia that he found in Eriugena phrases that would match the first of 
Amalric’s erroneous theses.55 But Nicholas also saw that Eriugena understood 
this statement correctly through the notions of the coincidence of opposites,56 
of God as the opposite of opposites,57 and the corresponding notion of crea-
tion as theophany.58 Accordingly, Nicholas was able to paraphrase Eriugena’s 
text using the terminology of complicatio.59 Along with Nicholas’ recollection 
of his first encounter with Dionysius in the Apologia and his interpretation of 
David of Dinant in the De li non- aliud, this is a clear example of his use of the 
hermeneutic of learned ignorance to draw out a correct and even fruitful inter-
pretation of a difficult work.
As for the primordial causes and the division of the sexes – the other two 
theses for which Amalric was condemned – the cardinal’s judgement was less 
positive. He certainly never used the syntagm causa primordialis in his works. 
His discussion of the Platonic theory of divine ideas in De docta ignorantia 
ii.9 gives some indication that the notion of an intermediary level of any sort 
of created and creative principles would not fit easily into his own thought.60 
In this passage, he noted the view of “certain Christians” who adopted the 
Platonic theory of the world soul as the principle that contains the plurality 
of exemplars as they exist between the simplicity of the divine mind and their 
likenesses in the material world. A better proposal, he argued, can be reached 
by recourse to learned ignorance. In this standpoint, one acknowledges that, 
since God is the absolute and uncontracted Maximum, in him “the maximum 
 54 These are preserved in ms London, British Library, Cod. Addit. 11035, and have been pub-
lished in J. Koch, “Kritisches Verzeichnis der Londoner Handschriften aus dem Besitz 
des Nikolaus von Kues”, in Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus- Gesellschaft 
3(1963), p. 16– 100, at p. 86– 100. A selection of these is also found in Lucentini, Platonismo 
medievale, p. 113– 124.
 55 ms London, British Library, Cod. Addit. 11035, f. 64v: Forma omnium deus (Periphyseon, lib. 
i, 501D).
 56 ms London, British Library, Cod. Addit. 11035, f. 18v: Nota contraria de deo dici (Periphyseon, 
lib. i, 452C).
 57 ms London, British Library, Cod. Addit. 11035, f. 80r: Nota istud singularissime (Periphyseon, 
lib. i, 517B- C: infinitas infinitorum, oppositorum oppositio, contrarietas contrariorum, etc.).
 58 ms London, British Library, Cod. Addit. 11035, f. 14v, 15r, 16r, 16v.
 59 ms London, British Library, Cod. Addit. 11035, f. 82r: Deus est complicatio omnium amorum 
(Periphyseon, lib. i, 519C).
















truth of a circle is not other than that of quadrangle”; that is, all ideas are one 
and “indistinct” in the Word. There is no need to posit an intermediary princi-
ple containing distinct exemplars – or, in Nicholas’ terms, “there is no medium 
between the absolute and the contracted” – for if there were many exemplars 
then there would be a plurality of “maximal and most true” things. The plural-
ity of primordial causes, whose number remained inscrutable for Eriugena but 
was decidedly fixed by Berthold, thus was not recognised by Cusanus’ learned 
ignorance.61
As for the overcoming of the division of the sexes, once again we can only 
make inferences based on Cusanus’ other works. We find no endorsement 
in his writings of the Eriugenian notion that sexual difference is doffed at 
the Resurrection or that human nature as an imago Dei in Paradise with its 
spiritual body is free from it. However, we can see that Cusanus’ obscure reflec-
tions on the subject of the Resurrection were, once again, explicitly marked 
by learned ignorance.62 His discussion of eschatology in the final chapters of 
De docta ignorantia iii.7- 12 approached such questions Christologically, focus-
ing primarily on Christ’s death, Resurrection, and the last judgement, and only 
hinted at what the implications of these events might be for those who are 
members of his body. His argument hinged on the notion that Christ’s human-
ity is the medium between the purely absolute and the purely contracted: as 
united to his divine person it is absolute, as united to his divine person it is con-
tracted.63 The divine and human natures are united in such a way that there 
is a mutual exchange of predicates (communicatio idiomatum) between them. 
This means that, at the time of Christ’s death, his human body and soul were 
never separated from his divine person, because his “maximum humanity” was 
supposited in his divine person. Therefore, all the attributes of human nature, 
including the union of body and soul, remained there.64 Nevertheless, since 
it belongs to “the shadowy truth” of human nature to undergo death and the 
separation of soul and body, it is fitting that Christ’s temporal birth should be 
fulfilled in a temporal death, so that the full truth of humanity as it was in him 
could be revealed. As temporally contracted, Christ’s humanity was thus a sign 
 61 On this aspect of Eriugena’s doctrine, see S. Gersh, “L’Ordo Naturalis des causes primor-
diales. La transformation érigénienne de la doctrine dionysienne des noms divins”, in Les 
Études philosophiques 104(2013), p. 57– 78.
 62 Nicholas of Cusa, De docta ignorantia, lib. iii, c. 7, §222, p. 140, l. 3- 4. See also H.- G. Senger, 
Ludus sapientiae. Studien zum Werk und zur Wirkungsgeschichte des Nikolaus von Kues 
(Leiden: Brill, 2002), p. 162– 180.
 63 Nicholas of Cusa, De docta ignorantia, lib. iii, c. 7, §225, p. 141, l. 19- 20.










and image (signum et imago) of the supratemporal truth of humanity. At the 
Resurrection, these shadows had their ending, for when the temporal truth of 
contracted human nature was fulfilled in its corruptibility, only the incorrupti-
ble truth remained. And although there is only one indivisible humanity com-
mon to all human beings, such that it is possible to say that the humanity of all 
has, in Christ, put on immortality, this is not a present reality except in him (cf. 
1 Corinthians 15:20: “the first fruits of them that slept”).65 All of humanity will 
rise from the grave because of the transformation Christ has accomplished. 
Nicholas thus understood the Resurrection entirely through Christ’s temporal 
birth and death, as the doctrine of learned ignorance required, and therefore 
would have rejected the views he would find in Eriugena (if he had read Book 
v of the Periphyseon or the entirety of the Clavis), and in Berthold, who located 
the general Resurrection in the domain of “natural providence”,66 with their 
concomitant views about the association of the fall from the pristine imago Dei 
with the beginning of sexual differentiation.67
When we consider the list of dangerous works mentioned by Cusanus, we 
must always remember that he concerned above all with defending the ration-
ale and hermeneutical validity of learned ignorance. The context of this pas-
sage in the Apologia and a survey of his judgements about the esoteric works, 
as far as this is possible, indicate that it was the first of Amalric’s errors that 
he was most concerned to correct by learned ignorance: God is all things “by 
enfolding”. Imagining his encounter with “friar John of Mossbach”, we note 
that such an idea could be found, for instance, in Berthold’s notion that all 
things are immediately related to the Good, which is all things “according to 
cause”, even though all things are other than the Good through their intrinsic 
limitations or contractions.68 Berthold also stated that God’s transcendence 
 65 Nicholas of Cusa, De docta ignorantia, lib. iii, c. 8, §227- 228, p. 142, l. 17 – p. 143, l. 29.
 66 Eriugena admitted his difficulties in determining whether the general Resurrection will 
be the result of nature or grace (Periphyseon, lib. v, 898D- 906C). He concluded that the 
Resurrection is natural, but deification is gracious (979B- C). Berthold’s references to 
the Resurrection, the glorified bodies of the saints, and the spiritual topography of the 
afterlife, were placed under the banner of voluntary providence (Expositio, 129A, p. 176, 
l. 94 – p. 177, l. 130) because, in Eriugenian terms, they would pertain to the “special” 
Resurrection that follows the “general”.
 67 The 15th- century annotator of the Clavis was also hostile to the doctrines of sexual differ-
entiation and the spiritual body. Using the numbering in Lucentini, “Le annotazioni di 
Nicola Cusano alla Clavis physicae”, in Platonismo, ermetismo, eresia nel medioevo, p. 24– 
48: L36: Nota quod male (Clavis c. 70); L39: Male. nota quod male (Clavis c. 76); L115: Error 
(Clavis c. 271); L118: Error (Clavis c. 349); L119: Error (Clavis c. 381).











of every causal order coincides with his “becoming” (fieri) within all orders 
of providence, which he described through Dionysius and the Clavis.69 As for 
Berthold’s Eriugenian doctrine of primordial causes and the spiritual body, 
we can only assume that Nicholas would have regarded these matters as det-
rimental for a true interpretation of Dionysius. And so, in light of these pat-
terns in the Apologia and Nicholas’ otherwise inexplicable attribution of the 
Clavis to Theodorus, it is reasonable to conclude that he either had read the 
Expositio directly or had a very accurate report of its contents. For Nicholas, 
an axiomatic interpretation of Dionysius like Berthold’s, with its limited and 
linear hierarchies of separate principles from the primordial causes to the ens 
secundum speciem of human nature, would have at best been preparatory for 
elucidating the dialectical mystical theology of the Areopagite.70 Berthold, as 
it were, saw the promised land of the coincidence of opposites and the stand-
point of learned ignorance in his conception of the intellectus adeptus and 
the unum animae, but he remained in the realm of the oblique motion, which 
he had regarded as the best preparation of the soul for the reception of that 
higher perspective.71
 69 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 3A, p. 92, l. 14 – p. 93, l. 32. See also, for example, 
Expositio, 7A, p. 144, l. 196- 199: Secundum diversum igitur gradum huius determinationis 
constituuntur etiam diversa bona minus vel plus contracta quasi secundum bonitatis quon-
dam intentionem et multiplicationem et quasi, ut sic loquar, unius boni ex alio expressionem. 
Perhaps the most Eriugenian passage of all is found at Expositio, 119B, p. 83, l. 22 – p. 84, 
l. 34 (non apparentis apparitio, occulti manifestatio, negati affirmatio, incomprehensibilis 
comprehensio, etc.).
 70 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 5- 6, p. 13, l. 252 – p. 14, l. 286. It has to be noted 
that, in terms of his reception of Proclus, Cusanus’ annotations to the Elementatio theo-
logica are incomplete and much sparser than those accompanying the Platonic Theology 
or the Commentary on the Parmenides. See S. Gersh, “Nicholas of Cusa”, in S. Gersh (ed.), 
Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), p. 318– 349, at p. 327– 336, who concludes: “It seems implausible to suggest 
that the philosophical ideas in the [Elementatio theologica] were simply of less interest to 
Nicholas than those in the [In Parmenidem]. It is perhaps more reasonable to think that 
the axiomatic methodology of Proclus’ treatise seemed inappropriate for articulating a 
paradoxical ‘Dionysian’ theology”.
 71 On this matter, Meister Eckhart was for Nicholas a superior, but still imperfect, interloc-
utor. Nicholas judged that Eckhart’s works should not be made widely available because 
of their subtlety and difficulty. See Nicholas of Cusa, Apologia doctae ignorantiae, §36, 
p. 25, l. 9- 12. Nicholas had acquired Eckhart’s Latin works in 1444 (ms Bernkastel- Kues, 
Bibliothek des St. Nikolaus- Hospitals, Cod. Cus. 21) and used them in his defence of 
Eckhart against Wenck. On this manuscript, see S. Frost, Nikolaus von Kues und Meister 
Eckhart. Rezeption im Spiegel der Marginalien zum Opus tripartitum Meister Eckharts 
(Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 2006). Nicholas’ marginalia to this manuscript are included 








From the Regensburg commentator, for whom the linear model of prime/ 
primo derived from “the venerable father Berthold” was an inspiration, to Franz 
of Retz, who used the Expositio as a resource for his doctrine of deification that 
preserves the distinct orders of nature even when they are elevated by grace, 
to Nicholas of Cusa, who would prefer to interpret Dionysius through other 
works of Proclus besides the Elementatio, we have seen that the explicit recep-
tion of the Expositio was more or less intertwined with its Eriugenian sources, 
and was ultimately defined by the harmony of Dionysius with the Elementatio 
theologica that Berthold had used these materials to establish.72
If not in his method but in his ambitions, Berthold profoundly antici-
pated Cusanus as a thinker who sought to articulate the accord of Dionysius 
and Proclus simply insofar as both authorities were understood to be heirs 
of Plato.73 For Berthold, this was a Platonism defined by Dionysius and the 
 72 This fortune has persisted to the present day. The first critical editions of Berthold 
(Propositions 184- 211, by Loris Sturlese) and the Clavis physicae of Honorius ( chapters 1- 
314, by Paolo Lucentini) were published in the same series in 1974. This coincidence was 
underscored by the series editor, E. Massa, “Presentazione”, in Berthold of Moosburg, 
Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. 184- 211. De animabus, ed. L. Sturlese 
(Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974), p. v– xi. The first major study of the Expositio, 
published in 2013 (Ezequiel Ludueña’s La recepción de Eriúgena), used Berthold’s 
Eriugenian doctrine of the primordial causes to measure Berthold’s reception of and 
innovations upon the intellectual heritage of the Dominican school of Cologne.
 73 Nicholas of Cusa, De venatione sapientiae, eds R. Klibansky, H.- G. Senger, Opera omnia, 
vol. 12, §59, p. 57, l. 15- 19; §64, p. 61, l. 3 – p. 62, l. 20. On Thomas Aquinas as the originator 
of this reading of Proclus and Dionysius, see W. Hankey, “Misrepresenting Neoplatonism 
in Contemporary Christian Dionysian Polemic. Eriugena and Nicholas of Cusa versus 
Vladimir Lossky and Jean- Luc Marion”, in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 
82/ 4(2008), p. 683– 703, at p. 690; id., “The Concord”, p. 153– 154. On the importance of 
this approach to the Platonic tradition, see Hankey, “Misrepresenting Neoplatonism”, 
p. 693– 694: “Although the history of Cusanus is skewed because he accepted Dionysius’ 
self- representation, in principle he is ready for another account. Because he has detected 
that Dionysius reproduces Platonic texts, and because on a mixture of scriptural and 
philosophic principles, he regards Plato as also divinely inspired, he could have given 
up the derivation of the Dionysian doctrine from the mystical experience attributed to 
St. Paul, without thereby depriving the doctrine of the corpus of spiritual authority and 
truth. Equally, because Proclus is seen to borrow from both Dionysius and Plato, all three 
belong to a common hunting of God, a common theological tradition and enterprise. 
For Cusa, there is one sole source of being, truth, and good, beyond conceptual grasp, 
but giving, disclosing, indeed creating itself diversely. In fact, Cusanus has the evidence 
which moved modern scholars to place Proclus before Dionysius and which would allow 
Dionysius to have received his Platonism via Plotinus and Proclus, rather than from Plato 
directly. Because the fact that the Christian divine Dionysius was taught by the pagan 






Latin corpus of Proclus as he knew it (Elementatio theologica and the Tria 
opuscula), that could be elucidated using rare doxographies (Thomas of York), 
marginal philosophies (Dietrich of Freiberg), or combinations of the two 
(Eriugenism). For thinkers after Berthold who would entertain this deeper 
agreement between Proclus and Dionysius, the face of the Areopagite would 
have to change as his companion stepped further into the light. Berthold’s 
understanding of Platonism evidently had already been formed when he 
read, however extensively, Proclus’ commentary on the Parmenides. His two 
brief citations this rich text indicate that he could find in it only the confir-
mation of the strict distinction between abstract and separate universals.74 
This was the central axis around which the entire Expositio would revolve, just 
as it passed through microcosm, in whom the frontiers of these two realms 
were conjoined. This vision of a theorematic Platonism, with the existential 
choice it presented through the De mystica theologia – whether to do theology 
according to ourselves and remained “sealed off” in beings, or not according 
to ourselves, and prepare the mind for the gift of a higher insight – had suffi-
cient urgency that whatever other dimensions of Proclus that Berthold found 
in the Parmenides commentary were regarded either as secondary or impos-
sible to assimilate. What was primary was to make the mind receptive to the 
domain of what is beyond being and the “divine frenzy” of stillness which, for 
Berthold, it seems so inclined to ignore and retreat into the familiar territory 
of abstraction, solipsism, and appropriation. As Dionysius and Proclus had 
taught, “as long as we are occupied with what is below, we are incredulous 
about all these things”.75
Proclus before Dionysius would be of no deep importance. In contrast, the interpene-
tration of philosophy and Scriptural revelation is of such heaven- shaking consequence 
for the twentieth- century Christians to whom we now move that they are unwilling to 
recognise the obvious philological facts which Nicholas and those around him saw. What 
blinds them is a sectarian religious narrowness which belongs to their determination 
either to free their religion from Hellenic philosophy, or to have it generate its own meta-
physics, or, stranger yet, to do both! At the very point when our historical researches make 
us endlessly aware of the inescapable interpenetration of religion and philosophy, our 
philosophy and theology fail us.”
 74 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 11, p. 17, l. 401- 402; 41K, p. 53, l. 232- 243. Berthold 
did not situate the Parmenides commentary relative to the three motions of the soul in 
Expositio, Expos. tit. B- D, p. 38, l. 49 – p. 41, 147.
 75 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 17, p. 27, l. 724- 728: ‘Donec autem circa ea, quae deor-
sum, volvimur, increduliter habemus circa haec omnia divino cognoscente impartibiliter et 
superaeternaliter’. Haec ille. Ad idem consentit Dionysius 1 et 2 cap. Mysticae theologiae. Cf. 






2 Lady Philosophy’s Vesture
As the only commentary on the entire Elementatio theologica from the Latin 
tradition, which also served later readers as an encyclopaedia of a vast tradi-
tion of sapiential theology (divinalis sapientia), the achievement of Berthold 
of Moosburg’s Expositio was a substantial one. In comparison with similar 
works from contemporary Dominican authors, such as the earlier commen-
taries on the Liber de causis or Nicholas of Strassburg’s Summa, the Expositio 
stands out not only for its scope and complex use of sources, but above all 
for its Dionysian critique of the Liber de causis and the metaphysics of being. 
If we can conclude that the philosophical and hermeneutical principle “not 
according to ourselves” was the guiding light of Berthold’s work, which was 
presupposed in his professed exegetical method of compilatio, then we must 
also acknowledge that the result was anything but unoriginal or derivative.
Although we may never know what was being taught in the Dominican 
studia of the period, it is conceivable, given its subject matter, that the Expositio 
would have been written with the schools of natural philosophy (studia nat-
urarum) in mind. It is clear in the commentary that Berthold regarded the 
Metaphysics and the Liber de causis as fundamentally flawed in their assump-
tions about first principles. To be sure, certain doctrines from Metaphysics xii 
could be incorporated into the Platonic synthesis, especially when elucidating 
the background assumed by Proclus’ propositions on intellect, but by this stage 
of the Expositio the framework has been entirely reconfigured along the strict 
separation of theological and logical universality. It seems Berthold regarded 
the other books of the Metaphysics as valuable for the study of the logical 
intention of ens as it is derived or abstracted from the material world. But as a 
theory of the separate substances, the metaphysics of being was for him only 
a hindrance. The science of being as being would be conceded to Aristotle in 
its logical domain, while the pursuit of wisdom and the salvation of the soul 
through philosophy required leaving behind that familiar world and enter-
ing byways “beyond the common path of reasonings”.76 Of the Liber de cau-
sis there was little to retain. Perhaps Berthold also envisioned the progression 
from the study of invisible realities in natural providence to the consideration 
of voluntary providence in subsequent theological study. His emphasis on the 
accord of Proclus and “Dionysius Platonicus” would have made this transition 
a seamless one. Such hypotheses, however, must remain tentative given the 
almost total lack of evidence concerning the place of the Liber de causis, not to 





mention the Elementatio theologica, in the curricula of the Dominican schools 
of this period.
Of all the philosophical projects we find among the German Dominicans 
in the 14th century, Berthold’s Expositio most resembled the earlier Summa 
of Nicholas of Strassburg, although there is no proof of a direct influence of 
Nicholas on Berthold. Both thinkers identified their works as compilations, 
either explicitly or conceivably suited to respond to a lack of books besetting 
the provincial schools. More strikingly, both Dominicans looked to Boethius 
to account for the rationale for their compilations. Nicholas made the point 
clearly: Lady Philosophy’s garment has been divided and dismantled not only 
by sectarianism, but also in the fragmentation and proliferation of compen-
dia and florilegia, which lacked the coherence required to direct the student 
toward wisdom in its fullness.
There have been many occasions in this study to emphasise the centrality 
of Thomas of York or Eriugena for the establishment of the peace that reigns 
among the ancient philosophers of Berthold’s golden age, or the importance 
of Dietrich of Freiberg as the source for the mechanisms of Berthold’s meta-
physics and anthropology, or the role of Eriugenian sources in the reception 
of the Expositio. With the greater part of the commentary now in view, how-
ever, we may say that the author whom Berthold most closely approximated in 
his understanding of the science of metaphysics and theology, and his views 
about the kind of knowing demanded by it and the path by which the human 
is to achieve it, was Boethius. Him we find described, with one of the few epi-
thets in the entire Expositio, as that “most brilliant man” (vir clarissimus).77 
The prayer “with Plato and Boethius” to the paternal Light that concluded the 
Prologus was taken directly from the Consolatio philosophiae, where the pris-
oner and Lady Philosophy attempt to move from the discursive apprehension 
of finite goods to their simultaneity (cuncta simul) in the Good itself – that 
is, to ascend from ratio to intellectus. The aim of the Expositio was to re- enact 
the same movement that Proclus had undertaken in the Elementatio theolog-
ica: passing from the oblique motion of ratiocination to the intellectus adeptus 
and the providential unum animae of the direct motion, or (which amounts to 
the same thing) to the intelligentia of the circular motion. To join in the prayer 
for divine grace common to a pagan and a Christian author was for Berthold 
anything but a rhetorical trope.78 If we recall how thoroughly Berthold’s 
 77 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. E, p. 41, l. 153.
 78 Cf. Albert the Great, De intellectu et intelligibili, lib. ii, tr. unicus, c. 9, p. 516b: et haec est 







understanding of the formal and final causes of the Elementatio theologica – 
its theorematic method and its beatifying end – was informed by Boethius, 
and if we consider now how he synthesised doctrines he found in De Trinitate, 
the Consolatio, and the De hebdomadibus, we will see that, for Berthold, the 
method of the commentary was intrinsically connected to that end. In other 
words, by considering Berthold’s use of Boethius, we can best understand the 
continuity and distinction between the oblique motion and the two motions 
that are above it.
Berthold’s discussion of the final cause of the Elementatio in the Expositio 
tituli was framed by two themes from Boethius: first, the strong doctrine of 
deification in the Consolatio (omnis beatus deus) and, secondly, the descrip-
tion of Lady Philosophy’s first appearance to the prisoner.79 Regarding the 
first, Berthold connected two passages from Book iii of the Consolatio, where 
it is argued that beatitude is to be found “in pursuing the perfect condition 
brought about by the collection of all goods”, and that “everyone in bliss is god” 
by participation.80 As Berthold framed it, this beatifying collection of all goods 
is to be found in the passage from contemplating the gods dividedly (which 
are divina per essentiam but nevertheless “participate” or “limit” God’s supera-
bundance),81 to contemplating God himself (et per hoc ad divinum principali-
forme), which anticipated the second prayer in the Expositio, where he looked 
to Christ, “the mediator of God and man”, to lead the soul from the gods to the 
One.82 In this regard, Berthold shared the view of Lady Philosophy, who agreed 
with her servant Plato, that the passage from dividedness to unity always pre-
supposes a gift from the higher and unified principle.83
As for the second Boethian theme in the Expositio tituli, the appearance 
of Lady Philosophy, Berthold began by recalling her face and stature.84 She 
appeared to the prisoner as at once ancient yet animated by the vigour of 
youth, with eyes aflame that can see beyond human capacity, whose height 
at times seems to pierce the very heavens, while at other times she adopts a 
more human measure. We have here already, as Robert Crouse observed, the 
 79 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. L, p. 49, l. 408- 430.
 80 Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, lib. iii, prosa 9, §22- 23, p. 68, l. 63- 69; lib. iii, prosa 10, 
§25, p. 84, l. 85- 86.
 81 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 4, p. 12, l. 243 – p. 13, l. 250.
 82 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. L, p. 51, l. 486- 491.
 83 Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, lib. iii, prosa 9, §32, p. 79, l. 94- 97: Sed cum, uti in 
Timaeo Platoni, inquit, nostro placet, in minimis quoque rebus divinum praesidum debeat 
implorari, quid nunc faciendum censes, ut illius summi boni sedem repperire mereamur?
 84 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, p. 49, l. 420- 430. Cf. Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, 














essentials of the Boethian conception of wisdom, in a figure who transcends 
the same boundaries that Berthold sought to overcome:
In his final work, [Boethius] is most directly concerned with the prob-
lems – not pagan or Christian, but universal – of understanding the 
rational order of the world, the vagaries of fortune, and the nature of 
man’s freedom. Lady Philosophy is not natural or revealed, not philoso-
phy or theology; she is simply Sapientia, who can lift her head to pierce 
the very heavens.85
Berthold’s conception of the supersapiential habit of the unum animae in the 
Praeambulum, which received the properties Dionysius had used to describe 
the faith that locates the mind in the first Truth, finds its precursor here. For 
Berthold, the notions of divinising grace and revelation were intrinsic to the 
natural philosophy of Platonism, and in this way it could challenge the stark 
boundaries of nature and grace, pagan and Christian. It was the same concep-
tion of nature that led Berthold to affirm that true light that “illumines every 
person who comes into the world” or “the natural light of intellect”, only fully 
illumines those who “come into intellectual purity”.86
For the Dominican, this wisdom was most adequately realised, not in a dia-
logue like the Consolatio, which was intended to use poetic metre and rational 
argument as the medicines of the soul, but in the theorematic form of the 
Elementatio theologica. In his account of the theology of the unum animae 
in the Praeambulum, Berthold had drawn on the tripartite division of specu-
lative philosophy he found in Boethius’ De Trinitate, into the physical, quad-
rivial, and theological (theologica).87 For Boethius, the “theological” proceeds 
“intellectually” and not by imaginings. It is the intuitive vision of the Form 
 85 R. Crouse, “The Doctrine of Creation in Boethius. The De hebdomadibus and the 
Consolatio”, in Studia Patristica 17(1982), p. 417– 421, at p. 418.
 86 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 21, p. 34, l. 968- 973; Expos. tit. A, p. 37, l. 30 – p. 38, l. 34.
 87 Boethius, De Trinitate, c. 2, p. 169, l. 78- 83: in naturalibus igitur rationabiliter, in mathemat-
icis disciplinaliter, in divinis intellectualiter versari oportebit neque diduci ad imaginations, 
sed potius ipsam inspicere formam, quae vere forma neque imago est et quae esse ipsum est 
et ex qua esse est. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 63, l. 375- 376: quo the-
ologus in divinis apprehendendis versatur; p. 64, l. 417: quo circa divina versari oportet; p. 65, 
l. 423: circa divina versatur. See also A. Speer, “The Hidden Heritage. Boethian Metaphysics 
and Its Medieval Tradition”, in Quaestio 5(2005), p. 163– 181, at p. 167– 174; id., “The Division 
of Metaphysical Discourses. Boethius, Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart”, in K. Emery, 
Jr., R. Friedman, A. Speer (eds), Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages. A Tribute 








(ipsam inspicere formam) that forms all things. Following Boethius, Berthold 
stated that the objects of knowing are determined by and correlative with 
modes of knowing. Through this principle he made the insightful connection 
between the description of theologica in De Trinitate with the highest of the 
four modes of knowing identified in the Consolatio (lib. v, prose 4), intelligen-
tia, which comes after sense- perception, imagination, and reason. Intelligence 
is the mode of knowing exercised by the divine providence, which grasps the 
simple Form (illam simplicem formam) beyond the entire universe.88 In the 
Consolatio, intelligentia is described as primarily the possession of God, while 
human beings tend toward it, as Olivier Boulnois has remarked, “in a ceaseless 
effort of ascesis of all sensible images”.89 It is, in other words, the perspective 
sought through prayer at the centre of the Consolatio and at the conclusions of 
the Prologus and the Expositio tituli, which seeks the passage from the divided-
ness of fate to union with the divine providence.
That passage to beatitude, as Berthold described it in the phrase scalaris 
ascensus, was figured on the vesture of Lady Philosophy as a ladder ascending 
from the letters Π to Θ, which he interpreted in the standard way as a rep-
resentation of practical and theoretical philosophy (opus et scientia).90 The 
rungs on this ladder are the propositions, elements, or “elevatements” of the 
Elementatio theologica.91 For Berthold, we will recall, the highest achievement 
of the ancient wisdom of Hermes (in the Liber xxiv philosophorum) and Plato 
(in his originally theorematic philosophy concealed by the later Academy in 
the kind of imaginings Boethius deemed inappropriate for theology) was 
restored in the Elementatio theologica. This, and Proclus’ exhaustive explo-
ration of the three possible motions of the soul, were the two sources of his 
“excellence”.92
 88 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 67, l. 516- 520: cum cognitivum nostrae 
supersapientialis et divinalis sapientiae sit non solum omnem scientiam, quae est entium, 
sed etiam ipsum intellectum supracurrens, ut supra ostensum est, habitus etiam ipsius non 
erit compositus proprie loquendo ex intellectu et scientia, sed simplex inspectio formae sim-
pliciter omnia formantis iuxta illud Boethii De Trinitate, quod ‘circa divina intellectualiter 
versari oportet neque deduci ad imaginationes sed ipsam inspicere formam’. Et quia, ut idem 
dicit De consolatione v libro prosa 5, ‘intelligentiae vero celsior oculus existit, supergressa 
namque universitatis ambitum illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie contuetur’. Cf. 
Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, lib. v, prosa 4, §30, p. 149, l. 86- 88.
 89 O. Boulnois, Métaphysiques rebelles. Genèse et structures d’une science au Moyen Âge 
(Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2013), p. 53.
 90 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. L, p. 49, l. 420- 430.
 91 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. K, p. 47, l. 343- 348.












When we consider Berthold’s discussion of the difficulty and divinity of the-
ological theorems, we see why he held this method in such high regard.93 As 
Hermes explained in his Asclepius, the difficulty of theology consists in the 
fact that one cannot keep pace with “the torrent” of the river of divinity as it 
rushes on ahead of those who would listen to it and speak about it. Therefore, 
as Thomas of York (Berthold’s tacit source) concluded, theology demands an 
attentiveness and concentration, a mode of knowing, that is almost super-
human: both the teacher and the student of theology must be attentive and 
divine (oportet non tam tractantem, quam audientem esse divinum hominem 
et attentum) – all the more so, Berthold added, are these qualities demanded 
of one who would follow “the coordination of theological elements”. At this 
point, he had recourse to Boethius’ De hebdomadibus and the commentary of 
Gilbert of Poitiers. Whereas for Boethius in the De hebdomadibus, the theo-
rems are what prevent the wisdom concealed in them from being divulged and 
misunderstood, in Berthold’s tacit modification of Gilbert, and in accordance 
with his history of Platonism, both the content and the theorems themselves 
were the secret: the wisdom contained in this book should be revealed only 
to the worthy, who are desirous of the unveiled (revelata) image of truth, and 
who “are attentive (attenti) and perspicacious (perspicaces) in the apex of the 
mind”. “Perspicacious” is the pivotal term here. It was presupposed in Berthold’s 
unusual interpretation of John 1:9 (venientem in hunc mundum, scilicet puri-
tatem intellectualem). As he put it in the Prologus, what must be exercised in 
the one who comes to know the invisible things of God is “the perspicacity of 
the mind” (subiectum […] exercendum est animi perspicacitas).94 Combining 
all of these Boethian threads together, we can understand that, for Berthold, 
theorems are necessary in theology because they serve to sharpen the acies 
mentis or awaken intelligentia – which, as we saw, is intellect in its providential 
state or intellect in love. They do this because the attention required to grasp 
the meaning of a proposition must see how a multiplicity, doxographically and 
philosophically, is gathered up and contained unconfusedly in simplicity and, 
from there, how this simplicity is taken up into a greater totality through the 
concatenation or “elementation” of theorems.95 Such a method at the level of 
 93 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. K, p. 47, l. 368 – p. 48, 400. Cf. Thomas of York, 
Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 5 (ms Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. A.vi.437, 
f. 5va).
 94 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 7, p. 14, l. 291- 292.
 95 It can be argued that this theorematic method was implicit in the approximation of 
intelligentia that the prisoner and Lady Philosophy pursued after the prayer inspired by 
the Timaeus. See Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, lib. iii, pr. 12, §30, p. 94, l. 77 – p. 95, 








discursive reason would best approximate the onrush or torrent of divine prov-
idence that comprehends all things in a simple intuition. Berthold, therefore, 
meant that the attention the teacher and student must cultivate is “divine” in 
the fullest sense: it participates in providential knowledge.96 If, for Boethius, 
the human rises to intelligentia through an ascesis of images, for Berthold this 
happens through the theorematic method and the discipline of the passions.97 
The Elementatio theologica, a pagan text, was thus a work whose study formed 
the central part of a spiritual discipline that disposed the soul to receive 
divine grace.
Observing his synthesis of these Boethian materials, we must acknowledge 
how indebted Berthold remained to the very tradition he sought to overcome. 
The notion of first philosophy as simultaneously the knowledge of God and a 
participation in the divine self- knowledge was, of course, a defining feature of 
wisdom as described by Aristotle in Metaphysics i.1- 2.98 So too, the theorematic 
method of the Liber de causis allured scholastic philosophers from before the 
time of Berthold and well into the 15th century.99 Berthold’s conclusion that 
the Elementatio incalculably surpassed its Peripatetic contenders because of its 
realisation of the theorematic method shows the common ground he shared 
with his opponent and the limitations of his critique, especially if we compare 
it with the later efforts of Nicholas of Cusa and Marsilio Ficino.100 The goal 
rationibus texens, quae nunc quidem qua egrediaris introeas, nunc vero quo introieris egre-
diare, an mirabilem quendam divinae simplicitatis orbem complicas? […] Tum illa: Minime, 
inquit, ludimus remque omnium maximam dei munere, quem dudum deprecabamur, exegi-
mus. Ea est enim divinae forma substantiae, ut neque in externa dilabitur nec in se externum 
aliquid ipsa suscipiat, sed, sicut de ea Parmenides ait, πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον 
ὄγκῳ rerum orbem mobilem rotat dum se immobilem ipsa conservat. Quodsi rationes quoque 
non extra petitas sed intra rei quam tractabamus ambitum collocates agitavimus, nihil est 
quod admirere, cum Platone sanciente didiceris cognatos, de quibus loquuntur, rebus oport-
ere esse sermones.
 96 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 65, l. 419- 420: divina tractantes effici-
untur di et cognoscunt divina. There may also be an echo of the watchtower (specula) of 
providence at Expositio, 202F, p. 188, l. 228- 231, translated at 2.2, n. 55, above. Cf. Boethius, 
Consolatio philosophiae, lib. iv, prosa 6, §30, p. 125, l. 117- 119.
 97 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 197I, p. 139, l. 220- 221: In statu enim generationis potest 
enumeratas quinque cognitionum species exercere, prout minus vel plus ab his corporalibus 
separaverit.
 98 Boulnois, Métaphysiques rebelles, p. 126– 131, as well as p. 12, 25, and 35.
 99 For literature on the theorematic method in the 12th century and a study of its impor-
tance in the 15th century, see M. Meliadò, “Axiomatic Wisdom. Boethius’ De hebdoma-
dibus and the Liber de causis in Late- Medieval Albertism”, in Bulletin de philosophie 
médiévale 55(2013), p. 71– 131, at p. 94– 116.
 100 S. Gersh, “Berthold of Moosburg, Nicholas of Cusa, and Marsilio Ficino as Historians of 












presupposed by the Expositio and the means used to achieve it were inherited 
from this tradition it sought to overcome. From Berthold’s perspective, one 
could say, the outward appearance of a propositional metaphysics of being in 
the Liber de causis promised the sought- after ladder to the divine, but its con-
tent fell short of the ascesis or self- criticism demanded by its method. Only 
a theorematic metaphysics of the Good, as Boethius himself had attempted 
in a more incipient way in the De hebdomadibus, could secure the passage to 
intelligentia.
The Expositio, then, belonged solidly within the medieval tradition of met-
aphysics as a spiritual exercise.101 A major assumption that Berthold shared 
with the Church Fathers and the Neoplatonic commentators of late antiquity 
(and, incidentally, not with Boethius), was his view that the highest fruition 
and goal of human life is to be sought in the exegesis of an inspired text. This 
meant that the end sought in the science could not be entirely separated from 
the method used to reach it.102 In Berthold’s Procleanised reading of Dietrich 
of Freiberg, the unum animae and the agent intellect are perpetually active in 
the soul. For him, this accorded with Boethius’ metaphorical account of recol-
lection and the ember or “seed of truth” that is aroused by teaching. Both the 
ground of the soul and the ancient wisdom familiar with it had been concealed 
by forgetfulness, but this did not affect their actuality. Otherwise, Tauler could 
not have preached what he did about Proclus and his familiarity with the soul’s 
ground.
If the ascent up the ladder of theorems is a spiritual exercise in that it forms 
a divinising habitus, then it is in Berthold’s exegetical methods that we would 
learn how the rungs are navigated. As we have seen, there are two methods in 
the Expositio: the historical (suppositum, propositum) and the syllogistic (com-
mentum). In both cases, each proposition of the Elementatio is found to con-
tain unconfusedly within itself an entire tradition of philosophical speculation 
and a sequence of syllogistic arguments. By discursively unfolding the content 
that is latent in each proposition and comment, the compilator and theoricus 
set out the necessary conditions for the movement back from plurality to unity. 
The difficulty of this spiritual exercise consists in moving from the divided to 
of conjecture replaced axiomatics, while for Ficino axiomatics in fact concealed the true 
Platonic doctrine.
 101 On this tradition, see Boulnois, Métaphysiques rebelles, p. 21– 62. Imbach, “Au- delà de la 
métaphysique”, p. 389, associates Berthold with the same tradition.
 102 For a similar conclusion about unity of the content and method in the Expositio that 
focuses on the meaning of principium in the three prefaces, see Gersh, “Berthold of 






the unified in such a way that the unified does not dissolve differences, as an 
abstraction would, but gathers them up like a separate universal. To whatever 
extent this is achieved, it coincides with the awakening of the unum animae, 
the exercise of the perspicacity of the mind, and the beginning of the habit 
of supersapientia. For the commentator, the Dionysian motto that theology 
must proceed “not according to ourselves” must be understood in a double 
sense, exegetical and philosophical, and in both senses it was recollection.103 
To mend the torn vesture of Lady Philosophy was to ascend the ladder embla-
zoned upon it.
In the analysis of Berthold’s understanding of the macrocosm and micro-
cosm in Part 2, we have found that his project involved an ongoing dialogue 
with Dietrich of Freiberg’s works.104 It is in the thought of Berthold’s “mod-
ern sage” (sapiens modernus) that the interplay of philosophical insight and 
forgetfulness is also most apparent. Certain notions from Dietrich were iden-
tified by Berthold as authentically Platonic and were therefore embellished 
(absoluta essentia secundum se non habet rationem boni; transfusio interior; 
causa essentialis; maneries; ens secundum speciem; the agent intellect as the 
essential cause of the soul), some were openly criticised as Aristotelian (the 
transcendentia with the priority of ens, and the concomitant doctrine that 
intellectus efficit universalitatem in rebus), while others were handled ambiva-
lently (the gods as intellectus in actu per essentiam). Berthold’s multiplication 
of cosmological principles (infinities, beings, lives) followed from his applica-
tion of a few basic patterns of causal ordering from Proclus that he interpreted 
through Dietrich.105 He was led down these paths, far indeed “beyond the com-
mon path of reasonings”, because he could not share Dietrich’s hypothetical 
attitude to the divine science of the philosophers. If the metaphysics of the 
Good was perfectly realised in antiquity, it was no longer necessary to hypoth-
esise about the separate substances within the constraints of the metaphysics 
of being. With this he jettisoned Dietrich’s elegant Pauline distinction between 
the transience of the philosophers’ worldly scientia and the enduring caritas 
of practical life that looks beyond the boundaries of this world. For Berthold, 
the aim was to harmonise the microcosm as far as possible with the macro-
cosm, where the heavenly souls must already exercise the kind of providential 
 103 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 64, l. 410- 417.
 104 Sturlese, Homo divinus, p. 143: “Als Berthold die Entscheidung traf, die Philosophie 
Dietrichs in Form eines Prokloskommentars zu durchdenken […]”.
 105 See, for example, Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 4, p. 11, l. 201 – p. 12, l. 242; Prol. 
19, p. 28, l. 745 – p. 30, l. 828; 1D, p. 77, l. 228 – p. 78, l. 246; 8B, p. 158, l. 34 – p. 161, l. 141; 65F, 









cognition to which individuals aspire in patria106 – in other words, to live in 
accordance with the human nature that abides in Paradise, as the Clavis taught 
from the Fathers, or in Platonic terms, that abides in being (in ente) and the 
order of natural providence.107 Whereas Dietrich only acknowledged the pos-
sibility of a transitory raptus, for Berthold the contemplative ascent can and 
should pass over into the non- reflexive cognition of providence that mirrors 
the ecstasy of divine love and “the goodness of silence”. Berthold was emphatic 
that deification did not entail a dissolution of human individuality or human 
nature in God. Rather, it amounted to a harmonisation of the individual with 
human nature and the divine will through the unum animae.108 In this regard, 
the individual is restored to the natural providence that guides the macro-
cosm. As Berthold’s older contemporary put it, the highest bliss in this life is to 
be moved by the same love that moves the sun and the other stars.
It is here that parallels with some of Berthold’s closer contemporaries, espe-
cially Meister Eckhart, Henry of Ekkewint, or John Tauler, began to emerge.109 
Deification, as Berthold understood it through Proclus, Dionysius, the Clavis 
physicae, and Bernard of Clairvaux, is when the lower is elevated beyond itself 
to union with the higher, becomes transfused with the abundance it receives 
from above, and communicates that bounty to what is below. Nature is not 
destroyed; rather, the divided is taken up into an active unity or the unified 
coordination of its parts. What changes is that the Good itself now operates 
through the creature. As the Clavis put it, nothing is “seen” in the creature 
except God, for, in other words, the creature has become a cooperator with the 
divine. We may appreciate how careful Berthold was when he gave proof that 
 106 See, for example, Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 185G- M, p. 23, l. 310 – p. 28, l. 471.
 107 Berthold would have likely agreed with Eckhart’s declaration that “the blessedness Christ 
brought us was ours”. See Meister Eckhart, Predigt 5b (First Sunday after Trinity), ed. 
J. Quint, p. 87, l. 5- 6: Diu saelicheit, der er uns zuo truoc, diu was unser.
 108 To take one example from the conclusion of Eckhart’s most widely disseminated work 
in the Middle Ages, Die rede der underscheidunge, ed. J. Quint, Die deutschen Werke, vol. 5 
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963- 1987), c. 23, p. 309, l. 3- 5: Der allen sînen willen hât und sînen 
wunsch, der hât vröude; daz enhât nieman, dan des wille und gotes wille alzemâle einez ist. 
Die einunge gebe uns got. Âmen. (“Whoever has all his will and his desire has joy; no one 
has this unless his will and God’s will are entirely one. May God give us union. Amen.”).
 109 Cf. L. Sturlese, “Die Kölner Eckhartisten. Das Studium generale der deutschen Dominikaner 
und die Verurteilung der Thesen Meister Eckharts”, in A. Zimmermann (ed.), Die Kölner 
Universität im Mittelalter (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1989), p. 192– 211, reprinted in Sturlese, Homo 
divinus, p. 119– 135, at p. 134: “die Strategie Bertholds bestand darin, durch den Rückgriff 
auf die Philosophie Dietrichs von Freiberg und durch ihre Einbettung in den denk-
geschichtlichen Kontext der platonischen Tradition die spekulativen Instanzen Eckharts 










Proclus traversed all three motions of the soul by citing passages that are effec-
tively reports of an experience of the circular motion (the soul encountering 
its “sisters” in the heavens and moves beyond them to Boethian intelligentia) 
and the direct motion (beginning from creatures and culminating in the intel-
lectus adeptus and unum animae). In both cases, it seems the description of the 
exercise of this higher mode of knowing was a report of the experience of the 
doctrine of deification described objectively at 129B. The divided parts of cre-
ation are seen to be held together by a unity actively transfusing them, which 
the Asclepius had likened to “the torrent of divinity”, or which St. Benedict saw 
as a single ray of light enfolding the entire universe. Once the perspicacity of 
the mind has been exercised and puritas intellectualis has been received, the 
experience of the intellectus adeptus and unum animae is of creatures suddenly 
becoming transparent to their exemplar, just as the air is filled with light.110
In the exercise of the oblique motion that prepares for that vision, the unum 
animae is presupposed and gradually awakened; in each theorem or rung of the 
ladder, when the divided is gathered into a unity, the inherently dispossessive 
cognition of this principle (Dionysius: nullius neque sui ipsius neque alterius / 
melius est enim esse Dei et non nostri ipsorum; Proclus: sunt non sui ipsarum, sed 
illustrantium) is communicated more and more to the rest of the soul as the 
habitus is cultivated. As long as reason follows this motion, creatures will only 
seem to be “vestiges” of their ideas, contradictions and oppositions that beckon 
 110 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. C, p. 39, l. 73- 78. Cf. Meister Eckhart, 
Predigt 103 (First Sunday after Epiphany), ed. G. Steer, Die deutschen Werke, vol. 4 
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2003) p. 487, l. 121 – p. 489, l. 140. English translation: Meister 
Eckhart, The German Works. De tempore, p. 267– 269: “Now you may say: Ah, Lord, you 
mean, this birth should happen, so that the Son be born in me. Ah, can I have a sign 
by which I know that it has happened? Of course! Three true signs! Of them I will now 
mention one. I am often asked whether man can achieve that he is not hindered by time, 
crowd or matter. Yes, in truth, when this birth has taken place in truth, none of the crea-
tures will hinder you; rather, they all point you to God and to this birth. Take lightning as 
an example. Whatever the lightning hits, it strikes; whatever it hits, be it a tree, an animal 
or a man, it turns it immediately to itself. And if a man had turned his back to it, in this 
moment it would turn him round to face it. If a tree had a thousand leaves, they would 
all turn right side up towards the strike. See, so it happens with all who are touched and 
struck by this birth, they will suddenly turn to this birth with everything that is pres-
ent. Yes, as far as something can be coarse, yes, what before was an impediment for you, 
now will fully help you. Your face, therefore, will be turned towards this birth. Indeed, 
everything that you see or hear, whatever it is, you can only grasp in all things nothing but 
this birth. Indeed, all things become the naked God, as in all things you cannot recognize 
or love but the naked God. Just as if man had looked for a long time into the sun in heaven, 
what he sees after that is that the sun is placed in him. If you fail to search for God, to 




for resolution. This persists all the way up to the rational apprehension of the 
primordial causes, where the distinct cosmic genera have their source. But to 
move from that most unified state of the possible intellect to the “altogether 
at once” (cuncta simul) of beatifying intelligentia, either in its fleetingness or 
permanence, was not an automatic process for Berthold. It was the result of 
a divine work in the soul, as the best of the Platonists, pagan and Christian, 
acknowledged. This was the philosophical revelation of divinalis supersapien-
tia Berthold of Moosburg discerned in the distant past. In it he recognised an 
opportunity for the reform of theology by the recovery of the Platonic under-
standing of how nature and the soul are rooted in God, which the mind seems 
so predisposed to ignore. If we must conclude that Berthold has blurred the 
old boundary between nature and grace,111 and that the kinds of revelation 
involved are plural, this is because the hardened divisions we would employ to 
bring the conversation to a reassuring close are ill- suited to capture the lowly 
contemplator’s transient vision of a greater consensus.
 111 Cf. Meister Eckhart, Die rede der underscheidunge, c. 23, p. 306, l. 10 – p. 308, l. 3. English 
translation: Meister Eckhart, The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense, 
p. 284– 285: “There was a man who would dearly have liked to make a stream flow through 
his garden, and he said: ‘If the water could be mine, I should not care what sort of channel 
brought it to me, iron or timber, bone or rusty metal, if only I could have the water.’ And 
so anyone is quite wrong who worries about the means through which God is working his 








This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-nd 4.0 license.
Note on the Translation
The three prefaces of Berthold’s commentary (Prologue, Exposition of the 
Title, Preamble) have been translated from the critical edition in the Corpus 
Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi: Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio 
super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus, Propositiones 1- 13, eds M.R. 
Pagnoni- Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 5- 69. The transla-
tion incorporates the notes from this edition with slight modifications and 
additions, the most substantial being the new references to Thomas of York’s 
Sapientiale, which was frequently Berthold’s direct source.
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Prologue
The invisible things of God, from the creation of the 
world, are beheld, being understood through the 
things that are made.
Romans 1:20.
∵
[1] The greatest theologian of divinising wisdom, Paul, was aware of the hidden 
things of God because he was rapt into the third heaven.1 Speaking of those 
who are wise in worldly philosophy – after stating,2 “What is known of God is 
manifest to them, for God revealed it to them” – he adds, “The invisible things 
of God”, etc.
Now, Ambrose, in the Hexaemeron,3 which is found in the Gloss on these 
verses,4 says this: “God, whose nature is invisible, fashioned a work, so that 
he might be known from what is visible. By its visibility, the work points to its 
maker, so that the uncertain might be known through the certain, and so that 
the maker of this work (which could not possibly be made by human hands), 
would be believed to be the God of all.”
»“For the ways to the creator”, as Gundissalinus writes in his book On Creation,5 
“are his works. When we diligently turn our attention to these, we are able to reach 
the understanding of any hidden thing of God whatsoever”; indeed, “the crafting 
of the world is the setting- forth of the invisible things of God”, as Dionysius says to 
Titus.6«7 »Al- Ghazali alludes to this in treatise 3 of his Metaphysics,  chapter 
 1 2 Corinthians 12:2- 4.
 2 Romans 1:19. “Revelavit”: cf. Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, ed. I. Brady 
(Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971– 19813), lib. i, d. 3, c. 1, §1, 
p. 69, l. 8.
 3 Ambrosiaster, Commentarius in epistulas Paulinas. Pars prima. In epistulam ad Romanos, ed. 
H.J. Vogels (Wien: Hoelder / Pichler / Tempsky, 1966), In Rom. 1:19, p. 39, l. 28 – p. 41, l. 3; apud 
Peter Lombard, Sententiae, lib. i, d. 3, c. 1, §2, p. 69, l. 11- 14.
 4 Cf. Peter Lombard, Collectanea in Epistulas d. Pauli, In Rom. 1:18- 19 (pl 191, 1326C- D).
 5 Dominicus Gundissalinus, De processione mundi, ed. G. Bülow, Des D. Gundisalvi Schrift von 
dem Hervorgange der Welt (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1925), p. 2, l. 1- 3.
 6 Dionysius, Epistulae, ix.2 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 642; pg 3, 1108B).
 7 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 7 (F f. 7va). All references to the Sapientiale are to ms 
















11:8 the first principle is known only as the hidden is known through what is 
manifest, that is, as the exemplar is known through the exemplated, which are 
his works and attributes,«9 »for, according to Rabbi Moses in The Guide of the 
Perplexed,  chapter 33,10 “there is no way to the creator we seek except through 
his creatures, for these prove his existence and what one must believe about 
God”.«11
Dionysius, however, shows that God is a nature invisible not only to the bod-
ily and the spiritual eye, but even the eye of the mind, as he says in  chapter 1 of 
On the Divine Names:12 “Certainly the knowledge and contemplation of what he 
is (that is, God) is inaccessible to all beings, for the Good is supersubstantially 
separated from all. You will find that many theologians have praised him not 
only as invisible and incomprehensible, but also as inscrutable and unsearcha-
ble, just as those who have passed over into his hidden infinity have left no trace 
behind. And yet the Good is not entirely incommunicable to any being; indeed, 
he establishes singularly the supersubstantial ray within himself, and benevo-
lently sheds forth illuminations proportioned to every being, and elevates holy 
minds to the contemplation of him and to communion and assimilation with 
him, as far as possible.” Thus Dionysius. Damascene alludes to this in Book i, at 
the beginning,13 when he says: “He does not forsake us in complete ignorance, 
for he naturally implants in us the knowledge of his existence.”
And so, as is said in the Sentences,14 man has been assisted to know God in 
two ways: “from rational nature, and from the works made by God,” which man-
ifest the maker. I say, “from nature” because “what is known of God is manifest 
to them”.15 The Gloss explains:16 this refers to what can be known about God by 
the guidance of reason. And I say, “from works”, “for creation itself”, according 
 8 Cf. Al- Ghazali, Metaphysica, ed. J.T. Muckle, Algazel’s Metaphysics. A Medieval Translation 
(Toronto: St. Michael’s College, 1933), pars i, tr. 3, c. 11, p. 87, l. 3- 6.
 9 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 4 (F f. 5rb).
 10 Moses Maimonides, Dux seu director dubitantium aut perplexorum (Paris: Ascensius, 
1520), lib. i, c. 33, f. 12v.
 11 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 3 (F f. 3va).
 12 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 1.2 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 13– 15; pg 3, 588C- D).
 13 John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, ed. E.M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan 
Institute, 1955), lib. i, c. 1, p. 12, l. 21- 23 (pg 94, 789B); apud Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. 
i, c. 5 (F f. 5vb).
 14 Cf. Peter Lombard, Sententiae, lib. i, d. 3, c. 1, §1, p. 69, l. 6- 7; apud Albert the Great, Summa 
theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei. Libri I, pars I. Quaestiones 1- 50A, ed. D. Siedler 
(Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1978), pars i, tr. 3, q. 13, a. 4, p. 46, l. 12- 15.
 15 Romans 1:19.



















to Damascene in the passage just mentioned,17 “its permanence, and its gov-
ernance declare the greatness of the divine nature”. For this reason, those scru-
tinising the works of the creator are reproved in Wisdom,  chapter 13,18 because 
they did not know the creator from those works, for “from the greatness and 
beauty of the creature their creator could be seen by knowledge”.19 And so, 
according to Hugh, commenting on the Hierarchy of Dionysius,20 “nature, hav-
ing been established in servitude, pointed to its creator”.
Indeed, according to Augustine in Book iv of The Literal Commentary on 
Genesis,21 “there is no knowledge that is not preceded by objects to be known; 
these, moreover, are first in the Word, though which all things are made, before 
they are in all things that have been made. Thus, the human mind first expe-
riences through bodily sense those things that have been made and derives 
knowledge of them only in a small measure because of human weakness. It 
then seeks after their causes, if in some way it can attain them, which primar-
ily and immutably abide in the Word of God. Thus, it beholds the invisible 
things of the Word through the things which are made, once these things are 
understood. But who is unaware of how sluggish and dull the mind is at doing 
this, with what difficulty the mind undertakes it, and how long the mind tar-
ries because of the corruptible body that weighs down the soul, even when it 
is caught up with a most fervent zeal to undertake this search earnestly and 
diligently?”
[2] From all the foregoing, therefore, it follows that “the invisible things of 
God”, etc.
In these words introduced from Paul, we may consider three things: what 
is beheld, since it says “the invisible things of God”; from what and in what 
they are beheld, because it has “from the creation of the world”; and that 
through which they are beheld, because it has “through those things, which 
are made”, etc.
The first denotes the object to be understood; in the second, following a 
twofold interpretation, we have the subject to be pondered and the subject to 
be exercised and elevated; finally, the middle term that has been brought into 
view is discerned and analysed.
 17 John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, i.1, p. 12, l. 23- 24 (pg 94, 789B).
 18 Wisdom of Solomon 13:1- 4.
 19 Wisdom of Solomon 13:5; cf. Augustine, De Trinitate, eds W.J. Mountain, F. Glorie 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 1968), xv.2.3, p. 462, l. 36- 45.
 20 Hugh of St. Victor, Commentaria in Hierarchiam caelestem, i.1 (pl 175, 926A).
 21 Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, ed. J. Zycha (Wien: Tempsky, 1894), iv.32.49, p. 129, l. 25 – 












The object ultimately to be contemplated is, as it were, inscrutable, illimit-
able, and ineffable. For who shall thoroughly seek out the invisible things of 
God? Who shall lay hold of, I dare not say comprehend, the illimitable? Who 
shall describe the ineffable? For “the seeker shall be overcome by glory”;22 
the intruder into immensity shall be charged with wrongdoing; the one who 
declares the unsayable through their senselessness shall be laughed to scorn.
The subject especially to be pondered is fourfold: the bodily, the spiritual, 
the intellectual, and the unifical. Similarly, the subject especially to be exercised 
and elevated is threefold according to Augustine,23 but fourfold according to 
Dionysius:24 the bodily, the spiritual, the mental, and the unifical visual power.
The middle term that is really beheld, discerned, and analysed is also four-
fold: the bodily, the animated, the intellectual, and the unifical.
[3] Regarding the first, know that the invisible things of God can be 
taken in two ways: either intransitively or transitively.
In the first way, it means the following: the invisible things of God are God, 
as we read in the First Letter to Timothy,  chapter 1:25 “Unto the King of ages, 
the immortal” (the Gloss:26 “immutable”), “invisible” (the Gloss: “incomprehen-
sible”), “the King of ages” (the Gloss: “the Trinity”).
Augustine, in his book On Seeing God,  chapter 2,27 discussing the words of 
Ambrose, says this: “God is an invisible nature.” And later:28 “Undoubtedly the 
error of the Arians is increased if it is believed that the Father’s nature is invis-
ible while the Son’s is visible. Therefore, Ambrose affirmed that the nature of 
both is one and is equally invisible, and to this he added the Holy Spirit.” And 
below:29 “Therefore, God is an invisible nature, not just the Father, but the 
Trinity itself is one God.” Thus Augustine. And so not only is the Father invisi-
ble, as some30 interpret the words of the Apostle to the Colossians,  chapter 1,31 
where he speaks of the Son, “who is the image of the invisible God”; rather, the 
 22 Proverbs 25:27.
 23 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Prologus 20, n. 247.
 24 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Prol. 15, n. 160.
 25 1 Timothy 1:17.
 26 Peter Lombard, Collectanea in Epistulas d. Pauli, In 1 Tim. 1:6- 17 (pl 192, 333C).
 27 Augustine, Epistulae, ed. A. Goldbacher (Wien: Tempsky, 1895- 1923), 147.7, §19, p. 292, l. 10- 
11; cf. Ambrose, Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam, ed. M. Adriaen (Turnhout: Brepols, 
1957), p. 18, l. 369 – p. 20, l. 432.
 28 Augustine, Epistulae, 147.7, §19, p. 293, l. 1- 4.
 29 Augustine, Epistulae, 147.8, §20, p. 293, l. 13- 14.
 30 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, In omnes s. Pauli Apostoli epistolas commentaria, 2 vols 
(Torino: Marietti, 1929), vol. 2, Ad Col. 1, lect. 4, p. 119a.





















Son is consubstantial, that is, coessential with the Father, and thus is invisible 
like the Father.
Concerning the invisibility of the Trinity, Dionysius says this in  chapter 2 
of On the Divine Names:32 “In the divine union, that is, in supersubstantiality, 
these are all one and common with the primary Trinity: the supersubstantial 
Essence, the superdivine Deity, the Goodness beyond good [superbona boni-
tas], which is the Identity beyond all of the complete Characteristic existing 
beyond all, the Unity beyond the principiated, the Ineffable, the Pluriluminous, 
Ignorance, absolute Unintelligibility.” Thus Dionysius. If God is unknowable, 
he is invisible. And below:33 “For all divine things and whatever is revealed to 
us are known only through participations. Those things themselves, whatever 
they are in their own principle and foundation, are beyond the mind, beyond 
all substance and all knowing.” Thus Dionysius. These are the proper invisible 
things of God in the strict sense.
There are also the appropriated or attributed invisible things of God, 
according to the words of Hugh of St. Victor:34 “The invisible things of God are 
three: power, wisdom, and benevolence.”
The invisible things of God are equally the eternal and immutable reasons 
existing in the Word of God the Father, according to what is said by Augustine 
in Book vi of On the Trinity,  chapter 10:35 “The Word … is the art of the omnip-
otent and wise God, and is filled with all living, immutable reasons.” Dionysius 
calls these reasons “exemplars” in  chapter 5 of On the Divine Names,36 where 
he says: “We say that the exemplars in God are the substantiating reasons of 
beings and that they singularly preexist. Theology calls them the predefini-
tions of beings and the determinative and effective divine wills, according to 
which the supersubstantial Substance has predefined and produced all things.”
We read this in the Letter to the Hebrews,  chapter 11:37 “By faith we under-
stand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God, so that visible things 
would arise from invisible things.” Augustine glosses this as follows:38 “What is 
meant by ‘from invisible things’ is the invisible world, which was in the wisdom 
 32 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 2.4 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 76– 77; pg 3, 641A).
 33 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 2.7 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 94; pg 3, 645A).
 34 Hugh of St. Victor, De tribus diebus, ed. D. Poirel (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), p. 3, l. 6 – p. 4, 
l. 7 (pl 176, 811C).
 35 Augustine, De Trinitate, vi.10.11, p. 241, l. 20- 23.
 36 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 5.8 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 360– 361; pg 3, 824C).
 37 Hebrews 11:3.
 38 Cf. Peter Lombard, Collectanea in Epistulas d. Pauli, In Hebr. 11:2- 4 (pl 192, 489D- 490A); 
Albert the Great, Summa theologiae, ed. A. Borgnet, vol. 31 (Paris: Vivès, 1894), pars i, tr. 13, 
















of God, after whose likeness this visible world was made … This is the arrange-
ment according to which he has arranged all things, so that they would arise 
after the manner of the intelligible exemplar that was in God’s mind.” Thus 
Augustine.
Augustine himself discusses these eternal reasons in question 73 of 83 
Questions in the following terms:39 “Now there are certain primary ideas, 
forms, or reasons of things. These are stable and immutable, unlike the things 
themselves that have been formed. And so the eternal reasons, which are 
held together in the divine intelligence, always exist in the same mode. And 
while these never come to be or pass away, everything that can come to be and 
pass away, and everything that does come to be and pass away, is said to be 
formed according to them.” He says this, and much else besides, in the same 
text. Accordingly, he declares40 that “such power is placed in them, that no one 
can be wise without knowing them”. Augustine also discusses these reasons at 
length in Book v of The Literal Commentary on Genesis,41 and how God knows 
all things in them and produces all things through them.
Let these words suffice for now concerning the invisible things of God in the 
first sense, that is, when taken intransitively.
[4] But if the invisible things of God are taken transitively, then in this 
sense, according to Thomas Gallus, commenting on  chapter 11 of On the Divine 
Names,42 “the divine Good is said to be the Substantiator”, namely, “of his invis-
ible things, which are the rays, so to speak, of superunified Goodness, such as 
per se being, per se life, and so on”. Al- Farabi discusses these invisible things 
in his treatise On the Cause of Causes,43 which begins, “The Principle of prin-
ciples”, and states the following: “Therefore, there are exemplars, the primary 
causes of things.” And below:44 “The first causes, because of their infinite dif-
fusion over all things and the incomprehensible height of the ineffable purity 
of their excellence, are not perceived by intellect, because they are not outside 
the First, who formed them in the principle.” And below:45 “The invisible things 
are hidden away in the shadows of his excellence, but in their effects – brought 
forth, as it were, into a certain light of cognition – they ceaselessly appear.” 
 39 Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus lxxxiii, ed. A. Mutzenbecher (Turnhout: Brepols, 
1975), q. 46, p. 71, l. 26- 32.
 40 Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus lxxxiii, q. 46, p. 70, l. 10- 11.
 41 Cf. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, v.13.29- v.18.36, p. 156, l. 9 – p. 161, l. 16.
 42 Thomas Gallus, Extractio de Divinis nominibus (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 705b).
 43 Liber de causis primis et secundis, ed. R. de Vaux, Notes et textes sur l’avicennisme latin aux 
confins des XIIe- XIIIe siècles (Paris: Vrin, 1934), c. 2, p. 91, l. 15- 16.
 44 Liber de causis primis et secundis, c. 2, p. 92, l. 12- 16.
















Thus Al- Farabi. Concerning these primordial causes, which Dionysius calls 
“per se power”,46 “per se being”47 or “being- itself”, and so on, and “the principles 
of beings”, Dionysius himself says the following in  chapter 5 of On the Divine 
Names:48 “Being- itself is both more ancient than per se life, and more ancient 
than per se wisdom.” And later:49 “I say that he made being- itself to preexist, 
and through being- itself he made to subsist everything that exists in any way. 
And because the principles of beings participate the Being of all, they exist and 
are principles; first they exist, and then they are principles. And if the power 
of what lives, insofar as it is the principle of what lives, is called per se life …”.
Concerning this passage in Dionysius, Maximus in his Comment writes:50 
“There are primordial causes, which the Greeks call ‘ideas’, meaning ‘species’ 
or ‘eternal and immutable forms’, according to which and in which the visible 
world is formed and governed. This is why, among the Greek sages, they earned 
the name potyn, which means the primary exemplars that the Father made in 
the Word, and which he divided and multiplied in his effects through the Holy 
Spirit. They are also called porismata, meaning ‘predestinations’, for in them 
all things whatsoever come to be and are made by the divine providence, and 
they are predestined all together and at once; for nothing among visible and 
invisible creatures arises by nature before it is predefined and preordained in 
these causes, prior to all time and extension.” And shortly thereafter:51 “The 
ideas are frequently called ‘divine wills’ by the philosophers, and especially by 
the Platonists, since whatever God willed to make, he primarily and causally 
made in them.” And below:52 “Dionysius and other saints called these forms 
or ideas ‘goodness- through- itself ’, ‘essence- through- itself ’, ‘life- through- itself ’, 
‘power- through- itself ’, ‘wisdom- through- itself ’ … For whatsoever is good, is 
good through participation in per se goodness, and whatsoever exists, exists 
by participation in per se essence, and whatsoever lives, lives by participa-
tion in per se life (and so on for the other participations and participants) … 
Accordingly, no power, either general or particular, is found in the nature of 
 46 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 8.2 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 418; pg 3, 889D).
 47 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 5.5 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 337 [transl. Eriugenae]; pg 
3, 820A).
 48 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 5.5 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 337; pg 3, 820A).
 49 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 5.5 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 339; pg 3, 820B).
 50 Commentator, In De divinis nominibus, 5 (ms Paris, BnF lat. 17341, f. 247ra- b); apud Albert 
the Great, Summa theologiae, pars i, tr. 13, q. 55, m. 2, a. 1, p. 559b- 560a.
 51 Commentator, In De divinis nominibus, 5 (ms Paris, BnF lat. 17341, f. 247rb); apud Albert the 
Great, Summa theologiae, pars i, tr. 13, q. 55, m. 2, a. 1, p. 560a.
 52 Commentator, In De divinis nominibus, 5 (ms Paris, BnF lat. 17341, f. 247rb- va); apud Albert 















things, which does not proceed from the primordial causes by an ineffable par-
ticipation.” Thus Maximus.
In  chapter 11 of On the Divine Names,53 where Dionysius explains in what 
sense God was sometimes called per se Being and per se Life, and at other times 
the Substantiator of per se being and per se life, he also says this: “We say ‘per se 
being’, ‘per se life’, and ‘per se deity’ in a divine sense and in a causal sense: caus-
ally, with respect to the one superprincipial and supersubstantial Principle and 
Cause of all, but divinely and participably (we say that) providential powers are 
given from out of the imparticipable God, who is the per se Substantiator, the 
per se Vivifier, the per se Deifier. Beings, according to their characteristic, exist 
by virtue of these and are called participants, givers of life, existents, divine 
things, and so on. For this reason (God) is first said to be the Substantiator of 
them, then of their wholes, then of their particulars, and finally of what partic-
ipates in them particularly. And what should be said about these? Since some 
of our divine and holy teachers indeed call the Substantiator of per se goodness 
and deity ‘the Beyond- good’ and ‘the Beyond- divine’, calling ‘per se goodness 
and deity’ the beneficent and deifying gift coming forth from God, and ‘per se 
beauty’ at once the per se beautifying effusion, the whole beauty and the par-
ticular beauty, the completely beautiful and the partially beautiful, and what-
ever other things have been or may be said in a similar fashion, they are point-
ing to the providences and goodness participated by beings. These providences 
proceed from God by an abundant effusion and are superabundant, so that 
the Cause of all is strictly above all and, supersubstantially and supernaturally, 
altogether exceeds what exists according to any substance or nature.” This is 
what Dionysius says about the First Cause as such and the primordial causes, 
which he calls the thearchy, the agatharchy [principatum boni], the primary 
principles of beings, deities, goodnesses, unities, and the beneficent and deify-
ing gifts of the Beyond- deity and the Beyond- good, who is the imparticipable 
and superprincipial God beyond every principle.
Dionysius’ Second Letter to the monk Gaius should be understood in this way. 
It reads as follows:54 “How is it that he is beyond all and beyond the thearchy 
and beyond the agatharchy? In this way: if you took ‘deity’ and ‘goodness’ to 
mean the exercise of the beneficent gift and the inimitable imitation of the 
Beyond- deity and the Beyond- good, by which we are deified and made good. 
For indeed, if this is the principle of deification and of deifying the blessed, 
he is the Superprincipial beyond every principle and beyond this deity and 
 53 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 11.6 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 521– 526; pg 3, 953D- 956B).






goodness, just as he is beyond the thearchy and agatharchy. Insofar as he is 
inimitable and incomprehensible, he exceeds the imitations and relations of 
what imitates and what participates him.” Thus Dionysius in the Letter.
See how Dionysius declares so plainly that the First Cause as such is beyond- 
god, beyond- good and is principial beyond every principle, beyond deity and 
goodness, and beyond the thearchy and the agatharchy! Accordingly, the 
beyond- blessed Trinity of primary persons, in which “the Father is fontal deity, 
but the Son and the Holy Spirit are god- born of deity, if one must speak in 
this way, and burgeonings of the divine nature, and are like flowers and super-
substantial lights”55 – this Trinity, I say, is “supersubstantial, beyond- god, 
and beyond- good”, according to Dionysius at the beginning of the Mystical 
Theology.56
Concerning these gods – above which is God, the great Lord and great 
King, “the primary God and the one God supersubstantially beyond- god”,57 
who is “exalted in the highest”58 for he is “God the Lord of gods”59 – Dionysius 
writes the following,60 using the words of the Apostle:61 “For if there are gods 
either in heaven or on earth, just as there are indeed many gods and lords, 
yet to us truly there is one God: the Father, from whom are all things and 
we in him, and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and we 
through him.”
These gods, as is said in the book On the Existence of Evils,62 “are beyond 
beings and are the measures of being, because every being is in them as in 
unitary numbers, and yet beings proceed from them”.
These gods are called unities and goodnesses, which God, who is the pri-
marily One and Good, produced, as is said in question 10 of On Providence:63 
“Indeed, every god, as I have said already, exists as a god according to the One 
(which we emphatically declare to exist prior to intellect), being identical with 
the Good and proceeding from the Good. Now, there are two kinds of unities or 
 55 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 2.7 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 96– 97; pg 3, 645B).
 56 Dionysius, De mystica theologia, 1.1 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 565; pg 3, 997A).
 57 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 2.11 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 116– 117; pg 3, 649C).
 58 Psalm 96:9.
 59 Psalm 49:1.
 60 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 2.11 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 118; pg 3, 649D- 652A).
 61 Cf. 1 Corinthians 8:5- 6: Nam etsi sunt qui dicantur dii sive in caelo […].
 62 Proclus, De malorum subsistentia, ed. H. Boese, Tria opuscula (De providentia, libertate, 
malo). Latine Guilelmo de Moerbeka vertente et Graece ex Isaacii Sebastocratoris aliorum-
que scriptis collecta (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1960), c. 2, §11, p. 190, l. 15 – p. 191, l. 17.
 63 Proclus, De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam, ed. H. Boese, q. 10, §63, p. 102, l. 1 – 


















goodnesses that the Good produced, being the cause of both and yet remain-
ing one in another way; some of these are self- complete, meaning per se per-
fect, but others are scattered into what participates the causes. For the ‘one’ 
and the ‘good’ are threefold: either according to cause, namely, the First, for 
he is the Good and Cause of beings and of all goods and unities; or according 
to existence, namely, any god existing as one and good; or according to partic-
ipation, namely, the one and good in substances, by which every substance is 
unified and is boniform. Every god, then, if it is a unity, is a self- complete unity, 
that is, per se perfect, for it is not the being of another, but of itself. But every 
intellect and soul that participates a certain one is unifical, for it is a certain 
one that soul and intellect participate.”
From what has been said it is abundantly clear that God, the Lord of gods, 
is called “God” in one sense, because he is God according to cause primarily, 
that the gods that are produced are called “god” in another sense, because 
each is a god according to essence, and, finally, in another sense, that those 
who participate deity called “god”, as Boethius says in Book iii of On the 
Consolation of Philosophy, prose 10:64 “Everyone in bliss is god; certainly, 
God is one by nature, but nothing prevents there being as many gods as you 
please by participation.” Now if you object, “So gods according to essence 
do not exist!”, I say that the two are not mutually exclusive, since every god 
according to essence participates deity inasmuch as it does not have deity 
in its superabundance like the primarily God, who is blessed throughout 
the ages.
So much for the first kind of transitive invisible things mentioned above.
[5] The invisible things also include the effects of the primordial causes, and 
these are either per se perfect or have their subsistence in others.
The per se perfect are, for example, infinities, true beings, lives, intellectual 
hypostases, total and partial souls, and what participates in these. Concerning 
these primordial causes and their effects, Dionysius says the following in 
 chapter 11,65 as was recounted above: “And the good God is first said to be 
Substantiator of them (that is, of per se being, per se power, and so on), and 
then of their wholes (that is, of the orders that the primordial causes institute; 
these orders are called wholes because they are per se perfect), and then of 
their particulars (that is, of the singulars of these orders), and then of what 
participates in them particularly (in which the perfections of the higher exist 
 64 Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, ed. C. Moreschini, De consolatione philosophiae. 
Opuscula theologica (München / Leipzig: Saur, 20052), lib. iii, prosa 10, p. 84, l. 85- 86.






neither first nor per se, such as the intellectuality that is participated particu-
larly in us and by us human beings).”
These are the invisible things of God taken transitively, which are discussed 
most subtly in this Theological Elementation within the domain of natural 
providence.
[6] For there are also the invisible things of God in the order of voluntary 
providence, such as the angels, which, as Proclus says in On the Existence of 
Evils,  chapter 3,66 are “the class that is the interpreter of the gods, existing in 
continuity with the gods. This class knows the mind of the gods and brings the 
divine will to light. Surely it is a divine light proceeding from the light abiding 
within the sanctuary that appears without, and is nothing other than the Good 
proceeding and coming to light first of all from those that remain inside the 
One. For it is necessary to make the procession of wholes continuous; but one 
thing is by nature consequent upon another because it is similar. Many goods, 
therefore, are consequent upon the founts of goods, that is, the number of uni-
ties that remain concealed within the ineffable Fount. Continuous with these 
founts is the first number of things proceeding and descending from here, sta-
tioned as it were at the portals, that is, before the gates of the gods, uttering 
forth their silence.” Thus Proclus.
The invisible things of God are also human souls and especially the blessed 
with their glorified bodies. For bodies that are not glorified are visible, though 
there are exceptions to this, for the universal elements, the celestial element, 
and certain familiar elements, such as fire as it exists in its own sphere, are not 
visible; only compressed bodies, which arrest the visual ray by their density, are 
visible. But as to how other spirits are invisible, such as demons, or our souls 
with rational and intellectual powers, or how prime matter and substantial 
forms are invisible, all of this I pass over for now.
So much then for the first part regarding the invisible things of God.
[7] Now there follows the second part: from the creation of 
the world.
In this part, we observe both the “from which” and the “in which” (for “from 
the creation of the world” can be taken either objectively or subjectively); here, 
in other words, the object to be pondered and the subject to be exercised and 
elevated are considered. As to the first, if “the creation of the world” is taken 
intransitively, the totality of all things is to be pondered; but if it is taken tran-
sitively, it refers to the being of certain things. The second, what is to be exer-
cised, refers to the perspicacity of the mind.
 66 Proclus, De malorum subsistentia, c. 3, §14, p. 194, l. 8- 18. 
 
Prologue 373
Now “world” comes from “adornment”: for “cosmos” in Greek, which is 
the same as “adornment”, is translated into Latin as “world”.67 In this way, 
“world” can be interpreted either with reference to the macrocosm or to the 
microcosm.
[8] The macrocosm, meaning the greater world, is described by Trismegistus 
to his companion Asclepius as follows:68 “The world is the immutable work of 
God, a glorious construction, a good work composed of a multiform variety of 
images, a mechanism of God’s will, who sustains his work without jealousy.”
[9] Regarding this description one should observe that the world is called 
a work and not a creature. Perhaps this is because of the primordial causes. 
For these, as was said above with Maximus,69 God “the Father made in the 
Son, and divided and multiplied in his effects through the Holy Spirit”, and 
according to them the visible world is formed and governed. For this reason, 
Dionysius says70 that, through being- itself, God made to preexist “all that he 
made to subsist in any way”, for being or being- itself is one of the primordial 
causes.
For this reason, Theodorus in the Key71 does not dare call them “creatures”, 
for they are “the heaven of heavens” and “the waters that are above the heav-
ens”.72 As it is written in the Psalm:73 “For he spoke, and they were made; he 
commanded, and they were created.” Now, the primordial causes are called 
“heavens” [caeli] by derivation, either from “concealing” [a celando] or because 
they are the houses of the sun [casae elios], that is, the abode of the highest 
God,74 who dwells in darkness and light inaccessible75 “and has made the 
shadows his hiding place”.76 All of these notions signify the primordial causes 
 67 Cf. Isidore of Seville, Etymologiarum sive Originum libri xx, ed. W.M. Lindsay, 2 vols 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911), vol. 1, lib. xiii, c. 1, §2; Papias, Elementarium doctrinae 
rudimentum (Venezia: Pincius, 1496), s.v. “Mundus”, f. 106v.
 68 Asclepius, ed. C. Moreschini, Apulei opera quae supersunt. Vol. iii. De philosophia libri 
(Leipzig: Teubner, 1991), c. 25, p. 66, l. 21 – p. 67, l. 2; apud Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. 
vii, c. 1 (F f. 212rb).
 69 Commentator, In De divinis nominibus, 5 (ms Paris, BnF lat. 17341, f. 247ra- b); apud Albert 
the Great, Summa theologiae, pars i, tr. 13, q. 55, m. 2, a. 1, p. 559b- 560a.
 70 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 5.5 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 339; pg 3, 820B).
 71 Cf. Honorius Augustodunensis, Clavis physicae, ed. P. Arfé, La Clavis physicae (316- 529) di 
Honorius Augustodunensis (Napoli: Liguori Editore, 2012), c. 333, p. 71, l. 327 – p. 72, l. 346.
 72 Psalm 148:4.
 73 Psalms 32:9 and 148:5.
 74 Huguccio of Pisa, Derivationes, eds E. Cecchini et al., 2 vols (Firenze: sismel – Edizioni 
del Galluzzo, 2004), vol. 2, s.v. “Celo” (C123, p. 210, §7).
 75 Cf. 1 Timothy 6:16.




















themselves. They are also the “waters” that are above the heavens, according 
to the interpretation of Theodorus in the Key,77 where he explains what is said 
in Genesis 1,78 “the Spirit of God was borne above the waters”, to mean that 
“he is supereminent above established causes in the excellence of knowledge”. 
For the God of gods himself, that is, God the Father, “spoke”, meaning he begot 
the Son, in whom these most divine things “were made”; he “commanded” 
these most divine things, the primordial causes, and all things “were created” 
in them, that is, through them, through the Holy Spirit, who divided and mul-
tiplied them in his effects.
Therefore, Hermes said the world is a “work” and, moreover, a work of the 
highest artificer, who accomplished his work, the universe of things, within 
which the primordial causes are supereminent. It is, I say, a work that is most 
perfect, most beautiful, and most orderly.
It is a “work”, which is a word derived from “labour”, because, according to 
Cicero in Book ii of On the Nature of the Gods,79 the world is “the sower, the 
planter, and the begetter of all things governed by nature and is, so to speak, 
the rearer and nourisher that gives nutriment to all things, which are like its 
limbs and parts, and contains them”.
It is “most perfect” because, according to Plato in the Timaeus,80 “God the 
artificer made” the world resemble the most perfect thing, namely, “the intelli-
gible substance, the nature that is eminent, primary, and perfect in every way”. 
Therefore, the world is perfect in every way, and contains all things by imita-
tion, which the intelligible world contains through its essence.
It is “most beautiful”, since it is formed after the fairest exemplar, just as 
Boethius sings in Book iii of On the Consolation, metre 9:81
From the supernal exemplar
You lead all things out, you who are most beautiful; the beautiful world
You carry in your mind, and you form it after your image and likeness.
 77 Honorius Augustodunensis, Clavis physicae, ed. P. Lucentini (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e 
Letteratura, 1974), c. 87, p. 62, l. 4- 5.
 78 Genesis 1:2.
 79 Cicero, De natura deorum, eds O. Plasberg, W. Ax (Leipzig: Teubner, 1933), ii.34.86, p. 83, 
l. 15- 18; apud Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 1 (F f. 212rb).
 80 Plato, Timaeus, ed. J.H. Waszink, Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus 
(London / Leiden: The Warburg Institute / Brill, 1962), 30d- 31a, p. 23, l. 16- 18; apud Thomas 
of York, Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 2 (F f. 57rb- va).












And likewise, according to Trismegistus, from the same text mentioned ear-
lier,82 “the world is prepared by God as the dwelling place of all species”, and 
thus is most beautiful [speciosissimus].
The world is “most orderly”, for it is made in wisdom by the Beyond- wise, who 
reaches from the supernal to the lowest bound, and arranges all things sweetly 
in weight, number, and measure,83 or in order, form, and mode.84 For nothing 
is without order, as Trismegistus says in the same text,85 since everything that 
is made is ordered and “nothing is without the composition of order”. Order, 
according to Augustine,86 is “the arrangement that allots to things equal and 
unequal their proper place”. For “in all things”, according to Trismegistus,87 “the 
world is sustained by order”. For this reason, in Book ii of On the Nature of the 
Gods,88 Cicero says that the world is that than which “nothing is better, nothing 
superior, nothing more beautiful”.
And so, the world is rightly called “the work of God”, who is the King of 
kings, the Lord of lords, the God of gods.89 As Dionysius says in  chapter 12 of 
On the Divine Names,90 “Scripture calls by the name of kings, lords, and gods 
the more primary adornments in each [dominion].”
Since, therefore, the primordial causes are the most primary things above 
the whole universe, they are kings, lords, and gods. Above them and their king-
doms and dominions is God, the great Lord and King above all gods, above 
which he is exalted in the highest.91 There is nothing like his work in all the 
kingdoms of the gods. For although they reign and preside in their kingdoms, 
as Proclus says in On the Existence of Evils,92 since their kingdoms are partial 
universes, that is, parts of the whole universe, they fall short of its perfection. 
This universe is the work of the highest God, which enfolds all things and is the 
kingdom of all the ages, whose glory even the gods themselves will proclaim, 
 82 Asclepius, c. 3, p. 42, l. 4- 5; apud Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 1 (F f. 212rb).
 83 Wisdom of Solomon 8:1.
 84 Cf. Augustine, De natura boni, i.3 (pl 42, 553).
 85 Asclepius, c. 39, p. 84, l. 8; apud Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 37 (F f. 42vb), lib. ii, 
c. 1 (F f. 51ra).
 86 Augustine, De civitate Dei, eds B. Dombart, A. Kalb (Turnhout: Brepols, 1955), xix.13, 
p. 679, l. 11- 12.
 87 Asclepius, c. 39, p. 84, l. 8- 9; apud Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 37 (F f. 42vb), lib. ii, 
c. 1 (F f. 51ra).
 88 Cicero, De natura deorum, ii.7.18, p. 56, l. 18- 20; apud Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. vii, 
c. 1 (F f. 212rb).
 89 Cf. Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 12.1 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 527; pg 3, 969A).
 90 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 12.4 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 535; pg 3, 972B).
 91 Cf. Psalm 96:9.























declaring themselves to be the work of the highest God, who “established it 
forever and into the age of ages”.93
[10] And then there follows in Trismegistus: “immutable”.
And this seems obvious with respect to the intelligible world, whether the 
supersubstantial or the substantial intellectual world, which is complete being, 
and is stable, fixed and immobile, immutable and eternal. For this reason, it is 
described by Pliny94 as follows: “The world” is “without beginning and without 
end, … sacred, immense, eternal, all in all, and truly is itself whole; infinite, and 
yet like what is finite; the most determinate of all, and yet like what is indeter-
minate; enfolding at once in itself all things within and without; at once the 
work of the nature of things and the nature of things itself.”
The sensible world, however, is becoming and is not stable or fixed, but is 
moving and mutable. Plato in the Timaeus95 also describes it in this way: the 
world “is begotten and not eternal, … the object of opinion through fragile 
sense, since it is indeterminate, arises and perishes, and never retains a fixed 
and stable position”. Thus Plato.
The world soul96 is the nexus of these two worlds, the sensible and the 
intelligible. According to Plato,97 it is a self- moving essence, and thus agrees 
with the higher through its essence and with the lower through its animating 
motion. And although the sensible world regarded in itself is becoming and 
mutable, yet in its totality the world, insofar as it simply enfolds the works 
of the beyond- blessed God altogether, is an immutable work. For every work 
proceeding from an immobile cause as such has an immutable essence.98 For 
this reason, Pliny says that the world is eternal, and the philosopher Secundus 
says that it is “an eternal steadfastness”,99 and thus is an eternal arrangement or 
work that remains upright, is ruled over, and is ordered, and thus is immutable.
Behold: “his work is full of the glory of the Lord”!100
 93 Psalm 148:6.
 94 Pliny, Naturalis historia, ed. K. Mayhoff, 5 vols (Leipzig: Teubner, 1892- 1909), vol. 1, ii.1.1- 2, 
p. 128, l. 12- 20; apud Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 1 (F f. 212rb).
 95 Plato, Timaeus, 27d- 28a, p. 20, l. 16- 20; apud Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 1 (F f. 
212rb).
 96 Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 34b, p. 26, l. 17- 19.
 97 Cf. Macrobius, Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis, ed. J. Willis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1970), 
i.14.19, p. 58, l. 30- 31.
 98 Cf. Proclus, Elementatio theologica, translata a Guillelmo de Morbecca, ed. H. Boese 
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1987), prop. 76, p. 40, l. 1- 2.
 99 Vita Secundi philosophi, ed. B.E. Perry, Secundus the Silent Philosopher. The Greek Life of 
Secundus (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964), 8.1, p. 78, l. 13- 14 and p. 94; apud Thomas 
of York, Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 1 (F f. 212ra).


















[11] And so, fittingly, there follows in Trismegistus: “a glorious construction”, 
which means an edifice filled with glory.
Now, glory is defined in four ways. According to Cicero,101 it is the praise pro-
claimed from the mouth of many, or it is a proclamation widely disseminated; 
or, according to Augustine,102 it is “recognition with illustrious praise”; or, 
finally, it is “what no reasonable person would hesitate to bestow”, as Aristotle 
says.103 According to Aristotle, glory makes itself manifest to everyone’s aware-
ness by its nobility and honour. Glory belongs to God in these ways, for only 
he can be proclaimed by the mouth of many, because all things declare the 
glory of his magnificence and tell of his wonderous deeds104 in the glorious 
construction of the world that “he made magnificently”,105 which is also set 
forth with illustrious praise before the recognition of all, so that, in his work, 
its builder may be “praiseworthy and glorious unto the ages”.106 He appears 
here, through his glorious construction, with his nobility and honour before 
the face of all who are aware of him, for in it he has made all things noble and 
honourable.
Now if, as Proclus says in his commentary on the Parmenides, “the world 
is the plenitude of every kind of species”,107 and, »as Trismegistus says in the 
text mentioned above,108 it is “the receptacle and container of everything 
God governs”, and according to Cicero in Book ii of On the Nature of the Gods, 
 chapter 15,109 it is “the common abode and city of both gods and human beings” 
and, according to the philosopher Secundus,110 it is “the admirable furnish-
ment” (which means the lofty and beautiful instrument and adornment) – from 
 101 Cicero, De inventione, ed. E. Stroebel (Leipzig: Teubner, 1915), ii.55.166, p. 150b, l. 18- 19; 
Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes, ed. M. Pohlenz (Leipzig: Teubner, 1919), iii.2.3, p. 317, 
l. 24 – p. 318, l. 1; vel potius Glossa interlinearis, in Biblia Sacra cum Glossis interlineari 
et ordinaria […] (Lyons: Trechsel, 1545), Ps. 70:8, f. 184v, ex Cassiodorus, Expositio in 
Psalterium, 70:8 (pl 70, 498C).
 102 Augustine, Contra Maximinum haereticum Arianorum episcopum, ii.13 (pl 42, 770).
 103 Aristotle, Topica, translatio Boethii, ed. L. Minio- Paluello (Bruxelles / Paris: Desclée de 
Brouwer, 1969), iii.3, 118b21- 22, p. 57, l. 24- 25.
 104 Cf. Psalm 18:2.
 105 Isaiah 12:5.
 106 Daniel 3:56.
 107 Proclus, Expositio in Parmenidem Platonis, ed. C. Steel, Commentaire sur le Parménide de 
Platon, traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke. Tome I. Livres I à IV (Leuven: Presses univer-
sitaires de Louvain, 1982), lib. iii, p. 136, l. 99 – p. 137, l. 00.
 108 Cf. Asclepius, c. 17, p. 55, l. 13- 15; apud Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 1 (F f. 212rb).
 109 Cicero, De natura deorum, ii.62.154, p. 112, l. 30- 31; apud Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. 
vii, c. 1 (F f. 212rb).























all of this it follows that the world must be a glorious construction, made not of 
timber and stones, but of all sensible and intelligible things. For this reason, it 
is called the common abode of gods (whether according to essence or accord-
ing to participation) and of human beings, and especially of those who are 
wise in the wisdom that is the virtue and final possibility of every science, and 
which is the possession of divine individuals who know all things in the high-
est degree. And this is fitting, for this wisdom is attained through the causes 
of all things, which are known through two kinds of toil, namely, through the 
labours demanded even of the person who is divine, and through the labours 
inherent to the things themselves by virtue of their perfection beyond perfec-
tion, according to which they exceed every principle of knowing. Just so are 
the primordial causes, which are in the ineffable Fount of all goods, the God of 
gods whose majesty is ineffable and indescribable.
Now, this world is also called “an abode”. This is the orb- shaped111 abode that 
the beyond- wise Wisdom, who is “an infinite sphere, whose centre is every-
where and circumference nowhere”,112 “built for itself”,113 provoking a certain 
sage114 to cry aloud: “O Israel, how great is the abode of God, and how vast is 
the place of his possession; it is great and has no end; it is high and immeasura-
ble!” O Israel, you are a man most upright and a man who sees, by virtue of your 
lively effort in the study of divine wisdom, how great is the abode of God.115
“The abode of God” is said to be the circuit of all those things in which God 
shows himself, either through power, through the effects of nature, grace, and 
glory, through his image, or through his vestige. For in all these things the 
elegance and glory of divine contemplation are shown. Wherefore, a certain 
Israelite declared:116 “Lord, I have loved the elegance of your abode, and the 
place of the habitation of your glory.”
The “elegance” of the abode is the beauty of form [formae], because in it 
there are wonderous works, works that are lofty, glorious, and concealed. For 
“the place of the habitation of his glory”, which is light inaccessible, is beyond 
 111 Cf. Hermes Latinus, Liber de sex  rerum principiis, eds P. Lucentini, M. Delp 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), p. 153, l. 11- 16; apud Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 1 (F 
f. 212ra).
 112 Hermes Latinus, Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum, ed. F. Hudry (Turnhout: Brepols, 
1997), maxim 2, p. 7, l. 1- 2.
 113 Proverbs 9:1.
 114 Baruch 3:24- 25.
 115 Jerome, Hebraicae quaestiones in libro Geneseos, ed. P. de Lagarde (Turnhout: Brepols, 
1959), In Gen. 32:28, p. 41, l. 8- 14; cf. Albert the Great, Super Dionysii Mysticam theologiam 
et Epistulas, ed. P. Simon (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1978), c. 1, p. 453, l. 35- 37.













all form [speciem] and elegance, for “the place of his possession” is “vast” and 
beyond- beautiful in a way that can scarcely be imagined. Upon it the Beyond- 
blessed sits as upon the throne of his kingdom, who is beyond- praiseworthy 
and glorious, truly great throughout the ages, of whose greatness there is 
no end. And so, he is endless, lofty beyond every height, and immeasurable, 
for the infinite sphere “built for himself an abode”117 shaped as an orb, both 
regarding things intelligible and things sensible, as is clear to us, and “has hewn 
seven pillars”.118
“He has hewn”: from the most hidden living and immutable reasons of the 
first and most eminent Art and of the other arts, which God the Father made 
in his Word (which indeed is his Art and is the first as such) – “he has hewn”, 
I say, he has polished and rounded out pillars that are most steady, upright, and 
fit for his work. “Seven pillars”: the number seven, according to Macrobius in 
Book i of On the Dream of Scipio,119 is by its manifold majesty understood to be 
fruitful in its parts as well as in the whole of its parts, for its primary fastening is 
constructed from one and six. Now, one, which is the monad, is not a number, 
but the fount and principle of numbers; the beginning and end of all refers to 
the highest God and to the intellect or mind born from the highest God, which, 
since it cannot be numbered (for it is one), nevertheless creates from itself and 
contains within itself the innumerable species of the classes of things.
Therefore, the highest God, though his paternal intellect, has hewn the first 
pillar, which he called goodness, erecting it upon its own stability,120 at the 
top of which were six small capitals. These are the primordial causes, which 
he constituted in the first perfect number insofar as they are perfect unities; 
he has placed himself perfectly upon them, and thus “he made them perfect, 
unmixed, and complete goods”.121 And thus »the number six that, when joined 
with one, makes seven, is a number with various and manifold religious hon-
ours and powers«,122 which is related back to the primordial causes, through 
which and in which the beyond- wise Wisdom has hewn six other pillars for the 
fabrication of its outer habitation: for Wisdom dwells within the inner abode, 
just as it says: “I dwell in the high and lofty places and my throne is in the pil-
lars of cloud”,123 of the cloud that is most superluminous and most fecund. Of 
 117 Proverbs 9:1.
 118 Proverbs 9:1.
 119 Macrobius, Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis, i.6.6- 8, p. 19, l. 19 – p. 20, l. 3.
 120 Cf. Psalm 103:5.
 121 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 4.20 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 246; pg 3, 717C).
 122 Macrobius, Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis, i.6.12, p. 20, l. 21- 24.
















the other six pillars it is said124 that “the pillars of heaven tremble (not with 
the fear of punishment but with admiration) and are astonished at the com-
mand of him” who made them. The first of these is called infinity, which has 
12 crossbeams and two bases upon which it is established, with the first pillar 
having only one base. The second is called being, having 18 crossbeams and 
three bases. The third is life, with 24 crossbeams and four bases. Fourth is intel-
lectuality, having 30 crossbeams and five bases. The fifth is animateness, with 
36 crossbeams and six bases. Sixth is naturalness, greatest in quantity but least 
in power; to it the crossbeams of the fifth column are connected, and it has 
seven bases. Behold, the dignity of the number seven! And so not without rea-
son is seven called the attendant of the entire edifice by Macrobius.125 This is 
the orb- shaped abode.
And so, it is called “the city”, that is, the city of the great King, because “God 
shall be known in her abodes”.126 Oh, such “glorious things are spoken of you, 
city of God!”,127 for your entire edifice rises up into a holy and wonderful tem-
ple, into which you too, O primordial causes, have been built together for a 
habitation of God through the Holy Spirit!128
[12] With the structure of the abode now in place, there follow its paintings 
and engravings, for it is said by Trismegistus to be “a good work composed of a 
multiform variety of images”.
It is “good”, which is the essence of any given thing, for it proceeds from the 
primarily Good. The world is a whole good because it contains all; it is a for-
mal good through the dynamic influence of superiors into the middle terms, 
and of the middle terms into the inferior; it is a good bounded in species and 
in parts because it is established in the mutual relation of superordinate and 
subordinate, which necessarily is bounded at the limits. Therefore, you should 
understand the meaning of the term “good” not adjectivally but substantively.
Concerning “the multiform variety of images”, note that Hermes specifically 
says “of images”, because “exemplar” properly speaking pertains to the super-
substantial, “image” to the substantial, and “imitation” [exemplum] to both. 
For “likeness” is said relative to all things produced internally or externally, as 
well as to things belonging to the same order, as Dionysius says in  chapter 9 of 
On the Divine Names.129 Now, according to Dionysius, there are three kinds of 
 124 Job 24:11; Glossa interlinearis ad loc., in Biblia Sacra cum Glossis interlineari et ordinaria, 
f. 51r.
 125 Macrobius, Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis, i.6.81, p. 33, l. 29- 30.
 126 Psalm 47:4.
 127 Psalm 86:3.
 128 Cf. Ephesians 2:21- 22.














likenesses: there is a most perfect likeness, by which something is said to be 
like itself or like that with which it is identical in absolute being, even though 
it is distinct in relative being, just as among divine things the Son is like the 
Father; there is a perfect likeness, by which an image is like its prototype or first 
exemplar; and there is an imperfect likeness, by which something is said to be 
like its cause because it displays some vestige of it. And so, because this primar-
ily active Cause brings forth all things as such, all things resemble it as such, 
even though they are of a different and multiform likeness. For this reason, the 
philosopher Secundus130 calls the world “a multiform formation”; and, accord-
ingly, this world is said by Trismegistus to be “good, composed of a multiform 
variety of images”. »For “image” means, as it were, “imitage” [imitago].«131
To see how this is the case, one should consider corporeal things, spiritual 
things, and the things between them.
In corporeal things, this is the case either visibly (for example in reflected 
and radiant phenomena), or subsistently (as in artificial or natural things), 
whether you consider minerals, seeds, aquatic life, reptiles, mobile animals, 
birds – and this is only to mention things generable and corruptible. Indeed, 
among incorruptible things, “look to the heavens, whose aspect [species] is 
the glory of the stars”,132 and consider the celestial spheres and the multiform 
variety of things moving in these spheres and stars, the eccentric circles and 
epicycles, and especially the images in the eighth sphere (the Chaldaeans say 
there are 48 of these images, but according to the Indians there must be many 
more,133 for they say that in any face among the signs of the Zodiac there are a 
variety of images).
Now, leaving behind such things because they are corporeal, open your 
spiritual eye and consider the hierarchies of angels, their orders, the things 
set beneath them, and their hierarchical acts. Each of these, according to 
Dionysius in  chapter 4 of On the Divine Names is “an image of God, a manifesta-
tion of hidden light”.134 This applies to either extreme, either corporeal things 
or spiritual things: »in bodies an image is a certain external configuration of 
bodily features«,135 while in spiritual things »an image is a species belonging 
 130 Vita Secundi philosophi, 8.1, p. 78, l. 13; apud Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 1 (F f. 
212ra).
 131 Huguccio of Pisa, Derivationes, s.v. “Imitator” (I49, p. 606, §1).
 132 Genesis 15:5; Ecclesiasticus 43:10.
 133 Cf. Albert the Great, De animalibus, ed. H. Stadler, 2 vols (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1916- 
1920), vol. 2, lib. xx, tr. 2, c. 2, p. 1310, l. 13- 14.
 134 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 4.22 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 269; pg 3, 724B).
 135 Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, ed. B. Mojsisch, Opera omnia, vol. 1. Schriften zur 














indifferently to the thing and that with which it is made coequal«, according to 
Hilary in his book On the Councils.136
Finally, as to the middle terms, that is, human beings, who are made by God 
»according to his image and likeness«,137 consider the variety of bodily figures 
and natures of souls, in whose hidden depths according to Augustine138 are all 
true reasons, and according to Boethius:139
Within … there clings the seed of truth,  
Which is aroused by instruction fanning the ember.
Even for the Peripatetics the first principles of the sciences and other things 
are in the hidden depths of the soul. There is a discussion of this below.140
Now, leaving behind all natural things, consider their limit and the beginning 
of things beyond nature: the movers of the celestial spheres, which are both 
united to the spheres and separate from them, according to diverse relations, 
insofar as they are divine and intellectual souls.141 Each of these possesses all 
the species that intellect has primarily142 and, indeed, each is all things: sensi-
ble things in the mode of an exemplar, but intelligible things in the mode of an 
image.143 Above these souls are intellectual hypostases, or separate intellects, 
that are per se subsistent. Each of these is what is prior to it and what comes 
after it in an intellectual mode144 and is the plenitude of species.145 Each spe-
cies is constitutive of things perpetual.146 Above the intellects are lives, and 
above these are true beings. Infinites are above these. Above infinities there 
are the primordial causes of all things; these are the self- sufficient, the unpar-
ticipated, the gods. Infinitely beyond them is the Beyond- god, the Beyond- 
unknown of ineffable majesty.
Behold, what various multiformity and multiform variety of images you 
find in the world by a glorious construction, by which the whole good is con-
structed and adorned!
 136 Hilary of Poitiers, Liber de synodis, §13 (pl 10, 490B).
 137 Genesis 1:27.
 138 Cf. Augustine, De immortalitate animae, iv.6 (pl 32, 1024).
 139 Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, lib. iii, metrum 11, p. 91, l. 11- 12.
 140 Berthold of Moosburg, Praeambulum A- B.
 141 Cf. Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 184, p. 90, l. 1- 3.
 142 Cf. Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 194, p. 95, l. 1.
 143 Cf. Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 195, p. 95, l. 1- 2.
 144 Cf. Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 173, p. 84, l. 1- 2.
 145 Cf. Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 177, p. 87, l. 1.























[13] There follows in Hermes: “a mechanism of God’s will”.
“A mechanism” in that, according to Trismegistus in the same text,147 the 
world is “a sort of instrument or mechanism subjected to the will of the high-
est God”. It is called “an instrument” because, just as in a musical instrument 
there is a diverse multiplicity of chords and a manifold diversity of things like 
and unlike, which produce a sweet harmony when struck in an orderly way 
due to their proportion with one another, so also, according to Theodorus in 
the Key,148 “the beauty of the whole universe – established from things like 
and unlike – is constituted like a certain wonderful harmony, which is joined 
together out of diverse genera and various forms, and is ordered out of the 
diverse orders of substances and accidents in a certain ineffable unity. For just 
as an instrumental melody is made up of diverse qualities and quantities of 
sounds through proportions of things truly differing from one another, but 
which through the skills of the musical art yield a natural sweetness, so too 
from one nature’s subdivisions, which seem dissonant among themselves 
when regarded on their own, the concord of the universe is brought together 
into unity according to the will of the creator.” Thus Theodorus. And so, accord-
ing to Hermes in the Hellera,149 “Knowing music is nothing other than under-
standing the order of all things together.” And below, he writes:150 “By divine 
song, the order of singular things, brought together into a whole by skilful rea-
son, produces a concord that is most sweet and true.” Thus Hermes. See why 
the world is called an instrument!
The world is fittingly called “a mechanism”, which means a well- crafted, arti-
ficial, or ingenious construction. “Well- crafted”, because it is his work, and is 
crafted not only out of the dawn and the sun, but out of all things.151 “Artificial”, 
because it is the artifice of the highest Art, who is the artificer of all,152 who 
looks out upon all,153 and because it is most artfully brought to completion. 
And what is more “ingenious” than the works of the Lord, which are great 
and highly sought after in all his divine and good wills that constitute beings? 
Behold, “how great are your works, O Lord! Your thoughts are made exceed-
ingly deep. The unwise does not know it, and the fool does not understand 
 147 Asclepius, c. 16, p. 55, l. 5- 6.
 148 Honorius Augustodunensis, Clavis physicae, c. 131, p. 99, l. 15- 25.
 149 Asclepius, c. 13, p. 52, l. 17- 18; apud Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 6 (F f. 62rb).
 150 Asclepius, c. 13, p. 52, l. 19 – p. 53, l. 1; apud Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 6 (F 
f. 62rb).
 151 Cf. Psalm 73:16.
 152 Cf. Wisdom of Solomon 7:21.
















it.”154 And above:155 “I will exult in the works of your hands”, because you are 
God, from whom all “jealousy is far removed”;156 you sustain your work without 
jealousy.157
Let this suffice, then, for the macrocosm.
[14] Now, concerning the microcosm, which is the human being, one must 
know what is written by Trismegistus in the text mentioned above:158 »The 
human is the nexus of God and the world, existing beyond the world through 
two kinds of scientific inquiry, namely, the physical and the quadrivial [doc-
trinalem]. Both are perfected through human reason. In this way the human 
is properly called the governor of the world. He is, however, subjoined to God, 
receiving his beauties that are not immersed in the world, in extension and 
time, through a divine likeness, which is the light of the simple intellect, which 
he participates from the God of gods.«
[15] In this description, one must first understand how the human is “the 
nexus” of God and the world, which means “a joining”: this necessarily occurs 
through likeness. By virtue of this likeness, the human being may be said to be 
like God and the world, such that he binds or connects them together.
Here, one should note that the human being, in his composition, embraces 
the four primary parts of the universe, by virtue of which he is rightly called 
“the small world” or “the creation of the world” and “the nexus of God and the 
world”. These parts are body, soul, intellect and the one or unity. Concerning 
the last of these, since the first three are obvious, Proclus says this in ques-
tion 10 of the book On Providence:159 “For there lies in us (that is, in us human 
beings), a hidden vestige of the One, something that is more divine than intel-
lect.” Dionysius agrees with him in  chapter 7 of On the Divine Names,160 calling 
this kind of one “the union [unitionem] exceeding the nature of the mind (or, 
according to the other translation:161 the unity [unitatem] superexalted beyond 
the nature of the mind), through which the mind is conjoined to those things 
that are above it (that is, above the nature of the mind)”.
The human is “the nexus of God and the world” through these four parts. 
For he is assimilated to God and to things divine by the one and the intellect, 
 154 Psalm 91:6- 7.
 155 Psalm 91:5.
 156 Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 29e, p. 22, l. 18- 19.
 157 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Prol. 8, n. 68.
 158 Albert the Great, Metaphysica, ed. B. Geyer (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1960- 1964), vol. 1, 
lib. i, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 2, l. 5- 15; cf. Asclepius, c. 6- 10, p. 44, l. 3 – p. 49, l. 17.
 159 Proclus, De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam, q. 10, §64, p. 106, l. 9- 11.
 160 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 7.1 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 385; pg 3, 865C).

















and to the world and things mundane by the soul and the body. And thus he is 
beautifully and perceptively called “the nexus”, “the bond” or “the continuation 
of God” through the one, which is like God and things divine – like God, who 
according to Dionysius in  chapter 13 of On the Divine Names,162 is “One, for he 
is all things unitively according to the one exceeding unity” and like things 
divine according to essence, each of which is one or a unity, for the human is 
such through his highest part – and is like the intelligible world through the 
intellect, which is like things intelligible, whether they be such according to 
cause or according to essence.
Furthermore, he is the nexus of God, of things divine, and of things intelli-
gible on the one side, through the one and the intellect, and of animate and of 
bodily things on the other side, through the soul and the body.
[16] And then it follows in Trismegistus: “existing beyond the world through 
two kinds of scientific inquiry, namely, the physical and the quadrivial”.
Here, one should note that »physical scientific inquiry perfects the human 
intellect chiefly insofar as it is related to time, while quadrivial scientific 
inquiry perfects it insofar as the intellect is inclined toward extension; for the 
speculative intellect must be perfected according to every kind of speculative 
form, according to which the true is examined«.163
»Now, things studied in physics are conceived with matter, which is sub-
jected either to motion, to alteration, or both; therefore, the inquirer conceives 
them with time, according to which they exist in the temporal thing. As a 
result, whatever is known about them is mixed with a great deal of opinion and 
lacks the stability and necessity of a scientific habit.«164 »For an unstable habit 
necessarily corresponds to an unstable object, as Plato says in the Phaedo.165 
Now, forms existing in matter are always unstable – for they exist, as it were, 
in a narrow strait [in euripo], that is, they are seething [in ebullitione] (for a 
narrow strait is the seething of the sea as it churns to and fro), and so nothing 
certain, nothing stable can be conceived relative to them. For this reason, there 
can only be opinion about them and nothing can be known about them, as 
Heraclitus said.«166
 162 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 13.2 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 540; pg 3, 977C).
 163 Cf. Albert the Great, Metaphysica, lib. i, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 1, l. 13- 18.
 164 Cf. Albert the Great, Metaphysica, lib. i, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 1, l. 18- 26.
 165 Cf. Plato, Phaedo, translatio Henrici Aristippi, ed. L. Minio- Paluello (London: The Warburg 
Institute, 1950), 90c, p. 50, l. 16- 17.
 166 Cf. Albert the Great, Summa theologiae, ed. A. Borgnet, vol. 32 (Paris: Vivès, 1895), pars ii, 












»However, quadrivial sciences, through rational inquiry, receive the medium 
of their demonstration according to the defining aspect of the form. Although 
the form exists only in physical things and not outside physical things, never-
theless, its defining aspect is not conceived with physical matter; it does not 
depend in its essential principles on physical matter but receives the prin-
ciples of its essence apart from physical matter. And so, in all the variety of 
physical things, those that are investigated relative to the form remain certain 
and stable. Examples of these are the even, the odd, and every proportion of 
number in arithmetic, the circle and the square in geometry, the fifth and the 
fourth in harmonics, conjunction in a point and every interrelation of the stars 
in astronomy, and other things of this sort. And just as these are stable and 
free from motion and alteration, so they produce stable habits that possess 
necessary knowledge and not opinion. Therefore, they are called quadrivial or 
instructional sciences, which do not depend on experience but rather on the 
understanding of terms. It is otherwise in physics, where experience counts for 
more than learning by demonstration.«167
From the foregoing it is sufficiently clear how physics and the quadrivial 
sciences are perfected by the power of human reason.
It is also clear now that, through these, and especially through astronomy 
and astrology, the human being is properly called “the governor” of the sensi-
ble world.168 Among all who philosophise, to the astrologers alone it is granted 
by divine obligation to be inquirers of the celestial decrees from the consid-
eration of causes that are primary, natural, per se, essential, and sempiternal, 
and to be aware of things to come. For these thinkers never depart from the 
principles of nature and natural science, just as Haly in his Commentary on 
the Quadripartitus169 commends us to follow the procedure of Ptolemy and, 
moreover, because, according to Al- Farabi in On the Origin of the Sciences,170 
the wise man is the measure of all things, dwelling among the elements and 
parts of the world, gaining the highest delights. And thus, according to Proclus 
in question 10 of On Providence,171 he rules the world with the gods.
 167 Cf. Albert the Great, Metaphysica, lib. i, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 1, l. 28- 56.
 168 Cf. Albert the Great, De intellectu et intelligibili, ed. A. Borgnet, vol. 9 (Paris: Vivès, 1890), 
lib. ii, tr. unicus, c. 9, p. 517a- b.
 169 Cf. Haly, Commentum in Quadripartitum Ptolemaei, in Ptolemy, Quadripartitum, 
Centiloquium […] cum Commento Haly Heben Rodan (Venezia: Locatellus, 1493), f. 2vb.
 170 Cf. Al- Farabi, De ortu scientiarum, ed. C. Baeumker, Über den Ursprung der Wissenschaften 
(De ortu scientiarum). Eine mittelalterlichen Einleitungsschrift in die philosophischen 
Wissenschaften (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1916), c. 1, §2, p. 18, l. 20- 26; c. 2, p. 22, l. 27- 30.












»These two kinds of scientific inquiry form the steps and conveyances 
to divinising wisdom, which belongs to the human, not as human, but as 
divine.«172
For, according to Proclus in the text mentioned above,173 the human is 
divine through the one that is more divine than intellect: “the soul, attaining 
this and settling itself within it, is divine and lives by divine life, to the extent 
permitted to it”. Thus Proclus.
Dionysius agrees with him, in the text mentioned above. After Dionysius 
spoke174 about the union or unity superexalted above the nature of the mind 
(or the intellect), “through which the mind is conjoined to those things that 
are above it”, he immediately adds:175 “Therefore, it is necessary to think divine 
things according to this (that is, the union or unity), not according to ourselves, 
but our whole selves placed outside our whole selves and deified whole”. Thus 
Dionysius.
Note that he says, “not according to us”, and so on (that is, insofar as we are 
human). For “it is impossible for the thearchic ray to illumine us from above 
unless it envelops itself, in order to elevate us, with various sacred veils that are 
according to us, and that are arranged naturally and in a familiar way by the 
paternal providence”, as Dionysius says in  chapter 1 of the Angelic Hierarchy.176
»John the Scot and John the Saracen, discussing this passage in their 
Comments, state that the created intellect cannot approach God through 
knowledge except in reflections and theophanies. Reflections are the lights 
scattered in creatures, calling out like a vestige, an image, or a sign; theoph-
anies are intellectual lights descending through God’s influence into angels 
and men, revealing the unbounded light that is God, as much as possible.«177 
For, according to Dionysius in  chapter 1 of the Mystical Theology,178 “God only 
appears unveiled and in truth” to those who transcend all things and enter the 
darkness. This “divine darkness”, as Dionysius says in the Letter to Dorotheus,179 
“is the inaccessible light, wherein God is said to dwell”.
[17] “The human is subjoined to God”, which follows in the description from 
Hermes. This means “he is conjoined”, “he is bound”.
 172 Cf. Albert the Great, Metaphysica, lib. i, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 1, l. 57- 58 and p. 2, l. 2- 4.
 173 Proclus, De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam, q. 10, §64, p. 106, l. 11- 12.
 174 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 7.1 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 385; pg 3, 865C); Berthold of 
Moosburg, Prol. 15, n. 160.
 175 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 7.1 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 385– 386; pg 3, 865D- 868A).
 176 Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia, 1.2 (Dionysiaca, vol. 2, p. 733; pg 3, 121B- C).
 177 Cf. Albert the Great, Summa theologiae, pars i, tr. 3, q. 13, c. 1, p. 40, l. 3- 11.
 178 Cf. Dionysius, De mystica theologia, 1.3 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 573; pg 3, 1000C).


















According to Dionysius at the beginning of the Mystical Theology,180 this 
occurs by a strong contrition, through the abandonment of the senses and 
intelligible operations, of all sensible and intelligible things, and of all beings 
and non- beings, so that a person, insofar as he is divine, might rise unknow-
ingly, insofar as it is possible, “to union with him, who is beyond all substance 
and knowing”. And Dionysius adds181 that it is necessary to go beyond one-
self and all things. Now, this abandonment and excess of all things and union 
with God is accomplished by the peace of God that passes all intellect182 – 
the intellect, I say, which, according to Plato,183 “belongs to God and to a few 
chosen ones”. On account of this peace, as Dionysius says in  chapter 11 of On 
the Divine Names,184 “souls unite their profuse reasonings, and directing them-
selves toward the one purity that gathers the intellectual power together, they 
arrive, according to their character and by their own path and order, through 
the immaterial and simple intellect, to that union which surpasses intellect”. 
Thus Dionysius.
Behold, what Dionysius called “the mind” earlier in  chapter 7,185 here he 
calls “the intellect”, above which is the union, one, or unity, »by which, as by 
his summit that God planted in human nature,«186 the human is conjoined 
or subjoined to God, and through which he enters the divine darkness! “Into 
this”, as Dionysius says to Dorotheus,187 “enters everyone, who is held worthy to 
know and see God by not seeing and not knowing him, because he is beyond 
everything sensible and intelligible.” Take note of the entire Letter.
Proclus agrees with the foregoing in his book On Fate and Providence,188 
where, having enumerated three modes of cognition (the opinionative, the 
quadrivial, and the scientific), speaking about the fourth kind of cognition, the 
intellective, he describes its difference from the third mode in this way:189 “For 
scientific knowledge indeed seems to belong to the soul, insofar as the soul 
is cognition; whereas intellect belongs to it insofar as the soul is an image of 
what is truly intellect.” And below:190 “Imitating this intellect as much as it can, 
 180 Cf. Dionysius, De mystica theologia, 1.1 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 567– 568; pg 3, 997B).
 181 Cf. Dionysius, De mystica theologia, 1.1 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 568; pg 3, 997B- 1000A).
 182 Cf. Philippians 4:7.
 183 Plato, Timaeus, 51e, p. 50, l. 9- 10.
 184 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 11.2 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 503– 504; pg 3, 949D).
 185 Cf. Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 7.1 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 385; pg 3, 865C); Berthold of 
Moosburg, Prol. 15, n. 160 and 16, n. 174.
 186 Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, prooem. (4), p. 14, l. 34- 35.
 187 Dionysius, Epistulae, v (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 620– 621; pg 3, 1073A).
 188 Cf. Proclus, De providentia et fato, ed. H. Boese, c. 8, §27- 29, p. 136, l. 1 – p. 138, l. 15.
 189 Proclus, De providentia et fato, c. 8, §30, p. 139, l. 11- 14.
























the soul itself also becomes intellect, running beyond scientific knowledge.” 
And below:191 “After all these cognitions, I want you to receive the fifth mode 
of knowing, even though you believed Aristotle, who only leads up as far as 
intellectual activity and insinuates nothing beyond it. But now I want you to 
follow Plato and the theologians before Plato, who are wont to praise for us 
a cognition beyond intellect, and who divulge it as a truly divine frenzy, for 
they say this arouses the one of the soul, no longer an intellectual faculty, and 
connects it to the One. For all things are known by like: the sensible by sense, 
scientific objects by science, the intelligibles by intellect, and the One by the 
unifical. Indeed, when thinking, the soul knows itself and whatever it thinks 
through contact, as we have said; likewise, when thinking, the soul is ignorant 
of itself and other things, and because of that, casting forth its one, it loves to 
be at peace, enclosing itself from cognitions, having been made silent. For how 
else could it cast itself toward the most ineffable of all without putting to sleep 
the chatter within? Therefore, let it become one so that it may see the One; or 
rather, so that it may not see it. For by seeing it will see something intellectual 
and not what is beyond intellect; it will think a certain one, but not the One 
itself. My friend, when someone realises this most truly divine operation of the 
soul, entrusting oneself to it alone, to the flower of the intellect, and quieting 
oneself not only from external motions, but also from internal motions, having 
become god, as far as this is possible for the soul, one will only know in the way 
the gods know all things, in an ineffable manner, each according to the one 
that is properly theirs. But as long as we are occupied with what is below, we 
are incredulous about all these things, which are grasped by the divine knower 
indivisibly and in a manner beyond eternity.” Thus Proclus.
Dionysius is of the same mind in  chapters 1 and 2 of The Mystical Theology,192 
which will become clear to an extent in what follows.
[18] In this way, therefore, the human is truly subjoined to God, to the inef-
fable One, through his one, that is, through the divine likeness – for, by his one, 
which is the image of God, by which man is capable of God himself [capax ipsius 
Dei] and connected to God, man has the likeness of God, or rather is the likeness 
of God and a god by participation – “receiving”, according to Trismegistus,193 
“beauties that are not immersed in the world, in extension and time”.
Here, one should know that »God made the human according to his image 
and likeness«.194 And notably it says “his”, for, according to Dionysius in 
 191 Proclus, De providentia et fato, c. 8, §31- 32, p. 139, l. 24 – p. 140, l. 8.
 192 Berthold of Moosburg, Prol. 19, n. 224 and 20, n. 236.
 193 Berthold of Moosburg, Prol. 14, n. 158.










 chapter 9 of On the Divine Names,195 “the theologians say that nothing is like 
God in himself, who exists above all; yet God gives the divine likeness to those 
who convert to him – who exists beyond all definition and reason – according 
to the power for imitation. And it is the power of divine likeness that converts 
all things to the cause.” Thus Dionysius. »Now, every conversion occurs through 
the likeness of those that convert to that, toward which they are converted.«196 
Therefore, the human is converted to God in this way, to whom he is subjoined, 
and receives beauties not immersed in the world, that is, in extension and time.
Consider what we have from Dionysius in  chapter 4 of On the Divine Names:197 
“the Beautiful is identical to the Good, because all things altogether desire the 
Beautiful and the Good, according to every cause, and there is no being that 
does not participate the Good and the Beautiful”. And slightly earlier, speaking 
about the primarily Good, he says this:198 “This Good is praised by the holy 
theologians as the Beautiful, as Beauty, as Love and the Beloved, and whatever 
other gifts of beauty befit that beautifying graciousness. Now, the Beautiful and 
Beauty should not be divided in the cause that comprehends the whole in one. 
For indeed, it is by dividing this [unity] into participations and participants, 
as it is found in beings, that we call that which participates beauty ‘beautiful’, 
while by ‘beauty’ we mean the participation of the Beautifying cause of all that 
is beautiful. For the supersubstantial Beautiful is called Beauty because of the 
beauty communicated from it to all beings, according to the degree of beauty 
of each; and also because it is the cause of the lucidity and consonance of 
universes. For, in the manner of light, it sends out with a flash the communi-
cations of its fontal ray that beautify the universes; and also because it calls 
everything to itself, for it gathers all in all into the same. For this reason, it 
is named ‘Beautiful’. It is called ‘Beautiful’ as being both most beautiful and 
beyond- beautiful, and is always beautiful according to the same aspect and 
the same manner.” And below:199 “And thus it precontains exceedingly in itself 
the fontal beauty of every beauty. For, indeed, by the substantial and simple 
nature (in other words:200 ‘in the simple and supersubstantial [nature]’) of all 
beautiful things, every beauty and every beautiful thing preexists uniformly 
according to cause. And from this Beautiful there comes to all beings their 
 195 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 9.6 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 467– 468; pg 3, 913C).
 196 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 32, p. 21, l. 1- 2.
 197 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 4.7 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 185; pg 3, 704B).
 198 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 4.7 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 178– 181; pg 3, 701C- D).
 199 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 4.7 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 182– 184; pg 3, 704A).
 200 Cf. Albert the Great, Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, ed. P. Simon (Münster 














beauty according to their proper measure; on account of the Beautiful there 
arise the concords, friendships, and communions of all things; and all things 
are united by the Beautiful.” And below, in  chapter 11,201 after Dionysius shows 
that “per se being”, “per se life”, and “per se deity” are taken in two ways, both 
divinely and causally, and, after explaining this distinction, he adds: “And what 
needs to be said about these?”, and so on, as was noted above concerning the 
invisible things of God.202
[19] From the foregoing it can be gathered that, just as (according to the 
author in question 10 of On Providence203) “ ‘one’ and ‘good’ exist in three ways”, 
so also “beautiful” is said in three ways.
»“Beautiful” is said either according to cause, meaning the First, for he is 
Beautiful«204 because of the beauty communicated from him according to the 
degree of each. For he is the cause of the agreement and lucidity of universes, 
calling everything to himself, and gathering all in all into the same. And this 
is the fontal Beauty that precontains exceedingly in itself every beauty, as was 
said.205 It is also the primarily Beautiful, the beyond- blessed Trinity, such that 
what is said here may be understood with reference to it:206 “The eye will mar-
vel at the beauty of the radiance thereof, and the heart trembles at its pouring- 
down.” Behold, the radiance of everlasting light207 and the splendour of the 
paternal glory, and the figure of his substance,208 that is, the substantial mark 
and image of his goodness! “At the beauty”, I say, that is beyond the most beau-
tiful; and “of the radiance” of the Son; and “the eye of the beholder will marvel” 
at the paternal light; and “the heart trembles” at the pouring- down of the Holy 
Spirit upon the glorious souls devoted to the study of the power of beauty. In 
just this way the noble Apuleius the African introduces Plato in the book On 
the God of Socrates:209 “Plato, who was endowed with celestial eloquence, said 
that on account of the incredible and ineffable transcendency of his majesty, 
he (namely, the God of gods) cannot be comprehended even in the slightest 
degree, and stated that the understanding of this God can scarcely be had even 
 201 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 11.6 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 524– 526; pg 3, 953D- 956A).
 202 Berthold of Moosburg, Prol. 4, n. 53.
 203 Proclus, De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam, q. 10, §63, p. 102, l. 7.
 204 Cf. Proclus, De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam, q. 10, §63, p. 102, l. 7- 8.
 205 Berthold of Moosburg, Prol. 18, n. 199.
 206 Ecclesiasticus 43:20.
 207 Cf. Wisdom 7:26.
 208 Cf. Hebrews 1:3.
 209 Apuleius, De deo Socratis, ed. C. Moreschini, Apulei opera quae supersunt. Vol. iii. De phi-
losophia libri (Leipzig: Teubner, 1991), 3.124, p. 11, l. 4- 10; apud Albert the Great, Summa 




















by the wise, when they have separated themselves from the body as much as 
possible.” Thus Apuleius.
»“Beautiful” is also said according to existence, meaning any single god that 
exists as one, good, and beautiful«210 and as per se beauty, as the per se beauti-
fying effusion, and as total beauty. The beyond- beautiful and fontal Beauty is 
perfectly innate within them, so that he might make them perfect, unmixed, 
and complete beauties,211 and thus participants in beauty in the highest 
degree. For this reason, they are per se beautiful, per se beauties and are called 
the primordial causes of every beauty found among beings, such that it can be 
said of them:212 “Praise and beauty are before him; sanctity, holiness, and mag-
nificence are in his sanctuary.” And again:213 “O Lord my God, you are exceed-
ingly magnificent; you have put on praise and elegance and are clothed with 
light as with a garment.” In the translation of Jerome:214 “Glory and elegance in 
bestowing honour are before his face; strength and exultation are in his sanc-
tuary.” And again:215 “O Lord my God, you are magnificent in the highest; you 
have put on glory and elegance, you are clothed with the light that you have 
made.” Behold, how the beauty of the primordial causes is most glorious and 
fairest, and how exceedingly great is their elegance, their glory, and form, so 
also that God himself, clothed with them, is magnified in the highest!
»“Beautiful” is also said according to participation, for instance, relative to 
the beautiful that is found in substances according to every variety of their 
beauty, either total beauty or particular beauty, and, among the latter, whether 
they be totally beautiful or beautiful in part.«216 The following verse can be 
interpreted relative to the participants in beauty:217 “The Lord bless you, the 
beauty of justice.” “Of justice”, I say, that is divine and “distributes to all, accord-
ing to worthiness, commensuration, beauty, good ordering, and adornment, 
and administers all distributions and orders to each according to what is truly 
the most just limit, and is the cause of the cooperation proper to all things. 
For divine justice orders and limits all things, and preserves all things with-
out admixture or confusion, and bestows to all things what agrees with each, 
according to their worthiness.” Dionysius says this in  chapter 8 of On the Divine 
 210 Cf. Proclus, De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam, q. 10, §63, p. 102, l. 9- 10.
 211 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Prol. 11, n. 121.
 212 Psalm 95:6.
 213 Psalm 103:1- 2.
 214 Psalm 96:6, translatio Hieronymi (pl 28, 1203C).
 215 Psalm 104:1- 2, translatio Hieronymi (pl 28, 1208B).
 216 Cf. Proclus, De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam, q. 10, §63, p. 102, l. 10 – p. 104, l. 11.


















Names.218 And again it is written:219 “The beauty of the field (that is, of the 
world) is with me” through the immutable reasons, the archetypical exemplars 
of things, the beauties not immersed in the world, but separated and elevated 
beyond union with bodily forms. And, notably, Trismegistus says “beauties” 
because, according to Plato,220 the artificer cannot make things diverse in 
form to have one countenance; indeed, Plato says, “it cannot happen that there 
would exist one face that would contain all the forms and countenances of all 
things and would display the various appearances of bodies found everywhere”.
For these beauties are “not immersed” but are separate according to the 
various degrees of separation of the beauties themselves. After the primar-
ily Beautiful – which is most absolute, most unlimited, and is simply exalted 
above all things – the per se beauties hold the highest degree of separation, 
since they are most immediate and most akin to the primarily Beautiful. Next, 
the other beauties of the orders of per se beauties assume the degrees of sep-
aration proportionate to themselves, until we reach total and partial souls, 
which are intermediate between the beauties not immersed in the world and 
those that are immersed “in the world, in extension and time”.
The human, who is subjoined to God, “receives” these beauties “through the 
divine likeness” or image, that is, through the mind or the simple and imma-
terial intellect, which is the image of the primarily Intellect (with regard to 
the intelligible beauties that it resembles), and through the one or unity lifted 
high above the nature of the mind or simple intellect.221 This one or unity, 
because of its supereminence in the entire domain of the soul, is called “light” 
or “the simple light of the intellect”, by which the soul resembles the primarily 
One and the primordial unities (with regard to their beauties and, above all, 
the beauty of the primarily One). For, by his one, the human enters into the 
supersubstantial world, the beyond- luminous divine darkness that, as was said 
already,222 is inaccessible, “in which God is said to dwell, and indeed is called 
‘invisible’ because of its excessive lucidity, and ‘inaccessible’ because of the 
excess of the effusion of supersubstantial light”.223
This beyond- blessed world is the beyond- unknown, the beyond- resplendent, 
and the highest summit, “where the simple, absolute, and unchanging theolog-
ical mysteries”, as Dionysius says in the prayer on the Mystical Theology,224 “lie 
 218 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 8.7 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 434– 435; pg 3, 893D- 896A).
 219 Psalm 49:11.
 220 Plato, Timaeus, 50d, p. 48, l. 17- 19.
 221 Berthold of Moosburg, Prol. 17, n. 185.
 222 Berthold of Moosburg, Prol. 16, n. 179.
 223 Dionysius, Epistulae, v (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 620; pg 3, 1073A).















hidden away in the super- resplendent darkness of the silence teaching hid-
denly, the darkness that causes to shine forth what is beyond- lucid in what is 
most obscure, and that fills to excess, with beyond- beautiful lucidities, minds 
that are dispossessed of eyes, in what is altogether impalpable and invisible.” 
Thus Dionysius.
The mental eye is the simple intellect, and the one that is lifted high above 
the nature of the mind is more divine and more luciform than it. “For God 
is light.”225 Alan alludes to this in Proposition 6 of On Intelligences,226 say-
ing: “The first of substances is light” and, consequently, “to the extent that any-
thing possesses light, it holds fast to divine being; any substance that is more 
luminous than another is said to be nobler than it”, according to Proposition 7 
in the same text.227
Therefore, since the one, which we are discussing here, is more luciform 
than the simple intellect (which itself is light, as Aristotle says),228 the one is 
nobler than it. It is thus the noblest thing that the human participates from 
the God of gods – not through an echo or a passing image, like a mirror par-
ticipates the image of the face over against it, but rather through an impres-
sion, as a seal is imprinted in wax. And so, it is written in the Psalm:229 “the 
light of your countenance, O Lord, is sealed upon us”. The Gloss:230 “meaning, 
your face is luminous and illumines us, namely, the image, by which you are 
known”, now in a glass darkly but, in the time to come, as you are, face to 
face.231 For this one of ours is the face or countenance, the hidden depth of 
the mind,232 the higher reason, which inheres only in those divine things 
that are the object of contemplation.233 By this we are like God, and in it 
this light or this seal is impressed. “Therefore, the countenance of God is 
taken to be our reason, for just as someone is known by their countenance, 
so God is known through the mirror of reason; and just as one person’s coun-
tenance is likened to another by conformity, so through reason we are like 
 225 1 John 1:5.
 226 Adam Pulchrae Mulieris, Liber de intelligentiis, ed. C. Baeumker, Witelo. Ein Philosoph und 
Naturforscher des XIII. Jahrhunderts (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1908), prop. 6, p. 8, l. 6.
 227 Adam Pulchrae Mulieris, Liber de intelligentiis, prop. 7, p. 9, l. 19- 22.
 228 Aristotle, De anima, iii.5, 430a14- 15.
 229 Psalm 4:7.
 230 Glossa ordinaria (Ps. 4:7) marg., [facsim., v. 2, p. 460b], eds M. Morard, et al., Glossae Sacrae 
Scripturae electronicae (Paris: cnrs- irht, 2017), accessed 29 June 2020 [http:// gloss- 
e.irht.cnrs.fr].
 231 Cf. 1 Corinthians 13:12.
 232 Cf. Augustine, De Trinitate, xiv.7.9, p. 433, l. 19.



















God, according to what is said:234 »God made the human to his image and 
likeness«.”235
So much, then, concerning the microcosm. Let this suffice for the sec-
ond part.
[20] As for the third part, that is, how the invisible things of God, from the 
creation of the world, are beheld, being understood through the 
things that are made, one should know that on this matter different sages 
among the theologians and the philosophers advanced along different paths.
For Dionysius in  chapter 1 of the Mystical Theology236 teaches Timothy the 
path that was mentioned above,237 and is as follows: the passage through the 
activity of the senses and things intellectual, the abandonment of all things 
sensible, intelligible, of beings and non- beings, and, as far as possible, the 
ascent in ignorance to union with him, who is beyond every substance and 
cognition. There is also [the path] through the exceeding of oneself, through 
separation from all things, and an upward action.238 Here Dionysius gives the 
example of Moses.239 Then, when the soul becomes deiform and has arrived 
at the apex of contemplation, it contemplates the place where God is, “and 
then it takes leave of these sights and seers, and enters the darkness of igno-
rance”.240 Enough has been said already about this darkness.241
Now Plato, as Augustine recounts in Book viii of On the City of God,242 “is 
praised for having perfected philosophy by joining both philosophies (that 
is, the Socratic and the Pythagorean) into one, which he then arranged into 
three parts: the moral, which above all concerns action; the natural, which is 
considered by contemplation; and the rational, by which the true is separated 
from the false”. Plato and his followers arrived at the knowledge of the invisible 
things of God through these parts, as through three paths, so that they could 
understand where the cause of all natural things is to be found, the light of all 
reasons, and the end of all actions. And thus, they discerned “that in God must 
be found the cause of subsisting, the reason of thinking, the order of living”. 
The first of these pertains to the natural part, the second to the rational part, 
and the third to the moral part. Following these paths, they reached “that which 
 234 Cf. Genesis 1:27.
 235 Peter Lombard, Commentaria in Psalmos 4:7 (pl 191, 88A).
 236 Cf. Dionysius, De mystica theologia, 1.1 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 567– 568; pg 3, 997B).
 237 Berthold of Moosburg, Prol. 17, n. 180.
 238 Cf. Dionysius, De mystica theologia, 1.1 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 568– 569; pg 3, 997B- 1000A).
 239 Cf. Dionysius, De mystica theologia, 1.3 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 574– 575; pg 3, 1000C- 1001A).
 240 Dionysius, De mystica theologia, 1.3 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 577; pg 3, 1001A).
 241 Berthold of Moosburg, Prol. 16, n. 179, and 19, n. 222.



















surpasses everything, namely the one, true, and best God, without whom no 
nature subsists, no doctrine instructs, no exercise liberates. And so, may he be 
sought, in whom for us all things are serene; may he be discerned, in whom for 
us all things are certain; may he be loved, in whom for us all things are right.” 
And then Augustine shows243 that Plato advanced along the first path to the 
Principle of all things, which is not made and from whom everything exists. In 
this way, what is known of God, God showed to them, for the invisible things 
of God, and so on.244 Augustine says245 that the Platonists had also understood 
God through the second path: “For they distinguished those things that are 
beheld by the mind from those that are reached by the senses, not depriving 
the senses of anything of which they are capable, nor attributing to them any-
thing that is beyond their capacity. But they said that the light of minds, which 
can come to know all things, is the same as God himself, by whom all things 
are made.” Finally, Augustine says that the Platonists understood God through 
the moral part of philosophy:246 “in this part the question of the highest Good 
is discussed, to which all our actions are directed; by seeking it, not for the 
sake of something else but for the sake of itself, and by reaching it, we would 
be blessed, and there would be nothing further we would require. Therefore, 
God is the end, because we will everything else on account of him, but himself 
only for his own sake.” This is from Augustine’s teaching in On the City of God.
In question 73 of the book 83 Questions,247 the title of which is “On the 
Ideas”, Augustine also says this: “But every soul except for the rational soul is 
denied the power to contemplate these (that is, the ideas). The rational soul 
does this by that part in it which surpasses the rest, namely, by the mind or 
reason, as if by a kind of face or by its inward and intelligible eye. And, indeed, 
not the whole soul and not just any soul is said to be prepared for this vision, 
but rather the soul that is holy and pure, which has that very eye, by which the 
ideas are beheld, in a state that is healthy, limpid, serene, and like those things 
that it intends to see.” And below, in the same chapter:248 “Plato called these 
primary reasons of things the ideas, which are not only ideas, but are them-
selves true, because they are eternal and remain immutable and self- identical. 
Whatsoever exists, in whatever way it exists, comes into being by participation 
in these. But the rational soul, among those things which are established by 
 243 Cf. Augustine, De civitate Dei, viii.6, p. 223, l. 45 – p. 224, l. 53.
 244 Cf. Romans 1:19- 20.
 245 Augustine, De civitate Dei, viii.7, p. 224, l. 16- 20.
 246 Augustine, De civitate Dei, viii.8, p. 224, l. 2- 6.
 247 Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus lxxxiii, q. 46, p. 71, l. 33 – p. 72, l. 40.













God, transcends all things and is near to God when it is pure. And to the extent 
that it adheres to God in charity, to that degree the soul is in some way flooded 
with that intelligible light from him. Having thus been illumined, the soul dis-
cerns these reasons, not through bodily eyes, but through that primary part 
of itself that excels the rest, namely through its intelligence. By the vision of 
these reasons the soul becomes most blessed. These reasons, as was said, may 
be called ideas, forms, species, reasons; and while it is granted to many to call 
them what they wish, it is granted to few to see them in truth.” Thus Augustine.
Belonging to that smaller company was the one who said:249 “Like as the 
hart desires the water- brooks, so longs my soul after you, O God. My soul is 
athirst for God, the living fount; when shall I arrive and when shall I appear 
before the face of God? My tears have been to me etc., … while they daily say to 
me, ‘Where is now your God?’ These things I ponder upon” (in other words:250 
“I meditate upon”), as we read in the Gloss,251 “through all visible things. ‘Where 
is my God?’, means that I have, so to speak, surveyed the visible things of the 
world through the windows of the senses, so that through them I might know 
the invisible creator – and know him not only through these visible things, 
but even through my soul itself. For having abandoned these exterior instru-
ments belonging to the bodily senses, my mind returns to itself and begins to 
contemplate itself, so that it might see him in itself” (thus the Gloss) in imag-
ination according to imagination, and in imagination according to reason,252 
(resuming with the Gloss:) “so that it might recognise him within itself (in rea-
son according to imagination and in reason according to reason), so that it can 
understand whether any of this could belong to God himself. And this is what 
is meant by ‘I pour out’: that is, ‘I have dilated my soul within me’. But because 
my mind finds God neither in exterior things nor within the soul, I shall pass 
over, that is, ‘I shall go beyond myself ’, to things intellectual, as it were, in this 
sense: ‘I have dilated my soul to know those things that are above it’ (so that 
it might seek God in intelligence according to reason). For if the soul remains 
in itself, and does not go beyond itself, it will not see God, who is beyond. But 
why have I done this? Because in this way (that is, through intelligence, that 
eye, which according to Boethius,253 is higher than imagination and reason – 
‘for surpassing the boundary of the universe it views that simple Form by the 
 249 Psalm 41:2- 5.
 250 Peter Lombard, Commentaria in Psalmos 41:4 (pl 191, 417B).
 251 Peter Lombard, Commentaria in Psalmos 41:4- 5 (pl 191, 417B- 418A).
 252 Cf. Richard of St. Victor, De contemplatione (Beniamin maior), ed. J. Grosfillier 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), lib. i, c. 6, p. 102, l. 5 – p. 104, l. 10 (pl 196, 70B- C).












pure apex of the mind’ – in this way, I think,) I shall pass over or I shall enter 
(by the one of the soul) into the place of the wonderful tabernacle (that is, 
into light inaccessible, which is the primordial causes), even into the abode 
of God: ‘with the voice of praise and of thanksgiving is the sound of one who 
feasts’. I know not what hymns or songs, sweet to one’s heart, are resounding in 
that eternal festival. Here, one is taken up like a hart to the water- brooks and 
is soothed with the voice of exultation and eternal praise; here, there resounds 
to the mind the wondrous sweetness of the shouts of those who feast, of the 
banqueters calling out.”
[21] Perhaps from all of this it is now clear with what great difficulty even 
the soul that has been made deiform ascends in this life to glimpse the Fount 
of paternal light, whose splendour of glory is the Word,254 “the true light, which 
illumines everyone coming into this world”255 (that is, into intellectual purity 
itself), and how far from this is »the mind of one who is distracted by cares, 
clouded by images, not to mention entangled by bodily lusts«.256
Therefore, with Plato and Boethius, I deem it good that the lowly contem-
plator should resolutely implore the most divine light with supplicant prayers, 
saying: O most blessed, most excellent, most revered, most honourable, most 
complete, most omnipotent, most free, most sovereign, most virtuous, most 
simple Light; remove from those who seek you the innate restriction of nature, 
the crooked habitual ways, the indolent discipline, the ignorance of the meas-
ure of intellectual capacity, the aversion to the light of intelligible lucidity, the 
dread of such subtlety, the degree of remoteness, the presumption of familiar 
intelligibility, the search for too much provability and demonstrability!
And grant, Father, that our minds may climb to your august throne,
Grant the sight of the Fount of good, and grant light 
To fix upon you the mind’s unblinded eye!
Disperse the clouds and weight of this earthly concretion;
Shine in the splendour that is yours! For you are serenity,
You are untroubled rest for worshippers, to see you is the end, 
You, the principle, conveyance, guide, path, and boundary – the same.257
 254 Cf. Hebrews 1:3.
 255 John 1:9.
 256 Cf. Bonaventure, Itinerarium mentis in Deum, eds PP Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Opera 
omnia, vol. 5 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1896) c. 4, §1, p. 306a.










This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-nd 4.0 license.
Exposition of the Title
An exposition of the title prefixed to the Theological Elementation:
Here begins the Theological Elementation of Proclus, 
Son of Diadochus, Son of Licius, the Platonic Philosopher
∵
This is the title prefixed to the present book. In it the four causes of the work, 
which are customarily sought out at the beginnings of books, are stated 
plainly. First there is the primary efficient cause, since it says: of Proclus; 
the subjective material cause is touched upon in the phrase Theological 
Elementation, which also expresses the directive formal cause and the per-
fective final cause.
[A] Now, the philosopher Proclus was the author of this book. He was one 
of the greatest disciples of Plato, and so by prophetic insight he was named 
“Proclus”, which means, as it were, “being esteemed from far and near” [pro-
cul cluens vel prope] or “being esteemed before” [ante cluens]; and “being 
esteemed” means “exceeding” or “surpassing”. For, according to Papias,1 “I am 
esteemed” is the same as “I exceed” or “I surpass”.
For Proclus exceeded by far [procul excellebat] all the followers of Plato and 
thus surpassed them all in ability [praepollebat], such that there emanated 
forth from him most of all, as it once had from Plotinus, “the very voice of 
Plato”, which, as Augustine attests in Book iii of Against the Academicians,2 
“is the purest and most lucid in all of philosophy after the clouds of error have 
been cleared away” and all the coverings [integumentis], with which the first 
Platonists, and especially the Academicians, had concealed Plato’s wisdom. 
For it was customary among them, as Cicero says and Augustine recounts in 
the same work,3 “to conceal his doctrine and not reveal it to anyone, except to 
those who had lived with them up to old age”. And thus Proclus, like Plotinus, 
as is recounted in the same text,4 “was deemed to be so similar” to Plato “that 
 1 Cf. Papias, Elementarium, s.v. “Cluere”, f. 34v.
 2 Augustine, Contra Academicos, ed. W. Green (Turnhout: Brepols, 1970), iii.18.41, p. 59, l. 41 – 
p. 60, l. 43.
 3 Augustine, Contra Academicos, iii.20.43, p. 60, l. 5- 7.
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one would have supposed that they lived at the same time; but since so many 
centuries had elapsed, one had to suppose that Plato was reborn in him”.
Now, the excellence and surpassing ability of Proclus in comparison to the 
other Platonists is abundantly clear from the fact that, in the present book, he 
gave order to the theorems of Plato himself and explained what he had thus 
ordered in a most subtle way. Concerning these theorems, Eustratius says this 
in his commentary on Book I of the Ethics,  chapter 4:5 “Plato passed on the-
orems concerning the first Good that are above contempt; indeed, they are 
magnificent conveyers of the soul into what is absolutely highest.”
The excellence of Proclus also appears in the fact that, by ascending through 
the three motions that the divine Dionysius ascribes to angels and souls in 
 chapter 4 of On the Divine Names, section K6 (which concerns the circular, 
direct, and oblique motions), he arrived at the knowledge of the highest Good, 
insofar as this is attainable to mortal humans under the guidance of the natu-
ral light of the intellect. As Dionysius treats them in that text, the definitions 
of these motions as they belong to the soul are as follows:7 “Indeed, the motion 
of the soul is circular when it enters into itself from things external. It is a uni-
form convolution of its intellectual powers, granting inerrancy to the soul, as 
it were, in the form of a certain circle, first by gathering it, diffused in many 
externals, to itself, and then, with the soul having been given form, uniting it 
unitively with the united powers, and thus guiding it to the Beautiful and the 
Good, which is beyond all beings, and is one and the same, without beginning 
and without end. But the soul is moved obliquely insofar as it is illumined with 
divine cognitions according to its capacity, not intellectually and singularly, 
but rationally and diffusely, as it were, with mixed and transitory activities; and 
from exterior things as from certain variegated and manifold signs, it rises up 
to simple and united contemplations. But it moves by the direct motion when, 
neither entering into itself nor being moved by singular intellectuality (for this, 
as I have said, belongs to the circular motion), it proceeds to those things that 
are around it.”
[B] That Proclus ascended by the circular motion, as I have claimed, is clear 
from his book On Fate and Providence,  chapter 6,8 where he shows that reason, 
moved insofar as it is reason, looks to intrinsic reasons, and as such “evidently 
 5 Eustratius, In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius, translatio Roberti Grosseteste, ed. H.P.F. 
Mercken (Leiden: Brill, 1973), lib. i, c. 4, p. 68, l. 60- 62.
 6 Cf. Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 4.8- 9 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 189– 194; pg 3, 704D- 705B); cf. 
Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 6 (F f. 6rb).
 7 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 4.9 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 190– 193; pg 3, 705A- B).
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distances itself from the senses, which it disdains, and is sequestered from 
pleasures and pains”. And immediately thereafter he speaks about the uniform 
convolution of the soul’s intellectual powers, saying:9 After the motion of the 
rational soul, I see another motion, better than the last, “with the lower powers 
now quieted and exhibiting none of the tumult that is usually found among 
the masses; by this motion, the soul is converted toward itself and sees its own 
substance and the powers existing in it, and the harmonic reasons from which 
it is made, and the many lives of which it is the plenitude, and it recollects that 
it is a rational world – indeed, an image of those things that are prior to it, from 
which it has come forth, but an exemplar of those which come after it, over 
which it presides.”
And a little later in the same chapter, he writes:10 “After these two activities of 
this rational soul, as was said, we climb back up now to its highest intelligence, 
through which it actually sees its sister souls in the world” – and then, further 
on11 – “and again, above all these souls, it sees the intellectual substances and 
orders” – and then12 – “and yet again prior to these it sees the monads of the 
gods themselves that are beyond intellect.”
Boethius states the same thing concisely in Book v of On the Consolation of 
Philosophy, prose 4,13 while explaining the difference between intelligence and 
reason: “But there exists a higher eye of intelligence: for surpassing the bound-
ary of the universe it views that simple Form by the pure apex of the mind.”
So much for the first motion.
[C] That Proclus also ascended to the knowledge of God by the direct 
motion – »not by returning into himself, nor by proceeding with discursive rea-
son from things that are outside, but departing from creatures as from certain 
tokens, images, or signs that are variegated and manifold in themselves, toward 
unitive reflections, not intelligibly but intellectually, not discursively but uni-
tively, that is, not by the mind’s oblique motion, but by its direct vision«14 – is 
clear in  chapter 8 of the book mentioned above.15 By this point Proclus has 
enumerated three of the soul’s modes of cognition, that is, the opiniona-
tive, the scientific, and that which ascends up to the one and unhypothetical 
“through all the forms, so to speak – dividing some, analysing others, making 
 9 Proclus, De providentia et fato, c. 6, §18, p. 124, l. 2 – p. 126, l. 8.
 10 Proclus, De providentia et fato, c. 6, §19, p. 126, l. 1- 3.
 11 Proclus, De providentia et fato, c. 6, §19, p. 126, l. 5- 6.
 12 Proclus, De providentia et fato, c. 6, §19, p. 126, l. 8- 9.
 13 Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, lib. v, prosa 4, p. 149, l. 86- 88.
 14 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 6 (F f. 6vb).
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the many from the one and the one from the many”. Through this process the 
soul ascends to the principle of beings as such and “as far as the ascent of the 
instruction of the sciences reaches”. Then he immediately adds:16 “There is yet 
a fourth mode that you must understand, and this is our simpler cognition that 
no longer uses methods such as analyses, syntheses, divisions, or demonstra-
tions, but gazes upon beings by simple epiboles, meaning ‘projections’, and, so 
to speak, by antoptices, meaning ‘per se visions’. Those who can achieve this 
mode of knowing praise it, referring to it now reverently as intellect and not as 
science. Or have you not heard that Aristotle in his books on demonstration in 
fact says something like this, that intellect in us is greater than all science, and 
that he defines it as that by which we know the terms? And that Plato in the 
Timaeus declares that intellect and science are modes of cognition in the soul 
that relate to beings? For science indeed seems to belong to the soul, insofar 
as the soul is cognition; whereas the intellect belongs to it insofar as the soul 
is an image of what is truly intellect. For the latter sees things intellectual, or 
rather being itself, through one epibole, as he says (meaning ‘injection’ or ‘intu-
ition’), and through contact with the things known; thinking itself, it beholds 
those beings within it, and because of that, it thinks both that it itself exists 
and that it is thinking, and that it at once thinks being and what it is itself. 
Therefore, imitating this as much as it can, the soul itself becomes intellect, 
running beyond science, abandoning the manifold methods with which it was 
formerly adorned, and raises its eyes to beings alone.”
Shortly thereafter,17 Proclus discusses the cognition above intellect, which 
the theologians before Plato also divulged by calling it a truly divine frenzy: “For 
they claim that the one of the soul no longer arouses an intellectual power”, but 
connects the one itself to the highest One, to which, “casting forth its one, the 
soul loves to be at peace, enclosing itself from cognitions, having been made 
silent, and keeping quiet with inward silence”. Dionysius agrees with these 
points in  chapter 7 of On the Divine Names section B and  chapter 4, section N.18
So much for the direct motion.
[D] Proclus certainly also ascended by the oblique motion to the knowledge 
of the highest Good. This motion was proper to the philosophers and occurred 
»by a laborious investigation of the first Principle of all beings, by divid-
ing, defining, using common principles, proceeding from the known to the 
unknown by discursive reason, ascending from the sensible to the intelligible, 
 16 Proclus, De providentia et fato, c. 8, §30, p. 139, l. 1- 21.
 17 Cf. Proclus, De providentia et fato, c. 8, §31, p. 139, l. 1 – p. 140, l. 12.
 18 Cf. Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 7.1 (Dionysiaca vol. 1, p. 385– 386; pg 3, 865C- 868A) 
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and tending from one thing to another among the intelligible, until it arrives to 
the ultimate«19 as such. It is clear from the present book that Proclus accom-
plished this. For here he ascends to the highest by attending to the condition 
of the works, the governance of what is made, and the reconciliation of con-
traries. For these are the three ways by which the philosophers arrived at the 
knowledge of God by discursive reason.
»A person ascends by attending to the condition of the works, because, 
as Gundissalinus says in On the Creation of Heaven and Earth,20 “The ways to 
the creator are his works. When we diligently turn our attention to these, we 
are able to reach the understanding of any hidden thing of God whatsoever”; 
indeed, “the crafting of the world is the projection of the invisible things of 
God”, as Dionysius says in the Letter to Titus.21«22 The author ascended along 
this path, both by the investigation of the many and the one, and by the inves-
tigation of productive principles and what is produced, as is clear from the first 
12 elements.23
»A person also ascends to God from the governance of what is made, just as 
Cicero shows in Book ii of On the Nature of the Gods,  chapter 5.24 His words are 
summarised as follows: the world exists and is ruled by reason; but the reason 
ruling the world is beyond the world and not from the world; therefore, there is 
some reason that rules the world, which we call God or his providence.«25 The 
author also proceeded along this path in this book, as is clear from proposition 
120 and many that follow,26 and especially in the book On Providence,27 where 
ten questions concerning providence are resolved.
A person also ascends to the knowledge of God from the reconciliation of 
the contraries that are in the world, Plato made clear in the Timaeus.28 In this 
work, Plato himself pursued the cognition of God and the highest Artificer by 
all three paths. Boethius is also in agreement with him in Book iii of On the 
Consolation, prose 12:29 “The world could hardly have come together from such 
 19 Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 6 (F f. 6vb).
 20 Dominicus Gundissalinus, De processione mundi, p. 2, l. 1- 3.
 21 Dionysius, Epistulae, ix.2 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 642; pg 3, 1108B).
 22 Cf. Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 7 (F f. 7va).
 23 Proclus, Elementatio theologica, props 1- 12, p. 3, l. 1 – p. 9, l. 19.
 24 Cf. Cicero, De natura deorum, ii.6.16- ii.7.19, p. 55, l. 11 – p. 57, l. 4.
 25 Cf. Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 7 (F f. 8ra).
 26 Cf. Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 120, p. 60, l. 1- 13.
 27 Proclus, De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam.
 28 Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 27d- 29d, p. 20, l. 15 – p. 22, l. 14 et seqq.
 29 Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, lib. iii, prosa 12, p. 92, l. 14- 25; cf. Thomas of York, 
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diverse parts into one form, were there not one God, who joins such diver-
sity together. But this diversity of natures, once brought together, is discordant 
with itself, and would dissociate and tear apart, were there not One who sus-
tains what he has brought together. Such a defined order of nature, moreover, 
would not have proceeded forth, nor would the things thus arranged unfold in 
local motions, times, effective causes, spaces, and qualities, were there not One 
who, remaining himself, arranged these varieties of change. This, whatever this 
is, by which the things that are made abide and are set in motion, I call ‘God’, 
using the word that everybody uses.” That Proclus proceeded along this path is 
clear from proposition 2030 and those that follow, and in many other places in 
the present book, and in his book On the Existence of Evils.31
From the foregoing, the excellence and surpassing ability of this author, 
Proclus, are abundantly clear.
[E] Now, in the title there follows: of Diadochus, of Lycius. These might 
be Proclus’ first name and surname, such that he would have had three names; 
or, as seems more likely to me, these were the first names of his ancestors, 
which he prefixed to the title of his book following the ancient custom. For the 
ancients not only set down their own names in their titles and the names of 
their parents, but also their ancestors’ first names, last names, and epithets, as 
is clear from the books of that most brilliant man, Boethius.32 For this reason 
Proclus also adds both his school and his profession: “the Platonic philosopher”.
Therefore, he states: Of Diadochus, meaning “son of”. Now Diadochus 
means “what is taught” or “what teaches generously”, for dia means “gener-
ous”,33 or it derives from dia and doxa, which means “glory”34 – meaning, as 
it were, “generous glory” or “generously glorifying” or “glorious and generous”. 
For there is nothing (to say nothing of his descendant) more generous than 
wisdom itself, in whose possession Diadochus glorified.
Wisdom’s generosity appears from its source, the height of its nobility, and 
the multitude of its generous effects that it produces in those who have it.
»The source of wisdom is most high because “the fount of wisdom is the 
Word of God in the highest”,35 not only the divine wisdom of the orthodox 
or the faithful, but even of the Gentile philosophers, as is clear from Plato’s 
 30 Cf. Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 20, p. 13, l. 1 – p. 14, l. 31.
 31 Proclus, De malorum subsistentia.
 32 Cf. Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, titulus, p. 3; id., De Trinitate, ed. C. Moreschini, pro-
logus, p. 165; id., Utrum Pater et Filius, ed. C. Moreschini, p. 182.
 33 Cf. Papias, Elementarium, s.v. “Dia”, f. 46r.
 34 Cf. Huguccio of Pisa, Derivationes, s.v. “Doxa” (D88, p. 348, §1).
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propositions, which Augustine recounts.«36 For in Book viii of On the City 
of God,  chapter 3,37 he says that God is “the light of all”, and in  chapter 4,38 
that God is “the enlightener of truth” and “the reason of thinking”, without 
which “no teaching instructs”. In Book ix,  chapter 25,39 he says that God is 
“the giver of intelligence”. And in Book i of the Soliloquies, near the beginning, 
he writes:40 “God, the Father of truth, the Father of wisdom, … the Father of 
intelligible light”; and below:41 “God of truth, in whom and from whom and 
through whom are true all things that are true; God of wisdom, in whom and 
from whom and through whom are wise all who are wise”; and below:42 “God, 
intelligible light, in whom and from whom and through whom shine intelligi-
bly all things that shine intelligibly.”
The height of the nobility of wisdom is clear »because it is desirable in itself, 
as Aristotle shows in Book vi of the Ethics,  chapter 15,43 where he says that 
wisdom and prudence are desirable in themselves: “now, what is desirable 
in itself is free and perfect through itself, serving nothing else, governing the 
order through itself and holding dominion within itself”, as the Commentator 
explains on the same text.44
If we now turn the mind’s gaze toward the effects of wisdom, it becomes 
clear that wisdom is also generous. In those who possess it, wisdom, with 
regard to evil things, is fugitive of vice, sanative of sickness or allative of health, 
conducive to a place far from disturbances and passions, and contemptive of 
this life and this world; but with respect to the good, wisdom is formative of 
life, inculcative of the virtues, perfective of the soul, consummative of crea-
tion, elongative from our animal nature, impletive with longings, introductive 
of delight, and operative of beatitude.«45 »And so Cicero, in Book v of the 
 36 Cf. Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 1 (F f. 1rb).
 37 Augustine, De civitate Dei, viii.4, p. 220, l. 35- 36; apud Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, 
c. 16 (F f. 20ra).
 38 Cf. Augustine, De civitate Dei, viii.4, p. 220, l. 50- 60; apud Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. 
i, c. 16 (F f. 20rb).
 39 Augustine, De civitate Dei, ix.25, p. 334, l. 12; apud Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 16 
(F f. 20rb).
 40 Augustine, Soliloquia, i.1.2 (pl 32, 870).
 41 Augustine, Soliloquia, i.1.3 (pl 32, 870).
 42 Augustine, Soliloquia, i.1.3 (pl 32, 870); apud Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 16 (F 
f. 20va).
 43 Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, vi.13, 1144a1- 2.
 44 Eustratius, In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius, lib. vi, c. 15 (ms Vaticano [Città del], 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2171, f. 129ra).
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Tusculan Disputations,  chapter 5,46 exclaims: “O Philosophy, the guide of life, 
O discoverer and cultivator of virtue, and expeller of vices, what would we, 
and indeed the whole life of humankind, be without you?” And below:47 “You 
have been the discoverer of laws, the mistress of morals and discipline. We 
take refuge in you; from you we implore succour. We, who formerly devoted 
our greater part to you, now give ourselves over entirely. For a day spent well 
in your precepts is preferable to perpetuity and immortality without them. 
Whose succour do we need more than yours, you who have granted to us tran-
quillity of life and taken from us the fear of death?”«48
Therefore, from the explanation of his name, one can gather the nature and 
greatness of the philosopher Diadochus, whose name is inscribed in the title.
[F] Then there follows in this title: of Licius, meaning “son of”. Licius was 
the grandfather of Proclus. Now, Apollo was also called Licius,49 and Apollo 
stands for the “sun”,50 which according to the Gentiles of old was the god of 
wisdom;51 or, according to Papias,52 “Licius” comes from lichios, meaning the 
luminescent purple stone in lanterns that shines forth in splendour, and for 
this reason a lantern is called a lichios.
And so, one can surmise from his name that Licius was, in a manner of 
speaking, a god or the sun, and the fontal, overflowing abundance of wisdom, 
with the ray of his wisdom passing over everything. For among the sages of his 
time it is likely that he shone like a radiant lantern. Otherwise, it would have 
been inappropriate for Proclus to inscribe this at the beginning of his book, 
»unless those to come could obtain immense benefits from the splendour 
of his wisdom. For it is quite possible that, from the illumination of wisdom, 
many devoted themselves to the exercise of their own intellect and, conse-
quently, to gather kindred spirits, to educate them in the preambles to wisdom, 
to dissolve doubts, to consider the height of wisdom, and to apprehend the 
deeper truth.«53
[G] Next in the title we have the sect to which Proclus belonged: of the 
Platonist.
 46 Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes, v.2.5, p. 406, l. 3- 5.
 47 Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes, v.2.5- 6, p. 406, l. 9- 16.
 48 Cf. Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 1 (F f. 1vb- 2ra).
 49 Cf. Papias, Elementarium, s.v. “Licium”, f. 91r.
 50 Cf. Papias, Elementarium, s.v. “Apollo”, f. 13r; Isidore of Seville, Etymologiarum, vol. 1, lib. 
viii, c. 11, §53.
 51 Cf. Augustine, De ordine, ed. W. Green (Turnhout: Brepols, 1970), i.4.10, p. 94, l. 22- 26.
 52 Cf. Papias, Elementarium, s.v. “Luchinus”, f. 91r.
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Now, just as Augustine says in Book viii of On the City of God,  chapter 1,54 
“there is no one, who has even a meagre acquaintance with such things, who 
does not know about those philosophers called Platonists, who derive their 
name from the learned Plato. Therefore, concerning this Plato, I will touch 
briefly upon those things I deem necessary to the present question, first by 
recalling his predecessors in this kind of literature.”
And he says in  chapter 2 of the same book:55 “As far as Greek literature is 
concerned (which among the nations is the more celebrated), two schools 
of philosophers are known to us: the one is called Italic, coming from that 
part of Italy once known as Magna Graeca; the other is Ionian, coming from 
those lands now called Greece. To the Italic school belonged the authority of 
Pythagoras of Samos, from whom the very name of philosophy takes its origin; 
… the founder of the Ionic school was Thales the Milesian; … Anaximander 
was his pupil and succeeded him; … Anaximander left Anaximenes as his dis-
ciple and successor; … and Anaxagoras was his pupil” along with Diogenes. 
Succeeding Anaxagoras was Archelaus, whose disciple Socrates is said to have 
been, and Socrates was the master of Plato – which is why I have briefly sum-
marised these passages from Augustine’s City of God.
“Therefore, having acquired such illustrious renown by his life and death, 
Socrates left behind many followers of his philosophy”, as Augustine says in 
 chapter 3.56 “But among the disciples of Socrates”, as we read in  chapter 4,57 
“Plato shone with a most surpassing glory and, not unjustly, he eclipsed the 
others in every way.”
Plato, as is said in Book iii of Against the Academicians,58 “was the wisest 
and most learned man of his times, and he spoke in such a way that what-
ever he said became important, and he spoke of such things that, in whatever 
way he said them, they never became unimportant”. And later:59 “In this way, 
he added to the Socratic charm and subtly (which Socrates possessed in eth-
ical doctrine), an expertise in things natural and divine … and is said to have 
devised the perfect practice of philosophy”, “which is arranged in three parts”, 
as we saw already from On the City of God,60 “one part is moral, which above all 
 54 Augustine, De civitate Dei, viii.1, p. 217, l. 34- 39.
 55 Cf. Augustine, De civitate Dei, viii.2, p. 217, l. 1 – p. 218, l. 48.
 56 Augustine, De civitate Dei, viii.3, p. 219, l. 31- 32.
 57 Augustine, De civitate Dei, viii.4, p. 219, l. 1- 3.
 58 Augustine, Contra Academicos, iii.17.37, p. 57, l. 6- 9.
 59 Augustine, Contra Academicos, iii.17.37, p. 57, l. 15- 21.
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concerns action, the other part natural, which is considered by contemplation, 
and the third part is rational, by which the true is separated from the false”. 
And later:61 “But as to Plato’s views about these parts taken altogether or about 
each singly, that is, what he understood to be the end of all actions, the cause 
of all natures, and the light of all reasons – I believe it would take a long time 
to explain these, and I do not wish to make rash assertions.” Thus Augustine.
Therefore, from this same Plato, whom Labeo calls a demigod,62 the phi-
losophers mentioned already, namely, Proclus and his ancestors Diadochus 
and Licius, are called Platonists in order to distinguish themselves from the 
Peripatetics and Cynics. For, according to Augustine in Book iii of Against 
the Academicians,63 “Nowadays we scarcely see any philosophers who are not 
Cynics, Peripatetics, or Platonists. The Cynics are especially popular because 
a certain liberty of life or licentiousness brings them delight. Since, however, 
philosophy touches on learning, teaching, and morals, by which the soul is 
cared for,” we have in the title: of the philosopher.
[H] The word “philosophy”, as was said,64 comes from Pythagoras. For “when 
asked what he professed, he responded truly, saying that he was ‘a philosopher’, 
meaning a lover of wisdom, since it seemed supremely arrogant to claim that 
one was wise. And so, from that point on, it pleased those who came thereaf-
ter that, no matter how much a person seemed to excel in wisdom, either to 
himself or to others, he would not be called anything except ‘a philosopher’ ”, 
as Isidore writes in Book viii of the Etymologies.65
Now Cicero writes, in Book v of the Tusculan Disputations,66 that seven phi-
losophers in antiquity “were and were called sophi by the Greeks and, by us, 
‘the wise’ ”. Below he adds:67 “their name was preserved down to the age of 
Pythagoras who, as Heraclides Ponticus (a most learned man and a student of 
Plato) reports, is said to have gone to Phlius and to have learnedly and regularly 
discoursed on certain subjects with Leon, the prince of the Phliusians. When 
Leon, admiring his genius and eloquence, asked him what art he professed 
above all else, he answered that he in fact knew no art but was rather a philoso-
pher. Leon, admiring the novelty of the name, asked him who the philosophers 
were and what distinguished them from others. Pythagoras then replied … ,” 
 61 Augustine, De civitate Dei, viii.4, p. 220, l. 33- 38.
 62 Cf. Augustine, De civitate Dei, viii.13, p. 230, l. 31- 32.
 63 Augustine, Contra Academicos, iii.19.42, p. 60, l. 1- 5.
 64 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio tituli G, n. 55.
 65 Isidore of Seville, Etymologiarum, vol. 1, lib. viii, c. 6, §2- 3.
 66 Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes, v.3.7, p. 407, l. 7- 9.
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and below:68 “those who hold all other pursuits as nothing, and studiously look 
into the nature of things – these people call themselves zealous for wisdom, 
that is, philosophers; and just as there [that is, in sport,] one is freest when one 
is a spectator, appropriating nothing for oneself, so too in life, the contempla-
tion and knowledge of things surpass all other pursuits by far.” Pythagoras also 
gives the example of the marketplace.69 “Pythagoras not only coined the name 
‘philosophy’, but also magnified the thing itself.”70 Thus Cicero.
And so, from the foregoing, the identity of the author of this book, the sect 
to which he belonged, and his profession, have all been made clear.
[I] There follows Theological Elementation, which expresses the 
material, the formal, and the final cause of the book.
It expresses the subjective material cause in that the book, through the 
ordering of elements, treats the divine Good according to the order of nat-
ural providence. For this reason, it is called an “elementation” [elementatio], 
and not of just any kind, but “theological”, to distinguish it from the Physical 
Elementation,71 which this author is also said to have produced. In these two 
words the matter and subject are touched on most succinctly.
It touches on its matter, because the elements are, so to speak, the hyle-
ments72 or the propositions, out of which this book is constructed and made 
whole. If they are taken in themselves and according to their own notion, 
they possess only the mode of matter with respect to this wisdom itself, 
and they contribute to its wholeness; “the mode of matter”, I say, which car-
ries the notion of a principle or an element, insofar as from them, together 
with the form, as from an intrinsic principle, as it were, the substance of 
the composite thing is constituted. For just as grammar has letters or ele-
ments for its material, from which it is brought together into a whole, and 
just as the Arithmetic of Jordan,73 the Geometry of Euclid,74  the Optics of 
Peckham,75 and certain other sciences, have hylementary propositions, so 
too this book has 211 elements, which are the principles of demonstration in 
this philosophy.
 68 Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes, v.3.9, p. 408, l. 14- 20.
 69 Cf. Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes, v.3.9, p. 408, l. 3- 14.
 70 Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes, v.3.10, p. 408, l. 21- 22.
 71 Proclus, Elementatio physica, ed. H. Boese, Die mittelalterliche Übersetzung der Stoicheiosis 
physike des Proclus (Berlin: Akademie- Verlag, 1958).
 72 Cf. Huguccio of Pisa, Derivationes, s.v. “Yle” (I45, p. 605, §3).
 73 Jordan of Nemi, Arithmetica.
 74 Euclid, Elementa.
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Aristotle alludes to this meaning of “element” in Book v of the Metaphysics,76 
where he discusses the several senses of the term: “the elements of geometri-
cal diagrams” and the elements of demonstrations all “are called ‘elements’ in 
a similar sense”. What the Commentator explains about this passage can be 
summarised as follows: »They are called “elements” in a similar sense and in 
accordance with the same notion. But the first composite parts of geometrical 
diagrams, meaning those figures depicted in extension, are called “elements” in 
that they are composite parts relating only to position and are “parts from the 
whole” or “universal parts”. But if what is meant is rather “an intrinsic element” 
by virtue of some power, then this denotes the “elements” of demonstrations, 
according to the notion of element introduced above. Now, the first demon-
strations of all, to which none are prior, and which exist in many demonstra-
tions that follow them due to their power, are called “the elements of demon-
strations”. Now, although these first demonstrations exist in the consequent 
demonstrations through their power, they also exist in them in some mode 
according to their substance: for, when dealing with a subject and a predicate, 
the first demonstration is implicated in the second, and so on, where the prior 
is always in the consequent according to the order of theorems. Postulates, 
hypotheses, and definitions are the elements of the first demonstrations in this 
way, and certain propositions are the truest “elements” of the conclusions«77 
and, consequently, are the matter.
These theological elements are also the subject insofar as they include that 
which exists as something in act, in that it has the property of a subject. The 
act of consideration is concerned with the properties and attributes of this 
subject, which has a common notion by virtue of an analogical attribution to 
one first term, and to this first term the notion of a subject primarily belongs.
»This entire book treats the universe of divine things according to its proces-
sion from the highest Good and its return into the Good, according to the order 
and the proper intrinsic modes of the divine things themselves. These modes 
are placed in them by what is primarily divine or divine according to cause. 
This book treats this universe according to the order of natural providence, 
and not presently according to the order of voluntary providence (following 
the distinction made by Augustine in Book viii of The Literal Commentary on 
Genesis).78 It is necessary that everything treated here should agree in a single 
 76 Aristotle, Metaphysica, v.3, 1014a35- 37.
 77 Cf. Albert the Great, Metaphysica, lib. v, tr. 1, c. 4, p. 217, l. 8- 26; cf. Averroes, Metaphysica, 
ed. R. Ponzalli, Averrois in librum V (Δ) Metaphysicorum Aristotelis commentarius 
(Bern: Francke, 1971), lib. v, comm. 4, p. 86, l. 78 – p. 87, l. 88.
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notion of a subject, by virtue of which this philosophy itself is a single sci-
ence. That subject is called, and indeed is, the divine good, which belongs to 
the first principle of all simply, absolutely, and causally or primarily, but to the 
other goods, namely the divine according to essence and the divine according 
to participation, attributively in relation to the first. This attribution occurs 
according to the modes distinguished by Averroes while commenting on the 
beginning of Book iv of the Metaphysics:79 namely, in relation to the primary 
efficient cause, in relation to the ultimate end, and also in the relation of acci-
dents to their subject.«80 For God, who is the highest Good, is not only “the 
principle without principle, the process without variation, the end without 
end”, as is said in rule 7 from Trismegistus,81 but indeed “God” is also that, “in 
comparison with whom substance is an accident, and an accident is nothing at 
all”, as we read in rule 6 of the same text.82 Now, Hermes means that any sub-
stance is an accident by virtue of its dependency on the First, to whom alone 
the notion of a subject belongs – not as it belongs to beings existing in passive 
potency, but as the active potency by which he, who made the universes, sus-
tains all things. Avicebron uses the term “accident” in this sense in Book iii of 
the Fount of Life,  chapters 36 and 54.83
From this it is clear that the subject of this book is the divine good within the 
order of natural providence, and this is expressed by the title Theological 
Elementation.
[K] In the same phrase, but taken under another notion, one finds expressed 
the book’s directive formal aspect or the formal cause. For the form of proceed-
ing in this book is through the coordination and separation of theorems or 
elements, which are, so to speak, elevatements or elaboratements84 because 
they elevate and cultivate the mind. These are the rules of this most divine 
philosophy; and it is also by virtue of these that it is called an “elementation”, 
just as Varro calls grammar “letteration”, according to Isidore.85
 79 Cf. Averroes, Commentaria in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis (Venezia: Junta, 1562), lib. 
iv, comm. 2, f. 65rF- vI.
 80 Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De subiecto theologiae, ed. L. Sturlese, Opera omnia, vol. 3. Schriften 
zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), 3.5- 6, p. 281, l. 69- 84.
 81 Hermes Latinus, Liber xxiv philosophorum, maxim 7, p. 13, l. 1- 2.
 82 Hermes Latinus, Liber xxiv philosophorum, maxim 6, p. 12, l. 1- 2.
 83 Cf. Avicebron, Fons vitae, ex Arabico in Latinum translatus ab Johanne Hispano et Dominico 
Gundissalino, ed. C. Baeumker, 2 vols (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1892- 1895), vol. 1, lib. iii, 
c. 36, p. 161, l. 14 – p. 162, l. 10; lib. iii, c. 54, p. 199, l. 8- 17.
 84 Cf. Papias, Elementarium, s.v. “Elementum”, f. 52r; Huguccio of Pisa, Derivationes, s.v. “Yle” 
(I45, p. 605, §4- 5).
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For every science uses the rules by which it is upheld like its own founda-
tions, as Alan writes in the prologue of On the Rules of Theology,86 so that dia-
lectic has maxims, “rhetoric has commonplaces, ethics has general teachings, 
physics has aphorisms, arithmetic has aporismata, meaning ‘subtle rules’ ”, 
music has axioms, meaning “measures”, geometry has theorems, meaning 
“speculations”, and astronomy has excellences. In the same way, this philoso-
phy, the most excellent, most divine, and most difficult of all sciences, has rules 
that are “exceedingly more obscure and subtler than the other” rules of other 
sciences, as is said in the same text.87 “Although complete necessity holds sway 
over the other rules, since the regular course of nature is governed by regularity 
alone, the necessity of theological rules is nevertheless absolute and unshakea-
ble, because they produce conviction about what cannot be changed by action 
or by nature. And so, because of their immutable necessity and their glorious 
subtlety, they are almost fittingly called ‘glorious paradoxes’ by certain philos-
ophers”, or “enigmas” because of their obscurity, or “marquetries” because of 
their intrinsic splendour, or “hebdomads” because of their dignity.88
But the author calls them “theological elements”, meaning “propositions”, in 
which there is a discourse on the divine or on God, who is both the most divine 
and the most difficult to attain.
»”Most divine”, as Trismegistus says to Asclepius in On Hellera,89 which 
means “On the God of gods” (where he establishes that, of all discourses 
inspired by divine obligation, a discourse on the God of gods is more divine in 
religious devotion), stating, “if you will be found to understand it, your whole 
mind will be filled with all goods”. It is also “most difficult”, and for this rea-
son Trismegistus in the same text compares the discourse to a torrent:90 “An 
account of divinity … is most similar to a torrent of a river running from on 
high, sweeping and churning, such that it rushes on ahead of our attention, not 
only as we listen but also as we speak about it”.
Thus it follows that not only the teacher but even the auditor must be a 
divine and attentive person.
“A divine person” because, in light of what Trismegistus says in the same 
text,91 “an account of divinity is to be known through the divine concentration 
 86 Cf. Alan of Lille, Regulae caelestis iuris, ed. N. Häring, in Archives d’histoire doctrinale et 
littéraire du Moyen Âge 48(1981), prologue, §1, p. 121.
 87 Cf. Alan of Lille, Regulae caelestis iuris, prologue, §1- 5, p. 121– 122.
 88 Cf. Alan of Lille, Regulae caelestis iuris, prologue, §5- 6, p. 122.
 89 Asclepius, c. 1, p. 39, l. 4- 5.
 90 Asclepius, c. 3, p. 41, l. 19- 23.
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of awareness”. For this is true philosophy: the assiduous inquiry into the knowl-
edge of divinity. As Trismegistus says there,92 philosophy consists “only in 
repeated contemplation and the holy reverence with which one must know 
divinity”.«93 “An attentive person”, because of the elementation, extension, or 
coordination of the theological elements themselves; for to the extent that 
they contain a loftier meaning, so they require a more attentive and skilful 
auditor. Therefore, they are not to be expounded to fleshly or even to spiritual 
people, as is clear from the parable that Rabbi Moses sets down on this mat-
ter in  chapter 182,94 but only to intellectual people, »who, by a more rigorous 
inquiry, are attentive and perspicacious in the apex of the mind, and are less 
carried away by the fickleness of praise than attracted by the most longed- for, 
unveiled image of truth itself. Only to these worthy people should the worthi-
ness of wisdom contained in this Theological Elementation be uncovered. And 
so are they led into these theorems as into a certain byway that is beyond the 
common path of reasonings.«95
Now, I say “beyond the common path of reasonings” because, as Boethius 
states near the beginning of On the Trinity:96 “In physics one must apply one-
self rationally, in mathematics scientifically, and in theology intellectually, 
not being led astray by imaginings, but rather by looking into the Form itself, 
which is a true form and not an image.” For the intentions of the Theological 
Elementation diverge from those of all other sciences such that »one cannot 
find discourses akin to them with which they could be easily explained«.97
From the foregoing one can grasp succinctly both the form or mode of pro-
ceeding in this book and the reason for its name, Theological Elementation, 
which is imputed from the form. Moreover, one can understand why it is not 
called “First Philosophy” or “Metaphysics”, “On the Pure Good”, “On the Light 
of Lights”, “On the Cause of Causes”, or “On the Flowers of Divine Things”, as 
others98 – who all treated similar material, but completely unlike the present 
author – bothered to call their works.
 92 Asclepius, c. 12, p. 52, l. 2- 4.
 93 Cf. Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 5 (F f. 5va).
 94 Cf. Moses Maimonides, Dux seu director dubitantium aut perplexorum, lib. iii, c. 52, 
f. 109v- 112r; cf. Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 3 (F f. 4ra).
 95 Cf. Gilbert of Poitiers, Expositio in Boecii librum de bonorum ebdomade, ed. N. Häring, The 
Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval 
Studies, 1966), prologue, §7, p. 184, l. 32- 38.
 96 Boethius, De Trinitate, c. 2, p. 169, l. 78- 82.
 97 Cf. Gilbert of Poitiers, Expositio in Boecii librum de bonorum ebdomade, prologue, §8, 
p. 184, l. 39- 45.
 98 Cf. Albert the Great, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, ed. W. Fauser 
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[L] Finally, the name Theological Elementation expresses the perfec-
tive final aspect or final cause. In this sense, “theological elementation”, mean-
ing “of divine reason”, connotes a ladder ascending from the divine according 
to participation to the divine according to essence, and through this to the 
primarily divine, the divine according to cause, who is to be contemplated. 
The contemplation of this divinity makes the contemplator not only blessed, 
by pursuing “the perfect condition that is brought about by the collection of all 
goods”,99 but even god.
For, as Boethius says in Book iii of On the Consolation, prose 10,100 “since it 
is obvious that they become blessed by acquiring beatitude, and by acquiring 
justice they become just, and by acquiring wisdom they become wise, so by a 
similar argument it follows necessarily that by acquiring divinity they become 
gods. Therefore, everyone who is in bliss is god; certainly, God is one by nature, 
but nothing prevents there being as many gods as you please by participation.”
Now, this ladder ascending through deified reason to the divine reason 
according to cause seems to be implied by the allegory [integumentum], with 
which Lady Philosophy’s embroidered garment is described using two let-
ters, the Greek pi and theta, as we have it from Boethius in Book i of On the 
Consolation, prose 1.101 Having described Philosophy’s countenance, expres-
sion, complexion, strength, age, and height, he describes her garment:102 “Her 
robes were fashioned perfectly with the finest threads, the most delicate art-
istry, and imperishable materials, which, as I would later learn from her, she 
wove herself.” And below:103 “On the hem at the bottom one could discern 
a woven Greek pi, and at the top a theta, and between the two letters there 
seemed to be steps emblazoned as a ladder, forming an ascent from the lower 
to the higher letter.”
Now what are meant by these robes if not the sciences? And, among the 
sciences, this one is the worthiest. Seneca points out its difference from every 
other human science in Book I of On Natural Questions,  chapter 1:104 “the dif-
ference between philosophy … and the other arts is as great as that … between 
the part of philosophy concerned with humans and the part concerned with 
gods: the latter is higher and more spirited … In short, the difference between 
 99 Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, lib. iii, prosa 2, p. 60, l. 10- 11.
 100 Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, lib. iii, prosa 10, p. 83, l. 80 – p. 84, l. 86.
 101 Cf. Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, lib. i, prosa 1, p. 4, l. 1 – p. 5, l. 12.
 102 Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, lib. i, prosa 1, p. 5, l. 12- 15.
 103 Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, lib. i, prosa 1, p. 5, l. 17- 21.
 104 Seneca, Naturalium quaestionum libros, ed. H. Hine (Leipzig: Teubner, 1996), lib. i, §1, p. 1, 
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the two is as great as that between God and human beings: the one teaches us 
what is to be done on earth; the other, what is to be done in heaven; the one 
dispels our wrongdoings and casts the light in, with which the uncertainties of 
life can be discerned; the other goes beyond the darkness in which we wallow 
and guides us, standing upright, out of the shadows, and leads us to the light’s 
source.”
And so, this science is denoted by the theta sewn on the upper hem of 
Philosophy’s robes. For it consists in contemplating not just any object, but 
the highest Good, which is the end of all desires because, as Plato says, as 
Augustine recounts in Book viii of On the City of God,  chapter 4,105 it is the end 
of all actions, the cause of all natures, and the light of all reasons.
“For if the human being is constituted in such a way that, through what sur-
passes everything in him, he may attain unto that, which surpasses all things 
as such (that is, the one, true, and best God, without whom no nature subsists, 
no doctrine instructs, no exercise liberates), then may he be sought, in whom 
for us all things are serene; may he be discerned, in whom for us all things are 
certain; may he be loved, in whom for us all things are right.”
“If, therefore”, as Augustine says in  chapter 5, “Plato declared that the wise 
person is the one who imitates, knows, and loves this God, and becomes 
blessed by participating in him”, what remains to be said, except that the end 
of theological wisdom is God? And what could be signified by those two letters 
on Philosophy’s garment, except activity and knowledge?
And so Avicebron, in Book i of the Fount of Life,  chapter 2,106 responds to the 
question, “What is it that the human ought to seek in this life?”, and says: “Since 
the part of the human that knows is better than all other parts, then the higher 
activity is to seek knowledge. As for knowledge, however, it is more necessary 
that he know himself, so that through this he might know things that are out-
side him; for his essence comprehends and penetrates all things, and all things 
are subjected to his power. Along with this, he should also seek knowledge 
of the final cause, on account of which he was made, so that he might seek 
it out more zealously, because happiness will follow on account of this.” And 
later, in the character of the Disciple:107 “What, therefore, is the final cause for 
which the human was made? Master: To join himself to the higher world, so 
that each thing might return to what is similar to it.” And later:108 “Knowledge 
 105 Cf. Augustine, De civitate Dei, viii.4- 5, p. 220, l. 33- 38 and p. 220, l. 56 – p. 221, l. 2; cf. 
Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 16 (F f. 20ra).
 106 Avicebron, Fons vitae, lib. i, c. 2, p. 4, l. 1- 9.
 107 Avicebron, Fons vitae, lib. i, c. 2, p. 4, l. 23- 25; cf. Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 1 (F 
f. 1va).
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and activity liberate the soul altogether from the captivity of nature and purge 
it of its darkness and obscurity; in this way, the soul returns to its higher world.” 
And later, in  chapter 4:109 “The knowledge, for which the human being was 
created, is the knowledge of all things insofar as they exist and is, above all, the 
knowledge of the first Essence, which sustains and moves them”, in order that 
the soul may be joined to the higher world.
Boethius sings of this world in Book iii of On the Consolation, metre 9:110
From the supernal exemplar
You lead all things out, you who are most beautiful; the beautiful world
You carry in your mind.
From all the foregoing it is abundantly clear that, not only through activity and 
knowledge, as through the two letters, the practical and theoretical, but even 
more so through the highest philosophy of the Theological Elementation, a per-
son returns by an ascent to his final perfection, for the sake of which he was 
created: namely, happiness or, to speak more plainly, beatitude. “For there is no 
reason for a person to philosophise except that he may be blessed”, according 
to Augustine in Book xix of On the City of God,  chapter 2,111 “but what makes 
him blessed is the End of all good; therefore, there is no reason to philosophise, 
except the End of all good”: “for the End of all good, as soon as anyone arrives 
to it, immediately makes him blessed”.112
Now, what is the end of all good but the highest Good, the Good that is “the 
Good of every good”?113
To the knowledge of this Good this entire book is arranged, since it makes 
us ascend through the good participants in the divine Good, to knowledge of 
the divine goods according to essence. And that we may ascend through this to 
contemplate the highest Good, the primarily Good, may we be carried across 
with his support, who is the mediator of God and humanity, Jesus Christ,114 
who with the Father and the Holy Spirit lives and reigns, one God, unto the 
ages of ages. Amen.
 109 Avicebron, Fons vitae, lib. i, c. 4, p. 6, l. 13- 15.
 110 Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, lib. iii, metrum 9, p. 80, l. 6- 8.
 111 Augustine, De civitate Dei, xix.1, p. 659, l. 121- 123.
 112 Augustine, De civitate Dei, xix.2, p. 660, l. 8- 9.
 113 Augustine, De Trinitate, viii.3.4, p. 272, l. 17.
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Preamble of the Book
Here begins the text, to the exposition whereof I add this clarifi-
cation, showing that this philosophy most truly and properly pos-
sesses the notion of a science that is veridical, most certain, and, 
following from this, that it is the highest science.
Every multitude etc.
∵
The author, who is portrayed most skilfully in the title as a most learned man, 
when setting out his theology in detail, first demonstrates the One as such and 
the Good as such, and then proceeds to treat the properties of this One and 
Good in element 8.1 Now, “one” has the notion of a principle and “good” that 
of a cause. But since a principle is found in more things than a cause, it is prior 
according to definition. Therefore, this philosopher first establishes that the 
One exists and then, in element 7, that the Good exists.2
To establish the One’s thatness or its existence, he uses a certain complex 
principle, namely, “there is multitude”. Similarly, when establishing the that-
ness of the Good, he uses another principle, “there is the productive”. He 
assumes these two principles, upon which the edifice of this entire philosophy 
depends as upon its own foundations, as if they are grasped [nota] through 
the reception of the senses and in no way are intellected, known [scita], or 
apprehended [apprehensa] by any other scientific habit, but only are believed, 
just as the theology that concerns the divine Good according to the order of 
voluntary providence is founded upon principles that are believed, which are 
the articles of the Christian faith.
For this reason, many have tended to doubt whether either theology, the 
sapiential and the divinising, is a science in the true sense of the word.
To address this doubt, I will do three things. First, I present certain prelim-
inaries regarding the principles from which the sciences proceed in general, 
and upon which they are founded in their considerations and in the demon-
strations of their conclusions. Secondly, I discuss the three kinds of principles 
 1 Cf. Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 8, p. 7, l. 1- 2.
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found in the sciences in particular, as well as their properties and notions. 
Thirdly, I demonstrate from the foregoing that in this divinising wisdom or 
sapiential theology there is truly and properly a scientific mode and proce-
dure that begins from its proper principles, as they are enumerated in the sec-
ond part.
[A] As to the first point, one should know that every science uses its rules 
and principles as its own foundations, and from these one acquires the knowl-
edge [scientia] of conclusions. »For every science considers causes and prin-
ciples proportionate to its subject, as we know from Book vi of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics,  chapter 1.3 For all knowledge begins from things that are already 
known [praecognitis], as Aristotle states in Book vi of the Ethics,  chapter 4,4 
and Book i of the Posterior Analytics,  chapter 1,5 saying that “every instruc-
tion and intellective discipline begins from pre- existing cognition”. Now, the 
knowledge of conclusions is had through a demonstrative syllogism. But those 
things, from which syllogisms proceed, are either principles as such or are 
principles relative to the conclusion. Therefore, since all knowledge proceeds 
through syllogisms, every science [scientia] must possess certain things that 
are already understood, and these are the principles. For unless there are some 
propositions that are most certain and received from common teachings, from 
which the syllogisms would proceed, it would be impossible to demonstrate 
anything at all.
Although the name “principle” is common to every proposition that is 
already understood in any science, nevertheless, one assigns different names 
to them in different cases depending on the characteristic of the designa-
tions, as we saw already in the Exposition of the Title from the prologue to 
the treatise On Ecclesiastical Rules.6 Now, by a common name the principles 
are called “terms”, according to what Aristotle says in Book vi of the Ethics, 
 chapter 9:7 “intellect” is “of terms, about which there is no reasoning”. On this 
the Commentator writes:8 “All principles are terms, because we, who seek to 
know more specifically how many principles there are, ascend towards them 
 3 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, vi.1, 1025b3- 10.
 4 Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, vi.3, 1139b26.
 5 Aristotle, Analytica posteriora, eds L. Minio- Paluello, B.G. Dod (Brugge / Paris: Desclée De 
Brouwer, 1968), i.1, 71a1- 2, p. 5, l. 3- 4.
 6 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expos. tit. K, n. 86.
 7 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, ed. R.A. Gauthier (Leiden / Bruxelles: Brill / Desclée De Brouwer, 
1972), vi.9, 1142a25- 26, p. 262, l. 26- 27.
 8 Eustratius, In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius, lib. vi, c. 9 (ms Vaticano [Città del], 
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by analysis and come to rest; about these terms there is no reasoning, … essen-
tial definition, designation of the cause, or syllogism”, as Aristotle says in the 
same place.
Now, there are three kinds of principles, according to the Commentator in 
 chapter 8 of the same text:9 “axioms [dignitates], hypotheses [suppositiones], 
and postulates [petitiones]”. Now, “axioms are whatever things are understood 
by the student that are both believed intrinsically and, perhaps, only need to 
be presented, which happens when they are spoken” – for example, “things 
equal to the same thing are equal to one another”. “However, when the auditor 
does not have an inherently credible understanding of what is said, but still 
posits and concedes it to the one who assumes it, this is a hypothesis; for exam-
ple, we do not presuppose the proposition ‘this figure is a circle’ on the basis 
of a common understanding or concept without instruction, but we listen and 
concede it without a demonstration. When, on the contrary, what is said is not 
understood and is not conceded, but is assumed for the sake of the argument, 
then we call it a postulate.”
In Book i of the Posterior Analytics,10 Aristotle says that the principle of a 
demonstration is the immediate proposition, which is subdivided into axioms 
and theses. Theses are subdivided into hypotheses and definitions. An axiom 
is the greatest proposition, »which anyone accepts as soon as they hear it«.11 
A thesis, as Aristotle says in Book i of the Topics,12 is an unfamiliar opinion 
coming from someone who is renowned for their philosophy. A hypothesis, 
according to Aristotle in Book i of the Posterior Analytics,  chapter 2,13 is what 
can assume either part of a contradiction, by which I say that something is or 
is not. But a definition assumes neither existence nor non- existence, for a defi-
nition as such is neither affirmative nor negative; thus, it does not predicate 
the definition of something else, that is, it does not predicate the notion of the 
definition to the thing defined.
In  chapter 9 of the same text,14 Aristotle states that an axiom is not a 
hypothesis or a postulate, because an axiom is a principle that is intrinsically 
and immediately apparent, and does not stand in need of any reasoning or a 
 9 Cf. Eustratius, In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius, lib. vi, c. 7 (ms Vaticano [Città 
del], Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2171, f. 112va).
 10 Cf. Aristotle, Analytica posteriora, i.2, 72a7 and 72a14- 24.
 11 Cf. Boethius, Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint, ed. C. Moreschini, p. 187, 
l. 17- 18.
 12 Cf. Aristotle, Topica, i.11, 104b19- 20.
 13 Cf. Aristotle, Analytica posteriora, i.2, 72a18- 20.
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syllogism to demonstrate or explain it. It requires only the reason that exists 
in the soul (just as a visible luminous body requires nothing for it to be seen 
except sight falling upon it from without), for it is understood [cognoscitur] 
when it is seen. The truth of an axiomatic proposition is understood in this 
way, when the identity of the predicate and subject in the substance is seen. 
The necessity of a syllogism is understood when the identity of both extremes 
with the middle term is seen. Because an axiom requires no exterior reasoning, 
it does not inherently depend on reasoning, for it is accepted by all. However, 
when something is demonstrable in a higher science, and if it is accepted by 
the student and seems probable to them, then to them it is a hypothesis; I say, 
“to them”, because a hypothesis as such is what is not demonstrable nor is it 
accepted by everyone. Now, if something is demonstrable in a higher subalter-
nating science, and it does not seem probable to the student, then it follows 
that the teacher begs it of the student, and this is a postulate. Nevertheless, one 
commonly calls a “postulate” everything that is accepted without demonstra-
tion when it is in fact demonstrable, whether it seems probable to the student 
or not. Definitions, which are put forward at the beginnings of demonstrations, 
are not hypotheses, because every hypothesis predicates something of some-
thing else or from something else, and is a proposition that brings two notions 
into an ordered relation (the subject and the predicate), either in one subject 
or from one subject. A definition does not do this, but merely exemplifies a 
simple thing; intellect, when it apprehends the definition qua definition, is 
nothing else than a kind of simple understanding [intellectus] falling upon one 
thing that has been unfolded.
Furthermore, one should know that all indemonstrable principles of any 
discipline are comprehended under a general name: “a common concept of 
the mind”. According to Boethius in On the Hebdomads,15 there are two kinds 
of common concepts: those accepted by everyone and those accepted only by 
the learned.«16
So much for the first part.
[B] Now, regarding the properties, proper modes, and notions of the princi-
ples of the sciences, [one should know that] there are three different kinds of 
principles: some are most- common, others are less common, and are intrinsi-
cally proper to particular sciences.
The first are and are called most- common because, by their universal power, 
they descend into all sciences. For example, “it is impossible that the same 
 15 Cf. Boethius, Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint, p. 187, l. 18- 25.
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thing at the same time is and is not”, or “it is impossible that the affirmation 
and the negation of something is true”, or “names have determinate mean-
ings”. Aristotle discusses these Book iv of the Metaphysics,17 stating that they 
are grasped by reason or by the experience gained from the mere judgement 
of things in everyday life, as is clear from that text. The modes or conditions 
of any most- common principle, as we read in the same place,18 are that it is 
“most certain of all”, that “one cannot lie about it”, that it is “best known”, one 
cannot be deceived about it or err, that it is not “conditional” or hypothetical, 
(»such that it would be true only here or now or henceforth, but it is true to 
everyone, always, and everywhere«),19 and, finally, that it necessarily “comes 
to the one who has it” by nature, not by instruction. Now, these principles are 
most- common in this way because they concern being as being, which is the 
most universal of all formal intentions according to Aristotle – but for Plato it 
is otherwise, as will be clear later.20
There are also principles that are less common than these. They are, nev-
ertheless, common by virtue of their power and the extent of their universal-
ity. For even if they do not descend into every science, they still descend into 
some, insofar as their commonality is taken up proportionately by different 
sciences. This is clear in the case of those principles that are called “common 
concepts of the mind” and posited at the beginning of Euclid; for example, “if 
you take equals from equals”, and so on,21 and “every whole is greater than its 
part”.22 These are said to be less common than the principles of the first kind 
insofar as they are found only in discrete or continuous quantities.
There are also principles of a third kind, which are intrinsically proper to 
particular sciences. They are not taken up by different sciences according to 
proportional or analogical commonality; rather, each principle stands accord-
ing to its own notion. If it descends from a higher science into a determinate 
science, or even if it is used in some other science, nevertheless, this kind of 
principle will always stand according to its proper and determinate notion and 
nature, and is not taken from here to another determinate intention by way of 
any analogical commonality. For example, in geometry, there is the definition 
 17 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, iv.3- 4, 1005b19- 1009a5 (esp. c. 3, 1005b19- 20; c. 4, 1007b17- 18 
and 1006b7- 9).
 18 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, iv.3, 1005b11- 17.
 19 Cf. Albert the Great, Metaphysica, lib. iv, tr. 2, c. 2, p. 174, l. 62- 64.
 20 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 1A, p. 71, l. 22 – p. 74, l. 127.
 21 Euclid, Elementa, eds J.L. Heiberg, E.S. Stamatis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1969- 1977), vol. 1, 
lib. i, common concept 2, p. 5, l. 10; id., Opera a Campano interprete fidissimo tralata 
(Venezia: Pacioli, 1509), f. 4v.
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of the circle23 or the principle “all right angles are equal”;24 in optics, the prin-
ciple “colour moves sight”, and so on; in physics, “there is motion in nature”.
Having now outlined the different kinds of scientific principles, let us now 
consider their mode of certitude and the way their truth is apprehended.
»It is evident that, in most- common principles and in those we have called 
“common”, the truth is apprehended from the notion of the terms. Since, as 
Aristotle says in Book vi of the Ethics,  chapter 4,25 the cognitive habits “by 
which the soul says” or apprehends “what is true” are five, namely, art, demon-
strative knowledge [scientia], prudence, wisdom, and intellect – for it belongs 
to suspicion and opinion to say what is false, as he writes there26 – it follows, as 
Aristotle concludes in  chapter 7,27 that there will be no demonstrative knowl-
edge, art, prudence, or wisdom concerning the principle of the knowable 
[scibilis] or of the sciences [scientiarum]. It remains, therefore, that intellect 
relates to the principle or the kind of principles mentioned above. According 
to the Commentator,28 intellect is “that, according to which we take cognition 
of the principles” and through which we come to cognise them. For intellect 
alone has the principles of the sciences as its subject. For this reason, as the 
Commentator says at the beginning of  chapter 8,29 “concerning the common 
conceptions, which we call axioms, our intellect, through its intellectual activ-
ity, shows the simple and actual proximity between the objects of knowledge, 
which is immediate and cannot be reached through a syllogism, in that it does 
not require a mediating definition in order to comprehend the things intel-
lected”. Aristotle says the same in the final chapter of Book i of the Posterior 
Analytics.30«31
From the foregoing it is clear that most- common and common principles are 
apprehended from the notion of the terms or through the habit called “intel-
lect” which, as is said in  chapter 8 of On Fate and Providence,32 is greater than 
all scientific knowledge in us and is that by which we understand the terms 
 23 Cf. Euclid, Elementa, vol. 1, lib. i, definition 15, p. 2, l. 9- 13; id., Opera a Campano, f. 4r.
 24 Euclid, Elementa, vol. 1, lib. i, postulate 4, p. 5, l. 3; id., Opera a Campano, f. 4v.
 25 Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, vi.3, 1139b15- 17, p. 255, l. 13- 15.
 26 Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, vi.3, 1139b17- 18, p. 255, l. 15- 16.
 27 Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, vi.6, 1140b33- 1141a8.
 28 Cf. Eustratius, In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius, lib. vi, c. 6 (ms Vaticano [Città 
del], Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2171, f. 111rb).
 29 Eustratius, In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius, lib. vi, c. 7 (ms Vaticano [Città del], 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2171, f. 111vb).
 30 Cf. Aristotle, Analytica posteriora, i.34, 89b10- 15.
 31 Cf. Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. iii, c. 23 (F f. 167vb).
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or principles. This apprehension does not occur in any way through another 
habit or through the experiential apprehension [experimentalem notitiam] of 
the senses, as becomes obvious if one examines these principles case by case.
However, if we speak about the certitude of apprehended truth with regard 
to proper principles, then a distinction must be made: some proper principles 
belong to purely mathematical sciences, others do not, and if not, they belong 
to physical sciences or those related to the physical sciences.
For purely mathematical sciences, let us take as examples the principles of 
arithmetic and geometry. The principles of these sciences have the same mode 
of certitude as common and most- common principles; that is, such proper 
principles are grasped through the habit of intellect or according to the reason 
of the terms, and not through the experiential apprehension [notitiam] of the 
senses. Admittedly, sometimes we already possess some cognition of the sub-
stance of the things signified by the terms through the apprehension [appre-
hensionem] of the senses (for example, the number four, the number six, the 
circle, the triangle, and so on). In the case of non- mathematical sciences, how-
ever, the principles themselves are received through the senses or the experi-
ential apprehension of the senses, and not through intellect or any cognitive 
habit besides intellect.
The reason for this is as follows. We apprehend the proper principles of the 
mathematical sciences, which concern things abstracted by our consideration 
of them, at the outset of our entry into these sciences, and we apprehend them 
by intellect. For, in such sciences, those things that are prior as such in real-
ity and in nature are also grasped earlier by us. Therefore, at the first stage 
of our approach toward these objects of knowledge, the principles appear to 
our intellect, whether they are definitions (for example, of the circle or the 
triangle, or of the number four or the number six and so on), or whether they 
are the propositions that they call “postulates” (for example, “to extend a line 
indefinitely” or “all right angles are equal” and so on, which are enumerated 
at the beginning of Euclid).33 Therefore, it is the same for common and most- 
common principles as it is for principles that are proper to purely mathemat-
ical sciences: their mode and notion of certitude and apprehended truth is as 
we have just described it.
However, it is otherwise for sciences concerning things joined to mat-
ter, to bodily nature, or to any changeable substance in general, or even to 
unchangeable substance – whether such things are the essences themselves, 
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the substances, the natural attributes, properties, or operations of essences 
or substances, or in general any alteration or change, by which the things are 
affected, either by nature or by the determination of intellect (as happens, for 
example, in ethics). In the sciences concerned with such things, I say that their 
proper principles have another mode of apprehended truth and certitude. For 
in all these sciences that are investigated and comprehended through the scru-
tiny of natural reason – whether they concern things abstracted both accord-
ing to existence and our mode of consideration, or things joined to matter or 
bodily nature, as was said, or things abstracted according to our mode of con-
sideration that are related to the physical world – in all these cases, the things 
that are grasped earlier by us and according to our mode of thinking are later 
in reality (and thus by nature are grasped later, even though they are grasped 
earlier by us). Such things are the objects of the senses. In the pursuit of these 
sciences, these things occur earlier, relative to us, in the inquiry undertaken by 
way of the senses.
Aristotle’s teaching that is transmitted in the prologue of the Metaphysics34 
applies to the pursuit of these sciences: from sense there arises memory, and 
from these two an experience is acquired, and from many experiences comes 
the universal, which is the principle of art and science. He makes the same 
point at the beginning of Book I of the Posterior Analytics:35 “Every art and 
intellectual discipline comes from the pre- existing cognition” of the senses. 
Thus in physics, “there is motion” is received through the cognition of the 
senses; in medicine, “scammony purges the bile”; in music, “the proportion of 
pitches is relative to the size of the hammers being struck”; in optics, “light and 
colour move sight”,36 while the principle “the angles of incidence and reflec-
tion in a mirror are equal” is captured by experience using an instrument called 
a pinhole camera, as is evident in Book iv of Alhazen’s Optics;37 similarly, in 
astronomy, the experiential knowledge of certain things is gained through the 
instrument of the armillary sphere.
Therefore, proceeding along this path of sense and experience in the pur-
suit of these sciences, one universal is taken as their principle, and this prin-
ciple in each science is only believed, and not at all known or intellected. For 
is not grasped from the proper reason of the terms, which would require the 
 34 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, i.1, 980b28- 981a12.
 35 Aristotle, Analytica posteriora, i.1, 71a1- 2, p. 5, l. 3- 4.
 36 Cf. John Peckham, Perspectiva communis, in D. Lindberg (ed.), John Pecham and the 
Science of Optics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), lib. i, prop. 1, p. 62, l. 2- 5.
 37 Cf. Alhazen, Opticae thesaurus, ed. F. Risner (Basel: Episcopius, 1572), lib. iv, c. 7 and 10, 









Preamble of the Book 425
use of intellect, nor is it a conclusion reached from any other principles or 
causes; rather, as was said, the principle is only believed. Accordingly, it is 
apprehended under the certitude of the true, which cannot possibly be other-
wise. Now, I say “it is apprehended”, meaning the principle is that with which 
reason is objectively occupied in cognition, for example, “that, which is moved, 
exists”; I understand “the true” to mean the equality or consonance of the thing 
apprehended and the intellect (this, in its notion and mode, involves a com-
plexion or composition of speech); finally, “certitude” about the truth of the 
apprehended thing itself is the firm and unshakeable assent of reason in the 
apprehended thing.
Now, although the believed [creditum] is apprehended by reason under the 
certitude of the true and, in this respect, agrees under a common notion with 
the known [scito], nevertheless, they differ from one another.
First, they differ in the mode and reason of certitude. For demonstrative 
knowledge [scientia], relative to the known, brings about a kind of certitude 
arising from the evidence of the thing itself. This evidence occurs in the intel-
lect from the intention and the notion of the terms, which form a complex 
with one another; this happens either through the immediate relation of the 
terms with one another, if the proposition is immediate in both cause and sub-
ject (first principles, for example, are like this), or through a mediate relation, 
if the conclusion was deduced from prior principles. But the certitude of faith 
or credulity with respect to the believed does not arise from the evidence of 
the thing, as it does in demonstrative knowledge, but rather has its cause and 
reason from the outside, as it were – that is, from the clear authority of some 
expert, from whose truth the intellect cannot reasonably dissent.
From this distinction in the mode of certitude there arises the second 
difference between the believed and the known. This consists in the order 
of apprehension according to which someone apprehends the thing itself 
(which is in fact the primary object of cognition) as well as the truth about 
that thing. This truth is one mode of the thing apprehended. For, in demon-
strative knowledge, the evidence of the thing comes from the intention and 
notion of the terms, which are, as it were, the intrinsic principle of cognition 
discovered in the thing itself, insofar as it is a being and a thing of first inten-
tion. From this it follows that the thing itself by nature is apprehended first 
under its own real notion, which is the object of cognition, and only then does 
one apprehend truth or falsity about it, since, as Aristotle says, truth and fal-
sity are certain modes of complexion.38 But it is otherwise for faith in relation 
 38 Cf. Aristotle, De interpretatione, 1, 16a12- 13; De anima, iii.6, 430a27- 430b28. 
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to principles that are believed. For it does not have the cause and notion of 
its certitude from the thing itself, but from the authority of some expert, in 
whose truth reason declares our trust must absolutely be placed and to whose 
truth the will inclines. From this it follows that the believed as such is appre-
hended as true primarily and through itself and, as believed, it is known only 
under the notion of the true and not in its own notion, according to which it 
is a natural being. Thus, the believed does not have the same evidence as the 
known, because things known have evidence firstly and through themselves, 
insofar as they are beings of this or that kind according to the proper notion 
of their entity; things believed, however, are apprehended firstly and through 
themselves and have evidence only insofar as they are true, and not insofar 
as they are beings of this or that kind according to the real and proper notion 
of their entity.
From the foregoing, by way of summary, we can gather eight noteworthy 
conclusions about principles.
The first is that the cognition of principles is one thing, and the cognition of 
conclusions is another: for there is no demonstration of principles, but only of 
conclusions, because principles are not understood through anything prior – 
for they are themselves the principles of knowing other things – but conclu-
sions are known from the principles.
The second is that the cognition of most- common principles, common 
principles, and those proper to purely mathematical sciences are one thing, 
because they are intellected, but the principles of metaphysics or things 
divine, of physics, and of things related to physics, are another, because they 
are received through the senses.
The third conclusion is that all principles do not possess the same certitude 
and evidence.
The fourth is that there is neither demonstrative knowledge, nor art, nor 
prudence of the principle of the knowable; there is either the reception of the 
senses (with respect to the believed), or intellect or wisdom (with respect to 
the other principles).
The fifth is that it belongs to wisdom to manifest the principles the sciences, 
not to demonstrate them.
The sixth is that the habits of principles of the first kind of certitude are 
innate in us. Later it will become clear whether they are in us by nature only 
in potency and proceed into act from pre- existing sense- cognition, as Aristotle 
says,39 or, as Plato says, whether they are by nature in us already in act, although 
 39 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Praeamb. B, n. 34- 35. 
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they are aroused by instruction fanning the ember, according to Boethius in 
Book iii of On the Consolation, metre 11:40
Within … there clings the seed of truth,
Which is aroused by instruction fanning the ember:
For why, being asked a question, do you freely and correctly respond,
Unless buried deep in the heart there burned a living coal?
If Plato’s Muse makes the truth resound,
What each forgetful person learns, they recollect.
The seventh conclusion is that nothing is more known than the first principles.
The eight is that it does not belong to any science to demonstrate its princi-
ples, even though they are disclosed by first philosophy or wisdom.
From these eight conclusions the properties of every complex principle, 
insofar as it is a principle, appear in summary form: namely, such a principle is 
conceived by intellect or common reason, or by the reception of the senses; it 
comes last in analysis and thus is terminative; it is more permanent and more 
manifest; it is first apprehended and far removed from deception, and is intel-
lected through itself; it is understood from what comes after it, but in a differ-
ent mode of cognition than that which comes after it; it is understood most of 
all; and it is not considered by any particular science.
So much for the second principal part of the Preamble.
[C] It remains to consider the third and final part, which concerns the 
proper mode of theological consideration.
One should know that this divinising wisdom proceeds in exactly the same 
way, according to the proper mode of a science, proportionately speaking, as 
the sciences mentioned above, apart from the purely mathematical sciences. 
This applies to its apprehension [notitiam] and use of most- common and com-
mon principles, as well as to the way in which its proper principles are received.
Now, this divinising wisdom uses most- common principles, such as “it is 
impossible that the affirmation and the negation of something are true”, or “it 
is impossible that something both is and is not”, and “names have determinate 
meanings”, and any others that there may be.41
This divinising wisdom also presupposes common principles like the other 
sciences, especially the quadrivial sciences, but by an analogy, in accordance 
with the notion of its own matter and subject; examples of these principles 
 40 Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, lib. iii, metrum 11, p. 91, l. 11- 16.
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are “the whole is greater than its part”,42 “whatever things are equal to one and 
the same thing are equal to one another”,43 “if you take equals from equals, the 
remainders will be equal”,44 and so on. The extension of principles is propor-
tionate to the degree of their power.
This sapiential science also has its proper principles, from which it perfectly 
proceeds according to the scientific mode. It follows this procedure in terms of 
the apprehension [notitiam] of its principles, in terms of their source, and in 
terms of the process by which it demonstrates conclusions, either positively or 
by a reductio. Now, the proper principles of this science are “there is multitude” 
and “there is the productive and the produced”.
These principles are grasped in this most divine science in the same way, 
proportionately speaking, as the proper principles are in other sciences that 
concern things joined to motion or change and to matter, and in those sciences 
that are related to the physical world, such as music, optics, so on. For it is 
obvious that in such sciences there is no necessary relation between the appre-
hension [apprehensionem] of the senses and the apprehension of the intellect 
which arises from them. Consequently, there is no necessary relation between 
sensible, experiential apprehension [notitiam] and the universal proposition, 
which the science takes for its principle, as if something could be inferred nec-
essarily from the sensible, as it were, according to the proper notion of the 
terms, or concluded from its per se causes – unless it might seem to someone 
that that weak mode of argumentation, which occurs through induction or by 
example,45 could hold, but even from these nothing is inferred or concluded, 
nor does anything come to be apprehended according to its proper notion 
or cause.
Therefore, in taking this universal principle from sensible experiences there 
is nothing but a certain conjectural inference under the notion of the true and 
not under the notion of determinate being, as has been said. Thus, the univer-
sal principle is only received as believed, not as intellected or known. And, as 
has been said, it is taken according to a certain conjecture, but nevertheless 
with the firm and unshakeable assent of reason. This firmness and unshakea-
ble assent arise from a certain natural instinct founded in the distinctive and 
simultaneously collective and collative power that we call “the cogitative”.46 
 42 Euclid, Elementa, lib. i, common concept 8, p. 6, l. 4; id., Opera a Campano, f. 4v.
 43 Euclid, Elementa, lib. i, common concept 1, p. 5, l. 9; id., Opera a Campano, f. 4v.
 44 Euclid, Elementa, lib. i, common concept 3, p. 5, l. 11- 12; id., Opera a Campano, f. 4v.
 45 Cf. Peter of Spain, Summulae logicales, ed. L.M. De Rijk (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972), tr. 5, 
§3, p. 56, l. 12 and p. 58, l. 4- 5.
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In or through this power the simple and pure intentions of things are appre-
hended, distinguished, collected, and drawn together, once they have been 
separated from their idols, to borrow an expression from Averroes.47 This is the 
doctrine of Aristotle in Book i of the Metaphysics,  chapter 2,48 and in the final 
chapter of Book ii of the Posterior Analytics,49 where he shows how, from many 
sensations, memory arises in rational creatures once reason is stimulated, and 
from many memories there comes experience, and from many experiences the 
universal, which comes after the particulars and is, as it were, not separate 
from them but is nearly identical with them. Such is the principle of art and 
science, as has already been explained.50
»It is similarly the case in this science with regard to the reception of its 
proper principles, namely, “there is multitude” and so on, which the author 
receives and assumes, not by a propter quid demonstration, which is “from 
what is prior or from the causes”, but by a quia demonstration, which is 
“from those things, which seem to the many or to the wise to be the case, or 
which are agreed upon from prior things”, as Aristotle, in Book I of the Ethics, 
 chapter 10,51 and his commentator, Eustratius,52 have it. As if in response to 
the question, “what are the modes by which the principles are cognised?”, 
Aristotle says in that passage that there are three modes:53 “Now, some princi-
ples are viewed by induction, others by sense, and others by habituation, and 
others in other ways.” Now, they are cognised “by induction”, for example, “if 
you take equals from equals, what remains are equal”, and others like this. The 
Commentator explains this as follows:54 if someone doubts these, you assume 
numbers, sizes, and other things that can be measured in the demonstration 
of this principle. But the principles are cognised “by sense” when, for example, 
we know the particular qualities of the elements that are prior to them, such 
as the heat of fire, the humidity of air, and so on. The principles are cognised 
“by habituation” when, for example, we understand that the virtues are good 
and morally upright by performing them and in becoming familiar with their 
acts.«55
 47 Cf. Averroes, De anima, ed. F.S. Crawford (Cambridge, Mass.: Medieval Academy of 
America, 1953), lib. iii, comm. 6, p. 415, l. 62- 64.
 48 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, i.1, 980b28- 981a12.
 49 Cf. Aristotle, Analytica posteriora, ii.19, 100a3- 9.
 50 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Praeamb. B, n. 34.
 51 Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, i.7, 1098a33- b2.
 52 Eustratius, In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius, lib. i, c. 7, p. 124, l. 46- 48.
 53 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, i.7, 1098b3- 4, p. 152, l. 5- 6.
 54 Cf. Eustratius, In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius, lib. i, c. 7, p. 126, l. 98 – p. 127, l. 12.
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The principles of this science, “there is multitude”, and so on, are received in 
exactly the same way. In fact, over and above the mode common to it and the 
other sciences, it has something greater in the notion and cause of its certitude 
and its unshakeable assent in these principles themselves.
This becomes evident first from a consideration of the cognitive principle, 
with which the theologian applies himself to divine objects, and which is more 
eminent and thus more acute than every other cognitive principle that we use 
relative to any knowable objects whatsoever.
For it exceeds the particular reason, which some56 call “the cogitative” and 
which, though it is one in subject, is three in operation. Regarding its lower 
part, where it touches the imagination, the particular reason is opinionative 
and is occupied with the intentions of physical things; regarding its higher 
part, where it is joined to the universal reason, it knows demonstratively [sci-
entifica] and is occupied with purely mathematical things, such as arithmetic 
and geometry (these two kinds of speculation belong to reason, as the author 
explains in  chapter 8 of On Fate and Providence,57 near the beginning); as for its 
middle part, the particular reason is occupied with mathematical things that 
are applied to the physical world, for example, with number related to sound in 
the case of harmonics, the visual and radial line in the case of optics, or moving 
quantity in the case of astronomy. From here the levels in reason can be con-
sidered from the diversity of knowable objects with which reason is occupied.
Now, the cognitive principle of this science also exceeds the universal rea-
son, which we call “the possible intellect”, which apprehends the thing in its 
reason. This universal reason, regarding its lower part, is occupied with logi-
cal intentions; regarding its middle part, with metaphysical intentions, as can 
be gathered from the book and chapter mentioned above;58 but regarding its 
higher part, it reflects beings as such and is intellect, as is written in the same 
passage.59
Indeed, these cognitive principles relate only to beings, though according to 
different notions. However, there are many divine things above being, as is clear 
 56 Cf. Averroes, De anima, lib. iii, comm. 6, p. 415, l. 59 – p. 416, l. 91; Albert the Great, De 
anima, ed. C. Stroick (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1968), lib. iii, tr. 2, c. 19, p. 206, l. 27- 28; 
Thomas Aquinas, De anima, ed. A.M. Pirotta (Torino: Marietti, 19594), lib. ii, lect. 13, §396- 
398, p. 101; Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, ed. B. Mojsisch, Opera omnia, 
vol. 1, iii.27.2, p. 200, l. 26.
 57 Cf. Proclus, De providentia et fato, c. 8, §28, p. 136, l. 1 – p. 138, l. 5. Reading metaphysicas 
with ms Oxford, Balliol College Library, Cod. 224B, where the critical edition follows ms 
Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2192 (mathematicas).
 58 Cf. Proclus, De providentia et fato, c. 8, §29, p. 138, l. 1- 15.
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in the case of things divine according to essence and what is divine according 
to cause, which is “above all beings”, as Dionysius attests in  chapter 4 of On 
the Divine Names B.60 For this reason, in  chapter 1 of the Mystical Theology,61 
he calls “unlearned” those “who are sealed off in beings and believe that there 
is nothing supersubstantially beyond beings, but they presume to know, with 
that cognition that is according to themselves, him, who makes the shadows 
his hiding place”. Consequently, it is impossible that we should receive those 
things that are above us according to our ownness and thus compare things 
divine with a reason that has been reared on the senses, through which we 
are deceived by appearances, as he says there in  chapter 7 of On the Divine 
Names.62 Dionysius adds an explanation for this,63 when he describes the cog-
nitive principle in us of things divine, which we are seeking here: “one must 
see that our mind has a certain power for knowing, through which it examines 
things intelligible, but a union exceeding the nature of the mind (the other 
translation says: ‘a unity superexalted beyond the nature of the mind’), through 
which the mind is conjoined to those things that are above it. Therefore, it is 
necessary to think divine things according to this, not according to ourselves, 
but our whole selves placed outside our whole selves and deified wholly. For it 
is better to be God’s and not our own; thus, divine things will be given to those 
made to be with God”. Thus Dionysius.
Behold, how beautifully he describes this cognitive principle, this union or 
unity, with which »one must apply oneself to divine things«,64 and its super-
eminence relative to every other principle in us! Proclus speaks of this princi-
ple, which he also calls “the one of the soul”, and about its eminence relative 
to every other cognitive power in us, in the text discussed above,65 and about 
how those treating divine things are made gods and knowers of things divine. 
For this reason, in question 10 of On Providence,66 he says that this one itself is 
more divine than the intellect.
Thus, it is evident that this science, because of its cognitive principle 
through which it considers divine things, not only incomparably exceeds all 
particular sciences in the certitude of its principles, but even the metaphysics 
of the Peripatetics that is occupied with being as being.
 60 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 4.3 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 175; pg 3, 697A).
 61 Dionysius, De mystica theologia, 1.2 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 569– 570; pg 3, 1000A).
 62 Cf. Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 7.1 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 384– 385; pg 3, 865C).
 63 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 7.1 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 385– 386; pg 3, 865C- 868A).
 64 Cf. Boethius, De Trinitate, c. 2, p. 169, l. 79- 80.
 65 Cf. Proclus, De providentia et fato, c. 8, §31- 32, p. 139, l. 1 – p. 140, l. 5.
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This is evident in a second way from a consideration of the divinising or 
supersapiential habit through which this theology receives its principles, and 
from a reflection on the eminence of this habit itself relative to all other habits, 
whether these be scientific or even sapiential.
To make this point clearer, one should know that, just as Plato and Aristotle 
diverge on the question of the cognitive powers and modes of cognition in the 
human soul, so likewise they do not agree on the question of scientific and 
sapiential habits.
Aristotle, as the author attests in his book On Fate and Providence,  chapter 8,67 
leads us through the cognitive powers and modes of cognition in our soul as 
far as intellect and intellectual activity, and insinuates nothing beyond this. 
But Plato and the theologians before Plato praised a cognition beyond intel-
lect, which they divulge as a divine frenzy, and they say that this cognition is 
the one of the soul. For in this one – which Dionysius, as we saw,68 calls “the 
union (or, according to the other translation, ‘the unity’) superexalted above 
the nature of the mind (or intellect)” – the cognitive power and the cognition 
are the same. Therefore, it necessarily follows that, just as the cognitive pow-
ers and modes of cognition are ranked in terms of nobility and eminence, so 
too must the sapiential habits of these cognitive powers be ranked in terms of 
nobility and excellence. For one cognitive power relates to another just as one 
habit relates to another. Now, the cognitive power of this, our divinising the-
ology, exceeds not only the cognitive powers of all sciences but even the intel-
lect itself, as was said – and the intellect, according to the author in the text 
mentioned above,69 is greater than every science and belongs to the soul itself 
“insofar as it is an image of what is truly intellect”. For “imitating this as much 
as it can, the soul itself becomes intellect, running beyond science, abandon-
ing the manifold methods with which was formerly adorned, and raises its eyes 
to beings alone”. Thus Proclus.
The eminence of this cognitive power, the one or unity of the soul, is so 
great that the soul – once it is completely stationed within it – is almost made 
into God, according to Dionysius and the author in the passage mentioned 
above.70 Therefore, the habit of this, our divinising beyond- wisdom, exceeds 
every other habit – not only of the sciences, but even the habit of intellect that 
is wisdom, through which Aristotle received his first principles in his first phi-
losophy which, because it concerns being as being, is merely of beings.
 67 Cf. Proclus, De providentia et fato, c. 8, §31, p. 139, l. 2 – p. 140, l. 6.
 68 Berthold of Moosburg, Prol. 15, n. 160; 16, n. 174; 17, n. 185.
 69 Cf. Proclus, De providentia et fato, c. 8, §30, p. 139, l. 8- 21.
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Now, according to Aristotle himself, this habit of wisdom, although it seems 
to differ in general from intellect, nevertheless is said by him to consist in sci-
ence and intellect.
»This can be shown more clearly by the three propositions that Aristotle 
himself gives in Book vi of the Ethics,  chapter 8.71 The first is that wisdom is 
the most certain kind of knowledge; the second, that wisdom is “intellect and 
demonstrative knowledge [scientia]”; the third, that wisdom “is the most hon-
ourable knowledge because it holds the highest rank”. He proves the first prop-
osition when he says72 that “wisdom must not only know what follows from 
the principles but also must be able to say what is true about the principles”. 
The second part of this quotation shows the difference between wisdom and 
intellect; for, according to what Eustratius the commentator says there,73 wis-
dom “is not only the cognition of things demonstrated from the principles but 
is the veridical science of the principles themselves and those things relating 
to them”. For wisdom is able to think these things, not only by a primary recep-
tion, but, if needed, it can use arguments to persuade someone who requires 
them. For this reason, first philosophy is entirely wisdom and the first philoso-
pher is entirely wise, “because it crafts the crafts, knows the sciences scientifi-
cally, demonstrates the principles, and, where it is fitting, manifests them”, and 
conveys them to the other sciences. The Commentator gives the fine example 
of geometry:74 geometry assumes extensions, height, width, and depth, but the 
philosopher himself demonstrates these, and likewise for the other sciences.
And so from the foregoing it is clear that intellect is the simple reception of 
principles, but wisdom is the reception of the principles with certainty about 
them.«75
If, therefore, wisdom is the most certain knowledge, as the first proposition 
states, because it receives the principles of the sciences with certainty about 
them, what shall we say about our beyond- wisdom? It receives, with certainty, 
not only the principles of beings (which according to Aristotle are themselves 
beings),76 but even the principles that are beyond beings, and especially the 
primarily Good, which is the principle and cause, not only of all beings, but 
 71 Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, vi.7, 1141a16- 20, p. 259, l. 17- 22.
 72 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, vi.7, 1141a17- 18, p. 259, l. 19- 20.
 73 Eustratius, In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius, lib. vi, c. 7 (ms Vaticano [Città del], 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 2171, f. 112rb and 112va).
 74 Cf. Eustratius, In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius, lib. vi, c. 7 (ms Vaticano [Città 
del], Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2171, f. 112vb- 113ra).
 75 Cf. Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. iii, c. 23 (F f. 168ra- b).
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even of the divinising principles that are the primordial principles of all beings, 
which are beneath the first Principle as such. What shall we say, except that 
this is the most certain and highest cognition of the deified human?
For this reason, the author, speaking about that cognition of the soul, 
by which it ascends to the One and hypothetical, says this in On Fate and 
Providence,  chapter 8:77 “From this, the geometer and each of the other scien-
tists will derive knowledge of their principles, because it reconnects the many 
and divided principles with the one principle of all. For what it (meaning: the 
Principle) is in all things, in geometry is the point, in arithmetic the monad, 
and in each science that which is most simple, from which the sciences bring 
forth and demonstrate what belongs to them. But, to be sure, each of these is 
called a particular principle, but the Principle of all beings is the principle as 
such, and it is this that the ascent of the teaching of the sciences reaches”. Thus 
Proclus.
From what has been said it is abundantly clear that, if wisdom is said to 
have such certainty while it only concerns beings, how great will the certitude 
of that wisdom be, which treats not only beings, but beyond- beings, which, as 
it were, infinitely surpass beings themselves? For among these are things that 
are divine according to essence and indeed God himself, who is glorious unto 
the ages.
»Similarly, from the second proposition we have the other difference 
between wisdom and intellect, namely, that wisdom consists of intellect and 
demonstrative knowledge. For, as the Commentator states,78 wisdom is the 
habit composed of intellect and knowledge. For intellect has cognition of the 
principles and demonstrative knowledge concerns conclusions derived from 
the principles, but wisdom has the necessary knowledge of both. Accordingly, 
Aristotle says79 that “the wise must not only know what follows from the prin-
ciples (that is, the conclusions), but must be able to say what is true about the 
principles”. “Therefore, when the soul conceives both kinds of truth – both the 
truth about the principles and the truth about what follows from the princi-
ples – then it becomes intellectual, and a theologian (that is, a wise soul).”«80 
Thus the Commentator.81
 77 Proclus, De providentia et fato, c. 8, §29, p. 138, l. 7- 15.
 78 Cf. Eustratius, In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius, lib. vi, c. 7 (ms Vaticano [Città 
del], Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2171, f. 113ra).
 79 Berthold of Moosburg, Praeamb. C, n. 72.
 80 Cf. Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. iii, c. 23 (F f. 168rb).
 81 Eustratius, In Ethicam Nicomacheam commentarius, lib. vi, c. 7 (ms Vaticano [Città del], 
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Indeed, since the cognitive power of our supersapiential and divinising wis-
dom not only runs beyond every kind of knowledge that concerns beings, but 
even ascends beyond intellect itself, as was shown above,82 the habit of this 
wisdom will not strictly speaking be composed of intellect and knowledge, but 
will be the simple inspection of the Form forming all things as such, according 
to what is said by Boethius in On the Trinity:83 “in theology one must apply 
oneself intellectually, not being led astray by imaginings, but rather by looking 
into the Form itself”.
And since, as he says in Book v of On the Consolation, prose 5,84 “there exists 
the higher eye of the intelligence, for, surpassing the boundary of the universe, 
it views that simple Form by the pure apex of the mind”, so therefore, accord-
ing to Dionysius in  chapter 7 of On the Divine Names,85 “because of the divine 
wisdom, souls have the rational power, indeed, to go about in a circle around 
the truth of beings, and because of their abundant variety they fall short of the 
unitive minds, but also, by virtue of enfolding the many into the one, they are 
held worthy of intellections equal to the angels, insofar as this is fitting and 
possible for souls”.
Now, Dionysius had said already86 that in these angels “intellectual power 
and activity shines forth pure and immaculate and is able to behold the divine 
intellects. And by virtue of its simplicity and immateriality, the intellectual 
power is shaped, as much as possible, by its simplicity, immateriality, and by 
its divinely, conformly, and uniformly unitive character, after the divine and 
beyond- wise mind and reason”. And below, in the same chapter, section i,87 
after he spoke about the cognition of God in a general way, he adds: “And there 
is, furthermore, the most divine cognition of God, which is known through 
ignorance according to the union above mind, when the mind, having departed 
from everything else, and then also sending itself away, is united with the 
super- resplendent rays, and is illuminated hither and yon by the inscrutable 
depth of wisdom.” Dionysius makes the same point in  chapter 1, section A.88
From these passages, we clearly see the eminence of the habit of the super-
sapiential science of the Platonists in comparison to the habit of sapiential 
metaphysics.
 82 Berthold of Moosburg, Praeamb. C, n. 69.
 83 Boethius, De Trinitate, c. 2, p. 169, l. 79- 81.
 84 Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, lib. v, prosa 4, p. 149, l. 86- 88.
 85 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 7.2 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 390– 391; pg 3, 868B- C).
 86 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 7.2 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 389– 390; pg 3, 868B).
 87 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 7.3 (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 406; pg 3, 872A- B).















436 Preamble of the Book
»The third proposition, from which the third difference comes, is that wis-
dom is the most honourable knowledge.89 This is explained in two ways. The 
first is relative to its matter and subject, since we say that things divine are 
most honourable.«90 According to Aristotle,91 these things are being as such 
and its parts, modes, and properties. »The second is relative to its form, since 
we think using the most honourable principles, and wisdom is a veridical and 
most certain knowledge about these principles. Therefore, Aristotle says in the 
same place92 that “wisdom is the demonstrative knowledge and intellect of 
things that are most honourable by nature”.«93
From this third proposition, once again, we clearly see the eminence of the 
habit of this divinising science above the habit of metaphysics. In terms of 
matter and subject, this wisdom concerns the most honourable things, namely, 
the divine good according to cause primarily and according to essence or exist-
ence – that is, the first Good and One and the goodnesses and unities – and 
also what participates goodness after the manner of an exemplar.
Similarly, in terms of its form, these are the most honourable principles, 
through which this divinising science ascends to the thatness of the primarily 
One and primarily Good (I do not say “the whatness”), in accordance with what 
Dionysius writes in  chapter 7 of On the Divine Names, section H:94 “Moreover, 
one must ask how we are to know God, who is neither intelligible, nor sensible, 
nor is absolutely any of those things that exist. So is it never true to say that we 
know God? Not from his nature, for this is unknown and exceeds all reason 
and mind; but from the ordering of all things, just as it has been projected from 
him”, and so on. Thus Dionysius.
For this reason, the author ascends methodically and gradually, according to 
his capacity, to what is beyond all things, through the principles proper to the 
science, as will be clear immediately in what follows.
From all the foregoing it is abundantly clear that this, our divinising philoso-
phy, is most truly and properly a science – a science, moreover, that is veridical, 
most certain, and thus the highest of all, both by virtue of its mode of pro-
ceeding from principles that are most- common, common, and proper, which 
is truly scientific, and by virtue of the habit, by which it receives its principles, 
as has been shown here extensively.
 89 Berthold of Moosburg, Praeamb. C, n. 71.
 90 Cf. Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. iii, c. 23 (F f. 168rb).
 91 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, vi.1, 1026a19- 32.
 92 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, vi.7, 1141b2- 3, p. 260, l. 14- 15.
 93 Cf. Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. iii, c. 23 (F f. 168rb).
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